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ASEAN-China economic relations is an area of considerable significance. Indeed! 
. if anything, this significance has been increasing in recent years. Yet this 
relationship remains poorly understood, particularly in terms of the overall issues 
involved and their implications for individual countries and the region as a whole. 
h was partly to correct this state of affairs and to put ASEAN-China economic 
relations in their proper perspective that a group of ASEAN and Chinese scholars 
came together in· April 1985 to plan a three-year research project on ''.ASEAN-
Chiha Economic Relations". Three themes were identified: Phase I _:_ ASEAN-
China Economic Relations: Trends and Patterns; Phase II - Developments in 
China and ASEAN and Their Implications for ASEAN-China. Economic 
Relations; and Phase III - ASEAN-China Economic Reiations in the Context of 
'Pacific Economic Development and Co-operation. The Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Singapore, and the Institute ofWorld Economics and Politics, 
Beijing, are the co-ordinating institutions for ASEAN and China, respectively. 
Dr Chia Siow Yue is the Co-ordinator of the ASEAN aspects of the project and 
Mr Cheng Bifan, the Chinese aspects. Both Dr Chia Siow Yue and Mr Cheng 
·Bifan are also. the joint editors of the publications emanating from the project, 
with Dr Chia being responsible for the English edition and Mr Cheng Bifan, the 
Chinese edition. . 
The papers of the first phase of the project were presented at a workshop in 
Singapore in J u_ne 1986, and published under the title ASEAN-Chiria Economic 
Relations: Trends and Patterns in October 1987. The research findings of the second 
phase were presented at a workshop in Beijing in October 1987. It is hoped that 
this second "volume, ASEAN-China Economic Relations: Developments in ASEAN 
and ·China will also be usefui to scholars and policy-makers · concer~ed with 
ASEAN-China economic relations. The project on "ASEAN-China Economic 
Relations" has benefited immensely from the contributions of all participants, 
and from. the financial ·support provided by the Ford Foundation ~nd the 
International Development Research Centre, Canada. The Institutes would like 
to record their appreciation of all this assistance and support. Responsibility for 
· facts and opinions expressed in these volumes rests exclusively with the individual 
cm_itributors, and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policy 
of the Institutes or their supporters, or the editors. 
\ 
\ 
Pu Shan·-. . \ 
Institute of World Economics 
Kernial S. Sandhu 
· Instittite of Southeast Asian Studies 
and Politics, Beijing · Singapore 
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Economic Reforms in China and 
Their Impact on China-ASEAN 
Economic-Relations· 
Yang Deming, Yu Yunding, 
and Shen Huasong 
I. Introduction 
Since its inception in 1978, China's economic reforms have attracted world-wide 
attention. Their successful implementation is not only crucial to the development 
of China's domestic economy, but also highly significant in promoting China's 
economic ties with foreign countries. The ASEAN countries are China's dose 
neighbours, with whom China sincerely aspires to promote vigorous economi~ 
relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. This relationship hinges 
upon numerous factors, the most important of which are: firstly, the eco~omic 
policies, structures, and development of China and the ASEAN states; and 
secondly, the patter.n and development trends in the world economy. China's 
economic reform, .a most assiduous, complex, and time-consuming undertaking, 
constitutes a long-term factor that wiII affect the economic\ relations between 
China and the ASEAN nations. What is the nature and trend of China's economic 
reform? And what impact will it have on prospects for China-ASEAN economic 
relations? These are matters of general concern to the ASEAN countries. 
This paper is divided into three parts: first, an overview of China's economic 
reforms; second, China's economic structure and related policy reforms; and third, 
an analysis of the impact of China's economic reforms on China-ASEAN 
economic relations. 
II. An Overview of Chinas Economic Reform 
The economic reforms in China involve two interrelated aspects of structural and 
policy reforms, with focus on the former. The original economic structure 
characterized by centralized economic planning took shape in the late 1950s. The 
merit of such a structure lies in its centralized and unified planning which 
facilitates the mobilization of vast human, material, and financial resources for 
major projects vital to the national economy and the people's livelihood. It played 
a significant role in laying the foundation for China's socialist industrialization 
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and in setting up an independent and comprehensive system for the national 
economy. Yet it a)so had serious flaws, manifested mainly in: excessive concentra· 
tion of economic decision-making power; over-emphasis on mandatory planning; 
neglect of the development of the commodity economy and the regulatory role 
of the market; and lack of enterprise vitality and low economic returns. The basic 
goal of the economic reforms since 1978 has been to create a new economic 
structure that is a planned socialist commodity economy based on public 
ownership suited to actual conditions in China through the elimination of the 
above-mentioned defects. 
The economic reforms first began in the rural areas in 1978 and centred on 
a household contracted responsibility system linking remuneration to output, 
putting an end to the prolonged stagnation of the rural economy in a short span 
of time. Their success laid a solid foundation for a comprehensive reform of the 
nation's economic structure, with focus shifting to the cities. The major elements 
of these reforms are: (1) invigorating enterprises into efficient economic entities 
enjoying relative managerial indepen!'.fence; (2) further expanding the socialist 
commodity markets along with a gradually improved marketing network; and 
(3) establishing a new socialist management system with gradual shift away from 
direct towards ~ndirect state macro-control. Around these three core areas are 
supporting reforms in planning, pricing, finance, the fiscal system, labour, and 
the wage system. Together, these function as a complete set of macro-economic 
control mechanisms capable of combining planning with market regulation, and 
micro-flexibility with macro-control. This will, in turn, make it possible to 
harmonize the interests of the state, the collective, and the individual and thus 
bring about the virtuous circulation of the entire national economy. 
1. Invigorating the Enterprises 
Under the old economic structure, enterprises were no more than "appendages 
to state administrative organs", bereft of decision-making power and managerial 
vitality, resulting in micro-structural rigidity and low economic efficiency. 
Invigoration aimed at turning enterprises from administrative ''appendages" into 
socialist producers and distributors of commodities enjoying relative autonomy 
in management and bearing full responsibility for their profits and losses. 
Therefore, enterprise stimulation constitutes an essential part of the nation's 
economic restructuring. For this, the Chinese Government has, in recent years, 
adopted a variety of policies.and measures and carried out many experiments. 
These include, among other things, the following: 
(1) Delegating more decision-making power to state-owned enterprises. The principal 
measures are: (a) to stipulate that enterprises be entitled to sell their excess 
state-quota products to meet market demands; (b) to retain a portion of their 
profits instead of transmitting them all to the state which took care of their wages, 
income and expenditure, and profits and losses; and finally, (c) to use their funds, 
appoint and remove middle-level cadres, and recruit workers and staff personnel. 
·-··-· 
Economic Reforms in China 3 
(2) Introducing an economic responsibility system. This refers to a management system 
that will enhanc~. enterprises' socio-economic results under the guidance of state 
plans and integrate authority responsibility and benefits into an organic whole. 
Such a system may help eliminate the egalitarian defect of "everybody eating 
from the same big pot" among enterprises and among workers .and staff, in 
disregard of their performance. Responsibility here has a dual implication . 
responsibility in ter~s of the state-enterprise relationship in the form of profit 
retainment, contracted profits, and losses;. and responsibility in terms of intra-
enterprise relationship, with rewards based on performance, piece-rate, and 
floating wages and for 6verfulfilment of production quotas, and so on. 
'· 
(3) Tax1or-profit schemes. Under this scheme, enterprises pay taxes, rather than 
transferring all profits to the state, according to related taxation regulations. 
· State-owned enterprises are now required to pay three types of taxes: product 
taxes or income taxes on net profits, resource taxes, and adjustment taxes meant 
for rationalizing after-tax net income across similar enterprises. The problem 
wii:h adjustment taxes is that there is as yet no uniform tax rate. The amount of 
profits the enterprise delivered to the state in 1983 is taken as the base figure. 
(4) Expanding lateral economic ties between enterprises. This refers to the removal of 
existing barriers between the different types of ownership, regions, departments, 
urban and rural areas, and military and civilian sectors, and fostering co-
ordi11ation among specialized departments in production, marketing, use of funds, 
technological development, and labour administration so as to gradually form 
various enterprise groupings and cartels .. 
In accordance with the principle of separation of ownership and. managerial 
authority, various types of contract responsibility systems, such as leasing and 
the managerial contract responsibility system, are being implemented on a trial 
basis, depending on the nature, size, and technical features of the enterprise 
concerned. However, whatever the type adopted, the relationship of authority, 
responsibility, and benefit (between state and enterprise, and between owner and 
manager of the enterprise) should be formally defined in a contractual form, and 
management performance taken as the basis for rewards and penalties. 
Meanwhile, reforms related to the ownership of the enterprise through sharehold-
ing are also implemented on a trial basis. 
During the Seventh Five-Year-Plan period (1986-90), the government will 
continue to adopt vigorous measures to f\lrther enhance the vitality of enterprises. 
These measures include: · 
1. Further streamlining of administration and delegating more power to lower 
levels. In principle, ministries and commissions under the State Council, 
provincial governments, and governments in the autonomous regions 
should no longer directly control enterprises. In cities, a clear distinction 
must also be drawn between the responsibilities and functions of the 
government and those of the enterprises. 
2. Appropriately reducing the size of accounting units in large and medium-
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sized state enterprises and ·introducing a layered management system with 
division of decision-making power and turning over some small state-owned 
enterprises to collective or individual management through a multiformed 
property-related managerial responsibility system such as contracting or 
leasing; 
3. Adjusting the policies toward large and medium-sized enterprises and 
collective and individual enterprises in urban and rural areas concerning 
planning, tax, credit, and management to allow all enterprises to compete 
with one another on an equal footing; 
4. Gradually implementing the system where the factory director (manager) 
assumes overall responsibility and transforming the enterprise leadership 
set-up by introducing, on a trial basis, the system of board of directors or 
management council; and 
5. Having the overwhelming majority of enterprises bear full responsibility 
for their own profits or losses by the end of the Plan period. Enterprises 
· that have been badly managed should be shut down or production 
suspended, merged, or shifted to other lines of production. 
2. Establishing and Improving a Socialist Market System 
To establish such a network means that it· is necessary to set up and open up 
markets of all kinds, such as consumer goods markets and markets for means of 
production, for funds, and for labour, etc. It also means that China should 
undertake reforms on pricing and price control systems. In doing so, the principal 
goal is to break down the barrier~ between departments and between regions, 
and open up markets in provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, townships 
and villages, with a view to forming an integrated socialist market, and improving 
it over time. 
Establishing an Integrated Network of Socialist Markets 
The first major step in setting up such a network has been the transformation 
since 1978 of the system of commerce and the institution of a new system under 
which the state, collective, and individual businesses coexist. State commerce, 
which used to be under the system of unified purchase and supply of goods by 
the state, is now run on a flexible multi-formed management, encompassing state 
monopoly of purchase, planned purchase, ordering, selective purchase, commis-
sioned selling, acting as a dealer, etc. Supply and marketing co-operatives in rural 
areas have restored their co-operative character and are evolving into all-trade 
shopping and service centres. Trade centres that have broken down the confines 
of administrative subordinatioI;J. are on a trial run to transform the wholesale 
set-up. State commercial enterprises have begun to implement the economic 
responsibility system that combines authority, responsibility, and benefit in place 
of the old management system that was based on unified state planning for 
revenue and expenditure. A series of measures have been taken in the past few 
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years to establish and expand markets for consumer goods, means of production, 
funds, technology, and labour. 
Consumer Goods Market. The old practices of planned purchase, assigned purchase, 
and planned purchase combined with exclusive marketing of consumer goods 
were abolished, and markets of various kinds were set up. These drastically 
reduced the items of consumer goods under planned distribution thereby 
enlarging the scope of ·market regulation. Meanwhile; various kinds of trade 
centres, wholesale markets, markets for small articles of daily use, and agricultural 
produce markets have also been set up. It is necessary to perfect the contract 
system for purchase with regard to a small number of agricultural and sideline 
products, while setting up all kinds of wholesale markets to facilitate access to 
large quantities of farm and sideline products to urban markets. Efforts are made 
to enlarge the markets for industrial consumer goods through varying forms of 
purchase and marketing such as planned purchase, ordering, selective purchase, 
commissioned wholesale and marketing, and joint industrial-commercial manage-
ment and marketing. To increase commerce channels, introduced on a trial b~sis 
are new-type commercial enterprises that are inter-regional, inter-town and 
country, and inter-municipality and that combine agriculture, indu.stry, and 
commerce, agriculture and commerce, industry and commerce, or commerce in 
different areas and trades, 
Market for Means ef Production. It is imperative to grad.ually reduce, depending on 
the merits of each case, the number of items and the proportion of the materials 
allocated under the state plan and to transform the old system by which the major 
means of production were allocated by the state according to plans. The means 
of production will be distributed in three ways in the light of their importance 
to the national economy and of supply and demand: pla11ned state allocation, 
preferential ordering, and free purchase and sale. Matetials that are in short 
supply but are essential to the national economy and th~ people's daily needs will 
continue to be allocated under state mandatory planning at unified prices set by 
the state or at prices floating within a specified margin. For materials that are in 
short supply but are expected to be in better supply, the portions available for 
free purchase and sale should be properly increased. The state must gradually 
eliminate the practice of unified ailocation for those materials whose supply and 
demand are basically balanced. With regard to ordinary means of production for 
free purchase and sale, the state only sets quotas under guidance planning. 
Another important measure taken for market improvement is the formation 
of a nation-wide network of material distribution with supply and marketing· 
set-ups (material exchange centres or material markets) managed by economic 
regions and mainly based in cities, and the gradual reformation of the old closed 
system of material distribution which was characterized by vertical and horizontal 
barriers between departments and institutions and managed by administrative 
departments and regions. At present, the market for machinery and electrical 
equipment has been completely decontrolled. Cement and timber markets have 
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taken shape; coal and steels markets have also expanded. A pressing problem 
regarding the setting up of markets for the means of production is the so-called 
"dual-track" system, that is dual prices for means of production. Most means of 
production have two prices - market price and planned price - the former 
usually being much higher than the latter. This paves the way for profiteering 
and results in irrational allocation of means of production. 
Market for Funds. Reform in the monetary system is a prerequisite for the 
establishment of a market for funds. China has already set up a banking system 
with separation of the administrative function and business management. In 
addition to the People's Bank of China which functions as the country's central 
bank, there are such specialized bar.ks as the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the People's 
Construction Bank of China. Preparations for setting up other monetary 
institutions, comprising mainly collectively-owned financial institutions, are 
under way. This is aimed at establishing, step by step, a new socialist banking 
system having multi-formed monetary institutions with the People's Bank of 
China playing the leading role and all specialized banks forming the backbone. 
Through the reform, the banks have expanded the scope of their business, 
including issuing loans for circulation and fixed funds, initiating commercial and 
consumer credits on a trial basis, resuming the insurance business, and engaging 
in inter-bank borrowing and lending. Reforming the system of interest rates will 
enable the interest rates and other monetary mechanisms to play a more effective 
role in macro-economic regulation. At the same time, financial institutions will 
try out, as in enterprise management, independent business accounting and 
self-responsibility for profits or losses. 
Building on the reform in the banking system, China is making intensive 
efforts to establish a market for funds to change the traditional practice of 
distributing funds in a planned way. This involves two courses of action. The 
first requires setting up a market for f hart-term funds. Banks are engaged in 
short-term financing to fund enterprise reform through inter-bank borrowing and 
lending, commercial papers, bill acceptance and discount, supplier's credit, 
financial leasing, commissioned advances, commissioned receipts and payments, 
among others. The second necessitates starting a market for long-term funds, 
including shares and bonds, and at the same time opening up a market for foreign 
exchange adjustment. 
Market for Technology. Business act1vltles in the technology niarket include 
compensatory transfers, technology contracts, technological consultancies, tech-
nical services, etc. China has been engaged in these activities in recent years and 
will do better during the Seventh Five-Year-Plan period. Moreover, it is prepared 
to gradually set up both nation-wide and regional fixed markets for technology. 
It will also gradually ensure that research findings in applie<;I science be used in 
commodity production and enterprise management be adopted by research 
institutions of applied sciences. 
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Reform in the Labour System and Gradual Establishment of a Socialist Market for Labour. 
The primary objective of this reform is to abolish the old system of labour 
administration under a unified arrangement. Major policies and measures are as 
follows: 
1. Transform the recruitment system by introducing a contract system for 
newly recruited workers and sta.ff and reorganizing the other workers and 
staff into new work teams under the economic responsibility system; 
2. Institute a recruitment system in public organizations; 
3. Open up an experimental job market in which labour force suppliers and 
demanders come into direct contact, removing the barriers between town 
and country, between different means of ownership, and between different 
trades and industries; 
4. Delegate more decision-making power to localities and enterprises in labour 
and personnel matters and introduce a flexible recruitment system linking 
the total number of workers and staff in a given enterprise to the growth 
of its production output. 
Price Reform . 
This refers to the reform of the price and the price control systems. Prior to. 1978, 
China's price control was based on a unified system of state planned prices. Such 
a system had serious structural defects. The main problem was the price parities 
of commodities: prices of industrial products were too high relative to agricultura1 
produce, finished products too high relative to primary products, and cash crops 
too high relative to cereals; for major farm products,. marketing prices were lower 
than purchasing prices; finally, the price variation was much too small and did 
not reflect the quality gap for the same products. Owing to the irrational price 
structure, the -prices of many commodities did not reflect their production costs, 
no.r were they indicative of supply and demand in the market. Profits of 
commodity producers depended, to a large extent, ~n the discrepancy in external 
conditions and· hardly reflected management performance. This led to an 
irrational allocation of resources, low macro-economic efficiency, and ineffective 
state regulation of t):ie economy. 
Therefore, the key to the establishment and perfection of the market network 
lies in a reform of the price and price control systems to ensure gradual 
introduction of a new price system in which price is generally in accord with 
value and reflects supply and demand, and under which there exist prices directly 
set by the state, prices determined under state guidance, and prices regulated by 
the market. Since 1978, efforts have·been devoted to readjusting prices for farm 
and sideline products, manufactured goods, raw and semi-finished materials, and 
fuels. Yet, the problems have not been fundamentally solved. 
The main.ideas on China's price reform during the Seventh Five-Year-Plan 
period can ~e outlined as follows: 
1. Except, for a few major commodities whose prices should continue to be 
determined by the state, price control over ordinary commodities should 
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be systematically relaxed. The prices for farm and sideline products set by 
the state should be kept basically stable in every possible way. 
2. Prices for some means of production will continue to be determined by the 
state while state control over the prices for others will be relaxed, with 
efforts being focused on removing the irrational price disparity between 
primary products and finished or semi-finished goods and the gap-between 
planned and market prices for major means of production. 
3. The fees for important public utilities and major items of service fees will 
remain under state control while control over other service fees will be 
gradually relaxed. 
4. The scope and scale of price increases must be strictly controlled. Increase 
in production costs due to rising prices of major means of production should 
be offset as much as possible by management improvement and better 
economic results. 
5. The government will formulate rules and regulations to enforce rigorous 
control and supervision over prices. 
Intensifying and Improving Macro-Economic Control 
The main theme and basic objective are to establish, step by step, a new system 
of macro-regulation through reform in state planning, the fiscal and monetary 
structure, and the labour and wage system, and through changes in the functions 
of the state and the methods it uses in economic management to ensure a rough 
balance between aggregate social demand and supply, and promote optimalization 
of industrial structure and scientific-technological progress. 
( 1) Reform of the planning system. The old planning system is based on the Soviet 
model which is characterized by excessive centralization. The main features of 
such a system are: (a) emphasis on direct state control and mandatory planning 
to the neglect of indirect control and guidance planning; (b) emphasis on 
production targets in kind to the neglect of output value; (c) emphasis on 
administrative mechanisms to the neglect of economic levers; and ( d) emphasis 
on fiscal means to the neglect of monetary means for economic levers. The major 
defect of this system is that, owing to over-centralization and rigid state control, 
state plans are not as rational and flexible as they should be. 
In reforming the planning system, priority should be given to gradual 
transformation of the old system which was based on direct state control into a 
new one under which the state mainly exercises indirect control over the economy 
through economic levers. The way to do so is to gradually reduce the scope of 
mandatory planning in favour of guidance planning in the light of actual 
conditions. Generally speaking, mandatory planning applies to state-owned key 
enterprises that have an important bearing on the overall national economy and 
to major means of production that are vital to the national economy and people's 
livelihood; guidance planning applies to small and medium-sized state enterprises 
and enterprises under collective ownership; while production of small articles and 
local specialities is regulated by the market. 
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It is imperative to improve and perfect decision-making in state planning 
through scientific substantiation. It is important for the central government to 
make rational decisions on economic and social development objectives, growth 
rate of the national economy, distribution of productive forces, and foreign 
economic relations so as to bring about an overall balance of financial, material, 
and human resources and foreign exchange_ reserves, and reinforce the formula-
tion of medium- and long-term plans. Moreover, it is necessary to rationally 
divide administrative power over planning among departments, localities, and 
key cities. All ministries under the central government (with the exception of the 
Ministry of Railway, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, and Civil 
Aviation Administration of China), provincial governments, and governments of 
the autonomous regions exercise no direct supervision over planned production 
targets of enterprises, which come under unified assignment by key cities. The 
old methods of planning based primarily on the aggregate output value and a 
small number of production targets in kind should be replaced by new ones with 
the per-capita national income and living standards as the base. 
In the implementation of its plans, China should reverse the tendency of 
relying exclusively on administrative means by reinforcing the role of such 
economic levers as pricing and price control, credit, taxation, and exchange rate. 
After several years of reform, command planning has been replaced with guidance 
planning and market regulation in the agricultural sector. In the industrial sector, 
in the 1984-86 period, the proportion of the gross output value of industry 
for industrial products under command planning dropped from 40 per cent to 
17 per cent; and their items also declined from 120 to around 60. 
(2) Reform of the fiscal and taxation systems. Desplte the fact that the revenues and 
expenditures of the central government were separated from those of local 
governments at different levels, the old fiscal system was over-centralized. This 
created the problem of revenues and expenditures being under rigid unified 
arrangement and expenditures divorced from revenues. The reform in recent 
years is primarily aimed to replace such uniformity with financial contracts. To 
handle the relationship between the central and local governments with regard 
to fiscal matters, China introduced in 1985 a system of financial contracting at 
all levels. This replaced the 1980 system of contracting revenues and expenditures 
at different levels and was used to delineate tax categories and verify revenue, 
expenditure, and contracts at different levels. 
In handling the relationship between the state and enterprises, China has 
adopted the method of fiscal contracting. For example, state-owned industrial 
enterprises have begun to introduce, one after another, the systems of enterprise 
reserve funds, proportionate profit retainment, and tax payment in place of profit 
delivery. Public organizations are under a system of budgetary contracting; units 
and institutions that are engaged in capital construction are funded by bank loans 
instead of state budgetary appropriations. The restructuring of China's taxation 
system in the past few years has focused on rectifying the "left" ·practice of _ 
sir:o.plifying the taxation system during the "cultural revolution" and reintroducing 
and improving the multi-form taxation and tax delineating systems. 
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In addition to the above, further efforts will be made to reform financial 
institutions, improve economidegislation and judiciary, and restructure govern-
ment depar~ents in. charge of economic management by reinforcing depart-
ments and instli'l:rtions that exercise comprehensive economic regulation with a 
view to enhandng their capacity for macro-economic control. A new system of 
macro-economic control through planning, taxation and other fiscal measures, 
monetary controls, foreign exchange rates, pricing and price control, and 
economic legislation will become an increasingly important economic lever under 
the guidance of efficient government departments in charge of economic 
management. 
III. Reform of China's Economic Structure and Economic Policies 
Concerning Relations with Foreign Countries 
Opening to the outside world is a Jong-term fundamental policy China formulated 
in 1979. Since then, proceeding from the principles of self-reliance, equality, and 
mutual benefit, and following a new strategy of de~eloping foreign economic 
relations, China has been vigorously promoting economic and trade ties with 
foreign countries and undertaking a series of reforms in economic policies and 
economic structure. These reforms cover the following areas: (a) foreign trade 
management system and policy; (b) policies concerning the use of foreign funds 
and import of foreign technology; (c) policies concerning undertaking contracted 
projects and labour_ services for foreign countries and providing economic aid to 
foreign countries; ( d) monetary system and policies concerning relations with 
foreign countries; and ( e) policies concerning special economic zones and other 
open regions. 
1. Foreign Trade Management System and Policy 
Foreign Trade Management System 
Prior to 1979, China's foreign trade had been under unified control of the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade. A dozen or so import and export corporations were directly 
affiliated to the Ministry. Government functions were not separated from those 
of the trade corporations. Since 1979, reform has been focused on eliminating 
the domination of foreign trade by foreign trade departments and invigorating 
foreign trade enterprises. For the former objective, m~jor measures are: (a) 
delegating more power in business deals to industries, localities, and some large 
and medium-sized enterprises (including foreign-Chinese joint-ventures, co-
operative businesses, and enterprises with exclusive. foreign capital); and (b) 
introducing a multi-channel and multi-form management system under which 
there are processing of materials for foreign businessmen, compensatory trade, 
barter trade, frontier trade, etc. 
The principal measures for invigorating foreign trade enterprises include 
separating government functions from enterprise ones, undertaking import and 
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export on a comm1ss10n b~sis, and combining trade with industries and 
technology impo.rt. Separation of functions means that the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), and its subordinate local bureaus 
and departments, no longer directly involved in import and export, are in charge 
of administration and policy planning. Separation of functions also means that 
foreign trade enterprises have become economic entities independent of foreign 
trade administrative departments, bearing full responsibility for their own profits 
or losses. By putting import and export on a commission basis and combining 
trade with industries and technology import, China, replaced the old system where 
foreign trade departments were in charge of unified purchases and marketing, 
and responsible for all profits or losses. Under. the new sY,ste~, enterprises that 
produce. export commodities or import foreign products an:: accountable for their 
own profits or losses, and foreign trade corporations maintain close lateral ties 
with production enterprises and research institutions, making joint efforts to 
promote foreign trade through co-operation and division of labour. Meanwhile, 
efforts are beirig made to reform the management system of export-oriented 
enterprises with the criteria for performanq: assessment shifting to export, 
production cost of export commodities, and the honouring of contracts. 
Foreign Trade Plannin!J, Tariff Structure, Licensing, 
and Price Fixing of Imports and Exports 
Reforming the foreign trade planning system involves transforming exclusive 
mandatory planning into a combination of mandatory planning, guidance 
planning, and market regulation and gradually reducing the scope of mandatory 
planning while extending that of guidance planning and market regulation. This 
move is in line with the reform of national economic planning. With regard to 
exports, the state sets .mandatory planned targets only for. the total volume of 
exports, major items of export commodities, and a few items of export goods for 
balancing purposes. Purchase and distribution arrangements for export com-
modities are worked out by the localities and foreign trade enterprises under their 
own export plans. In the case of imports, state mandatory planning is applied 
only to commodities to be imported by departments and institutions at the central 
level and to the amount of foreign exchange earmarked for such imports by 
departments and localities. Prior to 1984, over 3,000 items of import commodities 
were placed under command planning: At present, the figure has dwindled to 
several dozens, and this declining tendency persists. 
In 1984-85·, a comprehensive revision was made in China's tariff regulations. 
The guideline for tariff reform is to implement the open policy, promote export, 
and increase indispensable imports so as to guarantee and speed up n~tional 
economic growth. In fixing the tariff rates, the basic principles laid down are as 
follows: 
1. Those commodities vital to the national economy and the people's daily life 
that cannot be produced in China or are in short supply on the home market 
. are tariff-free or taxed at a reduced rate, while other tariff rates are higher. 
2. Tariff rates for imported parts and components of machinery, instruments, 
and.meters are lower tha,n those for complete sets. 
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3. Commodities in need of protection on the domestic market are imported 
at higher tariffs. 
4. With the exception of a few raw and semi-finished materials, export 
commodities are generally exempted from tariff. 
Import and export tariffs are levied ad valorem and according to the origin of 
products. Custom duties are rated against the classified catalogue compiled by 
the Customs Co-operation Council. Import tariff rates are divided into immunity, 
minimal, and general rates .. The minimal rates have 17 grades ranging from 3 
to 150 per cent while the general rates with the same number of grades range 
from 8 to 180 per cent. The former applies to commodities exported by countries 
that grant "most-favoured nation treatment" to China whereas the latter applies 
to commodities of other countries. There is only a single rate for export tariffs 
with 6 grades ranging from 10 to 60 per cent. In order to protect certain industries 
in China that have a considerable gap with their counterparts in developed 
countries in production technique, the custom authorities began to levy, as of 
1985, a regulatory tax on imports and, on commission, the unified industrial and 
commercial tax on imports. 
Beginning from 1980, China reintroduced the ~ystem of import and export 
licences in place of the system practised in past year;:under which imports and 
exports were based on commodity bills provided by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
to ensure foreign trade in an orderly way. Import and export licences are issued 
and authorized by MOFERT. The import licensing system serves as an important 
means to ensure that the limited foreign exchange reserves are used for imports 
that are badly needed in the country's economic development. MOFERT makes 
frequent adjustment of the restrictions placed upon the items of imports in the 
light of the foreign exchange reserves, domestic production, and changing 
markets, and publicizes them. At present, a total of 42 import items are under 
China's import licences. These imported items account for about one-third of the 
nation's total import volume. 
The system of fixing.prices on imports and exports is to be transformed from 
one of unified price fixing by the state to a multi-form pricing procedure. The 
state sets domestic for a few import items of vital importance to the national 
economy and people's livelihood such as rolled steel, chemical fertilizers, grain, 
etc. and bears responsibility for all profits and losses. Prices for the overwhelming 
majority of imports (approximately 70 per cent of total import volume) are fixed 
by foreign trade enterprises on commission. The domestic prices comprise cost, 
insurance, freight, import tariff, domestic tax, bank charge, and commission fee, 
and the import institutions bear responsibility for gains or losses. 
There are two ways of fixing prices of export commodities. Export prices of 
commodities that are commissioned by foreign trade enterprises are determined 
according to domestic production costs and the world market price; in such a 
case, the enterprises receive a commission fee. Prices of commodities exported 
by foreign trade enterprises alone or jointly with production units encompass 
purchase price or production cost, shipping and other expenses, storage fee, bank 
charge, export tariff, and a moderate portion of profits. Due to China's imperfect 
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taxation system, exports still contain part product tax and added value tax. 
Moreover, prices for China's manufactured goods tend to be high because of the 
irrational price structure. Therefore, pending improvement of taxation and price 
systems, the state has adopted the practice of tax refunding and transitional 
economic assistance aimed at making it possible for Chinese exports to compete 
with foreign products under equal conditions in the international market. In 
principle this is different from export subsidies under Article XVI of CATT. 
Foreign Trade Policy 
Such reform aims mainly to adjust the goal of China's foreign trade and the 
means with which to achieve it as required by the modernization of the cpuntry. 
As a developing country, China pursues, a basic goal in foreign trade 
importing on a moderate scale, some advanced technologies, equipment, and 
essential means of production. To achieve this goal, on the one hand, it vigorously 
promotes export for more foreign exchange earnings, and on the other it 
economizes in the use of foreign exchange reserves, and adjusts and regulates 
the import product mix to enhance the economic results of foreign exchange used 
for imports. 
Vigorous fostering of export industries and commodity export forms the core 
of China's foreign trade policy. The basic elements of this policy are: 
- setting up a network of production bases for export commodities in coastal 
regions and other places where conditions permit, trying hard to increase 
the production of those low cost, fine quality export commodities that are 
readily marketable and ensured of timely delivery; 
- fostering and supporting enterprises whose products are highly competitive 
on the international market giving favourable treatment to export com-
modity producers in terms of taxation, credit, depreciation, bonus, etc.; 
introducing a system of proportionate retainment of foreign exchange 
earnings from export; 
establishing funds for export promotion and for awards; and 
- gradually changing the emphasis of the export product mix from primary 
products to finished products, and from roughly-processed manufactured 
goods to finely processed ones. 
2. Use of Foreign Funds and Import of Technology 
Use of Foreign Fundf 
China pursues an active and prudent policy concerning the use of foreign funds. 
It consistently adheres to three principles: 
1. Control the scale and structure of foreign debts to make them commensurate 
with capacity to absorb and repay; 
2. Use foreign funds for production and construction, and in particular, for 
promoting enterprises that produce export commodities to earn foreign 
exchange, turn out import substitutes, or have advanced tedinologies; and 
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3. Lay more emphasis upon economic results from the use of foreign funds 
and ensure the repayment of principal and interest. Apart from the 
above-mentioned enterprises, priority during the Plan period is given to 
the energy industry, transport and communications, raw materials, and 
especially to electric power generation, port construction, and oil produc-
tion. 
The major policies and measures are: 
( 1) Open up more channels for using foreign funds in various forms, including preferential 
loans provided by foreign governments and international monetary institutions, commercial 
credits, airect investment; attracting foreign deposits and savings; and issuing shares and bonds 
abroad, etc. Apart from borrowings by the state, a few cities and certain 
departments and institutions may, with the approval of the central government, 
also use foreign commercial credits as required. 
(2) Improve laws and statutes concerning foreign investment and the investment environme,nt. 
In order to improve the environment for foreign investment, China will reinforce 
the infrastructure and raise the work efficiency of government organizations and 
enterprises as well as their ability to handle foreign business_es and provide better 
service to foreign investors. Special mention should be made of the fact that the 
laws and statutes promulgated by the Chinese Government in recent years 
contain fairly concrete provisions about the orientation of, obligation to, and 
favourable treatment of foreign investment. 
On the question of investment orientation, it is stipulated that enterprises with 
foreign investment must adopt advanced technology and management to facilitate 
technical innovation, ensure more foreign exchange earnings through export, and. 
train competent management personnel. Such enterprises are obliged torespect 
China's sovereignty, abide by China's laws, protect the environment, and promote 
China's economic development. With regard to favourable treatment granted to 
foreign investment, it is provided that: 
1. Foreign investment should account for no less than 25 per cent of the total 
investment of joint Chinese-foreign ~entures with no upper limit. 
2. Enterprises with foreign investment are permitted to sell a portion of their 
products on China's domestic market. 
3. They rec.eive equal treatment_ with Chinese state enterprises in terms of 
prices and bank loans. 
4. They have appropriate preferential treatment in material supply and in the 
import ofequipment and materials. 
5. Their independent management is ensured, in addition to preferential 
treatment in taxation. 
Taxation decrees concerning foreign_investment stipulate that on the basis of 
general low rates of taxes for such investment, tax reduction or exemption applies 
to the following: 
Economic Reforms in China 15 
- long-term foreign credits; 
,.- investment in agricultural, animal husbandry, and forest undertakings; 
- investment in scientific and technological projects, the energy industry, 
transport and communications, and other important areas; 
- investment in undertakings in frontier and remote regions; and 
income tax on profits for reinvestment in China. 
Necessary machines, equipment, and· raw materials these enterprises need to 
import from abroad and their export commodities are exempt from custom duties 
and the industrial and commercial uniform tax; fixed assets from investment by 
foreign enterprises are allowed a faster rate of depreciation (generally 5 to 10 
years; but 20 years for housing). 
Acco~ding to a decree on inviting investment from for.eign businesses that was 
issued in October 1986, special preferential treatment is granted to export 
enterprises and those enterprises with advanced technologies that have foreign 
investment: a reduced rate of the service and land fees, and exemption of income 
tax on the profits that are remitted abroad. This would make it possible for foreign 
entrepreneurs to run enterpr.ises in China in accordance with international norms, 
and consequently attract more foreign investment. 
(3) Give better guidance on the use of foreign funds and better socio-economic results. Unified 
borrowing from abroad by the state is placed under mandatory planning while 
guidance planning applies to other borrowings. However, all projects that use 
foreign funds shall be subject to state plans for utilization of foreign funds and 
foreign exchange earnings and expenses, and approved by governments at all 
levels through set procedures. Efforts are being made to increase feasibility studies 
on such projects and strike a comprehensive balance in production, market access, 
and repayment capacity. 
Technology Import 
Planned introductibn of foreign technology and intellectual resources from abroad 
is .an important means to China's advancement in science and technology. 
Technology import is focused on advanced, applicable technologies that can 
expedite technical innovation of existing enterprises, enhance the level of their 
management, and increase the production of export commodities and import 
substitutes. In technology import, the overall scale, total foreign exchange 
expenditure, and major items are under state mandatory planning. Technology 
import departments must draw up plans for individual trades and industries 
under a licence system. Major forms of technology import comprise licensing 
trade, provision of professional techniques, offering of engineering and technical 
services, etc. Such importation should be combined with integration, develop-
ment, and innovation. Duplication of imports should be avoided. Introduction 
of foreign intellectual resources refers to recruiting foreign professional personnel 
specializing in product development, technical designing, enterprise manage-
ment, and project construction and seeking their co-operation and advice. 
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3. Contracted Projects, Labour Services, and Economic Assistance 
to Foreign Countries 
A new undertaking by China that began in the early 1980s consists of contracted 
projects and labour services to foreign countries. This undertaking, which has a 
great potential for economic and technical co-operation, follows these basic 
principles: honouring contracts, ensuring quality, making small profits, and acting 
in good faith. In other words, China respects the sovereignty of the countries 
concerned, does not interfere in their internal affairs, attaches no conditions, and 
undertakes projects with moderate investments, short construction cycles, and 
quick economic returns to raise economic efficiency for both sides. Multi-form 
lateral co-operation must suit local conditions, and China takes the requirements 
and difficulties of its foreign partners into full account. Charges and fees are 
reasonable, fluctuating in accordance with the market. 
In providing economic assistance to foreign countries, China proceeds from 
the principles of equality and mutual benefits, achieving practical results, taking 
diverse forms, and promoting common development. On the one hand, China 
provides economic assistance to other Third World countries within its capacity, 
mainly undertaking small and medium-sized projects that need moderate 
investment and easy management skills but play an effective role in meeting the 
needs of recipient countries for their economic development and people's 
livelihood. China now implements a contracted responsibility system and puts 
project planning and fund using under unified direction. At the same time, China 
works in close co-operation with specialized organizations of the United Nations 
and other international economic institutions and accepts multilateral and 
bilateral assistance. Priority is given to developing technology and tapping 
intellectual resources. The use of project funds is placed under unified planning. 
4. Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policies. 
In foreign exchange matters, China follows a policy of centralized administration 
and balanced international payments. The State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange Control under the People's Bank of China is the principal orga-n 
exercising control over foreign exchange. It is in charge of implementing the 
statutes concerning foreign exchange control, formulating plans for foreign 
exchange earnings and payments, regulating the exchange rates between the 
renminbi and major foreign currencies, holding foreign exchange reserves, 
administrating foreign debts, and handling foreign currency transactions. The 
Bank of China is a specialized bank that is engaged in the foreign exchange 
business, although other banks can also do the same within specified limits. 
China consistently exercises centralized control over its foreign exchange. The 
reform undertaken in recent years has been (1) to introduce a system under which 
localities, departments, and enterprises that earn foreign exchange may, when 
selling them to the state, retain some portion for their own disposal; and (2) to 
start the business of foreign exchange adjustment through administrative institu-
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tions of foreign exchange control or the Bank of China. Further efforts should 
be made to improve the state unified control of foreign exchange and foreign 
debts, and bring under state planning foreign exchange earnings and expenses 
of departments and institutions at all levels, their use of foreign funds, and their 
investment abroad. At the same time, foreign exchange markets should be opened 
up gradually. 
The fundamental principle in China's monetary regulation concerning finan-
cial relations with foreign countries is to strike a basic balance in foreign exchange 
earnings and expenses, and hold necessary reserves. To this end, vigorous efforts 
should be made to earn more foreign exchange not only through increased export 
of goods, but also through service exports such as air transport, shipping, banking, 
insurance, post and telecommunications, tourism, contracted projects, and labour 
service co-operation, etc. On the other hand, China should try in every possible 
way to economize in the use of foreign exchange. The state controls the planned 
total of exchange reserves earmarked for departments and localities. Departments 
and institutions that have introduced a: contracting system with regard to 
production and investment also put their foreign exchange used for technology 
import on a contracting basis. Regulations and procedures for approval of foreign 
exchange expenses on imports should be strictly implemented. To conserve foreign 
exchange, China should also avoid importing at random. 
As to the policy concerning exchange rates, the renminbi is a non-convertible 
currency and its exchange rates are determined by the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange Control. As of 1981, the system of internal settlement for 
trade-related renminbi accounts has been replaced by a new system based on a 
unitary exchange rate and regulated floating rates. The regulation of the 
renminbi's exchange rates is based on the purchasing power of the Chinese 
currency in relation to that of foreign currencies, China's current and prospective 
balance of payments and foreigh exchange reserves, and the changing exchange 
rates of foreign currencies on international financial markets. 
One major element of China's open policy concerns the development of the 
special economic zones and open coastal regions which are forward bases for 
China's opening to the outside world. Compared with the hinterland, these zones 
and regions have two features: (1) they enjoy more decision-making power and 
receive more preferential treatment in the use of foreign funds, technology import, 
and foreign trade; and (2) their development strategy is focused on the expansion 
of an export-oriented economy. During the Seventh Five-Year-Plan period, the 
goal for these zones and regions is to take advantage of their favourable conditions 
to quicken the pace of importing foreign funds and advanced technologies, 
vigorously promote technology- and knowledge-intensive industries, and develop 
a new-type economy that combines trade, industry, and agriculture so that they 
will become forward bases for China's economic and trade relations with the rest 
of the world. 
Early in 1988, in response to changes in the world economy, particularly to 
economic adjustments in the Asia-Pacific region, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang 
proposed an economic development strategy for China's coastal areas. He pointed 
out that 
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Economic development in China's costal areas is making the best use of a 
good opportunity. Due to rises in labour costs, the developed world has been 
readjusting its industrial set-up and moving labour-iptensive industries to 
places where labour costs are low. In this process, China's coastal areas are 
attractive since they have low-paict but fairly skilled labour, good transport 
facilities and infrastructure, and very importantly, a good scientific and 
technological development potential. So long as they do well, Chin:i's coastal 
areas should be able to secure sizeable foreign investment. 
Zhao further proposed that 
It is necessary for the coastal areas, with their population of one or two 
hundred million, to take their·place on the international market in a planned 
way and step by step get further involved in international exchanges and 
competition, and energetically develop an export-oriented. economy. 
Zhads remarks symbolized a major adjustment in China's development and 
trade strategies - a shift from inward to inward-cum-outward ones. However, 
whether this development strategy for the coastal areas can be implemented 
without hindrance, depends, first of all, on whether China's curr~nt economic 
reforms can be deepened further. With a view to ensuring the implementation of 
the strategy put forth by Zhao, drastic structural reform is planned for China's 
foreign trade structure, with the focus on the introduction of an overall managerial 
contract responsibility system, a system which has brought about beneficial results 
in the structural reforms in China's agriculture, industry, and commerce. Under 
this responsibility system, localities will contract with the state for the amount of 
foreign exchange earnings from export and hard currency they are obliged to 
turn over to the state; they are entitled to retain part of the above-contracted-quota 
hard currency. The contracted foreign trade assignments of the localities will then 
be subcontracted to the basic units under their respective control. Following the 
introduction of the system, the power to handle most import and export 
commodities will be transferred tolocal foreign trade companies. At present, over 
ten thousand export-oriented enterprises can export their products directly to the 
international market. It can thus be anticipated that, along with the full-scale 
implementation of the managerial contract responsibility system, good prospects 
for foreign trade are·projected for the coastal areas and the country at large. 
Meanwhile, for further attraction· of foreign investment, more preferential 
treatment, especially the improved "soft" environment, will be offered. General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang has stated that it is necessary to let foreign businessmen 
manage foreign-funded enterprises. For a while, at least, the management of 
Sino-foreign joint-ventures and co-operative enterprises should be left to foreign-
ers. They should be allowed to run the enterprises according to international 
norms: advertising for employees publicly and freely, and dismissing workers 
according to contract. As Zhao correctly points out, the investment environment 
can be judged by whether or not a foreign business is able to make a profit. If a 
foreign manager runs an enterprise well and makes more money by exporting 
more products, all will benefit. 
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In sum, the development strategy for the coastal areas places .stricter demands 
on China's economic reforms; conversely, .the deepening economic reforms will 
ensure in turn the satisfactory implementation of this development strategy .. 
IV. Impact on China-ASEAN Economic Relations 
Since the final goal of China's economic reforms is the establishment of a highly 
developed commodity economy, as economic reforms deepen the behavioural 
features of the various entities and agents in the Chinese economy will converge 
more and more with those of a market economy. As a ·result, the institutional 
barriers in China-ASEAN economic interaction will correspondingly diminish. 
This point should be recognized at the outset when ~e discuss the impact of 
China's economic reforms on its economic relations with ASEAN. 
As noted earlier, China's economic reforms involve three main aspects: 
enterprise invigoration, market nurturing, and macro-economic control improve-
ment, with focus on enterprise invigoration. In fact, the satisfactory progress of 
China's economic reforms serves as a strong impetus to the steady and sustained 
growth of the national economy, which registered a 10.3 per cent average annual 
growth rate of social gross output value in the 1979-86 period. This steady 
sustained growth has created fayourable conditions for the expansion of China's 
foreign economic relations, including those with the ASEAN countries. Between 
1978 and 1986, the total volume of China's imports and exp~rts grew at an 
average annual rate of 14.3 per cent; with that between China and the ASEAN 
countries growing at a similar rate. 
In the process of economic reform, enterprises in China have been transformed, 
to a considerable extent, from being administrative appendages into socialist 
commodity producers and managers with relative autonomy, able to manage their 
own affo.ks and be responsible for their own profits and losses. They have begun 
to develop behavioural features similar to those in the market economies, and 
factors such as price and profit play an ever bigger role in their decision-making. 
No longer confined to the domestic market, they are turning their eyes to the 
outside world. If more profits could be earned in the international market, they 
are now only too ready to expand their business. As a matter of fact, since the 
economic reforms, more and more enterprises have put on their agenda the task 
of expanding international market access and have thus far made some achieve-
ments. Therefore, it can be said that autonomous management coupled with 
assumption of sole responsibility for profits and losses have raised the degree of 
outward orientation of Chin~s enterprises. This will certainly spur greater 
economic exchanges, trade in particular, between China and the ASEAN 
countries. 
Up till now, the major progress in the structural reforms in China's foreign 
trade has been the removal of state monopoly. Over 8,000 enterprises are now 
allowed direct interaction with foreign markets. Meanwhile, local foreign trade 
companies have also gradually turned from being former appendages to national 
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foreign corporations and into financially independent business entities capable 
of autonomous management. After the removal of the main obstacle artificially 
separating the domestic market from the foreign market, a more direct link has 
thus been established between Chinese enterprises and the international market. 
Under the old planning system, export enterprises produced in accordance 
with the command plan assigned by MOFERT. This made it impossible for them 
to respond to exchanges in demand and supply in the international market. By 
the time certain products with a good marketing opportunity were finally sent 
to the international market, they would often have missed the opportunity due 
to changed demand and supply, and therefore heavy losses from drastic price 
drops were incurred. After reforming the old planning structure, the state will 
set mandatory planned targets only for the total export volume, volume of major 
items of export commodities, and supply arrangement for a few export items 
under the state overall balance. Local export enterprises and foreign trade 
companies will then be left free to handle their export business so that they can 
adjust their production and export speedily in response to changes in the 
international market. 
In sum, structural reforms in foreign trade and planning will make it possible 
for China's export-oriented production enterprises to establish direct links with 
overseas markets, thus facilitating their timely adjustments in production, import, 
and export in response to changing supply and demand in domestic and foreign 
markets. All these are expected to change the state of affairs which caused frequent 
complaints from ASEAN businessmen about narrow business channels and low 
efficiency in China trade. 
Another foreign trade constraint is China's long-established irrational price 
structure. The prices of many commodities reflect neither their production cost 
nor supply and demand. Such an irrational price structure not only entailed 
irrational allocation of domestic resources but also blocked the expansion of 
foreign trade. As a result, the state was forced to adopt a series of remedial 
measures to help export enterprises earn normal profits. Although this transitional 
economic assistance scheme aims at making it possible for Chinese products to 
compete with foreign products on equal terms in the international market, it 
reduces the degree of transparency of China's foreign trade policy and is therefore 
detrimental to the normal development of China's trade with ASEAN and other 
countries. However, along with the deepening of economic reforms, such a 
cumbersome practice of export pricing will gradually come to an end. Further-
more, the current price reform is expected to strengthen the link between domestic 
and international prices. This will certainly bring about a greater convergence 
between China's trade practices and international norms and various GATT 
regulations. This convergence will be a positive factor propelling China-ASEAN 
trade. 
Improvement of the macro-economic control mechanism also plays a sig-
nificant role in facilitating China's foreign economic relations in general and 
foreign trade in particular. For example, in 1985, due to inefficient macro-control 
over consumption and investment funds, the sharp rise in domestic demand led 
to rising production costs and the resultant heavy losses for export enterprises. 
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The favourable conditions for domestic sales induced many of these enterprises 
to turn their attention to meeting domestic demand, thus causing a drastic 
reduction in China's exports. Only after strengthened state macro-control on 
overheated domestic consumption and investment, coupled with a series of 
export-stimulating measures, was it possible for China's export to regain its 
normal growth in 1986. It is believed that along with the improvement of China's 
macro-control mechanism, macro-control wiil gradually replace administrative 
interference. Under such circu~stances, China's import and export growth will 
be more stable and more predictable. Undoubtedly, this will also contribute to 
the expansion of trade with ASEAN and other countries. 
On the balance, in the long term, China's current economic reforms will undoub-
tedly help the country speed up its opening to the outside world both in breadth 
and depth. However, in the short term, these economic reforms are no.t without 
problems. In the process of reform, China's foreign economic relations may suffer 
some possible shocks and disturbances. For instance, in 1985, due to the failure 
of the state to exercise proper macro-control in the course of decentralizing 
decision-making power in foreign trade, many local foreign trade companies and 
export enterprises vied with one another in promoting exports in ·pursuit of 
earning more foreign exchange, disregarding the overall interest of the state and 
the absorptive capacity of the international market. Such blind export competition 
undermined China's traditional overseas business channels, infringed on the 
interests of its foreign trade agents, led to the deterioration of the country's terms 
of trade, and brought about drastic reduction in its export revenues inspite of 
·rising export volume. However, such problems are temporary in nature and will 
eventually disappear along with the deepening of the economic reforms and 
improvement of foreign trade structure. 
Finally, the progress of China's economic reforms constitutes an indispensable 
condition for the successful attraction of foreign investment to China. Beginning 
in 1979, China has made tremendous efforts to improve its investment environ-
ment. For example, in the special economic zones and coastal cities, China has 
built or reconstructed such infrastructure as ports, docks, railways, and roads; 
ensured supply of water, electricity, and gas; and erected factory buildings and 
other supplementary buildings. It has .tlso provided foreign investors with 
extremely favourable treatment in terms of share ownership, profit remittance, 
and so on in its 'various foreign investment-related laws and regulations. 
Admittedly, however, there still remain many problems, particularly the need to 
improve the "soft environment" for foreign investment. Foreign-funded 
enterprises, Sino-foreign joint-ventures, and co-operative enterpri.ses still en~ . 
counter many difficulties not normally encountered in a'dyanced market 
economies. Bureaucratic forms n~tably ·hinder foreign investment. With this 
situation in mind, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang has proposed that foreign 
businessmen be allowed to ·run the above-mentioned three categories of 
enterprises. 
It is believed that structural obstacles to the attraction of foreign investment 
will gradually vanish in the course of the deepening of economic restructuring. 
As a result, China's attraction to foreign investors will increase. This will possibly 
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enhance China's competitiveness with ASEAN countries in the realm of foreign 
capital enticement. However, it should not be forgotten that improvement in 
China's investment environment will also facilitate the operations of existing 
ASEAN-funded enterprises and help absorb additional investments from ASEAN 
countries. What is more, ASEAN investment in China will certainly promote 
mutual trade and technological exchanges. 
In sum, China's economic restructuring has promoted the development of 
economic relations with ASEAN and other countries and regions. It has also 
provided China with the ability to "grasp the opportunity and meet the challenge" 
in the world economy. Similarly, it has created an opportunity and posed a 
challenge for the ASEAN countries. It is sincerely believed that only if China 
and the ASEAN countries broaden the scope of dialogue, deepen mutual 
understanding, and strengthen mutual co-ordination can both sides can further 
expand economic co-operation for common prosperity. 
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China's Changing Industrial 
Structure: Its Impact on 
Economic Relations with ASEAN 
Countries 
Luo Shaohong,. Cheng Bifan, 
and Gao Tiesen 
I. Introduction 
A well-defined policy for industrial structuring has yet to emerge in the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). For years there was emphasis on proportional 
arrangement in planning, first between agriculture and industry (including 
sometimes transport and communications and the building industry), then 
between light and heavy industries, thus setting up a proportional relationship. 
among agriculture, and the light and heavy industries. In those years, service 
trades, or the so-called tertiary industry, were simply excluded from planning, 
and the international practice of building a separate statistical system for service 
trades was largely unknown. Moreover, China's policy for industrial structuring 
was detached from the international environment due to its seclusion from the 
outside world. 
It was only in recent years, along with the deepening of economic reforms and 
the introduction of the open policy, that China began to show interest in exploring 
issues related to industrial structure. In the course of extensive discussion, in spite 
of competing views and scenarios, a consensus eventually emerged that the 
comparative rationality of China's current industrial structure should be rectified 
and that the traditional theory of socialist product economy should be discarded 
in favour of one advocating socialist commodity economy as the guiding principle 
in formulating a new industrial policy. Simultaneous1y, ·consensus has also been 
reached as regards the content of industrial policy, its linkage with China's 
long-term development strategy and current economic restructuring, and the 
direction of industrial structural adjustment and its relation with the international 
environment. 
In fact, the basic concepfofChina's industrial structure contained in The Seventh 
Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (1986-90) adopted at the 
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress represents the result of 
explorations of recent years. 1 This basic concept was also embodied in General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang's report to the Thirteenth National Congress of the 
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Communist Party of China on 25 October 1987, in the section concerning the 
rationalization of industrial structure and enterprise set-up. 2 These documents 
cover many basic points of the guidelines for industrial structural adjustment . 
. Discussion is still going on. It is widely fylt that an early formulation of a long-term 
industrial policy is of vital significance, not only for guaranteeing realization of 
the strategic goals for economic development set for the end of this century, but 
also for harmonizing emerging contradictions in the course of economic reform 
and securing a steady development of the national economy in the process of 
economic restructuring. 
This paper will thus focus on the above-mentioned consensus and the general 
trends in China's industrial structural readjustment. For background information, 
the paper gives an overview of the past development and current situation of 
China's industrial structure. After touching on the trends of structural readjust-
ment, an exploration of possible changes in China's foreign trade is presented. 
Finally, the impact of China's industrial restructuring on its economic relations 
with ASEAN countries is discussed. 
II. China's Past and Present Industrial Structure 
1. Brief Retrospect 
The PRC took over an economic shamble from the Kuomintang regime in 1949. 
At that time, the gross output value of modern industry accounted for only 17 
per cent of the gross output value of agriculture and industry, with the average 
annual output of steel at only 158 thousand tons, having fallen from 900 thousand 
tons in the peak years; coal was around 32 million tons as compared to 62 million 
tons· in the peak years; electricity generating capacity was 4.3 billion kWh; and 
annual grain yield, 113 million tons. After three years of economic recovery, the 
First Five-Year Plan for Economic Construction was begun in 1952, with the 
basic task of laying the initial foundation for socialist industrialization. Top 
priority was then given to the rapid development of heavy industry to meet the 
objective need at that time, partly because of the weak basis of China's heavy 
industry, and partly because of the economic blockade, military encirclement, 
and war threat imposed on China in its founding years by the Western powers. 
It was then of absolute necessity to lay the foundation for heavy industry and 
strengthen national defence in the shortest possible time. Even so, the government 
did not ignore the corresponding deveiopment of agricultur~ and light industry. 
As a result, there was no obvious imbalance between industry and agriculture, 
or between heavy and light industries. This led to comparatively satisfactory 
economic results and general improvement of the people's living standards. The 
share of agriculture in the gross output value of agriculture and industry 
decreased from 56.9 to 43.3 per cent in the 1952-57 period, while the share of 
light industry to total industry dropped from 64.5 to 55 per cent, and that of 
heavy industry rose from 35.5 to 45 per cent. In the same period, national income 
was up 53 per cent. 
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Unfortunately, in the two decades since the end of the First Five-Year Plan up 
to the year 1979, China did not adjust its policy for economic development to 
respond to changes in the structure of the national economy, but continued the 
development strategy characterized by priority on heavy industry, followed by 
light industry and then agriculture. This rigid practice resulted in a serious 
imbalance in economic str~cture which began to surface as early as the later years 
of the First Five-Year Plan. To a certain extent the excessive development of 
heavy industry hampered the development oflight industry and agriculture. This 
in turn resulted in shortages in market supply and the government was for:ced 
to introduce the policy of state monopoly for purchase and marketing of such 
essential products as grain and cotton. 
The unbalanced relationships among light industry, heavy industry, and 
agriculture in terms of development speed and investment allocation worsened 
in those two decades. The mistakes in economic decision-making manifested 
themselves most strikingly in the years 1958, 1970, and 1978. 
The so-called "Great Leap Forward" launched in 1958 resulted in distortions 
in the structural balance among heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture. 
The shares of light industry and agriculture in the gross output value of industry 
and agriculture dropped respectively from 31.2 and 43.3 per cent in 1957 to 26.l 
· and 21.8 per cent in 1960, while that of heavy industry rose sharply from 25.5 
to 52.1 per cent. Such a serious imbalance led to a decline in the national income 
and living conditions of 'the people. 
In 1970, capital construction investment rose to RMB32.65 billion, an increase 
of RMBll billion or 55.6 per cent over the previous year, while the share of 
heavy industry in capital construction investment reached, 57 .5 per cent. Conse-
quently, the respective shares of heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture 
in the gro!)s output value of industry and agriculture changed from 30.4, 32.3, 
and 37 .3 per cent in 1965 to 35. 7, 30.6, and 33. 7 per cent in 1970.. The excessiv:e 
development of industry outstripped the original plan in terms of employment, 
the total sum of wages, and grain consumption, thus once again triggering off a 
serious imbalance in the national economy. 
· The salient feature of the imbalance in 1978 was the excessive volume of 
investment in major construction projects. These comprised mainly metallurgical 
and petrochemical projects whose import needs absorbed a huge amount of 
foreign exchange. In that year alone, the total sum earmarked for capital 
construction climbed up to RMB50.1 billion. The share for heavy industry was 
53.3 per cent. On the other hand, the share for light industry was 5.5 per cent, 
and for agriculture, 11.3 per cent. The respective shares of heavy industry, light 
industry, and agriculture in the gross output value of industry and agriculture 
were 41.1, 31.1, and 27 .8 per cent respectively. Compared with the 1970 figures, 
the proportion for hea"'.Y industry registered a sharp jump of 5.4 points, that for 
light industry showed a slight increase of 0.5 points, while that for agriculture 
declined by. 5.4 points.3 The distorted structure of the national economy 
precipitated a seriqus imbalance in financial revenue, bank credit, material supply, 
and foreign trade. It also caused a deficit in the current account of the balance 
of payments. · 
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Beginning from 1979, the Chinese Government decided to concentrate its 
efforts on rectifying the serious imbalance in the national economy with a 
three-year readjustment, restructuring, consolidation, and improvement. By the 
year 1981, the State Council came to realize that the scope of economic 
readjustment should be far wider than the extent originally contemplated. For 
the rationalization of economic structure, it was not only necessary to readjust 
the proportion between industry and agriculture, between light and heavy 
industries, and between accumulation and consumption, but also to make 
readjustments in product, technological, enterprise, and organizational structures. 
Therefore, the government decided to spend an additional five years to press 
ahead with the principle of readjustment. 
2. Readjustment in the Sixth Five-Year-Plan Period 
Starting from the Sixth Five.:Year Plan, a fundamental shift occurred in China's 
economic development strategy. In his report on the government's work delivered 
at the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in November 1981, 
Premier Zhao Ziyang pointed out unequivocally that China should 
discard the old method adopted under the long-time guidance of'left' ideology 
and take on a new path suited to its actual conditions, with a feasible speed, 
better economic results and more real benefits for the people. 
In other words, China intended to change its development strategy. The 
so-called traditional development strategy adopts a quantitative growth develop-
ment model, with increase of output value as its objective, rise in accumulation 
and investment as the means, and extensive development as its method, in 
disregard of quality and economic results, well-balanced co-ordination, structural 
reform, and technological progress and renovation. The new development 
strategy focuses on the incremental satisfaction of the growing material and 
cultural needs of the people by (a) switching from the past practice of a 
single-minded pursuit of rate of growth to regarding better economic results as 
the central task, and (b) by shifting from extensive to intensive development in 
expanding production. In addition, the new development strategy also involves 
the shift from actual national seclusion to opening. to the outside world. 
With improving economic results as the objective, the Sixth Five-Year Plan 
projected an average annual growth rate of 4 per cent (with 5 per cent as the 
strived-for goal) for industrial and agricultural production. However, this target 
was greatly outstripped by actual performance, with overall annual growth rate 
averaging 10.8 per cent, and annual growth rates of 11.6 per cent in agriculture 
and 10.4 per cent in industry (11.8 per cent in light industry and 9.2 per cent in 
heavy industry). Such a high average annual growth rate represented an 
overheated economy, with its attendant problems and latent dangers. Neverthe-
less, in the light of economic achievements, the Sixth Five.:Year-Plan period 
proved to be one of the best periods since the founding of the PRC with the 
accomplishment of its original aim of gradual improvement in economic results. 
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During the Sixth Five-Year-Plan period, the average increase of national income 
per RMBlOO accumulation was higher than that in any other previous five-year 
plans (Table 2.1). 
TABLE 2.1 
Increase in National Income per RMB100 Accumulation 
National Income 
Total Accumulation Increase per RMBlOO 
Year (RMB hundred million) Accumulation 
(RMB) 
1st 5-Year Plan 200 32 
2nd 5-Year Plan 346 1 
1963-65 270 57 
3rd 5-Year Plan 409 26 
4th 5-Year Plan 729 16 
5th 5-Year Plan 999 24 
6th 5-Year Plan 1,641' 40 
NOTE: Calculated at current prices. 
SOURCE: China Statistics Press, China Statistical Yearbook, 1987 (Beijing; October 
198 7), p. 66. 
Since the implementation of the readjustment policy, conditions in Chinis 
industrial structure have somewhat improved. 
First, ~h-~ composition o_f the three categories of industries has undergone 
positive changes. Chini.s sectoral composition is characteristic of a developing 
country, with a preponderant share for the primary industry, a rising share for 
the secondary industry, and initial progress (on an extremely underdeveloped 
basis) for the tertiary industry. The share of the tertiary industry in the gross 
domestic product rose from 20.9 per cent in 1976 to 25 per cent in 1986.4 Such 
a general trend will continue in the future. In other words, the task set for 
industrial restructuring lies first in .reducing the proportion of the primary and 
secondary industries in the gross output value and raising considerably the 
proportion for the tertiary industry, and then readjusting the international 
substructure of each industry and correcting for the undue emphasis on heavy 
industry and relative backwardness of consumer goods production, so as to make 
the industrial structure capable Gf meeting the needs of technological development 
and the rising living standards of the people. 
Second, in the light of the internal structural changes of industry, the 
proportion for light industry in the gross output value of industry, rose from 43.1 
per· cent in i978 to 46.9 per cent in 1986, while that for heavy industry in the 
corresponding years dropped from 56.9 to 53.1 per cent (Table 2.2). This shows 
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Third, in the 1979-86 period, agriculture evidently grew rapidly, indicating 
the impressive achievements of the reform. In this period, the share of agriculture 
in the gross output value of industry and agriculture rose from 27 .8 per cent in 
1978- to 35 per cent. in 1986, while that of industry dropped from 72.2 to 35 per 
cent (Table 2.3). 
TABLE 2.3 
Composition of Gross Output Value of Industry and Agriculture 
Percentage Share of the Gross Output 
Value of Agriculture and Industry 
(At current prices) 
Agriculture Industry 
1978 27.8 72.2 
1979 29.7 70.3 
1980 30.8 69.2 
1981 32.5 67.5 
1982 33.6 66.4 
1983 33.9 66.1 
1984 35.0 65.0 
1985 34.3 65.7 
1986 35.0 65.0 
SOURCE: China State Statistics Bureau, Abstracts ef China's Statistics (Beijing: 
China Statistics Press, May 1987), p. 9. 
Fourth, some progress has been made in the technical revamping of existing 
enterprises. From 1977 to 1986, investment earmarked for technical renovation 
of state-owned enterprises increased 2.8 times and its share in the total sum of 
investment rose from 22.6 to 33.8 per cent. For example, in iron and steel in the 
Sixth Five.:Year-Plan period, of the total additional capacity for iron-smelting, 
83.8 per cent came from technical revamping and potentialities tapping, while 
the corresponding figure for steel was 97 .3 per cent. In technical renovation, 
China is well aware of the importance of utilizing foreign capital and importing 
technology. It is estimated that China has imported 14,000 items of technology 
and key equipment of various kinds worth more than US$10 billion since 1979. 
The main economic benefits from this importation are: 
1. Narrowing of technological gap between China and the advanced countries. 
Man.y electronics enterprises such as those producing colour TV sets, tape 
recorders,· and electronics components and spare parts have made the 
transition from manual to mechanized, and semi-automatic and automatic 
operation, and adopted advanced technologies for fine processing and 
automatic testing. As a result, the percentage of electronics products 
reaching the international standard of the late seventies and early eighties 
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rose from 15 per cent in 1982 to 30 per cent and more currently, while 10 
per cent of the machine-building industry products has also reached· the 
international standard of the early eighties; 
2. Strengthening independent research and development capabilities; and 
3. Promoting exports. 
Thus in Shanghai, 85 of 781 items of imported technology have turned out 
products for export. 
Fifth, significant changes have occurred in the rural industrial structure. 
Chinese farmers are no longer engaged merely in agriculture in the narrow sense 
of cultivation and animal husbandry, but are also engaged in rural industry and 
sideline occupations in a big way, thereby promoting prosperity in the rural 
economy. Township and village enterprises financed by farmers collectively or 
individually and accelerated township construction have brought about the rapid 
shift of the farming population to non-farming occupations. Such a population 
shift, in the form of"leaving farming without leaving the land'', is a special feature 
of China's economic restructuring. There were more than 15 million township 
and village enterprises throughout the country by 1986, absorbing one-fifth of 
the fll:ral labour force and making up 48.9 per cent of gross rural income and 23 
per cent of gross national industrial output. They have clearly taken up an 
important position in the national economy. 
Sixth, improvement has been made in the regional distribution of the national 
economy. Since the founding of the PRC, the government has given priority to 
developing industry in the western interior of the country partly for rectifying 
the imbalance in regional economic development and partly for national security. 
Nearly RMB200 billion of capital was allocated to this area, with the fixed assets 
thus formed having a total original value of some RMB140 billion. However, 
due to lack of overall arrangement and comprehensive balance, and as a result 
of an irrational investment structure, these newly-built enterprises showed poor 
economic results, with many incurring losses. Meanwhile, investment in the 
construction of industrial bases in the eastern part of the country was largely 
ignored as a consequence of preoccupation with industrial development in the 
western interior of the country. This deviation was rectified in the Sixth 
Five-Year-Plan period with the guideline for development changed to emphasize 
the potentialities of the multifaceted economic-technological advantages of the 
eastern part on the one hand, and systematically developing the material resources 
in the central and western parts on the other, thus taking a step toward 
rationalization of national economic production. 
Seventh, the open policy put an end to China's national seclusion. From 1979 
to 1986, China's foreign trade increased by an average annual rate of 24 per cent, 
while the share for imports and exports in the gross social output value rose to 
13.7 per cent, or 2.6 times the 1978 figure. At the same time, China established 
special economic zones and coastal open cities and areas in succession, in order 
to create a better environment for foreign direct investment. By 1987, the total 
sum of foreign direct investment with signed contracts reached US$19.5 billion, 
including US$6.5 billion actually utilized, involving 7,775 foreign enterprises in 
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various forms. Meanwhile, China for its part has also made overseas investments. 
By June 1987 there were more than 300 state-authorized non-trading enterprises 
abroad, with a total investment of over US$500 million and 50 per cent plus 
Chinese participation. Among them, more than half are now in operation. 
3. Existing Problems 
The above-mentioned facts notwithstanding, the improvement in the industrial 
structure under the Sixth Five.Year-Plan period is still only at an initial stage; a · 
fundamental change has yet to occur in the irrational industrial structure, 
especially structural deepening. 
First, judging from the proportion of the three economic sectors, despite their 
considerable rapid development under the Sixth Five.Year-Plan period, the share 
of the tertiary industry in the 1985 gross domestic product was only 25 per cent, 
still a far cry from the typical share for a low-income country (around 35 per 
cent). This underdevelopment of services not only seriol,lsly affects market 
nurturing but also hampers the creation of jobs. 
Second, basic industries still lag far behind. Both the development of the 
manufacturing industry and the flow of rural population to the cities and towns 
call for synchronized growth of the basic industries with total social product, or 
better still, its forward growth. However, the figures of forward coefficient for 
basic industries are all negative in the Sixth Five-Year-Plan period (Table 2.4). 
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NoTE: Forward coefficient indicates the ratio minus one between the 
growth rate of the ouptut value of basic industries and the growth rate 
of the total social product. A positive ratio means the former grows 
faster than the latter, while a negative ratio represents the reverse. 
SOURCE: Center for Development Studies, "A Preliminary Proposal 
for Implementing the Industrial Policy", The WOrld Economic Herald 
(Shanghai), 18 May 1987. 
It is estimated that around 25 to 30 per cent of production capacity in the 
country lies idle because of the shortage of electricity. About 10 to 20 million tons 
32 Luo Shaohong, Cheng Bijan, and Gao Tiesen 
of steel had to be imported in 1986. The average daily loading rate of the freight 
cars can only meet 70 per cent of the demand, while over 100 million passengers 
trav~l by passenger trains . .The national telephone pop~larization rate is only 0.6 
per cent or so. 
Third, import-substitution-type industries producing consumer durables grow 
rapidly, while the domestic production of their parts and components lag behind. 
As a result, the production of such consumer durables still rely on imported 
inputs. This means import substitution is yet to be completed. In the additional 
gross output value of industry in 1985, 30.8 per cent came from sectors producing 
new consumer goods including medicine, chemical and plastic goods for daily 
use, machines for cultural, educational, and artistic purposes, a_nd metals for ~aily 
use. But the production capacity for most of them has been built up by importing 
assembly or production lines. The national content is still very low in terms of 
major parts, components, and raw materials. The output of black and white TV 
sets was 16.68 million, while the domestic output of kinescopes in the same year 
was only 8.23 million or less than half the amount needed to form complete sets. 
Similarly, the output of colour TV sets was 4.35 million in 1985, while the 
domestic output of kinescopes for colour TV sets was less than a million. 
Compared with 1981, the amount of imported parts, accessories, and fittings 
increased 6.1 times in 1985 with its share in the amount of imported machines 
and equipment rising from 8.2 to 20.9 per cent. The output of colour TV sets 
in April-September 1986 dropped by 33 per cent in comparison with the output 
of the corresponding period in 1985 due to reduction of imported parts and 
components. This shows that such a distorted structure characterized by a high 
degree of reliance on imports cannot be sustained. 
Fourth, a serious defect still exists in China's industrial organization, symbol-
ized by the lack of appropriate concentration and decentralization on the basis 
of co-operation among the specialized sectors. In the advanced economies, there 
are now parallel trends in industrial organization. On the one hand, there exists 
centralization of production, that is more and more factors of production are 
concentrated in the major specialized enterprises; on the other hand, there exists 
decentralization of production, that is the scattering of factors of production to 
mini or super-mini enterprises which co-operate with the major enterprises. Such 
an industrial organization enhances competitiveness. The situation in China is 
just the opposite. Departments, areas, and even some enterprises are obsessed 
with the pursuit of "big and complete" or "small and complete" goals. Indeed, 
there is a large number of major enterprises, but they are mostly self-contained 
"all-round" enterprises, not specialized ones. Though their scope .may be large, 
the economies of scale are very small. For example, in the automobile industry, 
there were more than eighty commercial automobile factories in 1984 all over 
the country, exceeding the combined number of commercial automobile factories 
of six countries, namely the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Great 
Britain, and Italy. Obviously, most of the Chinese automobile factories cannot 
enjoy scale economies. 
Fifth, there exists i.n the enterprises a common lack of innovative capacity and 
technological reserve which makes it impossible for them to make rapid responses 
China's Changing Industrial Structure 33 
.. 
to the changing consumption trends of the people. There are two main causes 
for this phenomenon: the funds for technical innovation are not guaranteed and 
enterprises have not been given the dedsion-making power. This in turn makes 
the enterprise managers reluctant to take the risks involved in developing new 
products. 
Sixth, the overlapping and similar industrial structures among the provinces 
is very serious in the light of regional industrial distribution. In matters related 
to industry selection, many provinces and cities vie with one another in launching 
popular industrial projects in disregard of their resource endowments and 
comparative advantages. As a result, many factories producing TV sets, 
refrigerators, tape recorders, and automobiles have sprung up all over the country. 
Most of them are small ones. For the survival of these factories, many local 
governments indulge in carving up the market and practising local protectionism. 
This is the main factor precipitating the above-mentioned lack of appropriate 
concentration and decentralization on the basis of co-operation among specialized 
sectors in China's industrial organization. This shows that industrial structural 
readjustment will not be effective unless underpinned by economic management 
reform.· In addition, the lack of a clear programme for regional industrial 
distribution handicaps the introduction of foreign capital. 
Seventh, there is chaos and disorder in product mix. The simultaneous 
existence of shortages and inventory accum'ulations is much in evidence among 
and within departments, trades, and enterprises. For example, in the machine 
tool making industry, there is an excessive supply and a large amount of 
production capacity lying idle. Yet machine tools worth US$400 million were 
imported, including 75 per cent of ordinary ones costing a quarter of this amount. 
There are many factors causing such simultaneous existence of shortages and 
inventory accumulations, the crucial ones being defects in the industrial structure 
and the irrational economic management system. 
Eighth, agriculture faces the problem of strengthening resilience. A sample 
investigation undertaken in seventy-one counties of the country in early 1985 
reveals a common lack of enthusiasm for grain production among the farmers. 
The main factor lies in the lowered incentives for grain production. Generally, 
the average income per workday for the agricultural and sideline products 
processing and catering trade is double that for grain production; while the 
average income per workday for transportation and industrial products processing 
is nearly double that for the agricultural products processing and catering trade. 
There has been no significant increase in rural basic installations in recent years. 
Moreover, there has been a decrease in the area ploughed by farming machines 
and/or irrigated by gravity, in ·addition to the annually diminishing acreage of 
cultivated land. Farmers and rural collectives make their investment mainly in 
the direction of industry and sideline occupations. What is more, prices for 
agricultural means· of production are too high. This in turn further restraints 
inputs into farming. Therefore, it is a matter of great urgency to find ways to 
realize the specialization of farming and its appropriate scale-management: 
increase long-term investment for agriculture, and promote technical transfor-
mation of agriculture, so as to raise the labour .productivity of farming and 
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increase the income of rural households engaged in grain production. Otherwise 
it would be extremely difficult for China to achieve the strategic goal of 
guaranteeing the per capita annual grain ration of 400 kilograms by the end of 
this century. 
III. Trends in the Changes in China's Industrial Structure 
The following two factors should be taken into consideration in the course of 
projecting and rectifying China's industrial structure: the correct understanding 
of China's present stage of development and China's economic development 
strategy. 
At present, China is still in the initial stage of socialist development charac-
terized by a low level in the development of its productive forces. China is now 
in a stage of transition from a low-income economy with a dual structure of 
coexistence of modern and backward sectors to a middle-income, single-structure 
modern economy. Changes in China's industrial structure will follow the general 
. ' path of structural change with economic development evident in other countries. 
However, China's economic development will also reflect its own uniqueness due 
to a variety of factors. Compared with other low-income countries, China has a 
higher rate of capital accumulation, more typical of a middle-income country; in 
fact, the.proportion of heavy industry in its national economy as a whole is higher 
than not only that of typical low-income countries, but also that of typical 
middle-income countries. Meanwhile, although the share of national income 
allocated to consumption is comparatively small; yet due to rational distribution, 
many indicators of the Chinese people's quality of life are approaching those for 
middle-income countries. 
The strategic plan laid down by Secretary General Zhao Ziyang at the 
Thirteenth Party Congress involves three steps: 
The first step is to double the GNP of 1980 and solve the problem of food 
and clothing for our people. This task has largely been fulfilled. The second 
step is to double it again by the end of this century, thus enabling our people 
to lead a-fairly comfortable life.5 The third step is by the middle of the next 
century to reach the per capita GNP level of moderately developed countries. 
This will mean that modernization has been basically accomplished and that 
our people have begun to enjoy a relatively affiuent life. Then, on this basis, 
China will continue to advance. 6 
China is now striving towards the realization of the second step. And the 
rational readjustment and reform of the country's industrial structure constitutes 
precisely an important foundation for accomplishing this step. 
From our point of view, the direction of industrial structural readjustment in 
this period should (a) suit changes in the consumption structure of the Chinese 
people and satisfy the demand of industrialization for infrastructure and basic 
industries; and (b) keep abreast of the developments of the global technological 
revolution. In line with these considerations, the development of China's 
industries and their structural transformation in this century can neither follow 
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the proposition that priority be given to the expansion of traditional and basic 
industries, and consequently postpone the development of new high-tech and 
technology-intensive industries to the day when the former have been built up; 
nor the proposition that priority be given to the development of new high-tech 
and technology/knowledge-intensive industries. Equal attention should be given 
to both new and traditional industries, and p. strong emphasis laid on the technical 
renovation of traditional industries. To be more exact, on the one hand, basic 
and traditional industries should be developed and transformed; on the other 
hand, close attention should be given to establishing and expanding new 
industries to combine labour-intensive ones with technology/knowledge-intensive 
industries and create a comparatively advanced industrial model or type of 
industrial structure capable of giving full play to China's comparative advantages. 
1. Forecast of Changes in China's Industrial Structure 
Heated discussions have been under way in China since 1986 cin the basic 
direction of industrial structural readjustment, without reaching a consensus. 
General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's report delivered at the Thirteenth Party 
Congress incorporated these discussions and summarized the tasks of China's 
structural readjustment and reform for the future as follows: 
-to continue to stress the strategic importance of agriculture and to develop 
the rural economy in an all-round way; 
-to strive to develop consumer-goods industries and at the same time to pay 
adequate attention to basic industries and infrastructure, accelerating the 
development of the energy industry (primarily electric power), of the raw 
and semi-finished materials industry (especially iron and steel, non-ferrous 
metals and chemicals) and of transport and communications (principally 
comprehensive systems of transport and of dissemination of information); 
to vigorously develop the machine-building and electronics industries, so · 
as to provide more and more advanced technical equipment to serve the 
modernization programme; and 
to energetically develop the building industry by commercializing housing, 
so as to gradually make this industry a major pillar of the economy. We 
must attach importance to the development of tertiary industry and strive 
for a co-ordinated growth of primary, secondary and tertiary industries. 7 
In accordance with the above-mentioned guidelines, the trends of development 
of various industrial sectors for the next decade or so are as follows. 
Changing Trends in the Proportional Relationship between Heavy and Light Industries 
The chief factors constraining the future development of heavy industry are 
energy shortage and lack of complete self-sufficiency in major raw materials as 
well as machinery and equipment. Based on the current consumption level, the 
gap between estimated production and demand in terms of output value may 
reach RMB50 billion by 1990, and RMB90 billion by the year 2000. Two possible 
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solutions to this problem are: practising restraint in the consumption of heavy 
industrial products, and importing the much-needed items. At present, China 
uses around half of its export earnings to import such heavy industrial products 
as steel, non-ferrou·s metals, chemicals, machinery, and equipment. This situation 
will persist till the year 2000. 
In the next few years, light industry will grow faster than heavy industry. 
However, along with the expansion of consumer durables, the demand for raw 
materials, machinery, and equipment will become stronger. As a result, there 
would be no substantial change in the proportion of production between light 
and heavy industries. 
In accordance with the forecast of quadrupling the_ 1980 gross output value-
of industry and agriculture by the year 2000, the average monthly consumption 
expenditure of urban and rural inhabitants may rise from RMB18.9 in .1980 to 
RMB24.4 in 1990 and RMB58.3 in the year 2000 (based on 1980 constant prices). 
As for light industry, in accordance with the China State Sta~istics Bureau's 
monthly per capita consumption level, and taking into consideration such factors 
as population increase, rise in collective consumption, export· growth, and 
enhanced commodity ratio of agricultural products, the development of the food 
industry, machine-building for light industry (including industries producing 
durable consumer goods), and light chemical industry (chemical industry for daily 
use, chemical fibre, and fine chemical industry) should be accelerated. 
As for structural changes within heavy industry, the trend is as follows: though 
the energy industry centred on electricity generating has been developing rapidly, 
it cannot meet the demands of a growing national economy, and has now become 
a bottleneck. Hence the expansion of the energy industry should be further 
accelerated. Even so, energy shortage is not expected to be alleviated drastically 
by the year 2000, due to the constraints of capital and technology. Therefore, the 
development of heavy energy-consuming industries such as the.metallurgical and 
building materials industries would certainly be restricted. Although China ranks 
high in the world in· terms of the volume of steel production, yet per capita 
production is still very low. As a result, since the beginning of the 1980s, it has 
spent several billion U.S. dollars annually on the importation of steel. In 1986 
alone, nearly US$6 billion8 were spent on the importation of 18.36 million tons 
of steel. It is estimated that in the final years of this century a considerable amount 
.of imported steel will still be needed. Meanwhile, the construction of coastal iron 
and steel enterprises using imported iron ore should be speeded up. Because 
bulky building materials have low value and high transportation costs, it would 
be uneconomical to import them from· abroad.· Therefore, their adequate supply 
should be based upon accelerated domestic expansion. Within heavy industries, 
machine-building and electronic industries are the most promising. Both will be 
energetically promoted to become export-oriented sectors for earning foreign 
exchange. Meanwhile, the current unfavourable balance of trade for heavy 
chemical products will persist because of the restraints of energy and capital 
shortages on the expansion of the heavy chemical industry and the time needed 
for its technical upgrading. 
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Changing Trends in the Relationship between New and Traditional Industries 
In the light of the present structure and future development needs, there will 
certainly be some progress for the new industries, particularly electronics, the 
growth rate of which will far surpass the national average. 
Chinese scholars have different estimates of the possible emphasis on new 
high-tech industries in the gross output value of agriculture and industry by the 
·· year 2000. Our·e~timate puts the figure above 10 per cent. Traditional industries 
now occupy a dominant position in China's indust_rial structure, and this 
dominance will not change by the year 2000. In order to satisfy the basic daily 
needs of one billion people, the current fundamental role of the traditional 
industries should be brought into full play. Therefore, we believe that China will 
strive for a steady growth of traditional industries on the basis of speeding up 
technical progress and innovation. In our judgement, it would be a safe and 
reliable approach for China to develop traditional industries by taking advantage 
of the country's vast domestic market on the one hand, and revamp them as well 
as enhance high-tech new industries by adopting advanced foreign technology 
on the other hand. In his report to the Thirteenth Party Congress, General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang advocated that 
We should ... expand the whole economy by emphasising the transformation 
and development of our traditional industries through the application of 
advanced technologies while at the same time developing new high-technology 
. 9 . 
industries. 
This policy suits China's actual conditions and is therefore feasible. It should thus 
be taken as the country's industrial development strategy for a fairly long period 
into the future. 
Changing Trends in the Relationship between the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries 
The ratio between the growth rate of the extractive and manufacturing industries 
was around 1:1.4 over the past three decades, with the slower growth of the 
extractive industry resulting in shortages of energy and raw . materials. This 
situation was brought about by the extractive industry's low rates of processing 
and resource utilization, and the rapid expansion of the manufacturing industry. 
To remedy this situation, in the future China should speed up the growth of the 
extractive industry. Meanwhile, it should also raise the degree of processing, 
expand the technology/knowledge-intensive industries, and lower the proportion 
of the high energy/resource-consuming industries. 
Changing Trends in the Relationship between Production and Infrastructure 
Accelerating the construction and expansion of infrastructure and ra1smg its 
shares in employment, national income, and the gross social output is a major 
task facing China in the course of its industrial development and transformation 
of the industrial structure. 
., 
·' 
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In the next decade, China will try its best to solve the problems of transport 
and electricity, two bottlenecks restraining economic growth. The forward 
coefficient of electricity should be raised. The increase of freight capacity and the 
growth of production should be harmonized to satisfy the needs of the growing 
rural commodity economy, regional economic intercourse, and the expansion of 
foreign trade·. 
Meanwhile, China should also accelerate the development of informiition and 
communications industries so as to overcome the backwardness of postal and 
telecommunications setvices. The popularization rate of telephone service will i;>e 
raised from 0.6 per cent in 1980 to at least 3 per cent in the year 2000. 
Along with the big shift of the farming population to non-farming occupations, 
and the growing importance of housing in the people's consumption basket, the 
building industry is expected to grow also rather rapidly. Taking into considera-
tion the fact that the building industry's labour productivity improves rather 
·slowly, the increase of employment in this sector will be faster than that in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Changing Trends in the Proportion among Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Sectors 
The general global experience has been that, with economic growth, the share 
of the primary sector falls, while that of the secondary sector rises and then falls, 
and that of the tertiary sector rises continuously. The transformation of China's 
production structure will also follow this pattern, but with Chinese characteristics. 
Due to the rapid development of township and village industries, rural com-
munic.ations, commerce, and service trades, the share of the primary sector will 
decline, that of the secondary sector will steadily rise, and that of the tertiary 
sector will rise comparatively rapidly. Needless to say, due to the serious 
underdevelopment of the tertiary sector at present, its size will still be smaller 
than the other two. But the increase of commercial circulation and the enhance-
ment of output value and national inco".Ile created by service trades will surpass 
the increase of national income and d.-; gross output value of agriculture and 
industry. The employment of the service trades will also increase faster than that 
in other sectors. 
2. Forecast of Changes in Regional Economic Structures 
As noted earlier, the overlapping of provincial and city industrial structures is 
very serious. As a consequence, the structural division of labour between the 
resource and processing provinces is very unclear and not according to the 
comparative advantages of resources or productive forces of the respective 
provinces. While the national economy is progressing, a rational pattern of 
division of labour among the provinces is yet to take shape. Evidently, China 
should improve the regional structure of its economy in· the final years of this 
century while readjusting its industrial structure at the same time. Efforts will 
be made to combine these two tasks so as to create a special industrial distribution 
system with national and regional industries playing their respective roles while 
forming an organized whole at the same time. 
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A basic concept l.n the regional distribution of China's economy is the 
satisfactory combination of progress in the Eastern Region with the development 
of the Central and Western Regions. IO · 
China can be divided into three major economic regions in terms of the level 
of economic development, degree of skilfulness of labour, distribution of natural 
resources, conditions of transport and communications, and economic-geographi-
cal location. 
The Eastern Region comprises the provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Shahdong, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region, and the municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. It is located 
in China's coastal areas, accounting for 14.2 per cent of the nation's territory, 
41.2 per cent of its population, and 45 per cent of its 400,000 industrial enterprises. 
In 1985, the output value of industry and agriculture of this region amounted to 
56.9 per cent of the national total. Except for the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region, the economic-technological basis of this region is comparatively strong, 
its external and.internal transport and communications comparatively advanced, 
and its scientific, educational, and cultural levels comparatively high. Historically, 
it also had widespread economic, technological, and cultural links with foreign 
countries. Now it has become the major base area for export, making up around 
80 per cent of China's total export volume. But, most places in this region are 
short of resources. Moreover, the region faces acute transportation strains and 
depends on the interior of China for most of its energy andraw material supplies. 
The Central Region comprises the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shaanxi, : . 
Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Shanxi, Sichuan, and the Inner Mon- . 
golian Autonomous Region, accounting for 34.3 per cent of the nation's territory 
and making up 47.9 per cent of its population. In 1985, the output value of 
industry and agriculture of this region amounted to 37 .2 per cent of the national 
total. The striking feature of this region is its comparative advantage in energy 
and mineral resources of various metals and non-metallic minerals, and its 
comprehensive economic advantage in technology, science, and transport and 
communications. Of the forty kinds of major mineral resources in the country, 
more than half (thirty kinds) come from this region. In the Sixth Five-Year-Plan 
period, the Central Region earned foreign exchange approaching US$3.1 billion 
from export, accounting for 12 per cent of the national total. 
The Western Regio~ comprises Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Gansu, Qj.rtghai, 
Guizhou, and Yunnan, accounting for 51.5 per cent of the nation's territory but 
only 6.4 per cent of its population. In 1985, the output value of industry and 
agriculture in this region amounted to 5.9 per cent of the national total. The 
region is comparatively rich in natural and animal husbandry resources, but it 
has the following disadvantages: 
a. poor biological environment; 
b. weak industrial and agricultural foundations; 
c. underdeveloped commodity economy and scientific-tehnological and cul-
tural undertakings; 
d:. meagre qualified personnel; and 
e; poorly developed transport and communications systems. 
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Taking into consideration the realities of the above-mentioned resource 
distribution and uneven development of productive forces, China should give full 
play to the important role of the comparatively economically-advanced Eastern 
Region in importing from the outside world and linking with the interior of the 
country in the remaining years of this century, while gradually speeding up the 
development of the Central and Western Regions at the same time. Thus each 
region will be able to give full play to comparative advantage. Consequently, a 
rational division of labour among the regions and an ideal regional economic 
structure will emerge through mutual opening and equal exchange. 
In late 1987 and early 1988, after having conducted two inspection tours of 
coastal provinces and cities, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang made a proposal 
concerning the development strategy for the coastal areas. He suggested that 
these areas should grasp the current opportunity of structural adjustment in the 
developed world, and bring their comparative advantages into full play by 
. developing labour-intensive industries and building up an export-oriented 
economy so as to take their place in the international market gradually and in a 
guided way. He pointed out that 
If the coastal areas, including the Zhujiang [Pearl] and Changjiang [Yangtze] 
River Deltas, the Southern Fujian triangle, and the Shandong and Liaoning 
peninsulas, fulfil their potential on the international market, and develop a 
solid export-oriented economy, this will not only expedite the economic 
development of the coastal areas themselves, but will certainly also boost the 
development of the central and western regions. 
To realize this strategy, China should first "lay emphasis on developing 
labour-intensive industries", for example processing with supplied and imported 
materials, developing the power industry so as to overcome energy shortage, 
expanding the building materials industry, and building some high-tech in-
dustries. Second, China should follow the principle of "putting both ends of the 
production process (the supply of raw materials and the marketing of products) 
on the world market", 11 and import raw materials and export products on a large 
scale. This is indeed a fairly attractive strategic concept. We believe concrete 
measures will be worked out for its prompt implementation. 
At present, the majority of Chinese economists have reached a consensus on 
the medium- and long-term programmes for China's regional economic structure. 
Bearing in mind the overall interests of the national economy, they maintain that 
in the 1986-95 period, China should emphasize industrial development in the 
Eastern Region and the large-sized energy bases in Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and 
Western Henan in the Central Region. This will constitute a crucial step in 
ensuring the smooth advance of the entire national economy into the 1990s 
through accelerated tackling of three essential factors of production (energy, 
capital, and technology) which constrains the all-round development of the 
national economy. By the middle of the 1990s, the Central Region will gradually 
become the priority area for economic construction. Apart from continuing the 
building of the above-mentioned energy bases, the Wuhan-Yichang-Chungqing 
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industrial belt along the Changjiang (Yangtze) River centred on the construction 
of the huge Three Gorges power station and the Zhenzhou-Xian-Lanzhou 
industrial belt along the Lunghai railway will be strengthened, thus turning these 
two industrial belts into bridgeheads for supporting massive development of the 
Western Region in the future. With the arrival of the twenty-first century, the 
priority area for economic construction will gradually shift to Southwestern and 
Northwestern China, by turning such provinces and autonomous regions in the 
Western Region as Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Xinjiang, and Qinghai into major 
industrial bases. 
The industrial development strategy for the three major economic regions up 
to the end of this century may be summarized as follows: 
Transforming and Revitalizing the Old Industrial Base. After the progress of three or 
more decades, the Eastern Region has become the most advanced area in the 
country. Due to past deviations in the guiding principle,- howev~r, China 
neglected to transform and upgrade this old industrial base in time with advanced 
technology, resulting in ageing industrial, product, and technological structures 
and other aspects. The Chinese Government has now given priority to economic 
construction in the Eastern region. It will speed up development in the four 
Special Economic Zones, fifteen open port cities, and such Economic Develop-
ment Areas as Hainan Island, the Pearl and Changjiang River Deltas, the 
"Golden Triangle" in South Fujian, and the Liaodong and Jiaodong Peninsulas 
to form step by step a coastal industrial belt and simultaneously an open economic 
belt stretching from Dalian Port in the north to Beihai City in the south, capable 
of giving full play to its comparative advantage in economic/technological 
progress and economic co-operation with foreign countries. 
In relation to the industrial structure in the coastal belt, China will pay 
attention to expanding labour-intensive and/or labour-intensive-cum-knowledge-
intensive industries. But in cities with more advanced economic and scientific-
technological foundation such as Shanghai, it will gradually shift priority to 
technology/knowledge-intensive industries and strive for the sophistication of its 
industrial and product structures by raisirig the international competitiveness of 
its export-oriented products to meet the needs of the international market and 
by energetically promoting the production Of high-grade, precis'ion, and advanced 
industrial products and such service trades as information and consultancy. The 
Eastern Region will undertake the task of introducing and absorbing foreign 
advanced technology, and spreading to the interior of the country this foreign as 
well as its own advanced technology. At the same time, the Eastern Region should 
also play the role of a door and bridge, that is become a base for launching new 
industries and upgrading the products of old ones by adopting new technologies, 
and at the same time become a major base for earning foreign exchange through 
exporting. 
Tapping the Great Potentials of the Central Region. This region has been the centre 
for major construction investment since 1958. Its rich energy resources and 
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abundant mineral resources of chemical materials and ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals determined its strategic position of "linking up" the Eastern and Western 
Regions. 
What merits attention is the fact that since the sixties an industrial system 
based on heavy industries has taken shape in this region. This includes nuclear 
energy, metallurgical industry, spaceflight, aviation, electronics, and chemical and 
machine-building industries. This industrial system is staffed with a stro!).g 
contingent of scientists and research personnel. In the defence enterprises, there 
are a number of highly qualified scientists and technicians, with great poten-
tialities for the economic development of this region. China will strengthen the 
development of energy resources, exploit and utilize the metallic and non-metallic 
resources in this region, launch new industries, and upgrade traditional ones. In 
some central cities in this region, it is possible to establish technology-intensiye 
zones for new industries, and major military and civilian enterprises will be 
encouraged to stretch out their antennae to the coastal region. 
Making Initial Preparations for Large-Scale Development of the VVestern Region. The 
Western Region is an area yet to be developed. Large-scale initial preparations 
for development in this region should be made in the eighties and early nineties. 
'For this, China should strengthen general resource surveying and prospecting; 
give priority to developing the rich deposits in this region which are badly-needed 
by the country at present; improve local transport and communications; and 
utilize the comparative advantage of this region in agricultural resources to 
promote the processing of agricultural and animal husbandry products. 
3. Forecast of Changes in the Commodity Structure of Foreign Trade 
The existence of foreign trade has a strong impact on changes in a nation's 
industrial structure. But apart from industrial structure, there are still many 
factors influencing a nation's import-export commodity structure, such as the 
demand and supply structure of the international market, natural resource 
endowment, level of scientific-technological development, size of domestic 
market, degree of economic openness to the outside world, socio-economic system, 
and stage of economic development. Generally speaking, changes in the industrial 
structure have a bigger and more direct impact on outward-oriented small market 
economies than on large, domestic-demand-dominant planned economies. 
China is a large socialist country with one billion people. It is still in the early 
stages of industrialization, with its commodity economy underdeveloped, and its 
opening to the outside world just begun. For a long time, foreign trade 'played 
only a secondary role in regulating surplus and deficiency in the development of 
Chinis national economy. Generally, the connection between import and the 
economic development plan· ~r industrial policy (mainly in the 1952-57 First 
Five-Year-Plan and the 197 6-80 Sixth Five-Year-Plan periods) is more direct; 
export has no co-ordinated linkage whatever with industrial policy as a whole, 
a~d its basic function is to earn enough foreign exchange to pay for imports. 
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Therefore, the export commodity structure only passively reflects China's 
industrial and agricultural production, being dominated by labour/resource-· 
intensive industries. 
In recent years, the state has formulated a policy of striving for the realization 
of the dual shifts in China's export commodity structure, namely the shift from 
primary products to manufactured goods, and the shift from low- to high-degree 
processing. As a result, the proportion of new products and high-degree processing 
goods has risen among the export commodities. But changes in export commodity 
structure are constrained by many factors, some of which can be improved in 
the short term, while the improvement of others needs a longer time. 
China's policy is to adopt an export promotion strategy for such labour-inten-
sive products as textiles and light industrial goods, and for agricultural and 
mineral products. This is the foundation of the current strategy model for foreign 
economic and trade relations, because China still enjoys comparative advantage 
in these respects. On the other hand, compared with advanced countries, China 
evidently does not, on the whole, enjoy comparative advantage in the high-
technology products. 
For the time being, exports of mechanical, electrical, and chemical products 
still play only a secondary role, but their importance will gradually rise and 
eventually replace primary and labour/resource-intensive products in China's 
strategy for foreign economic and trade relations. 
The realization of the above-mentioned strategy will certainly be reflected in 
changes in China's import-export commodity structure. Taking into account the 
needs of the international market and its comparative advantage, China will 
energetically promote those industries and products for export which enjoy 
international competitiveness, and show quick and better economic results. 
Meanwhile, China will also strive to raise the quality of its export commodities 
and penetrate the international market in a multidirectional way. The emphasis 
of import shall be on the introduction of technology and key equipment. Whatever 
major equipment and other products that are suitable for domestic production 
will be produced inside the country. 
In readjusting China's export commodities, China will on the one hand utilize 
the comparative advantage of the existing name brand commodities, bringing 
their mainstay role in earning foreign exchange into full play, and on the other 
hand support those new commodities which do not evidently enjoy comparative 
advantage for the time being, yet have great potentialities, so as to let them 
replace gradually those commodities which are losing in comparative advantage. 
In the short term, primary products, textiles, and light industrial goods will still 
be the major items for export because they still enjoy comparative advantage. 
Oil and coal will also be exported in large quantities. Meanwhile, the export of 
products of agriculture and sideline occupations will also be enhanced. For textiles 
and light industrial goods, the chief task is to raise their unit-added-value and 
bring about the shift from reliance on quantitative increase for export growth to 
reliance on qualitative improvement and better economic results by transforming 
popular low- and medium-grade goods into high-grade ones and diversifying 
their varieties and specifications. 12 
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In the meantime, China should develop its potential advantage for export of 
mechanical and electrical goods. China has already established a system of 
machine-building and electrical ,equipment industries with complete sectors, 
advanced equipment, modern technology, and qualified technical personnel. In 
1984, the original value of the fixed assets of China's machine-building and 
electrical equipment industries amounted to 24 per cent of the national total. In 
1985, the gross output value of machine-building and electrical equipment 
industries reached RMB234 billion, almost double that of 1980, with an average 
annual growth rate of 14.4 per cent. China's machine-building and electrical 
equipment industries should take up and are fully capable of taking up a bigger 
share of the global export of mechanical-electrical products in its export 
commodity ~om position in the final years of this century. 13 
As for the import commodity structure, in the light of the above-mentioned 
projected industrial policy, the following changes are expected to take place by 
the end of this century. 
1. The import of the means of production will occupy a dominant position 
and that of the means of livelihood a secondary position. The proportion 
of the means of production in China's import will rise while that of the 
means of livelihood will fall, although the absolute volume for the latter 
will rise. 
2. In the composition of the means of production, the imports of machinery, 
equipment (inch~ding technology), and industrial raw materials will rise, 
while imports of the materials for agricultural production will correspond-
ingly fall. 
3. For imports of machinery and equipment, attention will be paid to raising 
the proportion of software technology and appropriately reducing the 
proportion of complete sets of equipment. 
IV. Impact of China's Industrial Structural Readjustment 
· on China-ASEAN Economic Relations 
First of all, it is assumed here that China will largely achieve its project goals of 
industrial structural readjustment and that the current trend of growing China-
ASEAN economic relations will also continue. Taking account_.-0f possible 
uncertainties in mutual relations, the general trend in bilateral relations are as 
follows: 
(1) It can be expected that China's national economy will register a steady growth 
with rationalization of China's industrial structure, improvement in specializa-
tion, rationalization of the scale of operation, and the widening of the scope of 
reform of the economic management system, thus fulfilling its development goals. 
We also believe that ASEAN nations will also accomplish their respective tasks 
of economic readjustment in response to changes in international economic 
1conditions and furthe:r enhance their respective economic strength. Thus, the 
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possible scope for economic co-operation between ASEAN nations and China 
will certainly increase._ 
(2) By the end of this century, China's economy will gradually develop a 
comparatively rational, multi-level structure suitable to its special features and 
its stage of development. It will possess a comparatively developed integrated 
industrial system and a modern agriculture with a comparatively harmonious 
development of farming, animal husbandry, forestry, fishery, and other sideline 
occupations. Industry will largely employ medium technology, but there will also 
exist some high-tech industrial sectors such as spaceflight, nuclear energy, 
bio-engineering, information, laser, and new materials industries. Compared with 
other developing countries, China has a greater scientific-technological strength. 
China· will still have a large number of enterprises employing a comparatively 
backward technology and means of production, turning out low-grade products 
with a low degree of processing. Set against the level of division of laqour in the 
world economy, and in the light of China's current stage of economic development, 
China will still lay the stress on expanding traditional industries including iron, 
steel, automobile, shipbuilding, heavy chemical, textiles, food, and building 
industries in this century and beyond. 
ASEAN countries, except for Singapore, are resource-rich countries, and this 
is where their comparative advantages lie. From. the sixties to the early eighties, 
their economic growth depended mainly on the export of primary products. But 
after twenty and more years of rapid economic growth, Singapore has become a 
newly industrialized country with some high-tech industrial sectors. Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand have also laid a fairly solid foundation for their 
manufacturing industries. Indonesia started its industrialization later than the 
other four, but is vigorously catching up. Since modern industries in ASEAN 
countries were mostly set up by foreign direct investment, generally they are 
more competitive. In addition, ASEAN countries, except for Singapore and 
Brunei, have emerged from a monoculture or reliance on a few crops and made 
remarkable achievements in the· diversification of their agricultural production. 
This is particularly true of Malaysia and Thailand. ·ASEAN can be considered 
as an economic entity boasting of a multi-level industrial structure. 
With such a multi-level industrial structure, ASEAN countries and China have 
the following advantages for the development of mutual economic and trade 
relations. 
a. China will possibly become a bigger market for industrial raw material from ASEAN 
countries. The new technological revolution and shift of industrial structure in 
advanced Western countries in the direction of high technology have led to 
stagnation and even dedine in imports of irµklstrial raw materials from the 
developing countries, including ASEAN nations. Under such circumstances, it 
is quite possible that China will absorb an increasing part of ASEAN's industrial 
raw materials. China annually imports from abroad millions of tons of iron ore 
to meet the needs of its coastal ironworks. Beginning from 1985, China has been 
importing around 100,000 tons of iron from Malaysia-This represents only a 
:~ 
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small fraction of China's imported iron. China also needs to import copper and 
the Philippines can become an important supply source. For a long time to come, 
there will be a need for China to import timber, an important export of the 
ASEAN countries. Though China is a major exporter of textiles, it is not fully 
self-sufficient in some chemical fibres, and needs to import these from foreign 
countries including Singapore and Thailand. Also, demand for automobiles is 
rising rapidly in China. In 1984 and 1985, China imported over 600,000 cars 
from abroad, at a cost of more than US$4 billion, far exceeding the projected 
investment allocated to the automobile industry in the Seventh Five-Year-Plan 
period. By the year 2000, China is expected to have 13 to 15 million automobiles, 
or 4 to 4.7 times the 1985 figure. Obviously, a way out should be sought in 
domestic production. This will evidently provide a growing export market for 
rubber for ASEAN countries. 14 
b. The economic and trade relationships between ASEAN and China are mainly based on a 
horizontal division of labour. There exists the possibility of exchange from primary 
to high-tech products. Industrial manufactures are many and varied, and their 
variety will further increase with economic and technological progress. This will 
expand mutual economic and trade relations. The point is whether or not each 
country can provide the other with good quality products at competitive prices. 
China's machine-building industry possesses a comparatively powerful produc-
tion capacity and some independent research and development ability. It is 
expected to constitute a major export commodity in China's long-term economic 
programme. But thus far mechanical and electrical products make up only a 
small proportion of China's export commodities to the ASEAN countries, mainly 
because of inability to meet the requirements of quality, variety, complete sets, 
and after-sale service. If significant progress could be made in China's technologi-
cal upgrading and reforms in industrial organization and management system 
(including the foreign trade system), these defects in China's mechanical and 
electrical products can be corrected and their competitiveness in ASEAN 
countries enhanced. 
So far as ASEAN countries are concerned, their exports to China also 
underwent compositional changes in the late seventies. Apart from traditional 
primary products, other products - steel, offshore drilling platforms, kinescopes, 
refrigerators, car parts, chemical fibres, plywood, cement, pesticides, and chemical 
fertilizers - have also been exported. With progress in industrialization, the 
export of manufactured goods from the ASEAN countries to China will increase in 
quantity and variety. Apart from the traditional textile and light industrial 
products, the more competitive products which China may be able to provide in the 
future are as follows: ships, machine tools, farm machinery, medicine, medical 
equipment, computer software, and laser and spaceflight equipment. 
c. Mutual transfer of suitable technology has a bright future. In recent years, ASEAN 
countries have transferred to China many items of suitable technology through 
such channels as joint-ventures, project contracting, personnel training, under-
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taking technical revamping of factories, and patent selling. Though transfer of 
suitable technology from China to ASEAN began only in the last several years, 
it will grow with progress in China's economic reform and readjustment. Chinese 
authorities concerned have already received nearly thirty thousand applications 
for patent rights, mostly items of suitable technology needed in the developing 
countries and capable of being marketing abroad. Between 1979 and 1987, 
China's total export of technology reached around US$0.2 billion, covering 
matured industrial expertise, various kinds of new technologies, skills of tradi-
tional arts and crafts, and a small amount of laboratory technology. Among the 
countries and regions which imported technologies from China are Japan, the 
United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Democratic Republic of Germany, Brazil, Nepal, Burundi, and Hong 
Kong. 
d. Complementarity in agricultural products exists between ASEAN countries and China due 
to differences in natural environment, geographical conditions, and development priority. This 
has been demonstrated by years of trading practice and technical exchange in 
agriculture between the two sides in recent years. Reform and readjustment of 
economic structure in China's countryside will increase the variety of China's 
agricultural products. Meanwhile, ASEAN countries are also striving for diver-
sification of their agriculture. This trend will certainly further strengthen 
agricultural complementarity between the two sides. Thailand used to show 
concern that it would clash with China in the export of grain on the international 
market. In reality, however, in recent years China's grain export has not posed 
any threat to Thailand. The main reasons for the non-existence of threat are as 
follows: (a) China only exports a small volume of grain annually, chiefly for 
regulation of variety; (b) China also imports a considerable volume of grain 
annually from foreign countries including Thailand, and in lean years the amount 
of import is usually larger than that of export; and ( c) Thailand evidently enjoys 
comparative advantage in grain production over China. For the long-term, China 
should work very hard to achieve the goal of an average annual per capita holding 
of 400 kilograms of grain by the end of this century. However, even if this goal 
is achieved, it would still represent only a low level of self-sufficiency. Besides, 
China's Southeastern area, which keeps close economic relations with ASEAN 
countries, would give priority to economic crops, aquatics breeding, and other 
sideline occupations instead of grain production, due to scarcity of land and 
over-population. With the ease of transportation, it is quite possible for the 
Southeastern coastal area to import a certain amount bf grain for a long time to 
come. Meanwhile, it is also quite possible for this area to import a greater amount 
of food or other agricultural prdducts from ASEAN countries as a result of the 
implementation of the development strategy calling for more trade. 
(3) The formulation of China's industrial restructuring programme will be able 
to provide a better guide to the direction of foreign investment. Though China 
has already promulgated a series of laws and regulations on foreign investment, 
the absence of a well-defined, long-term industrial structure, and industrial 
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sectoral structur~programme has meant that the regulations on foreign invest-
ment are not well-defined. This has made the foreign investors, including those 
from ASEAN countries, in need of a dependable basis when selecting investment 
projects and assessing their feasibility, thus affecting their enthusiasm for 
investment in China. The improvement of China's investment environment calls 
for greater efforts from the departments concerned, but the formulation of an 
industrial structure programme is no doubt the prerequisite. 
( 4) China's search for a structural policy in pursuit of establishing stable regional 
economic relations will have a far-reaching impact on its economic relations with 
ASEAN countries. As these countries are China's close neighbours, they ought 
to have a bigger role in China's foreign relations. It is not difficult to recognize 
from the above analysis that there exist advantageous conditions for establishing 
structural co-operation between ASEAN countries and China. But in projecting 
a long-term economic relationship with these countries, China is faced with some 
uncertain external factors, including some non-economic barriers. These cannot 
be solved by China's unilateral effort. 
( 5) Readjustment of China's industrial structure will strengthen China's 
economic vitality and consequently its competitiveness with ASEAN countries. 
Of all the ASEAN countries, Singapore's level of economic development is in a 
general sense more advanced than that of China, therefore its complementarity 
with China is more striking. Brunei produces mainly oil and does not compete 
with China. As for the other four ASEAN countries, there will be unavoidable 
competition with China in certain products in the international market, because 
they are quite similar to China in the level of economic development. 
What merits exploration here is the impact of China's coastal area development 
strategy on its economic relations with ASEAN countries. As noted earlier, in 
this vast area a method called san lai yi bu will be widely adopted for developing 
export-oriented labour-intensive industries with foreign investment. San lai yi bu 
literally means "processing with materials sent in from abroad, manufacturing 
according to the designs and patterns sent in, assembling with parts sent in, and 
_engaging in compensation trade"; or processing, for short. Remarkable progress 
in adopt_ing this method has been made in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong 
Provin·ce in recent years by absorbing investment mainly from Hong Kong and 
Macao for boosting rapid economic advances. 
Guangdong's success story hinged largely on its advantage of geographical 
proximity to Hong Kong and Macao. Therefore, in our view, the success or 
failure of the other provinces in following the Guangdong model will depend to 
a considerable extent on whether or not they will be able to absorb foreign 
investment from other countries and regions. This calls for strenuous effort on 
the part of these provinces to improve their investment environment, one that 
allows foreign businessmen to run foreign-funded enterprises according to 
international norms practised in most countries. In our judgement, the export-
oriented labour-intensive industries characterized by the san lai yi bu method will 
be developed mainly in special economic zones and coastal open cities and areas. 
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If the advantage of low-paid labour can be maintained in the coastal areas, then 
bright prospects may be in sight. As for the types of products, judging by demands 
in the international market and China's comparative advantages, the development 
of such industries as footwear, garments, toys, household electric appliances, metal 
fittings, new building materials, general electronics products, plastic products, 
and food seem to have good prospects. 
It should be pointed out here. that with the diversity of Jabour-intensive. 
industries and products, China and ASEAN countries can help supply each other's 
needs, for instance textiles, clothing, household electric appliances, leather and 
wood products, and furniture. Nevertheless, since most ASEAN .countries are 
exporters of labour-intensive products, there unavoidably exists competition 
between them and China in the third countries. And, this competition will possibly 
intensify with the implementation of the export-oriented development strategy 
in China's coastal areas. 
Besides, there also exists some competition between ASEAN countries and 
China in attracting foreign investment. The prevailing international opinion is 
that the investment environments in the ASEAN countries are somewhat better 
than that in China. But if China's industrial restructuring progresses smoothly, 
especially if the export-oriented development ·strategy together with other 
supporting measures are carried o.ut in time in China's coastal areas, then its 
inherent or potential advantages such as low-paid labour, stronger scientific-tech-
nological power, and vast market for import substitution' will appeal to foreign 
investment more strongly. 
While China will compete with ASEAN for foreign investment, the vigorous 
development of labour-intensive industries in China's coastal areas will also 
provide entrepreneurs in some ASEAN countries with ·opportunities for invest-
ment because these labour-intensive industries are precisely what these 
entrepreneurs are familiar with, in addition to being suitable for the size of their 
capital, technological level, and managerial experience. For example, Thailand 
is China's strong competitor in labour-intensive industries, yet it is precisely the 
Thai businessmen .who have shown intense interest in investing in such Chinese 
industries. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that China will depend mainly on its domestic 
demand for economic deyelopment for a considerably long period of time into 
the future, and the share of foreign trade in China's GNP will continue to be 
small. It is therefore unrealistic to expect intense competition between ASEAN 
countries and China in international trade in the foreseeable future. What is 
more, due to differences in industrial structures, the industrial projects designed 
to attract foreign investment by both China and ASEAN are also somewhat 
different. More importantly, both the ASEAN countries and China are developing 
countries. They are both striving to improve their status in the imernational 
division oflabour and trying to do away with the irrational international economic 
order. Furthermore, they ·are both faced with the threat of trade protectionism 
from the advanced countries. Common interests will help enhance mutual 
economic relations. 
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There are two main sections in this study. The first reviews the strategic policy 
dimension and posture of ASEAN members in their external economic relations 
and their implications for ASEAN-China economic relations. The second 
examines the policy instruments and institutional mechanisms of individual 
ASEAN countries which have evolved in response to the economic opening up 
of China and in the context of its new economic relationship with ASEAN 
countries. 
It is inaccurate to suggest that there is a collective ASEAN posture with regard 
to external economic relations with China. To date there are no official 
ASEAN-wide policies and institutional mechanisms which constitute the official 
conduits for economic relations between ASEAN as a group on the one hand 
and China on the other. All existing economic relationships, particularly at the 
governmental level, are conducted at the national level on a bilateral plane. 
There are, however, some ASEAN private sector initiatives to approach China 
collectively. The approach is nascent and at the brainstorming stage. In particular, 
the G-14 for ASEAN Economic Co-operation and Integration, initiated by 
ASEAN-Chambers of Commerce and Industry, has suggested collective ASEAN 
initiatives with socialist economies which include China. But, for its rhetoric and 
numerous recommendations, the question of the China-ASEAN economic 
relations was deliberately made a low priority and conspicuously kept at a low 
profile. 
However, with respect to its external economic relationships with other 
countries, ASEAN has developed various institutional mechanisms and broad , 
pro-active policies collectively to have dialogues with major countries (particularly 
the United States, Japan, and EEC members) and to have a common stand on 
certain global economic issues (particularly in trade and protectionism). There 
are definitely areas of commonality and shared interests in regional and global 
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economic issues, and it is in these that one can identify a common, if not collective, 
policy position. In spite of this, we must recognize that there are substantial 
differences in views and postures a,mong the ASEAN countries on various global 
economic matters. The following section will highlight some of these collective 
ASEAN policy positions. 
II. ASEAN Management .of External Economic Relations: 
Implications for ASEAN-China Relations 
All ASEAN members are major trading nations. Indeed the principal source of 
economic growth is trade. Thus all the ASEAN primary commodity producers 
need the industrial markets of advanced economies. And all ASEAN members, 
because of their small domestic markets, adopt the strategy of export-driven 
industrialization. In many ways, ASEAN countries are price-takers and market-
takers for almost, if not all, their major exports. This really means they generally 
have no control of the external economic environment. 
In their search for opportunities, future directions, and options, ASEAN 
countries are now confronted with the following threats: 
1. The practice of economic mercantilism by the economic powers which adopt 
a two-pronged strategy of carving out international m.arkets among them-
selves while protecting their domestic markets. This threatens the success 
of ASEAN industrialization programmes. 
2. The long-term decline of primary commodity prices due to technological 
innovations and the decoupling of the primary industry from the manufac-
turing- and information-based industry. This undermines the existing 
production base of most ASEAN economies. 
3. The increasing competition from other Newly Industrializing Economies 
and other low wage economies. This pressurizes ASEAN countries in their 
search for viable alternatives. 
4. The uncertainties of the global financial and foreign exchange systems. This 
disrupts the functioning of the real economy. 
These are external factors which can destroy the short-term growth plans and 
long-term development strategies of the ASEAN economies. And these a.re the 
parameters which ASEAN countries must thus respond to in the management 
of their external economic policies and strategies. 
The commonality of interests among ASEAN countries thus lies in their 
dependency on the external markets and the threats of the international economic 
environment. This provides the arena for convergence of common economic 
interests and policy stance. 
It is clear that the use of economic diplomacy by ASEAN countries is for the 
enhancement of their overall economic security and long-term economic growth 
and is not aimed at geopolitical objectives. The strategies have no relation to 
geopolitical issues in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, these policies and game 
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plans are problem-targeted and sector-specific. They are used as part of overall 
economic diplomacy. 
Because of the wide ramifications and diffused impact of these external 
economic management policies and economic diplomacy of ASEAN countries 
(and for that matter China's), it is inevitable that their economic interests would 
overlap in both mutual benefit and conflict zones. This is inevitable even though 
the geo-economic objectives of the individual ASEAN countries are different from 
China. The reason is because ASEAN has few strategic export-led options. For 
instance, there is a wide range of export strategies and export directions which 
both similarly exploit. 
The economic statecraft of ASEAN countries includes a wide range of 
strategies, depending on the situation and country group. First, occasionally 
ASEAN countries have used the tactic of geopolitical security in negotiating for 
bilateral benefits from the non-communist economic ·powers. Thailand and 
Singapore have used this type of strategy. Second, while not as sophisticated as 
South Korea and Taiwan, individual ASEAN members have also begun to use 
lobbying tactics. The recent controversy over palm oil between Malaysia and the 
United States exemplifies this. Third, mechanisms like bilateral dialogue sessions, 
including the "6 plus 5" and "6 plus 1" approaches, between ASEAN as a 
group and the major industrial powers are now institutionalized into the foreign 
relations framework of ASEAN and effectively used. Fourth, ASEAN members 
have also collectively and individually actively used regional institutions and 
international organizations like GATT to articulate their aspirations and posi-
tions on economic matters which affect their well-being. Last, ASEAN countries 
also use various strategic trade-offs in trade and market access negotiations. 
Thailand liberalized the import of soya bean products for the United States as 
part of bilateral reciprocity. 
During the last three years, as a response to the challenges of the world 
economic downturn, ASEAN reformulated its economic strategies to regenerate 
positive economic growth. Singapore and Thailand are exemplary of thi~ 
energetic search for new directions and export markets, and they have succeeded 
quite well. All the ASEAN countries now attach priority to trade policy which 
can promote manufactures and agricultural exports and investment strategies 
which can encourage the inflow of foreign capital and technology. 
As early as 1973, ASEAN collectively made a policy stand on international 
commodity issues, including the synthetic rubber negotiation with Japan and 
tariff preferences on ASEAN-sourced products with the EEC. Since 1976 dialogue 
sessions were initiated with Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, and the 
United States (started in 1977) and international organizations like the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). In some cases, like the 
European Community (EC) and Canada, formal co-operation agreements were 
signed. Such dialogue sessions are not only useful mechanisms for reviewing trade-
related and market-access issues but have been instrumental in creating more than 
seventy programmes and projects for economic development. Examples of these 
mechanisms are the ASEAN-Australia Economic Programme (1975), the 
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ASEAN-Canada Joint Co-operation Committee (1981), and ASEAN-EEC Co-
operation Agreement (1980). The latter expedited the setting up of an ASEAN 
Trade Promotion Centre to promote ASEAN exports in the EC. The ASEAN-
Japan co-operation programme started in the 1970s. Presently, two ASEAN In-
dustrial Projects (AIPs) are funded by the Fukuda Fund. 
In recent years the ASEAN members have expeditiously used such dialogue 
sessions for the purpose of negotiation of Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSPs) at the bilateral level. This mechanism is an effective supplement to other 
international forums to protect the intemation'al economic interests of ASEAN 
members. 
Incidentally, although a growing portion of ASEAN external relations is now 
focused on economic matters, it is the ASEAN Foreign Ministries which dominate 
the dialogue sessions. The present structure of the ASEAN organization is such 
that ASEAN economic ministers have a somewhat smaller role. With economics 
occupying a more centralist role, it would be appropriate to enhance the status 
of the ASEAN economic ministers so that foreign economic diplomacy is given 
priority status. 
Because of the strategic importance of ASEAN; overtures are being made by 
other nations, like South Korea, to ASEAN to institutionalize similar dialogue 
sessions. 
On the whole, the perception of China regarding ASEAN economic manage· 
ment strategies must be explained in terms of her domestic politico-economic 
philosophy and her long-term geopolitical, geostrategic, and economic game plans 
in the international and regional arenas. 
The author's discussions with both Chinese officials and academics in China 
have confirmed that one needs a lot of empathy to understand Chinese foreign 
economic diplomacy as it is more complex and subtle than a_re usually simplified 
_ to be. To begin with, the importance of the domestic context and the Chiriese 
vision of their global position in the international setting must be given priority 
understanding as this determines all their initiatives, reactions, and responses to 
external political and economic events. 
Like other major powers, Chinese foreign economic diplomacy and trade 
policy are instruments for increasing national power as much as they are also ·an 
extension of the latter. To begin with, the present reform-oriented leaders are 
convinced that a higher level of economic wealth and national power can be 
achieved without losing China's national bearing. Secondly, to achieve this goal 
and for her to catch up, China needs a stable regional and international 
environment. Thirdly, they recognize the vital strategy of China's effective role 
in the international economic arena and that of foreign participation in her 
economic progress. Fourthly, China has an independent stance and pragmatic 
attitude in its international economic and foreign diplomacy. However, ·in this 
region it has the following priority interest ranking, namely the global powers 
comprising the United States, the USSR, and Japan; regional flashpoints 
comprising Indochina, Taiwan, and Korea (North and South), and the sub-
regional ASEAN group. The superstructure governing all these is of course 
China's four cardinal principles for domestic politico-economic management and 
56 Paul Chan 
five principles for the conduct of foreign affairs. In effect, this means that Chinese 
response and reaction to external stimuli would not be ad hoc but are statecrafted 
within this framework for the realization of her long-term goals. On the other 
hand, ASEAN countries do not have this long-term perception for their own role 
in history. Consequently, their responses may not be so consistent. 
Thus it would be obvious that ASEAN's economic diplomacy and management 
of external economic policies would be assessed by China in the light of the above 
guidelines which they have formulated for themselves. In this respect, then, China 
would be supportive of all ASEAN's initiatives which contribute to the stability 
of the international and regional economic setting and the expansion of export 
market opportunities. None of these actions could be perceived to aim for 
economic hegemony at the market, product, or spatial levels. Indeed all external 
efforts of ASEAN, for example, in penetrating markets of industrial economies, 
supporting stable commodity prices, and rejecting economic hegemony, also have 
positive spin-offs for China since there is a coincidence of economic interests. So 
too are ASEAN's active overtures to the United States, Japan, and the EC 
countries regarding investment participation in this region acceptable to China, 
for they are congruent with the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of China's 
triangular relationship with these economic powers. 
At the moment, China is making tremendous effort to develop its foreign trade 
system and policy. In line with this and its aspiration to have effective 
participation in the international economic system, China has applied to become 
a member of GATT. Absorption of China into GATT would further add 
orderliness into the global trading system. The problem, in the short run, is how 
China can reconcile its own economic system and practices to the rules of GATT. 
ASEAN members would be positive toward China's application. In the short run, 
the mutual interests of both groups would guarantee that they support each other 
within GATT. However, in the longer term, China's benefits from GATT would 
make her more competitive vis-a-vis ASEAN countries as some of them would 
be graduated out with rising per capita income. Singapore suffered because of 
this lopsided criterion when New Zealand delisted her from its GSP. ASEAN 
therefore recommends new trading rules which recognize disparity of economic 
resource wealth and adjustment problems of the non-advanced economies. This 
also means that ASEAN should not compromise on Part IV of GATT which 
accords less developed countries special protection. 
A related issue on reciprocity which the advanced countries can use to control 
the trade policy of ASEAN concerns the embargo of resale and re-export of 
"strategic goods and services" to socialist countries. This refers to certain types 
of technology and information-based products which can be used for military 
purposes. On this sensitive issue, the United States has specifically articulated 
that certain powerful computer products are not to be redirected via ASEAN. 
Singapore has been strongly advised over this with respect to sales of such items 
to the USSR and China. Depending on the types of technological products and 
services restrained from being resold, the role of Singapore in assisting China, 
which has increasing needs in its technology development, would be constrained. 
It is not probable that ASEAN countries would disagree with the directives of 
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countries like the United States since they themselves need the technology to 
improve their competitiveness. This is one sensitive spot in the triangular 
relationship between ASEAN, China, and the advanced non-communist 
countries which must be carefully monitored. 
China would also share ASEAN's protest over the demands of industrial 
economies on trade in services and trade-related investment issues in the Uruguay 
Round. Besides, she would also back ASEAN's insistence on standstill and 
rollback in trade protectionism by the advanced countries. Here, ther~ is 
commonality of interest between China and ASEAN in having a joint stand 
against the protectionist measures of the industrial countries in textiles and 
apparel, (for example, the U.S. Textile and Apparel Act of 1987), allegedly aimed 
at low-wage and socialist countries. China and some ASEAN members like 
Thailand and Singapore- have a growing textile and apparel industry which is 
now facing hostile protectionist threats from the United States and other OECD 
members. It is to their interest if these products are under GATT rules after the 
Multi Fibre Arrangement expires in_ 1991. 
In addition, ASEAN's fight against other forms of protectionism, as. well 
articulated by the Singapore Prime Minister in the U.S. Joint House of Congress 
speech in 1986, directly benefits China's emerging modernization programme 
and her search for export markets. These include the rejection of threats from 
omnibus trade bills like the Jenkin's Bill and HR-3, voluntary export restraints 
(which has hurt China, Indonesia, and Thailand's export of certain agricultural 
products), and the use of unilateral protectionist measures under the criterion of 
market disruption. 
ASEAN is also suggesting the phased reduction of subsidized agricultural 
exports and special and differential treatment for tropical and agricultural, 
resource-based products. The former is indeed an impossible task. There is not 
one agricultural product in any country, including ASEAN and China themsel-
ves, which does not benefit from some form of subsidies. The surveillance part 
is also not easy. Regarding tropical products, the EC has announced (20 October 
1987) its offer for the liberalization (tariff and non-tariff cuts) of trade in certain 
tropical and semi-processed tropical products at the Fourth Meeting of GATT. 
The suggested orientation programme would definitely boost ASEAN exports to 
the EC. But, the United States and Japan have yet to respond to this. 
Japan in particular is perceived to be foot-dragging in its liberalization efforts. 
The ASEAN perception, shared by China'.s experience, is that the ASEAN:Japan 
relationship is an asymmetrical one. In fact, there is increasing dependency on 
Japan's surplus capital and advanced technologies. Three issues will continue to 
be sources of friction in the economic relations between ASEAN and Japan, 
namely the ASEAN trade deficit with Japan, the increasing ASEAN debt burden 
because of the yen revaluation, and the inability to penetrate the Japanese market. 
Although the present trade tensions are well contained via· the mechanism of 
bilateral dialogues and GSP negotiations, it is unlikely that Japan would be 
allowed to perpetuate an unequal partnership. Presently, the ASEAN:Japanese 
economic relation is still cordial and has yet to be disrupted by some of the 
explosive controversies which Japan has experienced with China, South Korea; 
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and Taiwan. In the triangular relationship between ASEAN, Japan, and China, 
any decontrol of the Japanese market and any improvement of the asymmetrical 
·economic. relationship arising from either ASEAN or China's efforts would 
ultimately benefit both parties. Similarly, the recent reduction of interest rates 
by Japan's Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) to accommodate 
ASEAN's dissatisfaction would also assist China .in her own request for reducing 
her yen-denominated debts. Japan, as guided by the Ohira Principles, would 
adopt an equilibrium posture between China and ASEAN. 
While the above survey of major trade-related issues indicates that China and 
ASEAN have synergies in certain areas of international trade policy, there are 
also potential competition and conflict areas. 
As China and ASEAN both continue to progress in their development drive, 
their search for export markets would bring them into the competition zones. 
China's exports, especially labour-intensive products, would become more com-
petitive in terms of diversity and prices. Presently, there is "mild competition" in a 
small range of products. Estimates of competition in different export products in 
markets of industrial economies are shown in Appendix Tables A3.1 to A3.3. 
The number of competition areas presently is not large. Neither is the competition 
intense because there is still scope for sharing market niches. But the potential 
for intense competition exists as China succeeds in her modernization 
programme. Some ASEAN officials estimate that for some products this will 
occur during the next five years as the lobbying for access to markets of advanced 
economies intensifies. An example of this is the fall out between Thailand and 
the United States over a U.S.-subsidized sugar sale (12 August 1986) to China. 
The U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Sale of 145,850 tons of raw 
sugar to China at below world prices would depress sugar prices and thus affect 
a key export of Thailand, the fourth largest world sugar exporter. Incidentally, 
the U.S.-China sugar transaction was a direct sale which deviated from the normal 
practice of using·a broker. 
Another area of_general competition is in securing investible funds. Both China 
and ASEAN countries are making aggressive drives for foreign investment. 
ASEAN in particular, after three years of severe recession, have made aggressive 
drives to woo foreign funds. As China improves her financial and monetary 
systems, she will become more attractive to foreign investors. Presently, her 
international credit standing is high, even higher than some of the ASEAN 
countries. In ".iew of her appe;;i.l, there is some apprehension among some ASEAN 
quarters that China will take away a large slice of economic assistance from the 
advanced countries. In this context, the role of Japan is a delicate one. Both 
ASEAN arid China expect Japan to play a pivotal role in helping them succeed 
in their economic development, especially since Japan has already benefited from 
the opening up of their consumer markets. 
· Since 1980 Japan has increased her economic assistance to China. But 
Japanese diplomacy ensures that ASEAN is not deprived because of this. Indeed 
her economic assistance to China and ASEAN is governed by the Ohira Principles 
(Three Principles of Economic Co-operation with China). A fine balance is thus 
struck so that none should feel aggrieved. With the latest announce~ent of the 
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New Aid Plan (Asian Industries Development Plan), it remains to be seen how 
Japan would allocate her surplus capital to these countries. On this, Japanese 
foreign diplomacy would be guided by the parameters of the emerging trade 
friction which was discussed earlier. 
At the private sector level, the yen revaluation has changed the investment 
location of Japanese companies. ASEAN is ranked as high priority, particularly 
after the Mitsubishi Research Institute study which gave high ratings to Singapore 
and Thailand. Consequently, these two receive the bulk of the private Japanese 
funds now flowing to ASEAN. In comparison, China has not benefited from this. 
However, Hong Kong is being given a big injection of Japanese capital. China 
has a positive view of the new r:elocation of Japanese investment funds to ASEAN 
as economic success in these, economies would have a strong multiplier. impact 
on her, besides strengthening regional security and stability. A poor ASEAN is 
a source of power disequilibrium in this region. 
Before the normalization phase, international trading relations between China 
and ASEAN had been conducted against a background of discordant political 
cum security positions. Although there were no open economic conflicts of any 
sort, there were occasional "soft" tension~ which surfaced because of differences 
in ideological perceptions. 
After normalization, an interesting aspect of the new economic relation is that, 
while many countries are deviating from traditional practices in international 
trade, ASEAN-China is still operating generally within the agreed rules of the 
game. Though major differences still exist between China and some of the 
ASEAN countries, the risk of arbitrariness in instituting unfair trade practices 
which are damaging to predictable trade and investment ties between countries 
is not used. This has thus not created trade diversion, defensive counter-actions, 
and consequent trade distortion. However, a cautious and wary diplomatic 
attitude governs the present economic relationship. In contrast, the ASEAN 
private sector has a more relaxed and even aggressive stance in penetrating the 
Chinese economy. Probably, the private sector would be the pace-setter for some 
ASEAN countries as far as China is concerned. 
III. Policy Mechanisms and Institutions to Promote 
ASEAN-China Economic Relations 
From 1985 a new phase of Sino-ASEAN economic relations emerged since the 
era of "normalization" in the 1970s. Earlier in the ,year, the Singapore Prime 
Minister had visited China and so too had a trade delegation from the Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN). And in November 1985, the 
Prime Minister of Malaysia visited China with a large delegation. 
The first point to note about such visits is their focus on business and economic 
matters. Subsequent reciprocal visits from Chinese delegations also shared this 
commonality. of interest. Second, of strategic . planning significance is that 
invariably it is the political leadership (probably including the KADIN delega-
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tion) which is required to initially spearhead trade and investment between the 
two countries. 
This new phase of Sino-ASEAN relationship provides new learning curves for 
both groups of economies. The challenge is how both can participate in the 
opportunities which arise from dynamic changes and growth in each other's 
economic space .. If this relationship is carefully nurtured it would lead to the 
maturing of Sino-ASEAN relations conducive to the creation of wealth in the 
Asia-Pacific area. On the other hand, if the focus is distorted by exaggerated fears 
of economic competition in their common strategy of export-led modernization, 
then an uneasy tension will prevail between China and Southeast Asian countries. 
It may be a turning point that, after a decade of normalization of ASEAN-
China relations, this new phase has emerged. Two aspects are noteworthy. First, 
the importance given to the development of relations with Beijing coincided with 
the recession phase in all the ASEAN economies. China, with its new economic 
reforms in the Dengist-Zhao style, presents challenging opportunities as a 
"non-traditional" trading partner for the ASEAN countries. 
Second, this occurred in the context of a seemingly apparent convergence 
(since the late 1970s) between the two entities on the issue of Kampuchea. This 
convergence has been advantageous in so far as it contributes to the regional 
order wherein hegemony by any one state over others is rejected in the pursuit 
of inter-state relations, both political and economic. For the short-term this is 
salient since some ASEAN quarters suggest that China is a long-term security 
and economic threat to the region. 
The new phase must therefore be seen as a sequel to the first phase of the 
opening up of China to ASEAN with the establishment of formal diplomatic 
relations in 1974 (with Malaysia) and 1975 (with the Philippines and Thailand). 
Some observers see the new phase as akin to the "opening up process" that China 
ushered in after the establishment of U.S. formal diplomatic relations with Beijing 
in 1979 and which had begun with the Nixon visit to China in 1972. 
As explained earlier, ASEAN is basically a grouping of six equal and individual 
member states which have evolved different approaches in their China policy. 
There is as yet no official effort to establish a regional position towards Beijing. 
Consequently, the five ASEAN states have differential performance rates in their 
relations with China. But this is also due to Beijing's own differentiated policy 
towards ASEAN and its individual member states. 
Arising from the different levels, rates, and styles of development between 
ASEAN and China, it is expected that this will impact on the approaches in their 
economic and business relations. Also; some of the individual economies within 
ASEAN are better prepared and strategically positioned to conduct economic 
relations with Beijing. Similarly, Beijing's market orientation towards ASEAN 
may not be as effective as it should be because of her different priorities in her 
national modernization. 
At the same time, because of the less than congenial historical background in 
the ASEAN-China relationship, it is in practice impossible to separate economics 
from politics. However, despite this, it is possible to have economic exchanges 
between China and ASEAN countries regardless of formal political ties as with 
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Singapore; conversely, formal diplomatic relations do not necessarily mean strong 
economic links as is the case with Malaysia. For developments in China's 
economic relations with ASEAN countries see Chia and Cheng (1987). 
We shall now review the development of various policy mechanisms and 
institutions for promoting a closer economic relationship between ASEAN and 
China at the country level. 
1. China-Indonesia 
On 23 July 1985, after eighteen years of suspension of diplomatic relationship, 
direct trade resumed between Indonesia and China. The Presidential Instruction 
(Inpres) No. 9/1985 was· issued by the Indonesian Government and officially 
confirmed the negotiated agreement between the Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (KADIN) and the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT). 
Because of diplomatic sensitivity, the Indonesian Government regarded the 
negotiations between KADIN and CCPIT as unofficial. KADIN is actually a 
non-governmental organization. To ensure that no undue expectation or 
misunderstanding would arise from this negotiation, even the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between KADIN and CCPIT on 5 
July 1985 was arranged in a neutral country, Singapore. Furthermore, although 
the whole exercise had the support of both governments it was also agreed that 
both countries' names should not be incorporated in the agreement. All these 
suggest that the MOU should not be interpreted as a logical step towards the 
establishment of a diplomatic relationship. It appears that the mechanism to initiate 
direct tiade must be appropriate to the dictates of political factors. This is an 
interesting illustration of political diplomacy and manoeuvring. 
The MOU has formulated certain regulatory guidelines for direct trade to 
accommodate the absence of diplomatic ties. This covers (a) transaction pay-
ments; (b) visa application procedures; ( c) berthing rights of vessels of the two 
countries; (d) communication services; (e) exchange of trade missions; and (f) 
basic protocol regarding the MOU. 
The execution of direct trade by the Indonesian side, as laid down by the 
issuance of Inpres No. 9/1985, is based on the MOU provisions. The Inpres 
detailed guidelines on administrative procedures, scope of trade transactions, 
framework for policy-making, visa procedures, and the use of national carriers. 
By July 1985, direct trade resumed. Prior to this, during the period after 1967, 
China-Indonesia trade had to be effected via third countries. 
It is too early to prejudge the outcome of this diplomatic move on trade 
expansion. One may predict that the change in the mechanism of trade, from 
indirect to direct, would have a positive impact on trade volume. But how fast 
and how far this can move depends on the institutional facilitators. Singapore, 
like Indonesia, has. no diplomatic relations, but it .has developed appropriate 
attitudes and effective channels for mutual trade expansion. 
The resumption of direct trade between China and Indonesia should help to 
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resolve the differences over the role of intermediary trading countries like 
Singapore and Hong Kong. In practice, however, the role of these intermediaries 
cannot be totally eliminated for both economic and strategic reasons. As 
elaborated elsewhere in this study, they have economic functions. Besides, China 
will not just cut off traditional trading links just because of resumption of direct 
trade with Indonesia. 
In resuming direct trade, the Indonesians have considered the impact from 
different angles, including issues of trade expansion with China to trade losses 
within Indonesia arising from competition. Such matters were expressed in public 
debate and finally to the Chinese side. During the visit to Indonesia in August 
1985 of the CCPIT Chairman, Wang Yaoting, formal assurances were given that 
China would not disrupt the Indonesian economy by competing with domestic 
producers. 
When a KADIN delegation visited China in August 1985 for the purpose .of 
resuming direct trade, a number of letters of intent were signed for China to 
purchase Indonesian products worth US.$353 million; this included manufactures 
and agricultural produce: Letters of intent are what they are; it remains to be 
seen whether this outburst of enthusiasm and high expectations immediately after 
the resumption of direct trade will achieve results. If not, one should anticipate 
a renewal of misunderstanding between the two countries. 
The present position of bilateral relations is kept at arm's length. As far as 
Indonesia is concerned, China would not be given favourable treatment in the 
new economic relations. China, through the Chairman of CCPIT, did suggest 
the possibility of granting lower import duties on Indonesian goods. This has not 
yet been implemented. 
Countertrade is now increasingly used in international trade. However, it is 
not easy to co-ordinate. The matching of needs requires that quantity,· quality, 
and price must also be agreeable. There must also be organizations to facilitate 
this in each other's country. China is quite insistent on this form of trading since 
it economizes on the use of foreign exchange and helps to export its surplus 
products. Unfortunately, not all ASEAN countries find this feasible or always 
acceptable. In August 1985 a textiles team from China visited Indonesia to buy 
textile raw materials. But this was to be part of a counter-trade for Chinese cotton. 
When KADIN delegates visited Beijing in January 1986, a contract to buy 
cement, valued at US.$13.5 million, was regarded to be part of a counter-trade 
for Chinese coal and cotton. The Indonesians view this as somewhat obstruc-
tionist. To the Chinese, counter-trade is part of the multi-forms of trading. The 
origin and final destination of the products is not important as long as China 
could promote trade with the country in mind. 
In light of the above, the China-Indonesia bilateral economic relations can 
only be enhanced if the institutional structure is available and accessible for a 
fuller dialogue. In the case of trade, if no such mechanisms exist then the 
intermediary role of Hong Kong and Singapore will persist. 
There are other hiccups which are not critical but annoying to better trade 
relationships. Some concern administrative procedures regarding trade inspec-
tion, which, if not solved, are inconveniences hindering speedier trade. 
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A seemingly innocuous issue like the physical inspection of goods could be 
distorted into a conflict situation for China and Indonesia. China did not agree 
to Indonesia's appointment of a Swiss private company, S.G.S., to inspect goods 
to be imported into Indonesia. A tripartite meeting in March 1986 involving the 
S.G.S. and the two countries'.authorized surveyor corporations did not produce 
an acceptable solution. Since the inspection is now done in Hong Kong, China 
felt that this was not different from indirect trade and was upset over this. 
Again, all the build-up in the goodwill to date was ruffied when the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) condemned Jakarta for the execution of three former 
PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) leaders. The official organ of the CCP in 
its 3 September 1987 edition condemned the execution. This was interpreted by 
some quarters in Indonesia to mean that China has not actually abandoned its 
support for the communist movement in Indonesia, or in Southeast Asia. This 
was taken quite seriously since Chinese delinking with local communist groups 
is definitely a precondition for the defreezing of diplomatic ties between the two 
countries. This incident points to the. fragility of the trade relations. 
The developing Chi:da-lndonesia economic relationship illustrates the use.of 
various subtle policies, mechanisms, .and institutions which indicate that a very 
cautious stance should be taken. For the long-term relationship, probably this 
may be the appropriate strategic game plan in view of extant, real or exaggerated, 
political sensitivities. 
2. China-Malaysia 
There are three broad periods in the China-Malaysia relations: the first period 
covers the late 1950s to the end of the 1960s; the second covers the 1970s; and 
the 1980s constitutes the present phase. 
During the first phase direct trade was not significant. Actually a good 
percentage of the trade was conducted via third countries, particularly Hong 
Kong and Singapore. Meaningful direct trade between the two countries was 
only initiated .during the 1970s. When he became Prime Minister of Malaysia in 
1970, Tun Abdul Razak initiated the move to improve relations with China. In 
1971, China supported Malaysia's concept of "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and 
Neutrality" in Southeast Asia. 
Since the breakthrough, the number of delegations of industrialists and 
businessmen to China has increased. A growing number visits the Chinese Export 
Commodities Fair, held twice a year in Guangzhou. The number and volume of 
business contracts signed have also increased. With the establishment of 
diplomatic ties on 31 May 1974 a new phase of the China-Malaysia relations 
was initiated. 
Since 1980 the firming up of economic relations is indicated by the increase 
in the number of mutual visits between high.:level officials and also in the 
frequency of economic and trade delegations between the two countries. 
The largest a.p,d most important official Malaysian delegation to China was 
led by the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Datuk Seri Mahathir bin Mohammed 
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in November 1985. This visit, although its final effects are still unknown, confirms 
that a new phase of bilateral relations is beginning. A few formal agreements 
were signed. A major one was on the avoidance of double taxation and prevention 
of fiscal evasion with respect to income tax. Under this agreement, there will be 
no double taxation on business profits and investment income. 
The CCPIT and the Council of the Malaysian Sino-Malay Joint Chambers 
of Commerce also agreed to co-operate to promote direct trade between the two 
countries. Another outcome of such trade missions was a memorandum of 
understanding between the Chinese Metallurgical. Import and Export Corpora-
tion and the Malaysian Sabah Gas Industries. There was agreement that China 
would purchase hot pressed iron ingot from Malaysia during the following two 
years, 1986 and 1987. 
In September 1987, a delegation led by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia 
visited China. An outcome of this was the signing of two agreements related to 
air transport and shipping. The first would allow Malaysian Airline System to 
use chartered services to Canton and Beijing. The third and fourth freedoms 
would also be reviewed. The shipping agreement would allow the vessels of both 
countries to enjoy equal rights and opportunities in the carriage of cargoes 
between the two countries. It also meant that they would share cargo shipment 
as provided under the UNCTAD Convention in the ratio of 40:40:20. The 
agreement also encouraged ships of both countries to use each other's facilities. 
Since normalization, between 1974 and 1984, the volume of trade between 
China and Malaysia has more than doubled. Chinese imports from Malaysia 
increased more than thirty times. 
Although diplomatic relations are cordial, there are a few problems which are 
alleged to obstruct the further improvement of bilateral trade between China and 
Malaysia. The first concerns restrictions on the free flow of people between the 
two countries, but particularly by Malaysia. The Malaysian Government has 
regulated the movement and number of Malaysians visiting China. Certain 
criteria are used by the government to screen applicants for visas to China, namely 
age, character, and purpose of the trip. Three ministries are directly involved: 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. Some find this somewhat inconvenient. However, the Malaysian 
Government is reasonably liberal towards businessmen who visit the spring and 
autumn sessions of the Chinese Export Commodities Fair in Guangzhou. But 
the general feeling among Malaysian businessmen is that Malaysia has lost out 
to other countries because of bureaucratic regulations. 
A contentious issue in Malaysia is the alleged bias that the Chinese Govern-
ment shows towards Malaysian Chinese. There are also complaints that only this 
ethnic group is offered business opportunities and trade potential. Some attempts 
to rectify this have been made. At the official level, the Malaysian Government 
and quasi government officials have recommended changes in the traditional 
system of trading by involving more indigenous businessmen. At the practical 
level, the Chinese find it difficult to cut off the trade links between China and 
the Malaysian Chinese businessmen as they were set up at least a generation 
ago. To effect some changes, the Malaysian Government encouraged the Chinese 
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and Malay Chambers of Commerce to set up the Joint Chamber of Commerce. 
The objective is to promote collaboration among different ethnic groups, but 
particularly the Malaysian Chinese and Malays, to penetrate the Chinese market. 
There are also possibilities that some of the present functions of PERNAS 
(Malaysian trading company) could be taken over by this.Joint Chamber. Since 
its formation, however, the Joint Chamber has not achieved any significant 
impact on the China-Malaysia economic relations. 
Somewhat 'related to this is the question of direct trade. Although diplomatic 
relations have been resumed since 1974, the Malaysian Government alleges that 
the Chinese Government has not made a strong effort to cut off intermediaries, 
particularly Singapore and Hong Kong. This is taken to mean that the Chinese 
Government favours the ethnic Chinese in these countries. The counter argument 
is that it is the economics and efficiency of trade practices that have created this 
indirect trade structure. This indirect trade had been built up over time, especially 
when only Sing~pore and Hong Kong continued to maintain ties with China. 
The Bank of China, for instance, was never closed in Singapore as in Malaysia, 
and provided an important function for remittances and trade with China for 
the Overseas Chinese. When this issue was raised in private discussions, the 
Chinese Embassy officials repeatedly pointed out that China desired direct trade, 
but they could not stop intermediaries from participating in a lucrative business. 
A stalemate situation remains. 
Regarding the role of PERNAS in regulating economic and trade relations 
with China, the general view of the Chinese is that it is a discriminatory practice 
aimed only at the Chinese export trade. Malaysia does not impose the 0.5 per 
cent procedural fee on other countries although import licences are also required 
for imports of certain restricted items from all countries. The Malaysian 
Government response is that PERNAS' role is for "orderly" trade. It is pointed 
out that the reason why China and Malaysia have so far not signed a trade 
agreement is because of the interventionist position of PERNAS. But, the 
Malaysian Government does not seem to have the urgency to change this, in 
spite of numerous complaints from the Malaysian Chinese guilds and associa-
tions. 
The ubiquitous question of balance of trade is also raised off and on by the 
Malaysian Government. In recent years this has become worse because China 
has reduced imports of Malaysian primary commodities. But the central cause 
of the imbalance is really the narrow trade pattern and non-complementary 
production structure of the two economies. At the same time, the absence of an 
urgency to search for new export items, besides the usual primary commodities, 
has therefore perpetuated the existing trade problem. 
The Malaysian private sector, however, feels that there are prospects for 
increasing trade and investment in the two economies. China does provide an 
export market opportunity for Malaysian businesses. For instance, China is an 
important buyer of Malaysia's natural rubber and palm oil products. Forty per 
cent of China's natural rubber imports are from Malaysia. 
Exports of crude natural rubber to China are expected to increase further. 
The projected higher utilization of crude natural rubber from Malaysia is due 
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to the following factors: (a) only the Hainan Island of China produces natural 
rubber, but the supply is inadequate to meet the demand; and (b) with the rapid 
industrialization in China, demand for raw materials will increase. Correspond-
ingly, the demand for crude natural rubber will increase with the development 
of the rubber-based industries. 
The other exports which the Malaysian Government wants to promote actively 
in China are palm oil and its related products. So far, they are not selling very 
well in the Chinese market because of a number of factors. Firstly, there is stiff 
competition from soya bean oil and animal fats of which China has an abundant 
supply. Secondly, palm oil is mostly imported for industrial consumption in the 
production of soaps, detergents, and lubricants. Thirdly, the Hainan Island of 
China is also developing its palm oil industry. Lastly, there is inadequate 
promotion of the products in China. But, the Malaysian Government is hopeful 
that some co-operation on this can be worked out. 
From the Chinese side, there is a keen interest to supply fuel and rice to 
Malaysia. China can supply the cement factories and thermal power stations in 
Malaysia with coal. They are also keen to resume the export of Chines~ rice to 
Malaysia. However, as far as the latter is concerned, this may be viewed from 
the national security angle. Malaysia would most probably prefer more diversified 
sources of imports. 
A successful export item to China is cocoa products. Between 1982 and 1983, 
exports of cocoa beans to China registered an increase of about twenty-nine times. 
This was mainly attributed to the promotional efforts of the Malaysian trade 
mission to China in 1983. It is anticipated that the export of cocoa beans to China 
will rise with the expected increase in the manufacturing of confectionery and 
biscuits in that country. 
However, the extent to which one can be successful in doing export trade with 
China depends on two vital factors: on the one hand, the need for Mala:ysian 
products to be competitive both in terms of price and quality, and on the other, 
the transient nature of China's demand for specific goods. Malaysian businessmen 
are aware that China's demand for imports is guided by its ability to export and 
the rate with which the self-reliance policy ·is being pursued by the Chinese. 
At present, Malaysia's large supply of natural resources provides the base for 
the further exploration of trading opportunities with China. It is to Malaysia's 
interest to concentrate on a few sectors which have significant relative cost 
advantage, particularly, primary commodities and resource-based products. 
The general private sector view is that Malaysia should take advantage of the 
re-emergence of China in the international market because China's need to import 
more raw materials to facilitate its industrial development will increase further. 
In spite of the eagerness of the Malaysian private sector to have a closer 
economic relationship with China, the Malaysian Government posture is some-
what less enthusiastic. Consequently, the policy measures and organizational 
system for promoting trade and investment with China are only just basic. As 
an aside, it is noteworthy that, among the ASEAN countries, only Malaysia and 
Indonesia have historically attached weight to their domestic ethnic Chinese 
parameter in their policy formation with regard to relations with China. 
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3. China-Philippines 
In comparison to the other ASEAN countries' ties with China, the development 
of the Philippine economic and trade relations with China is a mere record of 
trade agreements and mundane trade. It lacks the drama of the China-Indonesia 
history of relationship and has little of the aggressive drive of the Singapore 
strategy towards China. The content of the relations is therefore less substantive. 
Since China became a communist country, and during the Cold War period, 
the Philippines had been under the strong influence of the foreign policy of the 
United States. It was anti-communist. Trade with China was embargoed. Finally 
in 1975 the Philippines and China resumed official diplomatic relations. But in 
1971, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce had already succeeded in initiating 
trade with China. This involved an exchange of Philippine coconut oil for Chinese 
rice. Like Singapore and Indonesia, but of a much smaller magnitude, trade 
preceded the resumption of political relations. 
Unlike Malaysia's relations .with China, the setting up of relations between 
China· ·and the Philippines was also accompanied by a trade agreement. This 
treaty set the tone and framework for economic .and trade relations. The relevant 
details pertain to the following: 
a. both countries to exchange most favoured nation treatment with respect to 
reciprocal trade taxes; 
b. both to promote long-term development in trade expansion; 
c. both agree to use amicable consultations to resolve trade disputes; and 
d. both to review other strategies to further improve economic and trade 
relations and the implementation of the trade agreement. · 
The trade agreement also incorporates options to set up a JOlllt trade 
committee. In April 1976, the Philippine-China Joint Trade Committee was thus 
established. Its principal job was to administer the implementition of the trade 
agreement. The agenda of the Committee's first meeting in June 1977 in Peking 
included an agreement with regard to the type and quantum of various trade 
products to be exchanged. 
Tq further strengthen mutual trade, both countries signed a long-term trade 
agreement in July 1979 for the period 1979-85. The target for the total value of 
import and export trade to be achieved during this period was set at US$2 billion. 
The Chinese agreed to export 8 million metric tons of crude oil and some amount 
of refined petroleum products. She would also give priority to supply the 
Philippines additional amount of crude oil and refined petroleum products if 
required. In return, the Philippines would export to China 1 million metric tons 
of raw sugar; copper concentrates and coconut oil would also be exported to 
China. On 30 January 1986 another trade protocol was signed. It specified an 
exchange of products of about US$180 million each way to be transacted. 
As part of the process of creating institutional infrastructure for trade 
expansion, the Philippine Government set up the Philippine International Trade 
Corporation (PITC) under Presidential Decree No. 252. The PITC is directed 
to monitor the effective implementation of Philippine trade with centrally planned 
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economies. It is also assigned the task of acting on behalf of the Philippine private 
sector to implement the details of the trade agreement. 
The above infrastructural groundwork and framework of guidelines are not 
only pertinent but are prerequisites for promoting effective direct trade. For the 
China-Philippines economic relations this is more than necessary since the extent 
and depth of their relationship are somewhat peripheral to each other. Thus, if 
the economic and trade relations of the other ASEAN countries with China are 
"underdeveloped", that of the Philippines with China is "undeveloped". It also 
suffers from the disadvantage of not having a tradition of other non-economic 
linkages. This may turn out to be a political advantage since minimal conflict 
areas are present. Indeed the expansion of trade between the two countries has 
been due more to politics as a facilitator than to economics as the source of trade 
growth. 
The Philippines shares many of the ASEAN problems in its bilateral economic 
and trade relations with China. This concerns the lack of a diversified export 
capacity, trade imbalance, weak trade mechanisms, and overall export competi-
tiveness. But, it has one edge over Malaysia and Indonesia; the· Philippines is 
not bogged down by the polemics of the politics of trade related to ideological 
and ethnic factors. On the other hand, unfortunately, it is shackled by critical 
domestic security and political problems. Given this, it is not expected that there 
would be any marginal changes in policies or relationship towards China in the 
immediate future. The priority on this matter is very low. 
4. China-Singapore 
Singapore Prime Minster Lee Kuan Yew visited China in 1976, 1980, and again 
in September 1986. And in October 1986, China's Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun 
visited Singapore. Although, there is as yet no diplomatic relationship, which in 
reality is a mere formality, between the two countries, Singapore has in fact the 
most intense relationship at the government and people's levels with China among 
the ASEAN countries. Such exchanges are now routine events. This is partly due 
to historical, cultural, and ethnic reasons, and also partly due to the strategic 
game plan of the Singapore leaders who have cut out a vital niche in China for 
Singapore. Only Singapore has forged links with China in a multilayered manner, 
from the appointment of Dr Goh Keng Swee, the former Deputy Prime Minister 
of Singapore, as economic adviser to the coastal cities to the proposed use of 
Chinese workers in Singapore. 
There is no doubt that a critical reason for the successful relationship is due 
to the mutual respect between the leaders of the two countries. In Asia, the 
personal touch and the chemistry of personality of leaders are very real and 
relevant to the success of government-to-government relations. Thus when 
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Singapore in 1981, he was all praise for 
the success of Singapore and its leadership. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew's visits to China were all diplomatic triumphs. Gestures like this no doubt 
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show that Singapore and Chinese leaders have a warmer relationship which is 
missing in the relati9nship 'of the other ASEAN leaders with China. But at the 
operational level, it is the effectiv<:< follow-up of the Singaporeans,· both the 
bureaucracy and entrepreneurs, which explains the success of the Singapore-
China commercial tie-up. 
In terms of the intensity and frequency of contacts, Singapore is well ahead 
of the rest of the other ASEAN countries. At both the Central and Provincial 
levels, Singapore has received and sent out more delegations in one year than 
what the other ASEAN countries have achieved during the last ten years. Some 
of the largest trade exhibitions have been held in Singapore. 
This competitive edge of Singapore is due to its more relaxed policy towards 
China, at least as far as trade and business are concerned. For instance, 
Singaporeans. could travtll by Singapore Airlines directly into and out of China 
for business purposes without a visa hitch or other forms of regulatory or 
bureaucratic control as are experienced in the other ASEAN countries. In 1982, 
18,000 Singaporeans visited China. This increased to more than 50,000 in 1985. 
This fa,cilitates and expedites commercial transactions. This was reciprocated by 
Chinese official delegations to Singapore which were predominantly fo~ business 
and industrial co-operation purposes. 
There is no doubt that the foresight of the Singapore Government in urging 
Singaporeans to master Mandarin has given it an advantage. Thus, because of 
Mandarin, Visa Card, the large American credit card company, has bypassed 
even Hong Kong and has chosen Singapore as the training centre for its strategic 
attack on the China market, which grew from US$3 million in 1983 to US$90 
million in 1985. For the same reason, Australian companies have also started to 
use Singaporeans and Singapore companies to penetrate the China market. 
Language and culture have become a winning edge in international business 
competition. This is the new "infrastructure" which is being promoted in 
Singapore to transform it into a competitive centre for trade and finance. China 
is throwing out more lines to the world, and it regards Singapore as a major 
junction it can use. · 
The transfer. of technology from Singapore is a vital contribution to the 
modernization of China. This is in the form of hardware and service technology, 
which are transmitted both directly and indirectly. Singapore may not be in a 
position to export high-level technology, but it acts as conduit for transferring 
technology from the more advanced countries like the United States. In many 
cases, the direct transfer of technology from the industrial economies to China 
is constrained by domestic regulations. However, this can be overcome when 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs) in Singapore are the source 
of the transfer. 
A major complementary role of Singapore to China is in the services sector. 
which in fact has been enhanced quite rapidly in recent -years. This includes the 
transfer of services technology, and other new learning curves for the Chinese, 
namely management culture, corporate leadership, and work ethic. This is 
achi~ved by the training of Chinese technocrats and bureaucrats in Singapore 
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and in China itself. Technology transfer also occurs in embodied form, particular-
ly via the use of Singaporean expertise in joint-venture projects in China. One 
major project, for instance, is the management of airports in China by Sin-
gaporeans. A direct request to manage the US$300 million Hongqiao airport 
from Mr Lu Guoxian, Shanghai's deputy director of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade Commission, to the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) 
was made in July 1986. This is in recognition of the high level of management 
expertise that Singapore has achieved, as manifested by Changi Airport and 
transforming Singapore into a "convention city". 
New services like insurance, franchises, and stockbroking are also being 
transferred via Singapore. During the visit of Lee Kuan Yew in China, there 
was consensus reached regarding the use of Singapore-dollar loans to China for 
the purchase of Singapore goods services. This financial agreement is pathbreak-
ing in a way since the Singapore Government's policy is not to encourage the 
Singapore dollar to become an international currency. 
The growing presence of Singaporean workers and technocrats in China is 
not only a new phenomenon but it is one which is part of the technology transfer 
process. Incidentally, among the ASEAN countries, only the Singaporeans have 
this opportunity to work in China. This may help to foster closer personal and 
c.ommercial ties, reinforcing the advantage that Singapore has over the other 
ASEAN countries. 
Its role as the regional shipping centre of Southeast Asia has also assisted 
Singapore in getting jobs from China. Keppel Shipyard, one of the biggest · 
ship-repairers in the region, has completed a US$9-million conversion of a 
Chinese supertanker. 
There is no doubt that the Chinese delegations are more than impressed by 
the conspicuous success and progress of Singapore's economy. Chinese delegates 
are impressed by the housing schemes, the Singapore port, the financial networks, 
the telecommunications system, the Mass Rapid Transport system being 
developed, and other functions of the c <>pita:list economy which purr efficiently. 
The closer economic relationship between the two countries is also manifested 
by the offer of Chinese construction workers to Singapore. The Tianjin Con-
struction Engineering Corporation wants to "export" 10,000 of its total 60,000 
workers. They are willing to work in Singapore at competitive international wage 
rates. If Singaporean construction companies start to use such Chinese workers, 
this may displace the traditional labour supply from Malaysia, India, and Sri 
Lanka. On this matter, the Singapore Government will take a cautious position. 
There are still some operational problems in the China-Singapore economic 
relations despite their steady growth. The first concerns the diversification of the 
trade structure. The present position is a reversal of the situation of the 1960s 
and 1970s when Chinese exports to Singapore were more varied, and rubber was 
the single main Singapore export item to China. Now Singapore's exports to 
China are more diversified than China's exports to Singapore. 
Secondly, China's expectations of Singapore are much higher than other 
ASEAN countries. Because of its higher level of economic achievements and 
technological developments, China exp~cts and prefers Singapore's investments 
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to be in the high value added and sophisticated technology areas, rather than in 
traditional sectors. After the first phase of saturation is over in such sectors, the 
options and opportunities can only be in the more sophisticated industries in 
which China needs outside assistance. 
During the 1985 visit of Lee Kuan Yew to China, the MOFERT minister, 
Zheng Tuobing, had assured Singapore that China intends to direct a significant 
part of her trade to Singapore. It was targeted to be doubled wit_hin five years. 
This assurance is heartening to Singapore and disturbing to her ASEAN 
neighbours. To the former it means strengthening of the trade role of Singapore; 
to the latter it means that the intermediary status of Singapore with respect to 
the China trade will not diminish. At the regional ASEAN level, Malaysia and · 
Indonesia have been trying to upgrade their direct trade links with all their trading 
partners. The entrep8t role of Singapore has not been accepted as an economic 
function but as somewhat detrimental to the national economic interests of these 
countries. 
It will not be easily appreciated that the underlying conditions of the dynamics 
of international trade have already changed during the last two decades. 
Comparative advantages are not due to factor endowments as explained by 
Ricardo and Hecksher-Ohlin; they can be created because of technological 
externalities and information networking. This is the type of new infrastructure 
that high-growth newly industrializing economies like Singapore and the ad-
vanced countries are creating to be ahead of the rest of the Third World. The 
traditional argument against the "middleman's" role is therefore both obsolete 
and incongruous in the light of changes in the structure of international trade. 
Indeed, with the integration of the role ofMNCs, many of which are essentially 
giant manufacturers cum sogoshoshas, in the economy of most countries, the 
function of global trade and the style of the business of trading has already 
changed fundamentally. Every country is now a potential middleman's economy. 
Singapore is-now the middleman for financial trading and information network-
ing; a dramatic change from its traditional entrep8t function. In fact, Singapore 
is also now the conduit for transfer of technology of MNCs to China, especially 
after the lifting of certain restrictions on trade with China by the Paris-based 
Co-ordinating Committee for Export Control (COCOM). This new role is an 
area of interest to China. Possibly some aspects of Shenzhen, Hainan Island, or 
Shanghai can be modelled after Singapore. 
For the other ASEAN countries, a useful lesson to learn from the Singapore 
experience is the importance of pack-up support by the political leadership, 
bureaucracy, and other vital services to ensure a high success rate in any ve~ture 
in China. For instance, a reason for the relative success in some of the Singapore's 
medium-sized companies in China is due to the support of the Market 
Development Assistance Scheme (MDAS). For instance, Matsushita Greatwall, 
a medium-sized manufacturer of mattresses, was able to get a foothold in the 
Chinese market because of the technical and financial assistance from MDAS. 
In contrast, such support is not forthcoming to the private sector in the other 
ASEAN countries. 
The China-Singapore relationship is exemplary of how two countries learn to 
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exploit each other's synergies for mutual benefits. In particular, it reflects the 
successfut use of a range of policy instruments, institutions, and mechanisms 
which are specificaily structured to meet the challenges of a system which is quite 
different from the one Singapore normally deals with. So far, its succyss is the 
envy of other ASEAN countries. 
5. China-Thailand 
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, although there was no 
diplomatic relations, bilateral trade had already started at the non-government 
level. However, in January 1959, the Thai Government under "Decree No. 52 
of the Revolutionary League" banned all imports from China. Only some 
re-exported goods from Hong Kong and Singapore reached Thailand. 
In December 1974, the Thai Government annulled the 1959 decree. Non-
government trade became important again and was instrumental in resuming 
diplomatic relations which occurred in July 1975. A new phase of economic and 
commercial relations between the two countries had begun. Trade subsequently 
developed rapidly as the mechanism was now available. 
Ahead of some other ASEAN members, Thailand signed a trade agreement 
with China in 1978. The general stipulation of the agreement stressed the 
importance of trade expansion based on mutual advantages and equality of status. 
The good relationship between the two countries culminated in the visit of 
Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping to Thailand in 1978. This resulted in the 
t\\:'O governments signing an agreement for establishing a joint committee for 
trade and a protocol on import and export commodities between the two 
countries. 
From 1979, the yearly protocol of import and export commodities became the 
format of trade between the two countries. The joint committee for trade meets 
annually, alternating between the capitals of the two countries, for the purpose 
of monitoring all trade matters. Although this approach towards trade is 
somewhat rigid, satisfactory results have been achieved. In general the specified 
commodities of the protocols were transacted. Occasionally some· deviations 
occurred because of contingency requirements. Thus the protocol for 1984 
itemized an import of 100,000 tons of rice from Thailand for China. But out of 
political goodwill, China, as requested by Thailand, purchased 190,000 tons of 
Thai rice. 
From 1985, the protocol incorporated more details and .also included quotas 
for the value of trade. The China!J'hai experience shows that although such 
protocols are inflexible, they do contribute to orderly trade. 
Besides Singaporeans, Thai entrepreneurs have been quite assertive in seeking 
market opportunities in China. During 1981-84, 15 investment agreements 
valued at US$26 million was signed with Thai investors. During 1985, another 
7 agreements valued at US$9 million were signed. The number of direct Thai 
investment agreements with China has totalled 25 to date. In contrast to 
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Singaporean investments which are more diverse and in the sophisticated 
technology areas, Thai investments are in consumer durables, light machinery 
products, and construction. This reflects the lower technology level of the Thai 
economy and its limited capacity to export technology to China. 
The mechanism of the:: investment is joint-ventures which are set up as limited 
liability companies. Most of these joint-ventures are meant to exist for not more 
than twenty-five years. The equity participation is not fixed and is negotiable. 
There is joint management. Most of the Thai companies do not have more than 
50 per cent of the equity. Profits are shared according to equity ownership. In 
some joint-ventures the Chinese provide the equity in the form ofland, resources, 
and labour; the Thai provide the machinery and technology. All details and 
obligations of joint-ventures are incorporated in documentation under the 
Chinese legal structure. Because of the nascent stage of the formation of foreign 
investment policy in China, the Chinese have chosen a case by case approach in 
structuring joint-ventures. The Thai investors have found this quite unsettling 
since the investors are uncertain about what to expect. Despite this, Thai 
investment in China is expected to increase. 
There were about 22 Chinese joint-ventures implemented in Thailand in 1986. 
Another 12 are being negotiated. China concentrates on resource-based and light 
industries, including timber processing, coal mining, and farm machinery. 
China's contributions include machinery and low-level technology. Besides the 
congenial environment in Singapore, China finds the Thai attitude accommodat-
ing, the economic programme attractive, and the foreign investment incentives 
competitive. For China, which is not permitted to invest in Malaysia or Indonesia, 
the rich resource economy of Thailand is an inevitable alternative option. In a 
way, the incremental gain in investment in these primary sectors that China is 
investing in represents the opportunity cost to Malaysia and Indonesia because 
of their unwillingness to accept Chinese investment. 
As elsewhere, the promotion of China's investment in Thailand is determined 
by· political and economic goodwill rather than by total commercial rationale. 
This is reasonably acceptable to the Thais who find the investment injection 
timely given the economic recession. A major departure from the other ASEAN 
countries is the willingness of the Thai Government to allow Chinese labour to 
be used inside Thailand. Like South Korean construction companies which have 
been exporting their surplus labour abroad, the Chinese have also undertaken · 
contracted work, especially in construction, in Thailand. Besides commercial and 
investment projects, the Chinese and Thai Governments have also promoted 
collaboration in educational, cultural, and technical projeCts. 
The China-Thailand economic relation is· constrained by S<lveral limitations. 
Fitst, they are economies which are pitched at the same level of development. 
The degree of complementarity is quite low. But, the biggest constraint is the 
limited capability of the Thai economy to expand her export capacity in the 
medium term. Both countries share a similar export trade stru.cture, importing 
technology and othe~ intermediate goods from the developed nations and 
exporting low level technology items and primary. commodities. Consequently, 
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the bilateral exchange is restricted. Given this similarity of economic structures 
the inevitability of trade imbalance and bilateral trade instability will arise if the 
needs of one party fluctuate/ For instance, in 1980 petroleum exports to Thailand 
constituted 60 per cent of China's total trade with Thailand. But in 1981 Thailand 
cut the imports significantly. China, on her part, has surpluses in a wide range 
of agricultural produce that Thailand exports, like _rice. There is therefore little 
absorptive capacity. 
To promote trade expansion, in 1985 trade protocols between the two countries 
were signed. These specified the quantity and the value of commodities in their 
bilateral trade. As always, e.nthusiasm and reality need not match. What may 
happen is that the initial purchases by China of Thai products, especially 
agricultural items, because of poiitical goodwill and not needs will become a trade 
issue that strains the bilateral relations. For instance, China has to re-export (for 
example, mung beans) a certain portion of what she imports from Thailand as 
the former does not really require the goods. Besides not being an effective way 
. to promote long-term trade, this may have.short-term adverse repercussions on 
the political relations. Thailand may misunderstand China's effort although this 
is done to have a more bilateral trade balance. 
Related to the above is the exaggerated role of trade balance or imbalance in 
the trading position of· countries. Many governments have viewed a bilateral 
trad~ imbalance with unnecessary alarm. More often than not this is politicized 
to affect the foreign relations of countries. On this matter, the China-Thailand 
situation shows that since 1974 Thailand has had an unfavourable trade balance 
for most years. This trade imbalance becomes acute when the foreign reserves 
are running low. Unfortunately, the options for improving this are severely 
limited by both countries' capabilities. Depending on the size of the imbalance 
and whether or not other compensating opportunities are made available by 
China, Thailand would raise this issue for trade negotiation in the future. 
A business question which remains is the unfamiliarity of Chinese consumers 
and users with Thai products. Ignorance about the competitive price and quality 
of particular commodities from Thailand hinders exports to China. The Chinese 
have expressed concern regarding unrealistic pricing of Thai goods which are 
out of alignment with world pricing. Some Thai commodities are below 
international standards. The case of Thai corn which has a high alfatoxin content 
was cited. More often than not, however, the problem is that Thailand cannot 
provide what China really needs. 
On the question of project investment, it is noticeable that the scope for this 
·is not fully exploited. Mutual frustrations arise because of the high expectations 
that investments should be in those areas that can promote the long-term 
socio-economic development of both countries. This is a problem of matching 
each other's strategic needs. 
What is interesting about the China-Thailand experience is the rapid develop-
ment and use of a wide variety of instruments to promote business and commerce 
between the two countries. Moreover, Thailand is also taking an increasingly 
more assertive approach in maximizing business opportunities and economic 
options with China. 
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IV. Conclusion 
In this paper we ha~e reviewed the implications of various policy changes and 
institutional developments which individual ASEAN countries have evolved in 
response to challenges at, the global level and in reaction to the new phase of 
bilateral ASEAN-China relationships. It is clear that each ASEAN country has 
developed its own structur'e of economic relationship with China. Among the 
major factors which influence this are the dictates of domestic political realities 
and perception of regional geopolitics. Consequently, each one moves at a 
different pace. But all are converging toward a closer economic relationship with 
China as rriore facets of policy instruments and ,institutional mechanisms develop 
and mature. 
How' the future scenarios for the China-ASEAN economic relations for the 
next decade will evolve is 'not easy to predict. Quite apart from the positive 
influence of policy changes and institutional infrastructure improvements, there 
are also other signifisant parameters which determine the probable outcomes for 
China-ASEAN economic relations in the future. They include the following: 
L The principal one is ·that the political and security scenario in Southeast 
Asia remai~s at the present stable level. Any probability towards a solution 
of the Kampuchea question is a plus factor for trade and investment. As 
for Indonesia and China, if diplomatic relations are, normalized the trade 
quantum will accelerate somewhat. The question remains as to whether it 
is economic imperatives or political ideology that.both wish to give priority 
to. It seems both can wait. 
2. Another parameter is that China will continue to accommodate to remove 
ideological and political differences between her and the ASEAN countri~s. , 
In particular, the issue of moral support for communist groups in ASEAN 
must be resolved. This will enhance the comfort level for closer economic 
ties. 
3. The ASEAN countries will recover from economic recession and be able 
to sustain a.growth rate of an average of 5 to 6 per cent annually throughout 
the 1980s. Ch,ina is expected to have an annual growth rate of at least 8 
per cent. Both, are positive factors for t,rade ,and investment as they create 
economic capacities and options. 
4. Both the 'ASEAN countries and China will succeed in restructuring their 
economies and thereby create increasing economic complementarities. 
5. Both parties, but particularly China, continue to consider trade as an 
important strategy for national economic development. For this, and not 
inward-looking policies,, would accelerat,e bilateral economic relationships. 
6. The last parameter is that the ASEAN governments will promote the role 
of the private sector in their economic relations with China. The p'rivate 
initiatives in ASEAN could then complement the initial efforts. of the 
government. 
In view of the above, the medium-term scenarios will be: 
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( 1) Singapore will continue to complement China, supporting her in high value 
and medium-to-high technology services. She will continue to act as a 
junction for China's export and import trade. Among the ASEAN countries, 
Singapore's ecof!.omic inter-dependency with China will be intensified in 
the future. Her competitive vis-a-vis the other ASEAN countries will 
be further reinforced. 
Singapore's exports to China is expected to increase by at least 15 per 
cent annually, and imports by 10 per cent. This is easily explained by the 
fact that the Singapore Government is already implementing, way ahead 
of the other ASEAN governments, its strategic plan to revive the Singapore 
economy. Intensifying trade and investment with China is one of the 
priority strategic options. For this reason, the Singapore Government has 
not only liberalized all controls governing commercial relations with China 
for Singaporeans, but also actively promotes their participation. 
(2) The other ASEAN countries will continue to specialize in the resource-
processing and labour-saving type of industries. The small- and medium-
scale industries and labour-intensive export industries will become more 
important because of the present change in economic policies to revive these 
economies. However, because of competitiveness between China and 
ASEAN this may not lead to a significant increase in trade between them. 
(3) The balance of trade will improve when the trade composition is more 
diversified. But this is not likely to occur during the next five years. 
Dependency on primary exports to China will still predominate the trade 
structure in the medium term. One should anticipate frustration among the 
ASEAN countries which are primary producers when China cannot absorb 
their primary exports. The Chinese demand elasticity for such products is 
low, but the ASEAN members are building up expectations that China has 
a market for these goods. One of these is palm oil products. 
( 4) There will be changes in the energy trade. The decline in oil prices is 
expected to persist in the medium term. China will therefore become less 
important as an oil supplier to some of the ASEAN countries like the 
Philippines and Thailand. However, because of political goodwill the lifeline 
is available, if needed. China's sales of petroleum products to ASEAN, 
especially Singapore, will increase. The energy trade ·will witness the 
growing importance of Chinese coal exports to the region. 
(5) If the rhythm of China's modernization programme remains, we should 
expect an increase in export of a wide range of light manufactured and 
intermediate goods to ASEAN. Since the latest economic policy of some of 
the ASEAN countries stress the role of small- and medium-scale industrial 
development, there is scope for the exports of China's light industry and 
machinery products. China can promote this by having a liberal credit or 
soft loan scheme to support the export of these products. How much this 
will be achieved depends qn the protectionist policy of the ASEAN countries 
and on whether these Chinese intermediate goods are price and quality 
competitive to have some substitution effects. The obstacle is that China 
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cannot or will be restricted by ASEAN domestic politics from providing 
strong technology and manpower support as part of the after-sale service. 
Also some ASEAN governments may discourage this, viewing this policy 
as a threat to their own industrialization efforts. They are also cautious 
about being overdependent on China. 
(6) Although in the short run the competition for third country markets between 
China and ASEAN is not expected to be problematic to the cordial relations, 
the urgency to seek out market niches because of the present economic 
recession will inevitably intensify competition in the medium term. In 
particular, the fight for the shrinking and protected markets for labour-in-
tensive and other export substitution products in the American and 
Japanese markets is inevitable. Among the ASEAN members themselves 
this has already happened. The probable scenario is that China, because 
of her low real wage, can displace a significant portion of the existing 
markets of the ASEAN exporters. It remains to be seen whether China uses 
long-term political strategizing or pure commercial imperatives to influence 
her export position which overlaps that of ASEAN. 
(7) A longer-term outcome of the above is that the ASEAN countries, following 
the models of Singapore and Taiwan, must upgrade themselves to medium-
technology-based industries and other higher value added products in which 
China has presently less competitive advan_tages. In light of the competitive 
experiences of the 1960s and 1970s among the newly industrializing 
economies (NIEs), it is critical that the ASEAN countries should accelerate 
the drive towards sophisticated areas of manufacturing. The next fifteen 
years will be a more competitive era. 
(8) Considering the above, the overall catching-up by China, which exerts 
tremendous pressure on ASEAN and the other NIEs, will also add urgency 
to Japan's industrial reorganization. In addition, the foreign trade policy of 
Japan must also be restructured to suit its own national aspirations and 
that of the growing economic power of China and ASEAN. Japan's latest 
investment move to get behind the protectionist barriers of the United States 
and EC countries serves its strategic interests. But, any severe diversion of 
capital investment away from ASEAN and China will lead to political 
reactions. During the medium term, the yen appreciation has a favourable 
effect on China and ASEAN as it leads to a shift in investment locations. 
Japanese investment is now increasing in Singapore and Thailand because 
of favourable cost-effectiveness and high return on investment. 
(9) The triangular economic relationship among Japan, China, and ASEAN 
is now poised for a potential improvement if Japan exploits the comparative 
cost advantage of the yen appreciation to invest in China and ASEAN, and 
also to amplify the export volume of ASEAN and Chinese exports to a 
more liberalized domestic market. As far as manufactured exports is 
concerned, the burden is on China and ASEAN to develop their export 
and marketing capacity to cope with the challenges of the Japanese market. 
So far, except for primary products, this has not met with great success. 
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For primary products, Japan in fact could now buy more raw materials 
from ASEAN for reprocessing for .the China market. 
(10) Despite the disenchantments with the inefficient economic institutions of 
China and the high in~estmerit risks, foreign investors cannot ignore the 
Chinese potential. The outcome depends on how fast China continues to 
modernize itself and how it packages its incentives for foreign investors. 
But the competition for scarce investible funds between China and ASEAN 
is real. In the short run this is a zero-sum game. Any loss of investment by 
one country among the ASEAN group or China is an incremental gain_for 
another country. 
Another dimension of capital flow from ASEAN to China concerns the 
type of investment projects. There is a noticeable concentration on 
infrastructure construction, tourism-related business, and medium-technol-
ogy manufacturing. While the much touted investment potential is always 
discussed, the actual range of investment is narrow. The problem is the 
lack of financial capacity and technological capability on the part of ASEAN 
investors to compete with their Western counterparts in the large-scale 
projects. Singapore is presently the only ASEAN country that has mar-
ginally more to offer China than the other ASEAN members. 
( 11) Above all, China and ASEAN will continue to learn to adjust to each other 
as_ they conduct trade and business based on economic factors. The 
peculiarities of various policy controls and mechanisms would be "normal-
ized" in due course as the adjustment and accommodation progress. 
APPENDIX TABLE A.3.1 
Estimates of Market Share of Chinese_ and ASEAN Products 
in the EEC Market, 1985 
(In percentage) 
Commodity China Indonesia Philippines 
Vegetables 5.0 
Spices 1.6 13.7 
Castor oil 10.5 
Bed feather (down) 20._0 
Goat skin 28.8 1.9 
Tungsten ore 24.8 






NOTE: The above statistics are revisions of M. Ebas_hi's initial estimates (see _M. Ebashi, 
"Role of China in the Economic Interdependence of ASEAN and the Pacific", Proceedings 
of Expert Group on ASEAN and Pacific Economi-;;- Co-operation, Bangkok, June 1982). 
They are based on information given by ESCAP, various ASEAN ministries, and Chinese 
officials' estimates. 
' \ 
APPENDIX TABLE A3.2 
. Estimates of Market Share of Chinese and ASEAN Products in the Japanese Market, 1985 
(In percentage) 
Commodity ·China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore 
Fowls 16.7 
Shrimps 13.0 22.b 
Prepared fish and shellfish 16.2 
Fruits 7.5 28.3 
Prepared fruits 10.7 7.5 
Beans 17.5 
Hemp 36.3 19.0 
Ramie 31.2 27.2 
Castor oil seeds 33.2 58.3 
Castor oil 5.6 
Lumber of broad- leaved tree 4.3 16.5 27.4 
Raw material for perfumery, pharmacy 52.8 
Petroleum crude 3.9 15.3 
Petroleum products 6.0 16.0 21.4 
Petroleum spirits 7.6 22.6 
Kerosene 12.0 61.3 
Synthetic fibres, fabrics 7.2 
Packing sacks and bags 29.3 













Secondary fibre goods, not clothes 27.8 
Clothing 15.7 
Trimming for garments 16.0 
Furniture 8.1 
Tea 21.3 
Wheat bran 3.5 
NOTE: Same as for Appendix Table A3.1. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A3.3 
Estimates of Market Share of Chinese and AS.EAN Products in the U.S. Market, 19,85 
(In percentage) 
Commodity China Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia Philippines 
Men's cotton shirts 4.5 38.1 
Men's cotton trousers, 
slacks, and shorts 9.6 52.9 
Tin 2.8 13.4 30.2 
Gloves of leather 10.1 17.6 18.2 
Gloves of textile 19.0 19.8 24.3 
Bamboo, rattan, willow chip, 
baskets, etc. 28.0 15.8 19. 7 
Tapestries,. linen, and 
other fm:nishings 15.8 13.3 5.2 
Handkerchiefs 25.1 14.5 
Women's cotton coats and jackets 10.7 26.5 3.0 
Men's cotton coats and jackets 10.5 18.4 9.0 
Gasoline 12.5 11.1 
Feather, downs, bristles, and hair 41. 7 












Development of the ASEAN 
Petroleum Industry and 




The energy picture in the ASEAN region is quite diverse, viewed from either 
the demand or the supply side. This diversity 1\eflects differences in stage of 
economic development, energy resources endowment, and other factors 
including energy policies. Per capita primary energy consumption in the ASEAN 
region in 1984 ranged from 29.3 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) in Singapore to 
1.4 boe in,Indonesia. Similarly, the share of non-commercial energy (fuelwobd, 
agriculturitl waste, etc.) in total primary energy consumption in 1984 varied from 
ari· estimated 38.7 per cent in Indonesia and 26.4 per cent in Thailand to only 
9.6 per cent in Malaysia and almost nil in Singapore. 
The six ASEAN countries, however, share a common feature in that they 
assign great importance to the petroleum industry in their economies. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Brunei are important regional producers and net exporters of oil 
and gas. The Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand are net importers of energy 
in general, and oil in particular. None the less, all three countries also have a 
sizeable petroleum refining capacity. Singapore, in fact, is the third largest 
refinery centre and third largest oil trading centre in the world. Thailand has 
greatly stepped up its efforts over the past few years to reduce dependence on 
energy imports by promoting the production of natural gas and oil, in addition 
to coal (lignite). In 1985, production of natural gas and condensate by the Union 
Oil Co. in the Gulf of Thailand has reached the rate of 327 million cubic feet 
per day (mmcfd) and 14,136 barrels per day (bpd), respectively. Production of 
crude oil in the North by Shell has amounted to 20,688 bpd. The Philippines is 
also producing some oil from ten producing wells. 
China, being an important regional producer and a net oil exporter, has 
developed over the years various relations with ASEAN countries in the field of 
energy generally and petroleum in particular. For many years, China has been 
exporting crude petroleum and petroleum products to the Philippines and 
Thailand, and more recently also to Singapore for refining. The publicity in the 
.past that sales of Chinese crude to the Philippines and Thailand were based on 
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friendship prices has caused some ill-feelings in Indonesia, which as an OPEC 
country was not in the position to offer even its neighbours better prices than 
those set by OPEC, at least to match Chinese offers. 
However, China has been regarded as a much greater competitor to Indonesia 
in the Japanese petroleum import market which is Indonesia's most important 
customer. As of 1985, Indonesia's share in crude oil imports into Japan of about 
11.4 per cent was still considerably larger than that of China which stood at 6.5 
per cent. But China's relations with the ASEAN region in the field of petroleum 
are not necessarily only of a conflicting nature. The more recent past saw the 
development of some co-operative relationship. Indonesian crude has found its 
way into China since 1986, amounting in total for that year to about 1 to 1.3 
million barrels. Such exports have continued in 1987. 
In 1984 China's Sinochem awarded its first term contract to the Shell refinery 
in Singapore to process 20,000 bpd of crude for one year. Prior to that China 
had been processing spot volumes in Singapore for some time. A 1985 bilateral 
trade agreement between China and Singapore included a minimum processing 
of 60,000 bpd of Chinese crude in Singapore for three years. This development 
has been welcomed by the refineries in Singapore that have lost a major business 
opportunity from Indonesia's processing deal with the completion of new 
refineries in Indonesia in 1985. But w~th China's current efforts to mO'c;iernize its 
refining system, would its processing in Singapore also decrease, and· how fast? 
And what would be the implications for Singapore's refineries? 
The above are some of the questions to be examined in this paper. The 
following section reviews the development of ASEAN's petroleum industry, and 
its problems and near-term prospects. This will be followed by a discussion of 
developments in the broader regional energy scene which provide the context for 
both ASEAN's and China's pefroleum indJstries, in terms of opportunities as 
well as challenges. The concluding section examines the implications of those 
developments to ASEAN-China economic relations. 
II. ASEAN's Petroleum Industry 
As an _overview it is useful to begin with an examination of the region's available 
reserves. Proven reserves of oil in the ASEAN region as of the beginning of 1987 
stood at about 12. 7 billion barrels, of which around two-thirds are in Indonesia 
(Table 4.1). Malaysia's and Brunei's shares were 22.3 and U.2 per cent, 
respectively. 
The past ten years or so saw a considerable decrease of oil reserves by about 
32 per cent, from around 18.5 billion barrels in 1976. This suggests that additions 
to the region's proven reserves have not come about as fast as the rate of increase 
in the region's oil production. As shown in Table 4.2, the ratios of oil reserves to 
production for the ASEAN region as a whole have dropped from 32 years in 
1975 to 20 years in 1985. The decline was most rapid in the case of Malaysia, 
from 69 years in 1975 to 20 years in 1985. This development also suggests the 
need for a continuous search for oil, especially in the ASEAN region where -
TABLE 4.1 
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in view of the geological nature of its basins - oilfields yet to be discovered are 
likely to be marginal fields. 1 
TABLE 4.2 
Oil and Gas Reserve-to-Production Ratios 
in the ASEAN and Pacific Regions 
(In years) 
Country 
Oil Natural Gas 
1975 1985 1975 1985 
Brunei 30 27 492 26 
Indonesia 29 19 71 34 
Malaysia 69 20 298 
Philippines 5 
Singapore 
Thailand 8 51 
A SEAN 32 20 169 62 
China 35 20 20 50 
Japan 6 16 18 15 
North America 13 17 11 17 
Oceania 12 8 118 38 
Other East Asia 10 6 28 23 
SOURCE: The Second Symposium on Pacific Energy Consumption, Energy Statistics, 
Tokyo, March 1987. 
Reserve estimates have varied widely, in part because of the different methods 
used. Estimates of undiscovered resources tend to have a much greater uncer-
tainty than estimates of recoverable reserves. 2 In the case of Indonesia, for 
example, remaining undiscovered resources have been estimated at between 17 
to 216 billion barrels, but a large portion of the estimates fall in the region of 40 
to 50 billion barrels. 3 
In contrast to oil reserves, proven natural gas reserves in the ASEAN region 
have increased dramatically over the past 10 years, from about 39 trillion cu. ft. 
in 1976 to 113 trillion cu. ft. in 1987. The shares of Indonesia and Malaysia are 
equal at 44 per cent and Thailand's share is approximately as large as that of 
Brunei, at about 6 per cent each. For the region as a whole, the rate of reserves 
to production at the beginning of 1987 was 62 years. 
Natural gas production has increased significantly in Brunei and particularly 
in Indonesia and is mainly developed for exports. Brunei's exports to Japan 
increased from 2 billion cu. m. in 1975 to about 7 ·billion cu. m. in 1984. 
Indonesia's exports to Japan developed much faster, from nil to over 19 billion 
cu. m. in 1984, which made Indonesia since then the world largest exporter of 
natural gas (LNG), surpassing Algeria. Malaysia has also entered the picture, 
and its exports - also exclusively to Japan reached 4.9 billion cu. m. in 1984. 
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This development suggests that the natural gas sector cannot be ignored in an 
examination of the prospects of ASEAN's petroleum industry and the region's 
energy future. 
Total crude oil production in ASEAN's three main producers - Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Brunei - increased by about 5 per cent per annum over the 
period from 1974 to 1979, but remained largely stagnant during the subsequent 
period from 1980 to 1986 (Table 4.3). This latter development was primarily due 
to Indonesia's decreased production of crude in line with OPEC's decision to 
impose production quotas among its members. Oil production in Brunei has also 
been declining since 1979, partly due to its own decision to conserve resources. 
Among these three countries, only M.alaysia continued to increase production, 
even during the recent oil glut period. Its share of total ASEAN crude oil 
production increased from less than 5 per cent in 1974 to close to 25 per cent in 
1986. LNG exports, which have continued to grow during the past years, partly 
compensated for the decline in oil export earnings. Exports of LNG from 
Indonesia increased from US$535 million in 1978 to US$3.8 billion in 1'985, but 
decreased to US$2.8 billion in 1986, since the drop in oil prices also affected 
LNG prices. 
Total petroleum refining capacity in the ASEAN region amounted to about 
2.3 million bpd in early 1987, up from around 1.9 million bpd in 1976. Of the 
total capacity in 1987, 42 per cent is located in Singapore, followed by 28 per 
cent in Indonesia, 12 per cent in the Philippines, 9 per cent in Malaysia, 8 per 
cent in Thailand, and only 0.4 per cent in Brunei (Table 4.4). Over the 1976-87 
period, the largest addition in refining capacity occurred in Indonesia, and came 
on stream in 1985. No significant cxpansi.ons are.currently being contemplated 
in the region, and Malaysia has temporarily cancelled the plan to build a 
120,000-bpd capacity in Malacca. This development reflects the slow-down in 
the growth of petroleum product consumption, both within and outside the 
ASEAN region. It also reflects surplus refining capacity globally, especially as a 
result of large capacity increases in the Middle East in recent years, which also 
directly competes with the refining centres in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The developments examined above have greatly affected the economies in the 
region which in one way or another have relied on the petroleum industry in 
their development. The net petroleum exporters, Indonesia and Malaysia, have 
been hard hit by the dramatic drop in oil prices, especially in 1986. The effects 
have not been as severe in Brunei, a rich sultanate with a very small population 
base. 
Until the early 1980s, up to 75 per cent of Indonesia's export earnings were 
derived from· the oil and gas trade, and also as large as 55 per cent of the 
government's revenues came from oil taxes. In the fiscal year that ended in March 
1987, the contribution of oil and gas to Indonesia's export earnings declined to 
only 50 per cent, and their contribution to the government's domestic revenues 
was less than 40 per cent. The severity of this development can be understood 
when one notes that Indonesia's total export earnings had dropped and govern-
ment revenues experienced a decline in real terms. Total exports declined from 
-----······ --------------------------------------------------
TABLE 4.3 
Oil Production in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and China 
(In thousand bpd) 
Av. Annual Av. Annual 
Country 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 % Change 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 % Change 
1974-1979 1980-1986 
Brunei 200 190 205 220 205 240 3.7 235 175 165 175 160 150 150 -7.2 
Indonesia 1,375 1,305 1,505 1,690 1,635 1,590 2.9 1,575 1,680 1,415 1;345 1,410 1,335 1,400 -1.9 
Malaysia 80 100 165 185 215 285 28.9 275 250 295 420 440 435 505 10.9 
Total 1,655 1,595 1,875 2,095 2,055 2,115 2,085 2,105 1,875 1,940 2,010 1,920 2,055 
China 1,320 1,490 1,675 1,880 2,090 2,130 8.3 2,125 2,035 2,050 2,135 2,300 2,515 2,630 3.6 
OPEC 31,055 27,530 31,100 31,680 30,280 31,465 0.3 27,445 23,380 19,930 18,425 18,470 17 ,215 19,440 -5.6 
SOURCE: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, various issues. 
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TABLE 4.4 
Refining Capacity in the ASEAN and Pacific Regionsa 











North America 18,013,590 
Oceania 761,100 
Other East Asia 769,500 
•crude runs, at the beginning of the year. 
bBP Statistical &view of World Energy. 



























US$22 billion in 1981 to US$19 billion in 1986. The price collapse also forced 
the petroleum industry in Indonesia to reduce spending and investment. During 
1986, investment in exploration, development, and production was 31 per cent 
below what was planned. 
Malaysia's dependence upon the petroleum industry is much less than that of 
Indonesia. However, its ability to accelerate its industrialization efforts since the 
early 1980s was due to the dramatic rise in oil export earnings. The importance 
of the petroleum sector to Singapore's economy also cannot be overlooked. While 
its contribution to total employment is small, its contribution to output and value 
added is quite sizeable. In 1980, the petroleum sector's contribution to the 
manufacturing sector's output was 43.2 per cent; it was 20.8 per cent in terms of 
value added, and 42 per cent in terms of total foreign investment. 4 
In contrast to the effects on the region's net oil exporters and on Singapore, 
the drop in oil prices has greatly reduced the import bills of .Thailand and the 
Philippines. The two large oil price increases in the mid-1970s and late 1970s 
have caused great hardships to these two countries. Overall, they have been able 
to overcome those difficulties rather well. This is especially true in the case of 
Thailand, which has also successfully stepped up its efforts to develop its 
petroleum industry to reduce dependence on energy imports. 
The above overview suggests the main issues in the development of ASEAN's 
petroleum industry, which differ in nature or degree among its six member 
countries. vVhat follows is a country-by-country survey of the industry's problems 
5 . 
and prospects. 
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1. Indonesia 
Current oil-producing capacity is about 1.6 million barrels per day (mbpd). Since 
December 1986, Indonesia's production quota under the OPEC agreement 
amounted to 1.133 mbpd, excluding condensate. 
The search for oil in Indonesia started in 1872 in Maja, West Java, but oil 
was discovered only in 1885 in Telaga Said, North Sumatra. With an initial 
production of 2.000 bpd in 1893, the cumulative amount of oil produced in 
Indonesia until 1 January 1987 amounted to about 12.1 billion barrels, of which 
about 9 billion barrels have been produced since 1967, following the government's 
efforts to revitalize Indonesia's petroleum industry. 
Since the early search for oil, five giant oilfields - namely fields with more 
than 500 million barrels of recoverable oil - have been discovered . They are: 
Duri and Minas, which are on shore and Handil, Ataka, and Arjuna, all of which 
are off shore. Their total original ~coverable reserves were estimated at 8.2 billion 
barrels of oil, of which 4.5 billion barrels are in the Minas field. Minas, which is 
just a little bit short to be called a super giant field, that is a field with an initial 
recoverable reserves of 5 billion barrels of oil, is the largest oilfield in the Western 
Pacific, but it only ranks fortieth in the world. 
Of the 60 tertiary basins in Indonesia, 37 basins have been explored. 
Discoveries were made in 23 basins, of which 16 basins proved to be commercial, 
and of this, only 14 basins have reached production stage. Estimates made by 
Pertamina geologists in 1985 suggest that 27 per cent of the sedimentary l:)asins 
are on shore, 42 per cent off shore in water depth of less than 200 metres, and 
the remaining 31 per cent in deeper waters. Total hydro-carbon resources yet to 
be discovered have been placed at 84.5 billion hoe, consisting of 48.4 billion 
barrels of oil and 216.8 trillion cu. ft. of gas or 36.1 billion hoe. 
At present, over 400 oil and gas fields have been identified throughout 
Indonesia. Twenty-seven large oilfields namely fields with initial recoverable 
~eserves between 100 to 500 million barrels of oil - have been discov~red, as 
well as another 185 oilfields with less than 50 million barrels of oil initially 
recoverable. The average size of a small field, on shore and off shore, is 22 and 
30 million barrels of recoverable oil, respectively. 
Such diverse reserves pattern also generates a highly dispersed industry, 
involving almost any dimension of company and venture to participate. The main 
policy issue for the government has been - and continues to be - the creation 
of a favourable investment and business climate for exploration and development 
of the country's hydro-carbon resources. This has not been an easy task, and 
requires an ongoing review ·of, while maintaining a "stable" relationship with, 
foreign oil companies which manage nearly all of the oil and gas operations. The 
essence of the problem is that of devising "fair" shares. 
In 1960, Indonesia made an end to the concession system under which the 
petroleum industry operated and replaced it with the Oil and Gas Law (Law No. 
44) in which the state was given exclusive rights to exploit petroleum resources. 
The creation of three national oil companies in 1961 paved the way for direct 
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participation of the state in exploration and development. The law stipulated that 
private and foreign companies conducted their oil operations as contractors to 
the national oil companies. This differed from the earlier arrangement, by sharing 
profits rather than providing royalties and by transferring title to the oil to the 
state. The three foreign companies Shell, Stanvac, and Caltex which held 
oil concessions, surrendered their rights and signed a Contract of Work (COW) 
agreement with the state oil companies. In 1968, the three state oil companies 
were merged into Pertamina. 
The Production-Sharing Contract (PSC) was devised in 1966, and opened the 
door for a large inflow of foreign capital. As of the beginning of 1987, seventy-one 
PSC areas were operated by forty-three foreign companies. The PSC agreement 
is based on a division of actual production between Pertamina and the contractor 
rather than net profits. Originally the contractor was allowed to deduct up to 40 
per cent of annual crude production for cost recovery, and the remaining 
production .. was shared on a 65-35 basis in favour of Pertamina. Pertamina is 
responsible for the management in the operation contemplated in the contract, 
and approves annual work programmes and budgets prepared by the contractors; 
the contractors must work according to the approved budgets. The contractor 
provides all the financing and carries the risk of all operating cost, and has the 
obligation to deliver a portion of its share (maximum 25 per cent) for the domestic 
market (called pro-rata crude), which is valued at a token price. 
In view of the sharp increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1974, the government · 
negotiated with the contractors to modify the existing agreements. The new terms 
called for an 85-15 split in favour of Pertamina. The 85 per cent share was 
considered to include the contract payment of Indonesian corporation tax 
liabilities. With the existing low price of the pro-rata crude, the split was effectively 
close to 88-12. 
In petroleum refining, Indonesia now has the capacity to supply its domestic 
·requirements from its own refineries. This may continue during the next ten 
years or so without having to buUd new facUities, following the completion of a 
more than US$4-billion expansion of three refineries in 1984. 
The Oil and Gasjournalestimated that as of 1January1987, the total capacity 
of Indonesian refineries was 635,800 bpd. With the completion of all refinery 
expansion projects, Indonesia's total installed refining capacity had increased to 
905,000 barrels per stream day (bpsd), that is during a day when it is in operation. 
Total crude processed in 1986 amounted to 639,000 bpd. 
Domestic demand for petroleum products now amounts to about 500,000 hpd. 
Since-1983, the country experienced negative growth rates in dom.estic petroleum 
fuels consumption. This partly resulted from slower economic growth, but was 
also partly in response to dramatic price increases in the domestic market. 
Prices were adjusted upwards by an average of 58 per cent in 1982, again by 
53 per cent in 1983, and by another 16 per cent in 1984. These adjustments were 
necessitated by budgetary considerations since domestic fuel subsidies had 
become a heavy burden on government finances. These adjustments were also 
made to check the high rates of growth of domestic fuel consumption experienced 
in the late 1970s, which went as high as 15 per cent per annum. The government's 
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programme to diversify sources of energy supplies was also meant to maintain a 
sizeable amount of exportable energy resources, petroleum in particular. 
Given domestic demand conditions and current refinery capabilities, Indonesia 
has the potential to become a major exporter of refined products in the Asian 
region. 
While the oil sector experienced a slow-down, the natural gas sector of 
Indonesia has been producing at full steam in recent years. Natural gas 
production and export revenues from LNG are expected to continue increasing 
for. the next few years. 
During 1986, the production of natural gas increased by about 7 per cent to 
amount to 1.6 trillion cu. ft. Estimates suggest current production capacity of 
clos'e to 3 trillion cu. ft. As shown earlier, Indonesia has a sizeable amount of gas 
proven reserves (Table 4.1), with a larger additional potential reserves -
including the super-giant offshore gas field in the East Natuna Basin - totalling 
about 109 trillion cu. ft. 
Indonesia began to export gas as LNG in 1977, exclusively to Japan, and has 
become the world's largest LNG exporter since 1984. The two giant onshore 
fields, the Arun field in Aceh (North Sumatra) and the Badak field in East 
Kalimantan, are the main gas suppliers to .the Indonesian LNG production system 
for exports. 
At present there are ten operating LNG trains. Six trains are located at Arun, 
which is operated by P.T. Arun. Gas for P.T. Arun is supplied by Mobil Oil 
Indonesia Inc. Production from the first three trains is sold under a 1973 contract 
to a consqrtium of Japanese buyers, callee[ the "Western Buyers Group". The 
fourth and fifth trains came on stream in 1984 and provide LNG to a different 
Japanese consortium, called the "Eastern Buyers Group". The sixth train, which 
came on stream in late 1986, provide LNG supplies to South Korea under a 
twenty-year contract involving 2 million tons of LNG annually. Regular 
shipments to South Korea began in March 1987. 
The four other LNG trains are located in Badak and are operated by P.T. 
Badak. Here, the gas is supplied by Huff co, Total, and Unocal. All four trains 
provide LNG to the "Western Buyers Group" under the same 1973 contract as 
with P.T. Arun, as well as a separate contract signed in 1984. A fifth train is 
currently being tendered, and is meant to supply LNG to Taiwan based on an 
agreement signed in March 1987 for supplies of 1.5 million tons per year 
beginning in 1990. 
Both P.T. Arun and P.T. Badak are owned by the participants in the gas 
contracts, namely Pertamina, as a partner with the production-sharing 
contractor and owner of the rights to the gas on behalf of the government; the 
Japanese customers; and the production-sharing contractors that supply the gas. 
The PSC for natural gas is similar to that for oil, except that the government 
share of production is only 21 per cent. However, multiplying the remainder by 
4he 56 per cent tax rate implies a profit split of 65-35 in favour of the government. 
There is also a requirement to deliver some gas for domestic use. 
Of total sales of natural gas in 1986, 75 per cent are supplied to the gas 
liquefaction (LNG) plants. The remainder are for domestic use by fertilizer plants, 
92 Hadi Soesasiro 
refineries, and other users, including liquid petroleum gas (LPG) plants. The 
government has made numerous efforts to increase gas utilization domestically 
in its energy diversification plans. The use of LPG is encouraged as a substitute 
for kerosene. LPG production indeed increased from about 4 70 thousand metric 
tons in 1982 to over 800 thousand metric tons in 1986. On average, only 30 per 
cent of total LPG production has been consumed domestically, with the remaining 
70 per cent being exported, largely to Japan. 
The importance of natural gas today, and over the medium term, rests 
primarily with LNG exports. Indonesia's LNG industry, however, is dependent 
on the Japanese market for over 80 per cent of its exports. Similarly, Indonesia's 
share of over 50 per cent of total Japanese LNG imports has led to policies of 
diversification. Such mutual dependence or interdependence, can be sustained if 
appropriately managed. 
One important feature of LNG trade today is that both the buyers and sellers 
are locked together by long-term contracts. Suggestions have been made that as 
current LNG contracts expire at the beginning of the next century, LNG will 
become more like a freely traded commodity. This being the case, the challenge 
to the Indonesian natural gas industry is to stay competitive as a major world 
LNG supplier. 
2. Malaysia 
Current production capacity in Malaysia is reported to be around 545,000 bpd. 6 
Not being an OPEC member, Malaysia was able to produce up to about 505,000 
bpd in 1986, up from an average of 435,000 bpd in 1985. At the beginning of 
1985, as a mark of solidarity with OPEC, production was cut by about 20,000 
bpd. However, as prices fell, it abandoned the restraints and was lifting some 
480,000 bpd later in the year. Its production target was raised to 510,000 bpd 
for 1986, but in support of OPEC's decision to cutback production for a few 
months, production dropped to 459,000 bpd at the end of that year. 7 
The drop in oil prices has affected Malaysia in a similar fashion as Indonesia. 
For some time petroleum has become Malaysia's largest foreign exchange earner. 
Federal government revenues from oil have dropped from M$5.4 billion in 1985 
to an estimated M$2.3 billion in 1987 (based on an average oil price of US$20 
per barrel). 
Oil search in Malaysia began in 1910 in Miri, Sarawak. Peak production of 
5.5 million barrels a year was reached in 1929. After sixty-two years of production, 
totalling some 80 million barrels of oil, the Miri field reserves were finally 
exhausted in 1973. The first offshore oil production came from the West Lutong 
field in 1966. 
The overall increase in production from about 275,000 bpd in 1980 to 435,000 
bpd in 1985 (Table 4.3) was made possible by the coming on stream of 13 new 
fields, bringing the total member of producing fields to 27 from 14 in 1980. One 
giant oilfield (Tapis/Bekok/Pulai) has been discovered, while five fields are 
classified as large, one medium, with the rest being small. Of the total crude oil 
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produced in 1985, about 51 per cent came from the fields located in offshore 
Trengganu, 18 per cent offshore Sabah, and 31.5 per cent offshore Sarawak. 
Recoverable oil reserves from a total of 45 offshore oilfields currently stand 
at somewhat less than 3.0 billion barrels of oil, with 62 and 35 per cent, 
respectively, held by the two major oil companies producing crude, Esso and 
Shell. Another 1.2 billion barrels of oil is expected to be discovered by the year 
2000. 
Malaysia essentially faces the same challenge as Indonesia, namely to maintain 
its position as an oil exporter and to encourage the necessary huge investment 
and technology through the active participation of foreign oil companies. With 
little prospect of discovering giant fields, Malaysia also will have to facilitate 
marginal small fields. Thus, Malaysia continuously has to confront the issue of 
providing improved terms and incentives to attract foreign oil companies. In 
addition, and as distinct from the Indonesian case, Malaysia has to face the 
~ecurring problem of federal/state disputes, largely over the division of revenues 
and over who should pay for development projects. Since the formation of a 
national oil company, Petronas, Malaysian petroleum has been "federalized" and 
the states only receive 5 p~r cent of revenues. 
Legislative control of the petroleum industry in Malaysia has evolved over 
three periods. The first was based on a concessionary system which operated in 
the states of Sabah and Sarawak and in the states of Peninsular Malaysia up to 
1965. The second period began with the Petroleum Mining Rules of 1966, which 
changed the concessionary system to one of equal profit-sharing between the 
companies and the government. The third period saw a tightening of the 
government's control over the petroleum industry with the replacement of the 
profit-sharing system by a production-sharing system in 1974 under the 
Petroleum Development Act, which also established Petronas. 
The Malaysian PSC, with the agreements reached in 1976, is similar to PSCs 
in other countries. For every 100 barrels of crude oil produced, the companies 
get 20 barrels for cost recovery and the government gets 10 barrels as -royalty. 
Of the remaining 70 barrels, 49 barrels (70 per cent) go to the government and 
21 barrels (30 per cent) to the oil companies. Petroleum income tax takes 45 per 
cent of the retained 21 barrels. This leaves the companies with 11.5 barrels. Thus, 
in total the companies get 31.5 barrels and the government 68.5 barrels. The 
PSC is to last twenty years, with the option of a four-year extension. In addition, 
duty of 25 per cent ad valorem was imposed on crude oil exports in 1980. 
During the negotiations in 1975, oil companies slowed production. Esso, in 
fact, suspended all exploration and the development of a number of fields. By 
1978, however, crude production surpassed 200,000 bpd. Exports of Malaysian 
crude oil have more than tripled during the period 1975-80 to amount to about 
11 million tons (Table 4.5) or an equivalent of 0.2 mm bpd, almost one-fourth 
of Indonesia's exports. By 1985 its. exports reached 16. 7 million tons or a little 
over 40 per cent of Indonesia's exports. Thus, in regional terms, Malaysia has 
become an important oil exporter. · 
Malaysian petroleum reserves, however, have been dwindling rather rapidly, 
with a drop in the reserve-to-production ratio from 69 years in 1975 to 20 years 
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TABLE 4.5 
Malaysia's Crude Oil Exports 1975, 1980-86 
Volume % Share 
of Total Volume 
(thousand Value 
tons) (M$ million) Japan Singapore Thailand U.S. 
1975 3,240 727 
1980 11,252 6,709 43.2 20.6 3.2 27.9 
1981 10,143 6,921 37.9 35.8 3.7 11.6 
1982 11,974 7,694 27.9 46.1 11.0 3.7 
1983 14,224 7,871 23.2 44.3 13.1 2.3 
1984 16,497 8,737 29.6 33.1 8.4 0.6 
1985 16,701 8,698 33.9 25.6 11.1 0.6 
1986 (est.) 10,576 3,352 37.5 22.8 11. 7 2.7 
SOURCE: Malaysia, Ministry of,Finance, Economic Report 1986187. 
in 1985. Thus, it was not surprising that Malaysia enacted the National Depletion 
Policy in 1979 to leave some oil discoveries in place and oil production regulated 
to a maximum of 1.75 per cent of oil-in-place il) any given year. This was to 
guarantee the availability of oil by the year 2000, given the remaining limited 
amount of recoverable oil. However, discoveries since then improved the outlook 
of oil availability and the Depletion Policy was revoked in 1982. 
Malaysia's dependence on petroleum revenues also increased significantly. 
This leaves the country with no other choice but to encourage more exploration 
and development of new fields. To stimulate investment and encourage develop-
ment of low-volume, high-cost marginal fields, in December 1985 a revised PSC 
arrangement which had been under consideration for two years was 
announced. The new terms include, among other things: 
1. Increased percentages of gross production allowed for cost recovery, from 
35 to 50 per cent; 
2. Improved profit split for oil on companies on the first 50 million barrels of 
cumulative production from contract area: 
- to 10 mbpd: 50-50; 
- between 10 and 20 mbpd: 40-60 in favour of Petronas; and 
above 20 nibpd: 30-70 in favour of Petronas; and 
3. Abolition of all bonus payments. . 
It was questioned whether these new terms were attractive enough to 
encourage development of marginal fields since only the first marginal field in a 
contract area is likely to benefit from the revision. Also, the revision made no 
reference to the existing windfall profit tax, royalties, or export duties. Petronas 
used these revised terms in offering three offshore blocks for bidding which was 
responded to favourably by forty companies, including new potential operators. 
Like Indonesia, Malaysia has also stepped up natural gas production, and by 
now has become an important LNG exporter. Production of natural gas 
(associated and non-associated) grew at a rate of 38.7 per cent per annum, from 
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258 million standard cu. ft. per day (mscfd) in 1980 to 1,324 mscfd. 
Malaysia is blessed with ample reserves of natural gas. Proven reserves have 
increased by a factor of three in five years, from 19 trillion cu. ft. in 1982 to close 
to 50 trillion cu. ft. in 1987. Another 21 to 37 triUion cu. ft. ofreserves is expected 
to be found by the year 2000. The discovery by Shell in the Bintulu field off the 
west coast of Sarawak is so far the largest gas find. Reserves are estimated to be 
6 trillion cu. ft. 
In view of the dwindling oil reserves, Malaysia has greatly encouraged 
exploration and development of natural gas as well as inte~sified its use as fuel, 
especially as a substitute for fuel oil in electricity generation and in the transport 
sector. Indeed, the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90) expected an increase in the 
contribution of gas to total electricity generation from 13.1 per cent in 1985 to 
30.9 per cent in 1990. 
Thus far, however, the rapid development in gas production is a result of the 
start in 1983 of LNG production from the plant at Bintulu, Malaysia's current 
biggest industrial project. The Bintulu liquefaction plant was constructed in 1978 
for LNG sales to Japan under a twenty-year agreement starting in 1973. Petronas 
on the one hand, and Shell and Mitsubishi on the other hand, are parties to this 
project. Together with Tokyo Gas and Tokyo Electric, they formed a company 
· in Japan to market the LNG. Petronas own an interest of 70 per cent in the 
marketing company. LNG exports to Japan is expected to increase to 6,890 
thousand tons in 1990. 
The LNG projects utilized about 74 per cent of total gas sales in 1985. Gas 
supplies to the project are taken from the Central Luconia and other fields 
offshore Sarawak. The remaining 16 per cent or so bf total gas sales were 
delivered to various projects of the so-called Peninsular Gas Utilization (PGU) 
Phase I project. This includes the power station at Paka, a steel billet production 
plant at Telok Kalong, and a housing area at Kerteh in Trengganu. The ASEAN 
ammonia-urea plant is also located at Bintulu. 
Increase in gas production will be attributable to the coming on stream of 
PGU Phase II project planned for 1989, which includes the Tuanku J aafar and 
Post Kluang power stations along the West Coast, each of 600 MW. Phase II 
would involve 489 million cu. ft. of gas per day, which is quite considerable 
compared with the 175 million cu. ft. per day for Phase I. In the Phase II project, 
Malaysia will also be supplying gas by pipeline to power stations in Singapore. 
Phase III envisages the construction of a pipeline grid to feed the power ·stations 
at Prai in the North. For the time being, Phase II has been put on hold for two 
years because it is not considered viable until oil prices rise again to around 
US$28 per barrel. · 
In addition to the PGU projects in Peninsular Malaysia and the LNG Plant 
at Bintulu in Sarawak, there is a major gas project, the Sabah Energy 
Corporation's gas collection system on Labuan Island, ·to provide gas to three 
industrial projects, namely the 700,000-ton per year sponge-iron plant, a 2,000-
ton per day methanol plant, and a 70-MW power station. 
Malaysia's four refineries now have a combined capacity of about 212,000 
bpd. Two large refineries are owned by Shell, another one is owned by Esso, and 
96 Hadi Soesastro 
Petronas has the most recent and smallest refinery. Petronas has delayed a plan 
to construct a 120,000-bpd refinery in Malacca. 
Shell has a programme to upgrade its refinery in Port Dickson and has beeh 
involved in two processing.proposals. The first was for a commercial-sized methyl 
tertiary:butyl ether (MTBE) - propylene gas processing plant near the LNG plant 
at Bintulu. In October 1985, Petronas signed a statement of intent to build such 
a plant but it will be located near Kuantan port on the East Coast of Peninsular 
Malaysia. It will be using LPG from the Trengganu state gas processing plant 
and methanol from the Labuan Feder.al Territory in Sabah. 
The other proposal was for the first commercial plant to produce middle 
distillates from natural gas using the so-called Shell Middle Distillate Synthesis 
(SMDS) technology. Based on a feedstock of 100 million cu. ft. of gas per day, 
the SMDS process will yield 11,000 barrels per day of diesel fuel, kerosene, and 
naphta. 
Current financial difficulties make it questionable whether the downstream 
projects could be expected to be on stream in 1990 as originally planned. None 
the less it is likely that in the future, and in contrast to oil, exports of gas (LNG) 
will only absorb a small part of Malaysia's huge gas reserves. The policy objective 
indeed is to develop uses for meeting the country's own energy needs, and to 
assist industrialization, while reserving oil for export. 
3. Brunei 
Oil production in Brunei has been declining by about 7 per cent per annum since 
1980, after peaking at some 240,000 bpd in 1979. Since 1983 Brunei began to 
adopt a depletion policy to limit its daily oil production to around 150,000 barrels 
until the end of the century, although its present production capacity stands at 
least at about 210,000 bpd. 
Production in 1985 and 1986 stooq at about 150,000 bpd (Table 4.3), partly 
as a result of the oil glut, and is expected to stabilize at this level in line with the 
government's conservation policy. Unlike many other oil exporters, Brunei has 
not had to resort to raising its production to compensate for falling revenues 
brought about by depressed oil prices. Brunei's external reserves, amounting to 
some US$20 billion, provide a more than sufficient cushion for the economy. 
Until recently Brunei ran trade surpluses of about US$3 to US$4 billion annually. 
The government, however, has realized that the economy cannot continue to 
rely solely on oil and natural gas, which contribute to over 70 per cent of the 
country's GDP, 99 per cent of its exports, and more than 90 per cent of 
government revenues. A twenty-year master plan has been contemplated, 
including use of its vast reserves of high-grade silica to develop a microchip and 
optics industry. However, manpower constraints are the biggest obstacle. 
Current proven oil reserves are put at 1.4 billion barrels of oil, with a reserve-
to-production ratio of 27 years (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Exploration for oil began in 
1899, but the giant Seria field was not discovered until 1929. Offshore drilling 
started in 1954 and led to the discovery of the second giant oilfield, Southwest 
Ampa, in 1963. The third giant field, Champion Off-shore, was discovered in 
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1970. In addition to these three giant fields, Brunei has two large and one small 
oilfields. Enhanced recovery activities over the next fifteen years are expected to 
yield an additional 200 million barrels of oil. 
Most of Brunei's crude oil production is being exported, since domestic oil 
consumption amounts to only about 12,000 bpd, or 8 per cent of its current 
production. Brunei relies more on natural gas to supply its domestic energy needs, 
namely up to 70 per cent of total energy supply. Oil meets the remaining 30 per 
cent. 
Brunei has only one 10,000-bpd refinery at Seria, which went on stream in 
October 1983. This makes the nation self-sufficient in regular and premium 
gasoline, kerosene, aviation jet fuel, and diesel fuel and it will continue to meet 
the country's own needs until the end of the century. The increase in petroleum 
product consumption is mostly in the transportation sector - estimated at 15 
per cent per annum but total consumption is estimated at only 4- per cent per 
annum. 
Brunei's recoverable reserves of gas at the beginning of 1987 were estimated 
at some 7 trillion cu. ft., sufficient for another 26 years at the current rate of 
production at the order of 900 mscfd. Additional gas finds are still expected in 
the future. 
LNG trade in the ASEAN region was pioneered by Brunei. In 1968 an 
agreement in principle was signed with the Japanese buyers Tokyo Electric, 
Tokyo Gas, and Osaka Gas. Since 1973 Brunei has exported LNG to Japan 
under a twenty-year sales contract. The five-train plant at Lumut is jointly owned 
by the government, Royal Dutch Shell, and Mitsubishi, and is capable of 
producing 5 million tons of LNG per year with an ultimate expandable capacity 
of 6 million tons per year. In 1985, with the weakening of oil prices, the Japanese 
buyers became disenchanted with the long-term contract with Brunei and they 
have called for a review of the deal. Indonesia has faced the same problem. The 
dispute with Indonesia over price was because it was linked to Indonesiis official 
selling price of crude oil, and was settled only after nine months of negotiations 
with the agreement by Indonesia to base LNG prices on the realized export price 
of crude. Indonesia also agreed to compensate for the over-payment back to 
February 1986 by giving more LNG in future shipments. 
The petroleum industry in Brunei is controlled by Brunei Shell Petroleum 
(BSP), a 50:50 joint-venture between the government and Royal Dutch Shell. 
Brunei is not considering the establishment of a state oil company because of 
manpower shortage. However, the government is known to want to strengthen 
its control over the energy sector and to have a larger share in BSP. 
Except for replacing ageing facilities and developing the presently known 
reserves, Brunei is not considering any new major developments in the rest of 
the petroleum industry. 
4. Singapore 
Singapore possesses no known indigenous hydro-carbon resources in any form, 
both on shore and off shore. None the less, Singapore has emerged .as a major 
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oil centre: it has five refineries, two major independent storage/terminalling 
companies, a large number of oil traders, and many foreign oil-service companies 
catering for the region, (mainly Indonesia and Malaysia). 
Singapore's refinery capacity was estimated by Oil and Gas Journal to be around 
961,000 bpd at the beginning of 1987; (Table 4.4), down from the 1.1 million 
bpd nameplate capacity. However, the effective capacity was thought to be in 
the order of 800,000 to 850,000 bpd.8 This lower effective capacity resulted from 
the fact that Singapore refineries are currently running mostly Far East crudes, 
while they were designed to run mostly Middle East crude. It should be noted, 
however, that this capacity is still quite substantial, especially if compared to the 
27,000-bpd capacity in 1961 when the first refinery came on stream. 
Singapore's refining industry has emerged in response to developments in the 
Asia-Pacific refining industry. Historically, the Asia-Pacific region suffered from 
inadequate refining capacity to meet the demand for petroleum products. In 
addition, the refining industry in the Asia-Pacific region was unable to meet the 
demand mix for petroleum products because the existing refineries were relatively 
unsophisticated. 
All together, the five refineries in Singapore, operated by Shell, Esso, Mobil, 
British Petroleum (BP), and Singapore Refinery Company (SRO) are not much 
more sophisticated than most other refinery centres in the Asia-Pacific region. 
This is reflected in the ratio of cracking capacity (hydro- and thermal cracking) 
to total distillation capacity, which is currently around 19 per cent (Table 4.6). 
SRO, which is jointly owned by Caltex, BP, and the Singapore Petroleum 
Company (which is owned in part by the Singapore Government) is the more 
sophisticated refinery, having a ratio of cracking-to-distillation capacity of about 
33 per cent. 
A large portion of the refinery capacity was added since 1973. About 65 per 
cent ofEssds present capacity was added in 1973, and Mobil's refinery atJurong 
was expanded from 30,000 to 180,000 bpd after 1973. The SRO refinery at Pulau 
Merlimau was expanded as late as 1981. 
Since 1973, in addition to efforts to increase energy consumption efficiencies 
in operation so as to stay competitive, the new refinery capacities were designed 
for greater flexibilities. Singapore has not only become the world's third largest 
refining centre but is also a major "swing refinery" complex in the Asia-Pacific 
region which acts to balance shortfalls and surpluses throughout the East-of-Suez 
supply system. In the early 1980s, the refineries again made huge investments to 
maintain their competitiveness. 
Three other developments took place. The first was the policy to reduce the 
dependence of Singapore-based refineries on Middle East crudes and to increase 
supplies from regional producers, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia. The 
second was a more active but. limited role of the government in the petroleum 
industry, as manifested in the establishment of the Singapore National Oil 
Company (SNOC), which was aimed primarily at enhancing the country's 
security of energy supplies. The third development was the growth of third party 
refining, or processing deals, initially with Indonesia and Malaysia. 
TABLE 4.6 
Singapore's Petroleum Refineries, 1987 
(In thousand bpd) 
Name-Plate Vacuum Hydro- Reforming Thermal 
Crude Capacity Distillation Cracking Vis-Breaking 
BP 27 
Es so 230 49 9 
Mobil 200 70 13 45 
Shell 316 88 18 20 60 
SRC 170 59 27.5 12 28 
Total 943 266 45.5 54 133 
NOTES: *Cracking-to-distillation ratio. 
(a) Hydro-cracking and thermal vis-breaking processes convert the heavier crude into lighter products. 
(b) Reforming is used to improve the quality of gasoline. 
Asphalt Lube Oil ((3)+(4)}/(1)* 
4 7 
22.5 
4 5.4 24.6 
5 32.6 
13 12.4 18.9 
SOURCE: Fesharaki, F., "Singapore as an Oil Centre", in Singapore: The Management of Success, edited by K.S. Sandhu and P. Wheatley (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989). 
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As to the first development, Singapor'e refineries which were originally 
designed to use Middle East crudes, which are heavy and have a high sulphur 
content, have gradually increased the intake oflight, low sulphur Far East crudes. 
In 1981, about 67 per cent of crude used for the refineries originated from the 
Middle East, mainly Saudi Arabia. However; after 1984 the discount rates were 
no longer applicable to Singapore. By 1985, the share of Middle East crudes 
declined to 43 per cent. The many factors that led to this shift, namely the above 
disCGntinuation of concessionary supplies, the greater availability of crude in the 
region, and the policy of enhancing energy security, have led to reducing the 
effective capacity of Singapore refineries. Other developments; which will be 
discussed later, also led to the shut down by Shell of around 140,000 bpd of 
capacity during 1985 and 1986. Similarly, Mobil has mothballed a 45,000-bpd 
unit.9 
About two-thirds of Singapore's refinery output is exported. The small 
Singapore domestic market for petroleum products, around 232,000 bpd in 1986, 
included an estimated 121,000 bpd of bunker fuel and 24,000 bpd of jet fuel. 10 
More than 90 per cent of Singapore's total export went to the Asia-Pacific region, 
and this accounted for almost 42 per cent of the region's total import. 
As to the second development, the role of the Singapore Government in the 
petroleum industry remains llmited compared to that of other Asia-Pacific 
countries. It has a one-third share in the Singapore Petroleum Company (SPC), 
which is part owner of the SRC, and also a 49 per cent investment in the Van 
Ommeren and Paktank storage/terminalling facilities. The establishment of the 
SNOC in 1981 by the government was to develop a sixth refinery, but the plan 
did not get off the ground. Today, the SNOC partially fulfils the role of an energy 
ministry which is non-existent in Singapore. 11 Its tasks are mostly confined to 
interacting with the oil companies to ensure the country's security of energy 
supply. 
The third development, namely with regard to contract processing, has greatly 
affected the health of Singapore's petroleum industry over the years. Processing 
has become a major element in Singapore's oil business. It can take different 
forms, namely term, spot, and deemed processing. Term (or long-term) processing 
is the most important processing business for Singapore refineries. Term 
processing is defined as processing under contracts for more than one year. 
Since the mid-1970s, Indonesia has been the most important source of term 
processing in Singapore. In 1982, of the 500,000-bpd crude runs, over 200,000 
bpd of crude had been processed for Pertamina (or its agents). Pertamina sent 
both Indonesian and Middle East crudes for processing in Singapore and shipped 
back the processed products to Indonesia to meet domestic needs. The contract 
ended in 1985 with the completion of Indonesia's refinery expansion project that 
resulted in a doubling of capacity from 400,000 to 820,000 bpd. 
The loss of the Indonesian business has greatly affected Singapore's refining 
industry. As the Indonesian processing contract of over 200 mbpd was lost, it 
was compensated by new processing opportunities. However, the future of term 
processing for Singapore is quite uncertain. As suggested elsewhere, Singapore's 
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oil refining industry is being challenged primarily by the potential loss of term 
processing business, which is partly caused by the construction Of new refineries 
. th . 12 m e region. 
Petronas, Malaysia's national oil company, has been the second largest 
customer of Singapore's refineries. Its processing deal has been carried out under 
a three-year contract ending in 1987 for volumes of around 75,000 bpd. The 
expansions in the Malaysian refining industry affected its need for processing to 
supply the domestic market. However, the Malaysian processing deal was not 
aimed solely at the domestic market; in fact, only around 20 per cent of.the 
processed products went back to Malaysia with the remainder destined for export. 
Because of the export orientation of the processing, it cannot be relied upon by 
Singapore refineries as a long-term business. 
None the less, Singapc:Jre refineries are still hopeful that Malaysia will continue 
to provide some business opportunity. In fact, Malaysia's domestic refineries are 
the least sophisticated refineries in the region, with practically no downstream 
conversion/upgrading units. As demand increases, Malaysia's dependence on 
Singapore may increase. A proposed 120,000-bpd refinery in Malacca was 
, postponed in 1985, but a smaller version of 30,000 bpd is being seriously 
considered. 
For long-term processing, China has become an important customer of 
Singapore, following the first contract awarded by Sinochem in 1984. The 
processed products found their way into a variety of export markets. Indeed, the 
increase of Chinese processing seemed to follow the rise in China's crude exports 
since 1983/1984. Since the discontinuation of contract processing for Indonesia, 
Singapore refiners had been hoping for deals with China as an alternative. There 
is the likelihood that processing of Shengli crude in Singapore may increase as 
Shengli production increases. However, the longer-term· prospect of Chinese 
processing is also quite uncertain. The rehabilitation and modernization of 
China's refining system are likely to reduce its processing needs in Singapore. 
During the first half of 1986, term processing by Singapore refineries amounted 
to about 250,000 bpd, of which 77 ,000 bpd (31 per cent) were for Malaysia, 
114,000 bpd (46 per cent) for China (Sinochem and agents), and the remainder 
largely processed on a shorter-term basis (for Iran and other customers). A recent 
study projected that by 1990 term processing in Singapore may be reduced to 
80,000 to 125,000 bpd. 13 
Prior to the term processing deal, China had undertaken spot processing in 
Singapore for some time. Spot processing needs are difficult to predict. Such 
processing arrangements usually are on a single cargo basis. During the first half 
of 1986, an estimated 186,000 bpd of spot processing took place in Singapore, of 
which close to 40 per cent were undertaken for Iran and about 25 per cent for 
Indonesian agents. 
However, developments during the 1986 have been somewhat unusual, and 
Singapore refineries were running at near full capacity, caused primarily by the 
availability of netback crude oil, the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war which has 
paralyzed a large portion of the Iranian refining capacity, and the strong demand 
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for products from Singapore's neighbouring markets, including Japan. The same 
projection referred to earlier suggested that spot processin~ in 1990 could amount 
to as low as 25,000 bpd only or as high as 117,000 bpd.
1 
Thus, term and spot processing in 1990 could range from about 100,000 bpd 
to close to 250,000 bpd. Singapore domestic demand and international transport 
fuels (bunkering for ships and jet fuels) could be relatively stable. So-called 
affiliate sales, that is sales to affiliates of Singapore refiners in other countries (or 
own account processing) have been declining but only gradually. These three 
categories of processing needs are expected to be in the order of250,000 to 300,000 
bpd up to 1991. Therefore, total processing in 1990 may be expected to amount 
to 350,000 to 550,000 bpd. It is believed that with a core capacity of 400,000 to 
500,000 bpd Singapore's refining industry will be able to survive. 15 
The third type of processing, deemed processing, is essentially only a swap 
between crude and products. This may be undertaken among traders with 
crude-product swap based on an agreed ratio. 
Oil traders continue to play an important part in Singapore's petroleum 
industry. The various refineries in Singapore had their own trading activities in 
both crude and refined products during the 1970s. Since they are no longer able 
to rely on long-term contracts for the supplies as well as for refined product sales, 
trading activities have proliferated, involving large and small trading companies 
that try to match supply with demand. 
To support its function as Asia's most important oil trading centre, Singapore 
has a rapidly expanding storage and tankage capacity. The total storage capacity 
in the country is currently more than 50 million barrels. 
Overall, despite the challenges and threats faced by Singapore's petroleum 
industry, the changing market conditions in the Asia-Pacific region may offer 
some opportunities to Singapore refiners and traders in the years to come. The 
refineries' advantages thus far have been their flexibility and determination to 
maintain competitive. However, the most serious challenge to Singapore 
refineries in the coming years is the cc Pl petition from export refining capacity 
in the Persian Gulf. 
5. Thailand 
Thailand is a net oil and energy importer and has been adversely affected by the 
two previous large increases in the price of oil. Even in 1985, the cost of imported 
energy still accounted for nearly one-fourth of the total import bill or over 30 
per cent of the total value of exports. It is, therefore, not surprising that Thailand's 
energy policy has been focused on reducing the country's dependence on imported 
petroleum. The target is to reduce the dependence on imported petroleum to 35 
per cent of total energy requirement by 1991 from close to 50 per cent in 1986. 
In addition to efforts to diversify energy sources, Thailand has stepped up the 
search for indigenous petroleum resources. In fact, oil exploration in Thailand 
dates back to 1921 with activities in the Fang Basin, Chiangmai Province, 
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Northern Thailand. Oil was discovered only in 1958, and a 1,000-bpd refinery 
began operation in 1959. In 1962, Union Oil Co. of Thailand (Unocal) was 
granted rights for oil exploration in Northeastern Thailand, which opened the 
way to foreign oil companies' activities. The Petroleum Act of 1971 allowed the 
concessionaires to conduct full-scale petroleum activities. Since then exploration 
activities began to pick up. The first offshore natural gas discovery was made in 
1973 in the Erawan field, Gulf of Thailand. The first commercial oil discovery 
was made in 1981 in Kamphaeng Phet Province, Northern Thailand, and was 
brought into production in 1983 as Sirikit field. 
Thailand's indigenous petroleum production, consisting of natural gas, crude, 
condensate, LPG, and natural gasoline, increased sharply from a mere 4.97 m 
boe (barrels of oil equivalent) per day in 1981 to 108.5 m boe per day in 1985. 16 
This amount met about 35 per cent of the country's local demand. In order to 
meet the 1991 target, accelerated exploration and production plus massive capital 
investment will be required. 
The decline in oil prices in 1986 has slowed down exploration; at best the· 
response by the oil companies has been mixed. In 1985 nine oil companies bid 
for concessions of which six were approved by the government. It was then 
estimated that the six firms would spend some US$18 to US$30 million for 
exploration. However, the collapse of oil prices has forced many to reconsider 
their spending. Only BP and Britoil have maintained spending levels. With a 
cancellation of exploration by one company, the Thai Government felt the 
pressure to re-examine its concession terms. 
As shown in Table 4.1 proven reserves of natural gas have decreased rather 
than risen in recent years. This partly resulted from the year-long disputes 
between the government and Texas Pacific and Unocal. The dispute with Texas 
Pacific was over gas prices and over its role in a possible LNG project. Texas 
was to be excluded from the project which was to be undertaken by a Japanese 
consortium linked to potential LNG customers. With the decline in oil prices the 
project has lost its urgency from Japan's point of view. The seven-year dispute 
over gas prices ended with the intended purchase of Texas Pacific's offshore gas 
field by the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT). Unocal had a long debate 
over the extent of gas reserves in the Erawan field as well as a price dispute. The 
reserves there were ultimately revised to. less than one-third of the original 
estimate and the royalty dispute was settled in July 1986. The royalty dispute 
came about when gas production from Erawan fell below contracted. volumes 
which resulted in reduced payments. Today, the situation is completely reversed. 
Unocal's production capacity of about 450 mcfpd surpasses the gas demanded by 
PTT, amounting to only 350 mcfpd, largely as a result of weakened gas demand 
domestically. This has led Unocal to shut in about one-third of its producing 
wells. 17 
The long-term plan of the Thai Government, however, is to maintain 
production at a 500-mcfpd level by 1988 and 700 to 900 mcfpd in 1991. The 
additional gas is expected to come from the fields in the northeast, the southern 
Gulf, and the offshore fields lying between the Thai and Malaysian boundaries. 
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An agreement was reached in November 1986 between Thailand and Malaysia 
to jointly exploit petroleum resources along their shared border in the South 
China Sea. This long-term plan also calls for the development of domestic markets 
for natural gas. The Natural Gas Development (NGD) Project which was initiated 
in 1977 reached Phase II of its implement~tion in 1984, with the commissioning 
of the first gas separation plant at Rayong. Phase II also included an LPG 
distribution network. Phase III was meant to develop natural gas-related 
industries on the Eastern Seaboard Development Zone. Other long-term plans 
for further gas utilization in the future include a gas pipeline to the Southern 
coast, a second gas separation plant to meet increasing LPG demand and for 
petrochemical stocks, development of compressed natural gas (CNG) as transport 
fuel, and a possible LNG train for export purposes. 
Implementation of the projects will largely depend on the development of oil 
and gas prices, and may be pursued more slowly than initially planned, but it 
seems that Thailand is determined to continue with its efforts to achieve greater 
self-sufficiency in energy sourcing. Increased utilization of natural gas is the key 
in such a strategy. 
There are a host of other issues which are considered important for the success 
of Thailand's energy policy. Pricing policy is a major problem due to strong 
political pressures to lower petroleum produ<;:t prices. Improved terms of 
exploration and exploitation would include a pricing system for oil and gas and 
the fiscal regime affecting production, such as taxes and royalties. Another issue 
has been the role of the PTT in Thailand's petroleum industry. 
6. Philippines 
As a net energy importing country, the Philippines shares the same concerns as 
Thailand, and its energy policy over the years has been focused also on the 
problem of overdependence on imported petroleum. Its dependence on foreign 
energy sources was over 90 per cent in 1973. Key parts of its strategy to reduce 
import dependence were the construction of a 600-MW nuclear plant and heavy 
investments in hydroelectric and geothermal capacity. It has also encouraged the 
development of renewable energy resources and new energy technologies. 
Serious efforts to find oil in the Philippines began in 1972 with the introduction 
of a new petroleum legislation, although drilling for oil began as early as 1896 
on Cebu Island. The first offshore oilfield (Nido) was discovered in 1976 by Cities 
Service off Palawan Island. The largest field discovered to date is the Matinloc 
field with an ultimate recoverable reserves of 20 million barrels of oil. Thus far 
less than one-fourth of the offshore basins and less than one-third of the onshore 
areas have been explored, but no major discoveries are expected in the future. 
Natural gas in commercial quantity has not been discovered so far. 
Production from the Nido field began in 1979, reaching a peak flow of 42,000 
bpd and a total output of around 11.5 million barrels on a yearly basis. Production 
has continued to decline ever since. By 1981, production from the Nido field 
reached only 1.5 mmb. The nature of this Nido field has cast doubt over the 
prospects of the two more recent fields, Cadlao and Matinloc. These three 
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currently producing fields totalled an average production of 8,000 bpd in 1985 
and has been estimated to amount to only 4,100 bpd in 1987 and to decline 
further to 1,000 bpd in 1990. 
Petroleum activities had been low for the past years, with no drilling at all in 
1985. This situation will probably remain until the end of this decade. The future 
of the petroleum industry in the Philippines depends to a large extent on the 
country's political stability. Commercially viable fields to be discovered are likely 
to be small, namely below 50 million barrels of recoverable oil. In addition, the 
exploration success rate in the past has been very low. 18 None the less, given the 
energy deficit of the country, any oil produced will certainly be bought by the 
government. Improvement of the investment climate, therefore, would be a 
crucial step to raising the level of exploration activities. 
In the Philippines, such activities are governed by the so-called "service 
contracts" in which the contractors provide the financing, services, and technology 
for a stipulated service fee. The terms of the Philippines service contracts are 
considered quite attractive, but a major problem for foreign oil companies is the 
restriction on repatriation of profits in dollars. 
The Philippine refining industry also faces not very bright prospects. The three 
refineries currently operate at about 55 per cent of their combined capacity. The 
Bataan refinery, owned by the Philippine National Oil Co. (PNOC), has 
experienced a continued decline in capacity utilization, to only about 40 per cent 
in 1985. In fact, the PNOC's Bataan refinery has a rated capacity of 155,000 
bpd, over half of the country's total refining capacity. 
In a move to revitalize the Philippine petroleum industry, in October 1986 
the PNOC announced its plan to privatize. The PNOC was created during the 
oil crisis in 1973 with the main task of procuring crude oil to ensure a stable 
domestic supply. Over the years, its activities were expanded to include 
exploration and exploitation of non-oil and gas resources, as well as to include 
shipping and related activities. The privatization plan stipulates that the PNOC 
itself, as a holding company, will remain wholly owned by the government. Much 
of its interest in petroleum· refining and marketing (Bataan Refining Corpora-
tion), the core of PNOC's operations, will be sold to private enterprise. Certain 
shipping and transport companies could also be privatized. The PNOC will 
remain active in oil exploration and in the development of new, indigenous energy 
sources. 
The PNOC's privatization plan has generated considerable interest from both 
local and foreign investors. However, the terms offered may not be sufficiently 
attractive. Foreign equity will be limited to 40 per cent to avoid foreign 
domination of the petroleum industry. In addition PNOC holdings in the 
privatized firms will be lowered to not less than a third of outstanding equity to 
maintain a veto power on policy-making. Furthermore, the two other refineries, 
Shell (68,000 bpd) and Caltex (63,000 bpd), as PNOC's chief competitors, have 
been barred from bidding in the privatization. It remains to be seen whether the 
other oil companies - Essa, Mobil, Gulf, and Getty - that have dropped out 
already in recent years from the downstream sector of the Philippine petroleum 
industry will be lured back. 
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III. The Regional Energy Scene 
The above review clearly shows that the ASEAN petroleum industry consists of 
national industries, each with its own problems, which often tend to be very 
country-specific. None the less, all these industries do share some common 
features and challenges. 
Firstly, the future prospects of the petroleum industry in both the group of 
oil-producing countries and the group of oil-consuming (importing) countries 
very much depend upon developments in the international oil markets. The 
continued weak oil prices threaten to cause drastic reductions in exploration 
activities. Given the nature of the oil basins in the region, continuous exploration 
efforts are necessary. Indeed, it has become harder for the ASEAN countries to 
maintain their attractiveness to foreign oil companies without providing addi-
. tional incentives. Therefore, there is the tendency among ASEAN countries to 
compete with each other. When China is put into the picture, the competition 
becomes even more pronounced. It remains to be seen how this development 
would affect ASEAN-China relations. 
Secondly, despite the changes in the international oil markets, all ASEAN 
countries seem to be content with their existing energy policies, which essentially 
emphasize the need to diversify their sources of energy. 19 The oil-producing 
countries, on their part, remain interested in the maintenance of export 
capabilities for as long as possible. The energy-deficit countries also are 
determined to attain their long-term goal of reducing the independence on 
imports, both for security and economic reasons. However, the continued weak 
oil prices tend to complicate the implementation of those energy policies. It is 
very likely that the same dilemma is faced by China as well. Thus, it would also 
be of interest to speculate whether or not such a situation would provide some 
ground for ASEAN-China co-operation. 
An examination of the broader Asia-Pacific energy scene seems called for in 
order to better assess the implications of those developments on ASEAN-China 
relations as well as to better appreciate the opportunities for ASEAN-China 
co-operation. Such opportunities are indeed worth examining. 
Until today, co-operation in the energy field even among the ASEAN countries 
themselves is still quite limited. In the petroleum sector, some co-operation began 
in 1975 with the establishment of ASCOPE (ASEAN Council of Petroleum), 
comprising various state oil companies in the region. ASCOPE has provided a 
mechanism for exchanges of views and experiences among those companies. In 
1977 it initiated the ASEAN Petroleum Sharing Scheme to provide for emergency 
situations of critical shortage or oversupply of oil. This scheme was further 
expanded in 1986 in the so-called ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement. 
However, all these schemes are strictly internal arrangements within ASEAN. 
By taking a broader regional - that is, an Asia-Pacific - perspective, ASEAN 
could give a new stimulus to its energy co-operation. This wc:mld bring in China, 
Japan, and perhaps Australia, and the East Asian NIEs (newly industrializing 
economies), into the picture. There indeed are a number of issues having such 
broader regional implications which are relevant to the ASEAN countries. The 
I 
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issue of energy security is definitely a pertinent one. This derives from the fact · 
that :most of ASEAN's oil and gas resources are located in offshore areas and 
therefore, may give rise to tensions among neighbouring countries. In addition, 
the security of sea lanes passing through the ASEAN region is of major 
importance to energy flows into the Asia-Pacific region. 
Crude oil and petroleum product trade is another such issue. Oil exports are 
of great importance to ASEAN oil producers; they contributed over 90 per cent 
of Brunei's total exports, over 70 per cent of Indonesia's exports, and about 
one-third of Malaysia's exports. This trade aspect is equally important for ASEAN 
energy-deficit countries. In 1985, oil imports accounted for US$2.4 billion or 26 
per cent of Thailand's imports. It was 19 per cent for the Philippines. Singapore 
recorded a net import of US$7.7 billion and exports (including re-exports) of 
US$6.1 billion, LNG trade constitutes another issue, which has an even greater 
regional relevance. 
The Asia-Pacific energy scene is characterized by the following developments. 
Firstly, the dynamic development and high economic growth performance in the 
region have resulted in a growth of energy demand that is highest in the world. 
This also led to the highest growth rate of energy trade, involving all kinds of 
energy. The global economic slow-down has not affected the region's relative 
position in these regards .. Secondly, the region's dependence on oil is high, while 
petroleum resources in the region are relatively scarce; this situation has made 
the region a large net petroleum importer. Thirdly, the region has had the 
problem of considerable imbalances in petroleum product supply and demand 
mix for some time. 
Developments since the 1973/74 oil price increase have led to an overall 
decrease in the Asia-Pacific region's dependence on the Middle East in its crude 
oil imports; in 1984 the dependence was reduced to 49 per cent from about 60 
per cent in 1975. This resulted from the following efforts: (a) diversification of 
energy sources; (b) increased petroleum production within the region itself; and, 
( c) falling demand in Japan and North America. 20 
However, current project demand and trends in crude oil production within 
the region appear to point to a gradual return in the region's dependence on the 
supply from the Middle East. If this is seen as posing a security risk for the region, 
efforts should be made to reve.rse the production trend. 
The regional picture becomes more interesting in the area of petroleum 
product demand an.cl supply. As mentioned earlier, the region has suffered from 
imbalances in the supply and demand mix of petroleum products for some time 
already. On the supply side, except for the refineries in North America, the 
region's refineries are not sufficiently sophisticated, in the sense oflimited cracking 
capacity. The ratio of cracking to distillation (topping) is less than 20 per cent 
(above 40 per cent in North America). 
On the demand side, there has been marked shifts in the regional pattern of 
petroleum product consumption, namely towards lighter products. One factor 
has been diversification which led to a reduction of heavy fuel oil consumption 
both in industrial use and power generation. Another factor has been the shift 
in industrial structure away from energy-intensive industries. This trend is 
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expected to continue, which means that the imbalance in supply-demand mix 
will tend to increase rather than decrease. 
There are different ways of dealing with this problem. The first is to adjust 
supply through a change in the refineries' crude intake mix, which may involve 
changing the region's crude intake mix. The second is to upgrade secondary 
refining facilities, especially cracking capabilities. The third is through increased 
trade of products. 
The growing supply-demand mix imbalances in the past had not increased 
the region's dependence on outside supply. In the ASEAN region, imports of 
middle distillates (kerosene and gas oils) had more than doubled during the period 
1975-84, but its dependence on Middle East supplies was halved. ASEAN and 
China have also increased their supplies of middle distillates to Japan and the 
East Asian NIEs. It should be noted that Singapore's "swing refineries" had played 
an important role in balancing the region's products supply-demand mismatch. 
In 1984, the Asia-Pacific region was still a net exporter of middle distillates, 
amounting to some 140 m bpd. Projections, based on the assumption of 70 per 
cent capacity utilization of the refineries (low-case), show that by 1990 the region 
could turn into a net importer of about 160 mbpd. However, with 90 per cent 
capacity utilization (high-case), the region could still be a net exporter of about 
170 mbpd. 
21 
The implications of those two different scenarios for the region are 
different as far as China and ASEAN are concerned. The uncertainty becomes 
greater because of the real possibility that the region will be faced with greater 
competition from the new refineries in the Persian Gulf. Another uncertainty is 
the speed with which Japanese imports of products will increase as a result of 
the liberalization of its product market. 
In addition to intensified trade in petroleum products, the region has also 
witnessed a sharp increase in gas - particularly LNG - trade. On the import 
side, Japan dominates the gas picture in the Asia-Pacific region. It is also the 
largest LNG importer in the world, having a share of about 73 per cent in 1985. 
On the export side, it is ASEAN that dominates the picture. In 1985, the combined 
share of Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia was about 65 per cent of world LNG 
trade. 
Since 1986 South Korea has become an LNG importer, and Taiwan has 
finalized a deal with Indonesia. None the less, Japan is likely to remain the largest 
LNG customer. The various forecasts on LNG demand in Japan suggest that 
consumption will continue to be on the rise, from about 37.5 billion cu. m. in 
1985 to somewhere in the order of 4 7 .5 to 50 billion cu. m. in 1990 and 60 billion 
cu. m. in the year 2000. 2.2 New potential suppliers have been identified, to include 
Australia, Canada, Thailand, and the USSR as competitors to the region's current 
dominant suppliers. The question of whether market-sharing of the Asia-Pacific 
LNG trade made sense has been aired for some time but the answer remains 
inconclusive. ASEAN main oil exporters also happen to be LNG exporters. To 
them the issue of market-sharing may not be the most urgent one. The issue of 
LNG pricing remains the most important one, especially when oil prices remain 
weak. The increased utilization of natural gas other than LNG, for both the 
domestic market and exports, is an issue of equal importance. In the field of 
Development of the ASEAN Petroleum Industry 109 
petrochemicals, the region is likely to face severe compet1t10n from the new, 
low-cost, and vast petrochemical complexes in the Middle East. 
In addition to the broader regional perspective, the discussion on the prospects 
of the ASEAN petroleum industry needs to inject as well the longer-term global 
perspective. Recent exercises to speculate about the ultra long-term development 
- that is, over the next forty to fifty years in the energy field suggest rather 
interesting directions. 
Under quite reasonable assumptions about the long-term GDP growth rates 
in different regions of the world, per capita final energy consumption by the year 
2030 may amount to twice that in 1975. Since 90 per cent of the increased 
population would be in the developing part of the globe that currently consumes 
low levels of energy, it is expected that global primary energy requirements by 
the year 2030 would be in the order of 2. 7 to 4. 4 times that in 197 5 when the 
amount was 113 mboepd. These are not small magnitudes. 
The ultra long-term view of the supply side is equally striking. Recent estimates 
suggest that at the 1980 production level of 59 mbpd of crude oil, the world's 
remaining recoverable reserves would last for another 57 to 85 years. In the Asia-
Pacific region this is likely to be considerably shorter. Thus, an interesting 
question is how the current diversification efforts fit into the longer-term global 
energy transition. The post-oil energy transition will not automatically be 
realized. A host of factors, such as prices, political constraints, foreign trade 
patterns, resource availability, and technological developments, will determine 
this transition. 
The historical path followed by the early industrialized countries shows the 
very long time for an energy source to gain or lose a large market share: 
approximately thirty to forty years have been required to move up from a market 
share of 10 to 25 per cent. 23 There is no reason to suppose that lead times will 
become shorter. An earlier long-term study which explicitly addressed these long 
lead times offers interesting results.24 Based on a so-called "substitution model", 
the study projects the following market shares in the year· 2030: 45 per cent 
natural gas; 40 per cent nuclear power; 7 per cent solar power; 7 per cent oil; 
and, 2 per cent coal. However, in taking account of the various limitations and 
constraints on both the supply and demand sides, the study arrived at a totally 
different picture: 34 per cent coal; 19 per cent oil; 17 per cent natural gas; 23 per 
cent nuclear power; 4 per cent hydro power; and, 1 per.cent solar power. 
A major factor accounting for those different results is the growing gap between 
the demand for liquid fuels and the supply of oil. It suggests that for the 
foreseeable future the demand for liquid fuels still constitutes the key problem 
within the world's energy problem. A more recent study also concluded that by 
the year 2030 the world may still depend on oil for 25 per cent of its energy 
requirements; coal will supply 23 per cent, natural gas 19 per cent, nuclear power 
17 per cent, hydro power 11 per cent, and other sources the remaining 6 per 
cent. 25 This should imply that the real price of energy - oil and liquid fuels, in 
particular is going to be even much higher than what it is in 1980. Would 
this suggest that the relatively scarce petroleum resources in the Asia-Pacific 
region be conserved for future uses? Is this posing a challenge to the region to 
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co-operate more closely with each other in the energy field? How would all these 
developments affect ASEAN and China, the two regions with relatively more 
favourable petroleum resources endowments? 
IV. Implications for ASEAN-China Relations 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the petroleum industries of ASEAN and 
China have a role to play in the Asia-Pacific energy scheme. The task would be 
to optimize that role. It is in the efforts of fulfilling this task that ASEAN and 
China would find themselves forced to co-operate more closely, perhaps also with 
the involvement of other countries in the region. 
The first step should be the creation of a mechanism for regular exchanges of 
views and information among the national oil companies of ASEAN and China, 
perhaps in the form of dialogues in the framework of ASCOPE. This should lead 
to policy consultations and, in some areas such as in exploration and production 
incentives, policy harmonization as well. The aim should be to reduce excessive 
competition with each other. · 
Given the broader regional perspective, as discussed earlier, there are no 
reasons for the ASEAN oil exporters and China to compete with each other in 
third markets, such as Japan. If anything, the regional producers will face more 
severe competition from the Middle East. This is also true in the area of petroleum 
refining. Both Indonesia and China are likely to export petroleum products in 
the future, and will be competing with Singapore. It is possible, however, that 
Singapore's major challenge will come from the Persian Gulf rather than from 
regional refineries. 
There is no reason for ASEAN and China to try to jointly manage the regional 
crude oil and petroleum products markets. Even within the Asia-Pacific region, 
ASEAN and China's roles will be limited, let alone in the global market. Also, 
the regional markets, especially Asia-Pacific, cannot be isolated from the global 
markets. Thus, both ASEAN and China should not be pressed to play a greater 
regional role than what they could reasonably fulfil. Such pressures would almost 
certainly bring them into a collision course. 
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Development of China's 
Petroleum Industry and Its Effect 
on China-ASEAN Economic 
Relations 
Shao Zuze, Guo Peixing, 
and Li Yong 
I. Introduction 
China's trade relatiol,'ls with the countries of ASEAN goes back a long time. These 
relations underwent a critical change in the 1970s and since then bilateral trade 
has expanded considerably. In 1970, trade values were only US$180 million; by 
1980 they had grown to US$1.85 billion, and by 1986 to US$3.35 billion, a more 
than a seventeen-fold increase over 1970. The variety of commodities traded has 
grown considerably, with petroleum as one of the important commodities. The 
proportion of petroleum in this trade is not large, but with the recent growth of 
the petroleum industry in Brunei and Indonesia, the countries of ASEAN have 
been closely watching the expansion of China's petroleum industry and its exports. 
This paper is a study of the development of China's petroleum industry and its 
effect on economic relations between China and ASEAN. 
II. Development of the Petroleum Industry in China 
China was one of the earliest countries to discover and use petroleum and natural 
gas. More than 2,000 years ago, in the Qin and Han Dynasties, oil and gas were 
found in what are the modern provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, and Sichuan. The 
Annals of the Han Dynasty record the existence of an "inflammable stream" near 
the present-day city of Yan'an, and note that the liquid was used for lamps,. 
lubrication, as an anti-corrosive, and as fuel for boiling bitter to make salt. 
However, the use of petroleum as a source of industrial energy has a short history 
of less than a century. 
China's modern petroleum industry dates from the end of the nineteenth 
century. However, the semi-feudal, semi-colonial nature of the society precluded 
the establishment of a national industry. A few fields were exploited but soon fell 
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into disrepair and near bankruptcy. By 1949, there were only eight outdated oil 
rigs producing 120,000 tons. China was called an "oil-poor country". 
1. Petroleum Prospecting and Growth 
With the founding of the People's Republic of China. (PRC), the petroleum 
industry began to develop rapidly. Many new fields and rich underground 
reserves were discovered. 
The first finds were in the Western Region of the country, with prospecting 
of the Kelamayi field in Xinjiang, the Yaerxia field at Yumen, Gansu, and the 
Lenghu field in Qinghai. "Production bases were established to exploit these 
resources. Subsequently in 1959, the Daqing oilfield was discovered in the 
northeastern Heilongjiang province. After the construction of the Daqing 
petroleum complex, exploration over a period of ten years revealed petroleum 
reserves in the region of the Gulf of Bohai, an area of 900,000 square kilometres, 
encompassing the provinces of Hebei, Henan, Liaoning, and Shandong and the 
municipalities of Tianjin and Beijing. The Shengli and Dagang fields were opened 
and then the Liaohe and Huabei ones too. In the following years, the Zhongyuan 
field was discovered. This is the second largest petroliferous area in east China 
after the one in Daqing andjiliri. The exploitation of these two regions has shifted 
the focus of petroleum production from the west of China to the east, and greatly 
changed the geographical distribution of the petroleum industry. In recent years, 
there have been further discoveries of underground petroleum. reserves; thirty 
structural petroleum-gas deposits have been found in various parts of the country, 
and petroleum is starting to flow from the drilled wells. 
Prospecting ofoffshore resources began in the sixties. In 1975, the experimental 
platform in the Gulf of Bohai began producing China's first offshore petroleum. 
Since 1979, with the initiation of the policy of opening to the outside world, China 
has begun to co-operate with foreign companies in the exploration and develop-
ment of its undersea deposits. This is a new stage in which foreign capital and 
technology are helping to fully develop the resources. Between 1982 and 1986, 
the petroleum industry held two rounds of bidding for contracts. The first, 
between February 1982 and December 1983, resulted in the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signing eighteen contracts with twenty-
seven companiies from nine different countries, involving a total of 39,200 square 
kilometres of ocean. The second round of bidding began in November 1984 for 
contracts in the area covering the mouth of the Pearl River, the eastern part of 
the Yingge Sea, and parts of the Yellow and South China Seas. This area of 
108,300 square kilometres is divided into twenty-two blocks. A system of open 
bidding was used for all companies, regardless of whether or not they had 
participated in the exploration itself. Conditions in the contracts were basically 
identical with those of the first round. These were as follows: 
1. The foreign company unilaterally assumes the risk. 
2. During the developmental stage, the Chinese side has the right to invest. 
3. Industrial and commercial taxes are deducted during the operational stage. 
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4. After oilfield royalties, operation costs, and investment returns are 
deducted, both parties will divide the profits and pay taxes to the Chinese 
Government. 
The main items foreign companies competed for were the proportion to be 
divided with the Qhinese side, and the volume of contractual prospecting to be 
undertaken. Some· fiscal terms for contracts, such as the percentage of profit split, 
arrangements for investment recovery, etc. will be negotiated and determined on 
the principle of mutual benefit according to the resources assessments made by 
both parties, so that the foreign contractor could have a reasonable return under 
the petroleum price conditions during the contract life. China will hold further 
rounds of bidding as the need arises (See Appendix A5.1). 
As a result of this first stage of Sino-foreign co-operation, China has developed 
data on the petroleum deposits in the contracted blocks. A number ofpetroliferous 
structures have been discovered. Simultaneously, feasibility studies have been 
carried out and preparations made for exploitation. Up until June 1986, 345,500 
line kilometres seismic had been shot, 162 wells had been drilled of which 65 
struck oil, and 120 structures had been tested by drilling and 35 of which were 
found to bear gas and oil. This gives a 29 per cent success ratio. Some of these 
fields are now under construction. 
In order to fully and more extensively meet the target of Sino-foreign 
co-operation, China has adopted even more flexible approaches. Below are some 
examples. 
( 1) With respect to co-operative exploration, China will take the approach of 
phasing out such exploration, that is allow foreign contractors to sign with 
CNOOC a geophysical survey or drilling agreement for areas of interest 
and take few commitments first, with the option of entering into a petroleum 
contract according to the results of exploration, so that the risk on foreign 
investors will be reduced. 
(2) China will adopt a less stringent policy for some highly risky areas such as 
deep water areas, that is allow foreign contractors to have a large contract 
area, longer exploration period, and flexible acreage relinquishment propor-
tion, to have fewer or no Chinese participating shares, and to speed up the 
exploration cost recovery, etc. 
(3) China will try to maximize the reduction of financial burdens to foreign 
contractors beyond explorations, for example the signature fee can be paid 
by instalments under certain conditions, and the training and technology 
transfer fees can be reduced or paid by instalments. 
( 4) During the period of field development, the authorities will ensure 
reasonable profits for foreign contractors by reducing the royalty and 
improving cost recovery according to the size of fields, so that these fields 
can be developed on the principle of mutual benefit. 
(5) All contracting services needed in the exploration and development opera-
tions.' except those few specified by the Chinese Government that tenders 
must be called for in China, will be selected by way of international tenders. 
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Meanwhile, Chinese contractors, including the joint-ventures with foreign 
companies in co-operation with Chinese firms, enjoy priorities on a 
competitive basis. 
We firmly believe that the Chinese offshore petroleum industry will be 
developed vigorously in the future. The current level of exploration is still low 
and only a small fraction of the rich petroleum reserves have been prospected so 
far. Experts estimate that China's petroleum reserves are between 300 to 600 
billion metric tons. Natural gas deposits are roughly 20 trillion cubic metres. 
These will take a long time and much funding to determine precisely. Although 
new deposits are continuously being discovered, they are still insufficient to 
support the annual 130-million-ton capacity of present production equipment 
over a longer period of time. Most of the petroleum .and gas locations are on the 
continental shelf, in Daqing, Shengli, Zhongyuan, Sichuan, and Xinjiang. 
Estimates of proven reserves place them at about 2.6 billion tons, Sl,lfficient to 
sustain present levels of production for the next twenty years only. 
2. Production 
China's recovery of petroleum has been increasing steadily since the founding of 
the PRC. In 1978, output exceeded 100 million tons for the first time. In 1986, 
it reached 130.9 million tons (Table 5.1). Daily production today is triple the 
annual production of 1949. Early in the fifties, China ranked twenty-seventh 
among oil producers in the world; today she is sixth. 
Ninety per cent of China's petroleum comes from the northeastern, northern, 
and eastern parts of the country (Table 5.2). In 1986, the output shares of the 
TABLE 5.1 
Petroleum Production, Consumption, and Import-Export Trade 
(In 10,000 tons) 
Year Production Consumption Export 
1949 12 144" 
1960 520 664' 6.28d 
1970 3,065 3,008 19.15 
1975 7,706 6,700 987.79 
1978 10,405 9,092 1,131.32 
1980 10,595 8,759 1,330.89 
1985 12,490 9,176 3,117.36 
1986 13,069 9,659 2,846.19 
"Figure for 1953. 
hFigure for 1950. 
'Figure for 1959. 










SOURCES: China Statistics Publishing House, Statistical Almanac of China, 198411987; 
China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Publishing House, Almanac of China's Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade, 1984; China Prospect Publishing House, Almanac of China's 
Foreign Economic Economic Relations and Trade, 198 7. 
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TABLE 5.2 
China's Petroleum Output, 1986 























SOURCE:· China Statistics Publishing House, Statistical Almanac 
TABLE 5.3 
Petroleum Output of Major Chinese Oilfields, 1986 
(In 10,000 tons) 
Oilfield Production 












SOURCE: Statistics of the China Min.istry of Petroleum 
Industry. 
vanous major oilfields were as follows: Daqing, 42.5 per cent of national 
production; Shengli, 22.6 per cent; Liaohe, 7.8 per cent; Huabei, 7.7 per cent; 
Zhongyuan, 4.8 per cent; Xinjiang, 4.2 per cent; Dagang, 3 per cent;_ Henan, 1.9 
per cent; Jilin, 1.8 per cent; Changqing, 1.1 per cent; and Jianghan, 0.8 per cent 
(Table 5.3). 
The increase m petroleum output has spurred the development of the 
petroleum refining industry. In the early years after 1949, national processing 
capacity was a mere 110,000 tons and only 12 different kinds of products could 
be produced. In 1986, total refining capacity increased to 107 .5 million tons. In 
Development of China~ Petroleum Industry 117 
the early sixties, China succeeded by her own efforts in developing advanced 
processes of catalyst cracking, delayed coking, catalyst platforming, and urea 
dewaxing, as well as the industrial production of corresponc;ling catalysts and 
additives. Later, techniques of hydrofining were imported, reducing the technol-
ogy gap between the Chinese and foreign refineries. Today, petroleum products 
have increased to some 730; supplies of the various oils and oil products needed 
by the civilian economy and national defence are basically assured, and there is 
a small excess for export. However, in general, the operating standards are still 
far behind the most advanced world ones, and future efforts will be directed 
toward cutting waste, preserving energy, improving quality, and strengthening 
comprehensive utilization. 
China had no petrochemical industry in- 1949. The earliest factories were 
established in the late fifties, the Gaoqiao in Shanghai and the Lanzhou 
Petrochemical Company in Gansu. A tube-style heater producing 5,000 tons of 
ethylene annually was completed at the end of 1961. In 1974, China succeeded 
in making cisbutadiene rubber and industrial production began at the Yanshan 
Petrochemical Company and the Shengli petrochemical plant. Around 1976, five 
petrochemical and chemical fibre comI>lexes _were -imported, -as well as thirteen 
sets of synthetic_ammonia -equipmeiit- which use petroleum and gas as raw 
materials. contributed to raising the technological standard of China's 
petrochemical industry. In 1977, ethylene output reached 300,000 tons, while 
outputs of plastics, chemical fibres, and synthetic rubbers have increased several 
fold. Since 1979, the pace of development has been speeded up. Ethylene output 
is now at about 700,000 tons or nearly 2· per cent of world output, up from less 
than 1 per cent in 1970. Plastics, synthetic rubber, and fibres are now respectively 
1. 7, 1.6, and 4 per cent of world production. 
3. Import-Export Trade 
In 1961, China began to export diesel oil to Albania; in 1962, crude petroleum 
. to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and in later years petroleum 
products to Vietnam and Romania. In 1962, crude petroleum exports were about 
60,000 tons and oil products 27,000 tons; in 1969, crude exports were 100,000 
tons and petroleum products, 140,000 tons. The quantities were small, but they 
marked the beginning of China's petroleum exports. 
Export~ continued to increase_in.the--1970s. In 1972 petroleum products were 
exported for the first time to Hong Kong. However, it was in 1973 that petroleum 
exports entered a new stage, with the first-ever sale of 1 million tons of Daqing 
oil to Japan. By 1978, sales abroad had reached 10 million tons; in 1984, 20 
million tons; and in 1985, over 30 million tons. There was a slight drop in 1986 
to 28.46 million tons. Since 1976, when annual export of petroleum was 8.49 
million tons, China's exports have-increased 2.4 times at an average annual rate 
of 12.9 per cent (Table 5.4). 
In the seventies, when Chinese petroleum first entered the international 
market, the biggest buyer was Japan, with 99.5 per cent of total exports in 1973. 
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TABLE 5.4 
China's Imports and Exports of Crude Petroleum, 1950-86 
(In 10,000 tons) 
Year Exports Imports 
1950 4.04 
1960 6.28* 59.40 
1970 19.15 47.26 
1975 987.79 175.85 
1980 1,330.89 36.56 
1981 1,375.40 7.02 
1982 1,520.37 64.45 
1983 1,519.42 36.99 
1984 2,229.27 24.58 
1985 3,117.36 71.68 
1986 2,846.19 107.50 
*Figure for 1962, when China started exporting crude 
petroleum. 
SOURCES: China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
Publishing House, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade, 1984; China Prospect Publishing House, Almanac of 
China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1987. 
As exports increased, China adopted a policy of diversifying, and began to develop 
sales to other Asian countries, the United States, and some Europ~an and Latin 
American countries. 
By 1986, exports to Japan had dropped to 39.4 per cent of total foreign sales, 
Singapore received 21.9 per cent and the United States 14.6 per cent. These three 
together accounted for three quarters of China's petroleum exports. Other 
important buyers were Brazil, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Spain, 
and Turkey (Table 5.5). 
Currently, China is also exporting a limited quantity of processed petroleum. 
In 1986, 5.51 million tons were exported (Table 5.6), double the 1.94 million 
tons of 1976. Over 80 per cent of this was diesel oil, gasoline, and naphtha. The 
processed petr:oleum went mainly to Japan, Singapore, the United States, Hong 
Kong and Macao, and Switzerland (Table 5.7). 
With the rapid growth of petroleum exports, China's petroleum imports have 
dropped. The 1984 crude petroleum imports of 245,800 tons were one-third less 
than those of 1980; though in 1986 they rose to 1.07 million tons, this was still 
40 per cent below the 1975 figure, when imports were at the peak (Table 5.4). 
4. Consumption 
· While China's petroleum industry has grown by leaps and bounds since the 
establishment of the PRC, it has been matched by an equally steep rise in 
consumption as the national economy developed. Estimates for 1986 place 
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TABLE 5.5 
Importers of Chinese Crude Petroleum, 1986 
Quantity Share in the Total 
Importing Country (10,000 tons) (%) 
Japan 1,122.36 39.4 
Singapore 621.96 21.9 
United States 416.85 14.6 
·Brazil 273.55 9.6 
D.P.R. Korea 124.48 4.4 
Spain 89.92 3.2 
Turkey 66.83 2.3 
Philippines 47.88 1. 7 
Yugoslavia 31.29 1.1 
Italy 23.04 0.8 
Chile 11. 79 0.4 
Romania 5.95 0.2 
France 4.73 0.2 
Total 2,846.19 100.0 
SOURCE: China Prospect Publishing House, Almanac of China's 














Exports of China's Oil Products, 1950-86 












*Figure for 1961. 
SOURCES: China Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade Publishing House, Almanac of China's Foreign 
Economic Relations and 1rade, 1981:; China Prospect 
Publishing House, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade, 1987. 
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nation-wide energy consumption at the equivalent of 808.82 million tons of 
standard fuel, of which petroleum makes up 17 .06 per cent with 137 .98 million 
120 Shao Zuze, Guo Peixing, and Li Yong 
TABLE 5.7 
Importers of Chinese Oil Products, 1986 
Importing Country Quantity Share of the Total 
& Region (10,000 tons) (%) 
Japan 189.87 34.4 
Singapore 105.82 19.2 
United States 103.64 18.8 
Hong Kong 90.08 16.3 
Switzerland 28.57 5.2 
Macao 10.00 1.8 
Philippines 5.48 1.0 
United Kingdom 3.62 0.7 
Thailand 3.49 0.6 
Total 551.53 100.0 
SOURCE: China Prospect Publishing House, Almanac of China's 
Foreign Economic &lations and Trade, 1987. 
tons (or 96.59 million tons of crude). This is already over sixty times the 1953 
level (when consumption of crude was 1.44 million tons) and over a third more 
than the 1975 figure of 67.0 million tons of crude. 
The enormous growth in petroleum production is still far from sufficient to 
satisfy the needs of the Chinese economy. For example, China's GNP increased 
at an annual average rate of 10 per cent between 1980 and 1985, while total 
energy production only grew at an average annual 4.8 per cent, with petroleum 
a mere 0.8 per cent. In the same period, the number of automobiles grew from 
2.12 to 4.0 million, an 88.7 per cent increase and tractors from 2.91 to 5.33 
million, an 83.2 per cent increase; but national supplies of processed petroleum 
only grew by 17 per cent. This gap between supply and demand is becoming 
more marked over time and the shortage of energy is one of the most important 
factors holding back the growth of the Chinese economy. It is estimated that, 
nation-wide, 20 to 30 per cent of industrial production capacity is unused due to 
lack of energy. Many motor vehicles and tractors are lying. idle, or are not used 
to the full, thus adding to the already serious lack of transportation. 
Consequently, apart from actively encouraging the exploitation of energy 
resources and production, China has been compelled to take measures to improve 
the management of petroleum consumption and energy saving. The main steps 
are as follows: 
1. Tighter control and unified planning of supply and sale of processed petroleum. A strict 
system of distribution and quotas is in place. All users must verify their 
annual consumption of petroleum in accordance with their quota, and must 
be responsible for abiding by it. All petroleum products are supplied only 
to certified users and any petroleum saved can be kept by the user, but no 
extra is given. 
2. Tight control on oil-burning machines and national organization of tmnsportfacilities. 
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3. Strict control over burning of petroleum. In accordance with the policy of replacing 
petroleum by coal adopted by the State Council, between 1980 and 1985 
China will cut petroleum-burning by 10 million tons, and by another 10 
million tons between 1985 and 1990. By 1990, petroleum-burning will be 
down from the 40 per cent of crude production in· 1980 to only 18 per cent. 
4. Tight control of development of small petroleum refineries. Small local refineries are 
prohibited. 
5. Periodic review of practical results so that effective petroleum-saving measures can be 
taken. 
5. Prospects 
China's economy has started to develop steadily and soundly. By the end of this 
century, GNP will double, and on this basis, after a sustained effort of thirty ~o 
fifty years, China hopes to approach the level of the developed countries. Industry 
(including the automobile), agriculture, transportation, and all other areas will 
also develop. It is predicted that China's need for petroleum products will grow 
even more rapidly. It seems likely that the sharp discrepancy between supply and 
demand will be very difficult to overcome. 
In accordance with China's economic orientation, efforts will be made within 
the next period to create favourable economic and social conditions for economic 
reforms. The goal is to establish as quickly as possible a new socialist economic 
structure with Chinese characteristics. Steady development of the economy and 
improvement of the living standards of rural and urban populations must be 
assured. While controlling the scale of fixed asset investments, key projects will 
continue to be built, and technological reform and manpower development 
encouraged. This will provide the necessary material, technological, and human 
capacities for the growth of the 1990s. To this end, there will be further adjustment 
of the industrial structure, including the concentration of funds and materials to 
spur energy production. Through price, tax, and loan policies, attempts will be 
made to ease the shortage of energy to prepare for the decade of the 1990s. 
In 1985, China's total energy production was 855.46 million tons (in terms of 
standard fuel). Coal represented 72.8 per cent, petroleum 20.9 per cent, 
hydroelectricity 4.3 per cent, and natural gas 2.0 per cent. Total production was 
a 34.2 per cent increase over that of 1980, or an average annual growth of 6:1 
per cent. Average annual petroleum output grew by 3.3 per cent and coal by 7.1 
per cent. According to the Seventh Five-Year Plan, petroleum production will 
continue to develop at an even faster pace in the next five years. By 1990, 
production is estimated to reach 150 million tons, or 20,1 per cent more than in 
1985. This will raise the average annual growth rate to 3.7 per ·C~nt. Particular 
emphasis is going to be laid on offshore exploration and development. Broad 
plans call for large-scale prospecting of resources ii). the 1980s to determine the 
size of deposits. The small .number of oilfields discovered first will be exploited. 
The 1990s will see large-scale development of offshore oilfields, in order to sustain 
present production levels. Within the next five years, China m~st _drill 60 million 
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metres of drilling footage to raise production capacity of crude by 60 million tons. 
New refineries will be built to match this increase, so as to satisfy domestic needs 
for processed petroleum. 
However, in spite of all these efforts, it still looks as if energy, particularly 
petroleum energy, will be insufficient for the country's needs. For example, within 
the next five years, the number of automobiles is expected to rise from 4 to 8.4 
million. Even conservative estimates are as high as 6 .. 5 to 7 million (or an average 
annual increase of 10 per cent). Today, over 85 per cent of the automobiles, 
including a large number of public buses and trucks under eight tons, use gasoline 
as fuel (in 1985, estimates of consumption of gasoline nation-wide was 14 million 
tons). There will probably be very little change in this situation before 1990. 
Gasoline output by 1990 is estimated at about 24.5 million tons, but average 
annual gasoline supplies per vehicle will be 20 to 25 per cent lower than those 
for 1984. 
Supplies of diesel oil are even more critical and this probably will not change. 
In 1985, China consumed 19 million tons of diesel, primarily in the countryside 
where there are 5 million tractors and large numbers of small, hand-tractors of 
12 horsepower and less. Many of these are used for transport, and consume up 
to 260 per cent more fuel for every kilometre than the average truck. By 1990, 
it is estimated that there will be a total of 190 million horsepower of diesel-fuelled 
vehicles in the countryside. Based on the 1970s average fuel consumption of 130 
kilograms per horsepower/kilometre, this will mean that 90 per cent of China's 
total diesel production will be used up for this purpose alone. 
Demand for other petroleum products is also expected to grow. For instance, 
kerosene is still widely used in the rural areas for cooking and heating, but the 
main consumer is the aviation industry which uses over 70 per cent of national 
output. By 1990, output of jet engine fuel is expected to reach 5 million tons, an 
average annual increase of 10 per cent. However, civilian and freight air 
transportation is expected to grow by 20 per cent every year. In the case of 
naphtha and light diesel oil, their demand by the petrochemical industry will 
grow enormously. By 1990, naphtha output is expected to reach 7.5 million tons, 
of which 3.5 to 4 million tons will be used for the petrochemical industry. 
We predict that over the next ten to twenty years, and even further into the 
future, energy, especially petroleum, will continue to be in short supply in China. 
It has been mentioned earlier that China greatly increased its petroleum 
exports starting in the 1970s. In view of its energy shortages, this petroleum could 
have been kept back for domestic use. However, as a developing country with a 
relatively backward economy, such exports form one of the most important ways 
of earning foreign exchange. Selling some petroleum to countries which either 
have insufficient supplies or lack it entirely is a satisfactory way of "exchanging 
needed goods". This export is also partly to make adjustments for uneven supplies 
in the northern and southern regions of the country. For some time in the future, 
petroleum will continue to be one of China's major exports, but the quantity will 
be limited. The volume for export is expected to remain roughly at the present 
level for a long time to come; even if there is an increase, it will be very small. 
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According to estimates by some analysts in Western countries, it is quite likely 
that for the remainder of the 1980s total petroleum exports will grow to no larger 
than 800,000 bpd (or about 40 million tons annually) before beginning to decline 
in the 1990s. By 1995 Chinese exports may fall to around 500,000 bpd (or about 
25 million tons annually). 
China's coal reserves are estimated to be 5 trillion tons, with 870 billion tons 
already confirmed. This guarantees the further increase of coal output. In 1968, 
it was 890 million tons. By the end of the century, output is expected to reach 
1.4 billion tons. Massive exports will be possible if prices remain appropriate and 
transportation and quality adequate. This will red'uce the need to export 
petroleum. 
III. Petroleum in China's Economic Relations with ASEAN 
1. Significance of Petroleum in the Economy and Trade of ASEAN 
Countries 
The development of the petroleum industry in the ASEAN countries differs 
greatly, depending on their oil reserves and economic development. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Br.unei are major oil producers and net exporters. In 1985, 
Indonesia produced 66.5 millions tons; in recent years its petroleum and natural 
gas exports accounted for 70 per cent of its export earnings and two-thirds of 
government revenues (Tables 5.8 and 5.9). Malaysia produced 21.65 million tons 
in 1985. Its exports of petroleum, petroleum products, and liquid natural gas 
made up about 32 per cent of its total export value for that year. Brunei's output 
for 1985 was 8.38 million tons; in recent years, its exports of oil and natural gas 
accounted for over 98 per cent of its total export value. 
The Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand produce very little petroleum or 
none at ajJ, and are net importers. In 1985, 40.8 per cent of energy in the 
Philippines came from imported fuel. Singapore relies completely ·on imports. 
However, it possesses a relatively large refining capability and is the third largest 
such centre in the world. Most of its refined products are for export, with 1985 
export values reaching US$6.1 billion, or 26. 7 per cent of its export values. 
Singapore is also the largest exporter of petrochemical products in Southeast Asia. 
Thailand can only meet 30 per cent of its energy needs with its own resources; 
the rest must be imported. This is also one of the main reasons for its trade· 
deficit. 
2. Petroleum Trade between China and ASEAN 
Co-operation in petroleum between China and its trading partners in ASEAN 
has always been important to both sides. In the 1970s, when China's petroleum 
industry was just getting started and quantities avai.lable for export were small, 
there was a shortage of petroleum on the international market. China began 
TABLE 5.8 
Petroleum Output of ASEAN Countries, 1950-85 
(In 10,000 tons) 
Country 1950 1960 1970 1975 
. 
Brunei 411.60 458.30 668.50 929.0 
Indonesia 667.30 2,024.50 4,259.80 6,413.80 
Malaysia '85.90 468.10 
. Philippines 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 
Thailand 0 0.6 '1.0 0.6 
Total 1,078.90 2,483.40 5,015.20 7 ,811.50 
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TABLE 5.9 
Petroleum Trade of ASEAN Countries, 1970-85 
(In 10,000 tons) 
Country 1970 1975 1980 1983 1985 
Brunei 
Export 579.2" 883.5 1,121.8 850.4 320.0 
Import 
Indonesia 
Export 3,102.8 5,241.2 6,201.5 5,489.4 3,600.0 
Import 2,188.lb 490.3 321.1 400.0d 
Malaysia 
Export 33.7 0.4 1,122. 7 1,422.4 1, 750.0 
Import 299.0 323.4 396.1 307.1 300.0d 
Philippines 
Export 
Import 909.7 913.8 883.2 752.3( 790.0d 
Singapore 
Export 0.7 24.3 12.5 46.5 35.0d 
Import 1,078.4 1,810.1 2,508.5 3,065.6 2,944.6 
Thailand 
Export 
. Import 50.7 584.1 846.1 667.1 645.3 
Total" 
Export 3,720.0 6,150.0 8,460.0 7,810.0 6,210.0 
Import 2,340.0 3,850.0 5,120.0 5,110.0 5,080.0 
"Figure for 1971. 
hFigure for 1978. 
'Figure for 1982. 
dEstimates from the Economists' Information Press. 
SOURCES: U.N., Yearbook of Statistics for Asia and the Pacific, 1981 and 1983; EIU, Yearbook 
of Energy, Far East and Australia, 1986187. 
supplying Thailand and the Philippines with petroleum and this trade continues 
to the preser;it, when there is a glut on the international market. This steady, 
long-term trade has· benefited both sides. 
China's petroleum is located mainly in the northern parts of the country. To 
meet the needs of the south, the pet.roleum has to be transported thousa~ds of 
kilometres from the northern oilfields, placing a huge strain on the transport 
system. To relieve this, .China ·adopts a flexible policy of importing crude through 
its southern ports to meet the needs of its .southern refineries. Thus it has imported 
crude from the Middle East and Indonesia. 
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Singapore has a large refining capacity and an advanced processing technol-
ogy, but has experienced a surplus of refining capacity since the beginning of the 
1980s. The situation in China is just the reverse: crude oil processing levels are 
not high enough, resulting in higher yields of fuel oils and lower yields of light 
oils; quality is insufficient and product variety incomplete. China and Singapore 
thus started to develop their petroleum relations in 1984. China exports crude to 
Singapore for processing, and in 1987 Singapore processed 115,000 barrels of 
Chinese crude a day. 
With the development of international co-operation in the exploitation of 
China's offshore petroleum resources, some ASEAN countries, particularly 
Singapore, have begun to participate in this endeavour. Singapore shipyards have 
built several mobile drilling rigs for China (Nanhai No. 1 and the Bohai Nos. 6, 
8, and 10). Singapore shipyards also participated in bidding for Chinese contracts 
to supply a semi-submersible. Its oil service companies provide services to China's 
offshore industry in the form of equipment and spare parts. 
Singapore companies have invested in China's offshore industry. For example, 
the Baomi Company joined with France's ELF in investing in the northern Wei 
10-3 oilfield; Singapore companies also own shares in the Chiwan Petroleum 
Supply Base. Singapore and. China have set up joint-venture companies, for 
example the China Nanhai Oxy-Sedco Drilling Corporation in Shekou, 
Shenzhen. China's contracting company has also joined international contracts 
to supply a mobile drilling rig to Malaysia. 
3. Evaluation of China's Petroleum Trade with ASEAN 
The entry of China's petroleum into the international market, and China's use 
of foreign investment in its petroleum industry, all signify its participation in 
international petroleum competition. In the authors' view, normal a11d reasonable 
competition is beneficial to the development of world trade. The Chinese 
Government advocates competition among enterprises within the country because 
it enhances economic efficiency and promotes development. In the international 
arena, the developing countries are at a competitive disadvantage and there is 
not too much difference in their competitive capacities. Their basic interests are 
the same, so though there is some competition among them, it ordinarily should 
not escalate into a trade war. Properly dealt with in a spirit of co-operation, it 
can become a beneficial factor for all parties. For example, the members of OPEC 
compete among themselves, but they have also worked closely together and won 
the support of other developing countries, and have had a great impact on the 
world economy. 
The industrial countries of the developed world are different. With their high 
level of competitiveness, they often engage in trade conflicts. With their great 
advantage over developing countries, unfair situations of the strong bullying the 
weak and the large manipulating the small often arise. These stand in the way 
of the development of world trade as a whole, and particularly the trade of the 
developing countries. 
Development of China's Petroleum Industry 127 
With China's entry into the petroleum market of the Asia-Pacific region, and 
its attraction of foreign investment for its offshore petroleum industry, there is 
bound to be some competition between it and other oil producers, including those 
of the ASEAN region. However, China and the ASEAN countries are all 
developing countries with fundamentally identical interests, so any contradiction 
between them can be dealt with through co-operation. In order to further support 
this viewpoint, a country-by-country analysis is made of the structures of the oil 
exports of China and the ASEAN countries, and of the supply and demand in 
the Asia-Pacific region. 
China and three ASEAN countries constitute the net exporters of crude 
petroleum in the region. The main importers of their crude are other countries 
of the region, especially the Uriited States and Japan. In 1973, 72 per cent of 
Indonesia's crude went to countries of this region, 93 per cent of Brunei's, 98 per 
cent of Malaysia's, and 99.5 per cent of China's. In 1983, the figures were 66 per 
cent for Indonesia, 86 per cent for Brunei, 95 per cent for Malaysia, and 77 per 
cent for China. 
At the time of the first oil crisis in 1973, 51.7 per cent of crude imports in the 
Asia-Pacific region came fr.om the Middle East, with only 13.3 per cent produced 
within the region itself. Another 22.1 per cent came from the American continent. 
By 1983, when there was an oil glut, 47.0 per cent of crude imports came from 
the Middle East and 18.4 per cent were from the Asia-Pacific region's own 
exporters. These figures show that oil demand in the Asia-Pacific region was four 
times greater than the supply. 
Japan and the United States are the principal importers of crude from China 
and the three ASEAN countries. In 1973, Japan and the Unit~d States imported 
respectively 45.9 and 35.0 per cent of total Asia-Pacific imports, which were 7. 7 
and 5.9 per cent respectively of world imports. In 1983, the figures were 40.1 
and 38.6 per cent respectively of this region's imports, which were 9. 7 and 9.3 
per cent of world imports. 
In 1983, 71.3 per cent of China's crude exports went to Japan, 42.4 per cent 
oflndonesia's, 47.2 per cent of Brunei's and 23.4 per cent of Malaysia's. Yet these 
figures represented respectively only 5.2, 14.5, 2.4, and 1.9 per cent of Japan's 
total imports. Imports from these four countries together only accounted for 24.1 
per cent of Japan's total imports of crude, while 70.1 per cent came from the 
Middle East. Ten years earlier, in 1973, aggregate imports from these four 
countries by Japan came to 23.4 per cent of its total imports, while 71.7 per cent 
came from the Middle East. There had been little change in the 1973-83 decade. 
In 1983, 2.9 per cent of China's crude exports went to the United States. For 
Indonesia, the figure was 25.2 per cent, for Brunei 12. 7 per cent, and for Malaysia 
2.5 per cent. These figures represented respectively 0.2, 11.3, 0.02, and 0.2 per 
cent of total American imports. The aggregate for these four countries only made 
up 1L8 per cent of total American imports, as compared with 30.5 per cent from 
Latin America and 14.7 per cent from the Middle East. In 1973, the four Asian 
countries' aggregate crude export to the United States accounted for only 5.4 per 
cent of American imports, as compared with 30.5 per cent from Latin America 
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and 18.6 per cent from the Middle East. The increase from the Asian countries 
in 1983 roughly made up for the decrease from the Middle East. 
In conclusion, as far as the Asia-Pacific region is concerned, whether in the 
shortage years of the 1970s or the glut years of the 1980s, petroleum exports from 
China and the three ASEAN countries were a long way from satisfying the 
demands of the region. It would seem therefore that far from there being any 
"conflict" between China and the ASEAN exporters, there is instead a greater 
possibility of co-operation. 
IV. China's Expanding Co-operation with ASEAN 
in the Petroleum Industry 
1. Development Trends in the Asia-Pacific Petroleum Market 
Any discussion of possibilities for future co-operation between China and ASEAN 
in the area of petroleum necessitates a prior analysis and projection of world 
market trends, particularly those· of the Asia-Pacific region. 
The sharp drop in world oil prices over the last few years has had some effect 
in stimulating consumption. However, many factors still exist·which will cause 
the oil glut to continue. These include changes in technology, slow world economic 
growth, oil-saving measures already in effect, and the use of energy alternatives, 
such as natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy. Consequently, we do not foresee 
any marked lessening of the over-capacity of petroleum production. If petroleum 
producers can control their output, it is possible that the price per barrel will 
remain between US$18 and US$20 for the time being. 
From a mid- to long-term viewpoint, we believe that world petroleum supply 
and demand will undergo some fairly big changes. The proportion of petroleum 
in world energy consumption has already dropped from 45 per cent in 1980 to 
40 per cent in 1985, and by the year 2000, it will be only 30 per cent. The world 
is passing through a transitional stage in which many new kinds of energy are 
being used; however, petroleum will continue to be the main source in this 
century. Petroleum demand will grow only very slowly during this period, 
increasing by 20 to. 30 per cent above present levels. However, before the end of 
this century, production patterns will change considerably: North Sea petroleum 
output will begin to fall in the 1990s, production in the Soviet Union and the 
United States will also decrease; and some Latin American countries hope to 
increase their output. In the decade of the 1990s to the end of the century, there 
will again be a shortage and a rise in oil prices. 
For the Asia-Pacific region, the situation will be different. Petroleu~ develop-
ment trends in this region are extremely important for exploring the possibilities 
of co-operation between China and ASEAN. At present, crude exports from the 
Asia-Pacific region account for less than 6 per c_ent of total world crude export 
trade while its imports are 24 per cent. In spite of the fact that 90 per cent of the 
region's exports are to countries within the region, they can satisfy only 22 per 
cent of their needs. The remaining 78 per cent must be imported from other 
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regions. The export of petroleum products from the Asia-Pacific region makes up 
only 15 per cent of total world crude export trade, _while imports come to 22 per 
cent of world trade. Once again, although 75 per cent of petroleum product 
exports go to countries of the region, they can only fill 44 per cent of the region's 
demand. The remaining 56 per cent must come from other regions. 
Japan and the United States are the largest importers Jn the Asia-Pacific region 
and the major petroleum trading partners of China and the three ASEAN 
petroleum exporters .. It is thus important to study their current situation and 
future trends. 
In 1973, Japan's energy structure was dominated by petroleum which 
accounted for 75.8 per cent; in 1980, this had dropped to 66.4 per cent, and by 
1984 to 60 per cent. Over 99 per cent of Japan's petroleum is imported. A 
breakdown of its 215-million-ton import in 1984 shows that 20 per cent came 
from the three ASEAN exporters - 6 per cent from China, 65 per cent from 
the Middle East, and 4.3 per cent from Latin America. Although the proportion 
of oil in its energy structure will drop, perhaps even to 45 per cent in the year 
2000, its absolute demand will continue to grow. Estimates place this rate of 
increase in the 1990s at 1.5 per cent annually, and it will continue to rely primarily 
on imports. 
In 1973, the proportion of petroleum in American energy consumption 
patterns was 45.3 per cent. By 1984, this had dropped to 43 per cent. A breakdown 
of its 1984 import of 269 million tons shows that only 7 per cent came from Asian 
exporters, 42 per cent from Latin America, 14 per cent from Africa, 11.4 per 
cent from the Middle East, and 11.6 per cent from Canada. From a mid- to 
long-term point of view, the proportion of petroleum in American energy 
consumption will fall to an estimated 37 per cent in the year 2000, but demand 
in absolute terms will continue to increase from 7.15 million tons in 1984 to 800 
million tons in the year 2000. A point worth noting is that American output of 
petroleum has been dropping, from 400 million tons in 1980 to 370 million tons 
in 1985, and perhaps to 335 million tons by the year 2000. If 800 million tons is 
taken as the overall need in 2000, then American imports of petroleum will have 
to increase from the 269 million tons in 1984 to 465 million tons. 
The Asia-Pacific region has not been able to meet its demands for petroleum. 
In 1983, the four major exporters of this region (China and the three ASEAN 
countries) were only able to satisfy 23.39 per cent of Japan's needs and 5.44 per 
cent of the United States' needs. This situation is the basis for co-operation 
between China and ASEAN in the area of petroleum. 
2. China-ASEAN Co-operation in the Petroleum Industry 
The present world petroleum situation, the political instability and tensions in 
the Middle East, and the inability of the Asia-Pacific region to satisfy its petroleum 
needs for a long time to come all combine to cause the countries of the region 
serious concern over the steady supply of petroleum. China and ASEAN's 
petroleum exporters and importers are all taking positive steps to develop their 
respective petroleum industries. Present co-operation between China and certain 
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ASEAN countries, though still on a small scale, provides useful experience for 
future co-op.eration. China is maintaining its policy of opening to the outside 
world, and takes a positive view of international co-operation in petroleum. The 
foregoing points to the possibility of co-operation in the areas of petroleum 
prospecting, exploitation, cont.ract services, processing, and trade so that the 
petroleum needs of the region can be met and supplies assured. We therefore 
make the following proposals: 
(1) Current steady, long-term trade relations between China and some ASEAN 
countries have proved to be mutually beneficial and should be continued and 
strengthened. China's petroleum exports to three ASEAN countries is only a 
small proportion of their imports. For instance, in 1983, China's exports to the 
Philippines was only 5.57 per cent of its total petroleum imports; for Singapore, 
it was 0.53 per cent; and for Thailand, 1. 77 per cent. In view of this, such 
petroleum trade could be expanded, given the proper conditions. 
(2) China's co-operation with Singapore has not only overcome the problem of 
China's inadequate domestic refining capabilities, but has also benefited the 
Singapore economy. This oil processing service should continue and grow. Even 
more important in our view, is the fact that this form of complementing each 
other's needs could be used as a model for co-operation in other areas of the oil 
industry, for example oil transport, the construction and leasing of tankers and 
drilling rigs, oil extraction and supply of refinery equipment, information and 
data exchange, technology and manpower, etc. 
(3) Indonesia is the only ASEAN petroleum exporter which is a member of 
OPEC. Although Brunei, Malaysia, and China have not joined the organization, 
they are all developing oil-exporting countries, and have the same basic interests 
as other such countries. They all wish to protect their rights and interests over 
their oil reserves, and maintain a reasonable level of earnings from their 
petroleum exports. China has all along been willing to work together with other 
developing oil exporters to co-ordinate action, and has actively supported the 
decisions taken by OPEC. China and the ASEAN oil exporters should increase 
contacts and co-ordination. There should be an exchange of information.so that 
they can all respond better to the world oil market, and more specifically, the 
Asia-Pacific market. 
( 4) Both China and ASEAN are encouraging the exploitation of national 
petroleum reserves, particularly offshore ones. China's offshore oil industry has 
gotten off to a good start, but is still in its infancy and a long way from fulfilling 
the country's needs. Singapore's direct and indirect participation in China's 
offshore oil activities should continue and may even be intensified. China is also 
willing to co-operate with other ASEAN countries. China has already gradually 
established complete, technically advanced, and well-managed oil contracting 
services. These twenty specialized services, with 11,270 employees~ have attained 
international standards and provide drilling, shipping, platform construction, 
transportation, and well logging and mud services for offshore oil exploration 
and extraction. There are also eleven joint-venture contracting services. In 1987, 
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China made great progress in self-funded prospecting in the Bohai-Liaodong and 
Shuibu Gulfs. In 1986, the Bohai Oil Corporation provided the manpower for 
jacket welding in Abu Dhabi, and gained a reputation for good work. In view i:>f 
the above, it would be useful to explore the possibilities of China co-operating 
in ASEAN countries' oil exploitation when the need arises. 
APPENDIX A5.1 
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the 
Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in 
Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises 
Adopted at the Regular Session of the State Council 
on 12 January 1982; · 
Promul$ated by the State Council · 
OQ January 30, 1982 
. Chapter I. General Principles 
Article 1 
In the interests of developing the national economy and expanding interna-
tional economic and technological cooperation, these Regulations are formulated, 
on the premise of safeguarding national sovereignty and economic interests, to 
permit foreign enterprises to participate in the cooperative exploitation of offshore 
petroleum resources of the People's Republic of China. 
Article 2 
All petroleum resources in the internal waters, territorial sea and continental 
shelf of the People's Republic of China and in all sea areas within the limits of 
national jurisdiction over the maritime resources of the People's Republic of 
China are owned by the People's Republic of China. 
In the sea areas referred to in the preceding paragraph, all buildings and 
structures set up and vessels operating to exploit petroleum, as well as the 
corresponding onshore oil (gas) terminals and bases, shall be under the jurisdic-
tion of the People's Republic of China. 
Article 3 
The Government of the People's Republic of China shall protect,· in accordance 
with the law, the investments of foreign enterprises participating in the coopera-
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tive exploitation of offshore petroleum resources, the profits due to them and 
their other legitimate rights and interests, and shall protect, in accordance with 
the law, the cooperative exploitation activities of foreign enterprises. 
All activities for the cooperative exploitation of offshore petroleum resources 
within the scope of these Regulations shall be subject to the laws and decrees of 
the People's Republic of China and relevant provisions of the State; all persons 
and enterprises taking part in petroleum operations shall be subject to the laws 
of China and shall accept inspection and supervision by the competent authorities 
concerned of the Chinese Government. · 
Article 4 
The Ministry of Petroleum Industry of the People's Republic of China shall 
be the competent authority in charge of the exploitation of offshore petroleum 
resources in cooperation with foreign enterprises, and shall determine the forms 
of cooperation and demarcate areas of cooperation in accordance with the zones 
and the surface areas of cooperation designated by the State; it shall work out a 
plan for the exploitation of offshore petroleum resources in co-operation with the 
foreign enterprises in accordance with long-term state economic plans, formulate 
operation and management policies for the cooperative exploitation_ of offshore 
petroleum resources and examine and approve the overit.11 devefopment nrnrrram 
for offshore oil (gas) fields. 
Article 5 
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) shall have exclusive· 
and overall responsibility for the work of exploiting offshore petroleum resources 
in the People's Republic of China in cooperation with foreign enterprises. 
CNOOC shall be a state corporation with the qualifications of a judicial person 
and shall have the exclusive right to explore for, develop, produce and market 
the petroleum within the zones of cooperation with foreign enterprises. 
CNOOC may, as the work requires, establish regional corporations, special-
ized corporations and overseas representatives offices to c~rry out the tasks 
delegated by the head office. 
Article 6 
CNOOC shall, by means of calling for bids and signing petroleum contracts, 
cooperate with foreign enterprises to exploit petroleum resources in accordance 
with the zones, surface areas and areas of cooperation with foreign enterprises 
for the exploitation of petroleum resources. 
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The petroleum contracts referred to in the preceding paragraph shall come 
into force after approval by the Foreign Investment Commission of the People's 
Republic of China. 
All documents signed by CNOOC for other forms of cooperative exploitation 
of petroleum resources utilizing technology and funds provided by foreign 
enterprises shall also be subject to approval by the Foreign Investment Commis-
sion of the People's Republic of China. 
Chapter IL Rights and Obligations of the Parties to Petroleum Contracts 
Article 7 
CNOOC shall cooperate with foreign enterprises to exploit offshore petroleum 
resources by means of entering into petroleum contracts, and, unless otherwise 
specified by the Ministry of Petroleum Industry or in a petroleum contract, the 
foreign enterprise that is one party to the petroleum contract, (hereafter "foreign 
contractor") shail provide the investment to carry out exploration, be responsible 
for exploration operations and bear all exploration risks after a commercial oil 
(gas) field is discovered, both the foreign contractor and CNOOC shall provide 
the investment for its cooperative development, and the foreign contractor shall 
be responsible for the development operations and production operations until 
CNOOC takes over the production operations when conditions permit as 
provided in the petroleum contract. The foreign contractor, in accordance with 
the provisions of the petroleum contract, may re~over its investment and expenses 
and receive remuneration out of the petroleum produced. 
Artide 8 
The foreign contractor may export the petroleum due to it and the petroleum 
it purchases, and may also remit abroad, in accordance with the law, the 
investment it recovers, its profits and its other legitimate income. 
Article 9 
All Chinese enterprises and foreign enterprises participating in the cooperative 
exploitation of offshore petroleum resources shall pay taxes in accordance with 
the law and shall pay mining royalties. 
All employees of the enterprises referred to in the preceding paragraph shall 
pay individual income tax in accordance with the law. 
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Article 10 
The equipment and material imported for carrying out the petroleum contract 
shall be subject to tax at a reduced rate, or exempted from tax, or given other 
preferential tax treatment in accordance with State provisions. 
Article 11 
The foreign contractor shall open a bank account in accordance with the 
provisions of the Provisional Reguiations on Foreign Exchange Control of the 
People's Republic of China. 
Article 12 
In carrying out the petroleum contract, the foreign contractor shall use 
appropriate and advanced technology and management experience and shall be 
obliged to transfer the technology and pass on the experience to the personnel of 
the Chinese side involved in carrying out the petroleum contract (hereafter 
"Chinese personnel"); in petroleum operations, the foreign contractor must give 
preference in employment to Chinese personnel, progressively increase the 
percentage of Chinese personnel and train Chinese personnel in a planned way. 
Article 13 
In carrying out the petroleum contract, the foreign contractor must promptly 
and accurately report to CNOOC on the situation of petroleum operations; and 
it must acquire complete and accurate data, records, samples, vouchers and other 
original data with respect to various aspects of the petroleum operation, and 
regularly submit to CNOOC necessary data and samples as well as various 
technological, economic, financial and accounting, and administrative reports. 
Article 14 
In carrying out the petroleum contract, the foreign contractor shall establish 
a branch or subsidiary or representative office within the territory of the People's 
Republic of China and fulfil registration formalities in accordance with the law. 
The domiciles of the offices referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be 
determined through consultation with CNOOC. 
Development of China's Petroleum Industry 135 
Article 15 
The provisions of Articles 3, 8, 9, 10 and 14 of these Regulations shall apply, 
by analogy, to foreign subcontractors that render services in connection with the 
petroleum operations. 
Chapter III. Petroleum Operations 
Article 16 
In order to achieve the highest possible oil recovery factor, the operator must, 
in accordance with these Regulations and the relevant provisions promulgated 
by the Ministry of Petroleum Industry on the exploitation of petroleum resources 
and by taking account of international practice, formulate an overall development 
program for the oil (gas) field and implement production operations. 
Article 17 
In carrying out the petroleum contract, the foreign contractor shall use the 
existing bases within the territory of the People's Republic of China, and, if new 
bases are needed, they must be established within the territory of the People's 
Republic of China. 
The specific locations of the new bases referred to in the preceding paragraph, 
and other arrangements that may be necessary in special circumstances, must all 
be subject to the written approval of CNOOC. 
Article 18 
CNOOC shall have the right to send personnel to join the foreign operator 
in making master designs and engineering designs for carrying out the petroleum 
contract. Design corporations within the territory of the People's Republic of 
China shall have priority in entering into subcontra.cts for the master designs and 
engineering designs mentioned above, provided that their terms are competitive. 
Article 19 
With respect to all facilities required to be built in carrying out the petroleum 
contract, including artificial islands, platforms, buildings and structures, when 
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signing subcontracts, the operator must give preference to manufacturing plants 
and engineering corporations within the territory of the People's Republic of 
China, provided that they are competitive in terms of quality, price, term of 
delivery and services. 
Article 20 
With respect to the equipment and materials required to carry out the 
petroleum contract, the operator and subcontractors must give preference to 
· procuring and utilizing equipment and materials manufactured and supplied by 
the People's Republic of China, provided that these are competitive. 
Article 21 
With respect to services that are required to carry out the petroleum contract, 
such as those for geophysical prospecting, well-drilling, diving, aircraft, ships and 
bases, the operator and subcontractors must enter into subcontracts and service 
contracts with relevant departments within the territory of the People's Republic 
of China, provided that they are competitive in terms of price, efficiency and 
services. 
Article 22 
The ownership of all assets purchased or built by the foreign contractor to 
carry out the petroleum contract in accordance with the plan and budget, 
excluding equipment leased from a third party, shall belong to CNOOC after 
the foreign contractor's investment has been compensated as provided for, and, 
within the term of the contract, the foreign contractor may continue to use those 
assets in accordance with provisions of the contract. 
Article 23 
CNOOC shall have the ownership of all of the data, records, samples, vouchers 
and other original data with respect to the petroleum operations stipulated in 
Article 13 of these Regulations. 
The utilization and transfer, donation, exchange, sale and publication of the 
previously mentioned data, records, samples, vouchers and other original data 
and their export and transmission from the People's Republic of China all must 
be conducted in accordance with the "Provisions foe the Control. of Data' 
formulated by the Ministry of Petroleum Indusiry. 
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Article 24 
In the course of implementing petroleum operations, the operator and 
subcontractors shall comply with the relevant laws and provisions on environ-
mental protection and safety of the People's Republic of China, and shall, by 
taking account of international practice when conducting operations, protect 
fishery resources and other natural resources and prevent the environment, 
including the air, sea, rivers, lakes and land, from being polluted or damaged. 
Article 25 
The petroleum produced within the petroleum contract area shall be l_<!nded 
in the People's Republic of China or may be exported from oil (gas) metering 
points on offshore terminals. In case such petroleum has to be landed at a point 
outsid~ the People's Republic of China, the approval of the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry must be obtained. 
Article 26 
In case of war, threat of war or other state of emergency, the Chinese 
Government shall have the. right of compulsory purchase or requisition with 
respect to·a ·portion or all of the petroleum earned or purchased by the foreign 
contractor. 
Chapter IV. Supplementary Principles 
Article 27 
Any dispute ansmg between foreign and Chinese enterprises during the 
.cooperative exploitation of offshore petroleum resources shall be settled through 
friendly consultations. If it cannot be resolved through consultation, mediation 
and arbitration may.be conducted by an arbitration body of the People's Republic 
of China, or the parties to the contract may agree upon arbitration by another 
arbitration body. 
Article 28 
In case an operator or subcontractor violates the provisions of these Regula-
tions in implementing petroleum operations, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry 
shall have the right to issue a warning and set a deadline for correction. If no 
138 Shao Zuze, Guo Peixing, and Li Yong 
correction can be made prior to the specified deadline, the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry shall have the right to adopt necessary measures, even to the extent of 
suspending implementation of petroleum operation. All economic losses caused 
as a result of this shall be borne by the responsibile party. 
A party responsible for serious violation of these Regulations may be fined by 
and/or even be subject to suit before the judicial authorities by the Ministry of 
Petroleum Industry. 
Article 29 
The terms used in these Regulations shall have the following definitions: 
(1) "Petroleum" means crude oil or natural gas deposited underground, 
currently being extracted or already extracted. 
(2) "Exploitation" means, in general, the exploration for the development, 
production and marketing of petroleum, as well as other related activities. 
(3) "Petroleum contract" means a contract signed, in accordance with the 
law, between CNOOC and foreign enterprises for the cooperative exploitation 
of offshore petroleum resources of the People's Republic of China, including the 
exploration for and development and production of petroleum. 
(4) "Contract area'' means a surface area designated within a sea area 
demarcated by geographical coordinates in the petroleum contract for the 
cooperative exploitation of petroleum resources. 
(5) "Petroleum operation" me.ans all exploration, development and produc-
tion operations and other related activities conducted in carrying out the 
petroleum contract. 
(6) "Exploration operations" means all work done to locate the petroleum-
bea~ing traps by means of geological, geophysical and geochemical methods and 
including drilling exploratory wells, etc., and all work done to determine the 
commerciality of discovered petroleum traps, including appraisal drilling, 
feasibility studies and preparation of the overall development program for an oil 
(gas) field. 
(7) "Development operations" means projects, such as those for design, 
construction, installation and drilling, and corresponding research work, con-
ducted from the date of the approval of the overall development program for an 
oil (gas) field by the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, in order to bring about 
petroleum production, including production activities carried out before the 
commencement of commercial production. 
(8) "Production operations" means all operations for producing petroleum 
conducted after the date of commencement of the commercial production of an 
oil (gas) field and related activities, such as extraction, injection, production 
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stimulation, processing, storage and transportation and lifting of petroleum and 
other operations. 
(9) "Foreign contractor" means a foreign enterprise that signs a petroleum 
contract with CNOOC. The foreign enterprises may be a corporation or a 
consortium of corporations. 
(10) "Operator" means an entity that is responsible for implementing the 
operations pursuant to the provisions of the petroleum contract. 
(11) "Subcontractor" means an entity that renders services to the operator. 
Article 30 
Rules for the implementation of these Regulations shall be formulated by the 
Ministry of Petroleum Industry. 
Article 31 
These Regulations shall go into effect on the date of promulgation. 
SOURCE: China Prospect Publishing House, Collection of Laws and Regulations of the People's 
Republic of China Concerning Foreign Economic Affairs, vol. 2 (Beijing, 1985). 
NOTES 
1. Petroleum Economist, November 1987, p. 407. 
2. One kilogram of standard fuel gives 7 ,000 KCal. One kilogram of coal gives an 
average of 5,000 KCal or the equivalent of 0. 7143 kilograms of standard fuel. 
Every kilogram of crude oil is reckoned as 10,000 KCal, which converts to 1.4286 
kilograms of standard fuel. One cubic meter of natural gas, at 9,310 KCal con-
verts to 1.33 kilograms of standard fuel. Hydroelectricity is calculated on the basis 
of the consumption of coal-generated electricity for that particular year. 
3. China Oil Quarterly (Hong Kong), (Summer 1987), p. 109. 
4. Guangming Daily (Beijing), 30 December 1987. 
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Development of the ASEAN 
Textile and Garment Industry and 
Implications for ASEAN-China 
Economic Relations 
Emmanuel T. Velasco 
I. Introduction 
1. Objectives of the Study 
The textile and garment industry is one sector where developing countries have 
successfully competed with industrial countries. Over the past deeade, the rapid 
increase in the production capacities of ASEAN countries has placed the region 
in the same league as the major producers and exporters of the industry. The 
industry plays an important role in the economies of the ASEAN members, except 
possibly for Singapore. Undeniably, textiles offer vast potentials for improving 
the capacity of each country to earn foreign exchange. However, the rapid 
expansion of trade has been heid back by the growing protectionism of 
industrialized countries, such that textiles is now probably the most regulated 
item in international trade. 
While the issue of protectionism has caused much coneern, many foresee that 
the ASEAN textile industry will be affected by another development. This is 
China's recent emergence as a major exporter of textiles and clothing. Although 
the world's largest, the Chinese textile industry has remained inward-looking for 
many years. More active involvement by China in world trade, particularly in 
textiles, is viewed as a threat by many producers in the ASEAN region. 
This paper attempts to analyze the impact of this recent development on the 
ASEAN textile industry and on ASEAN-China economic relations. The specific 
objectives of this paper are as follows: 
1. To analyze the structure of the industry and the pattern of its development 
in the ASEAN region; 
2. To identify the problems of the industry and to assess possibilities for the 
future; and 
3. To evaluate the impact of China's emergence as a major exporter of textiles 
on the ASEAN textile industry and on ASEAN-China economic relations. 
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2. Scope and Limitations 
The textile industry, as referred t9 in this study, comprises two separate industries: 
textiles (namely fibres, yarns, fabrics, and other products such as thread, twine, 
net, and cordage) and garments (namely wearing apparel and accessories). 
The study covers all the activities involved in the processing of fibres into 
finished goods. These activities are: (1) spinning; (2) weaving/knitting; (3) 
finishing; and ( 4) manufacture of garments from the finished fabrics. In addition, 
only five ASEAN countries are reviewed, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
This study is limited.by the lack of comprehensive, consistent, and up-to-date 
data. Data were obtained from several sources. In several cases, it was not possible 
to compute consolidated figures for the region either because oflack of uniformity 
of data or because of differences in the level of disaggregation. 
II. Structure of the Textile Industry 
1. Industry Background 
The textile industry was among the first industries to be promoted when the 
ASEAN countries embarked on their industrialization programmes. Its labour 
intensiveness and its use of standardized and less sophisticated technology made 
the industry appropriate for developing countries, where labour is cheap but 
capital is scarce. Furthermore, as the products of the industry were basic 
necessities, marketing was assured. 
At first, the industry served only the domestic market, in conformity with the 
import substitution industrialization strategy. With the help of government 
incentives and foreign capital, industry growth was bolstered. As foreign 
investments in the industry increased, more sophisticated technology was intro-
duced and operations expanded. The products also started to be exported to the 
international market. 
With the saturation of the domestic market, expansion of exports became the 
goal. This shift in the direction of the industry was consistent with the change in 
the overall strategy for industrialization. Recognizing the limitations of import 
substitution, the ASEAN countries began shifting to export promotion. The 
garment industry was, in fact, developed in most ASEAN countries increasingly 
as an export-oriented industry. 
Today; the textile and garment industries in the ASEAN region are moving 
towards integration and further expansion of exports. Although these industries 
generally developed in similar fashion, they now differ in status in each country. 
This is not only because the industries were established in different time periods 
but because different incentives and economic policies shaped their development. 
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2. Importance of the Industry to ASEAN Countries 
The textile industry occupies a major place in the manufacturing sector of each 
ASEAN country. Textiles and garments contribute a substantial share of value 
added, employment, and exports of the sector. The relative shares, however, differ 
between countries (Table 6.1). 
Thailand's textile industry has the highest share, accounting for almost 
one-fourth of manufacturing value added. In the other ASEAN countries, the 
industry's share is much smaller. In Indonesia, the share is 12. 7 per cent; in the 
Philippines 9.4 per cent; in Malaysia 4.8 per cent (of output valued); and in 
Singapore, only 3.8 per cent of manufacturing value added. 
When employment in the industry is examined, its share of manufacturing 
employment exceeds 20 per cent in three countries - Thailand (29.4 per_ cent), 
followed by the Philippines (26.3 per cent), and Indonesia (23.1 per cent). The 
industry accounts for 12 per cent of manufacturing employment in Singapore 
and Malaysia. 
In Thailand and the Philippines, textiles and garments are now the leading 
non-agricultural exports, accounting for 11 and 19.6 per cent of total country 
exports, respectively. These shares are higher in comparison with those in other 
ASEAN countries. Textile export earnings as a proportion of total exports are 
significantly lower in Malaysia and Singapore and lowest in Indonesia. The small 
3 per cent share in Indonesia is explained by the fact that the industry is basically 
oriented to domestic needs. 
From the foregoing performance indicators, it is evident that the industry 
occupies a leading position in .Thailand. It is also important in the Philippines 
and Indonesia, and less important in Malaysia. It has become less significant in 
Singapore. The declining share of the industry in Singapore indicates that the 
country is now moving away from textiles. The high cost of labour is making the 
country less competitive in textiles. Singapore, which has already attained a more 
advanced stage of industrialization, should be considered apart from other 
ASEAN countries. 
3. Profile of the Industry 
Number and Size of Establishments 
Table 6.2 shows the number of textile establishments in the region. The figures 
cannot be consolidated for lack of data uniformity, hence intra-regional com-
parison is not possible. Only patterns of growth can be compared across countries. 
As a whole, while the 1970s saw an increase in the number of textile 
establishments, the 1980s were marked by a general decline. The decrease was 
an expected outcome of industrial progress and technological improvements. 
Smaller, inefficient firms were forced to close down as other firms expanded or 






















Textile Industry: Value Added, Employment, and Exports, 1985 
Value Added Number Employed 
(Rp thousand at market prices) 
573,762 (1984) 240,393 (1984) 
71,686 (1984) 35,874 (1984) 
645,448 (1984) 276,267 (1984) 
5,091,040 (1984) 1,197' 799 (1984) 
n.a. 33,102 (1983) 
n.a. 27,681 (1983) 
n.a. 60,783 (1983} 
n.a. 493,158 (1983) 
(I! million at 1972 prices) 




2,031 288,970 (1981) 
21,625 1,097,868 (1981) 
::;: .... 
Exports 
















~ 4,628,954 " <:> 
s· b ingapore · (S$ thousand at current market prices) 
Textile manufactures 62,442 2,744 353,100 
Wearing apparel 345,663 24,782 534,700 
Total textile'.and 
wearing apparel 408,105 27,526 887,800 
Total manufacturing 10,687,326 253,510 22,806,500 
Thailand' (B million at 1972 prices) 
Textile manufactures n.a. 177,895 (1983) 19,000 
Wearing appl'j.rel n.a .. 363,984 (1983) 810,300 
Total textile and 
wearing app<;trel 18,93J (1984) 541,879 (1983) 829,300 
Total manufacturing 72,252 (1984) 1,843,000 (1983) 7,413,000 
aPata for Indonesia are for large and medium establishments only. 
bData for Singapore's textile exports are from the Yearbook of Statistics, Department of Statistics. 
'Data for Thailand's textile exports are from The Bank of Thailand Qy.arterly Bulletin, Department of Economic Research. 
SOURCES: Indonesia: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia; Malaysia: Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics; 
Philippines: National Census and Statistics Office, Philippine Statistical. Yearbook; Singapore: Department of Statistics, Report on the Census of Industrial 
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TABLE 6.2 
Number of Textile Establishments, 1975, 1980, and 1985 
Country 
Indonesia (only large and 
medium-scale establishments) 
Textile manufactures 






Philippines (only establishments 


































254 (1979) 211 (1983) 
187 (1979) 213 (1983) 
441 (1979) 424 (1983) 
4,470 4,471 (1981) 
29,543 19,559 (1981) 




n.a. 1,237 (1984) 
n.a. 600 (1984) 
n.a. 1,837 (1984) 
There is a greater proportion of garment than textile firms in the Philippines 
and Singapore. The opposite is true in Indonesia and Thailand. In Malaysia, 
firms are almost equally divided between the two industries. 
Within the textile sector, there are more establishments at the midstream of 
the production process than at the initial stage where raw materials are prod1:1ced. 
In the Philippines, for example, while many firms produce fabrics and garments, 
only one firm produces polyester staple fibre. Yet this fibre accounts for 60 per 
cent of the total raw materials used in the manufacture of fabrics. A similar 
situation exists in Indonesia, where there are only two firms producing nylon 
filament yarn and four firms producing polyester staple fibres. Thus, the industry 
remains heavily dependent on imported raw materials to supplement the limited 
local supply. This significantly increases the cost of production. 
Smaller firms outnumber the larger firms in the textile industry. As of 1985, 
approximately 61.3 per cent of the firms in the textile industry of Singapore 
employed only 10 to 29 workers, and 75.2 per cent of all textile firms had fewer 
than 50 workers. In the Philippines, about 36 per cent of textile firms employ 
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TABLE 6.3 
Average Employment, Fixed Assets, and Output per Establishment 
in the Textile Industry 
Average Average Average 
Number of Value of Value of 
Workers per Output per Fixed Assets per 
Establishment Establishment Establishment 
Indonesia (1984) (Rp million) 
Textiles 144 994.7 n.a. 
Garments 173 816.9 n.a. 
Total textiles 
and garments 147 975.1 n.a. 
Manufacturing 150 1,825.4 n.a. 
Malaysia (1983) (M$ million) (M$ million) 
Textiles 157 6.12 2.87 
Garments 130 2.58 0.67 
Total textiles 
and garments 143 4.34 1.76 
Manufacturing 84 7.03 2.68 
Philippines (1981) ( f! million) ( f! million) 
Textiles 30 2.18 1.52 
Garments 5 .20 0.04 
Total textiles 
and garments 9 .47 0.24 
Manufacturing 13 1.65 0.54 
Singapore (1985) (SS million) 
Textiles 44 3.12 n.a. 
Garments 67 2.80 n.a. 
Total textiles 
and garments 64 2.84 n.a. 
Manufacturing 72 10.99 n.a. 
SOURCES: Same as for Table 6.1. 
fewer than 100 workers, with 21 per cent of these having fewer than 50 workers; 
only 12 per cent employ at least a thousand workers. 
Comparing textile manufacturers and garment producers, the latter are smaller 
in size, as evident in Table 6.3. The large capital investments required for textile 
manufactur<;:s demand a bigger scale of operations for economies of scale. 
Concentration and Vertical Integration 
Despite the existence of ~ large number of textile firms, concentration of 
production in a few large firms is common in the ASEAN region. Malaysia has 
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the highest degree of concentration in both spinning and weaving. Thailand has 
high concentration in spinning, while the Philippines has high concentration in 
the weaving sector. Indonesia has the lowest concentration in both sectors. 
Although no updated figures are available, the decrease in the number of firms 
through the closure of smaller, inefficient firms could have led to greater 
concentration of production in the larger, more efficient firms . 
. The. ASEAN_textile industry is also characterized by vertical integration in 
the production process. Its firms perform several production activities, instead of 
engaging exclusively in a specific activity. In the Philippines, integrated mills 
hold 56 per cent of spindle capacity, 63 per cent of loom capacity, and 86 per 
cent of total finishing capacity. Furthermore, in. Thailand, integrated mills 
account for 78.1 per cent of total spinning production capacity and 63.6 per cent 
of the number of spinning machines. 
Concentration and integration are not unique to the ASEAN textile industry. 
These are also common in developed countries where concentration is more 
intense in fibre production than in textiles. In 1979, only twelve companies 
accounted for almost 60 per cent of world fibre production and 80 to 90 per cent 
of world trade in these fibres. 
Several factors contributed to the development of this type of industry 
structure. Technical progress is one major factor. In textile production, the 
development of machines that run faster and permit longer production runs 
encouraged smaller firms to merge for greater efficiency. Another factor is the 
increased use of synthetic fibres which led to greater vertical integration. Modern 
firms which initially produced pure man-made fibres or cotton blends and 
synthetic fibres were mostly integrated and performed spinning to weaving or 
even up to finishing. Finally, increasing costs of product research and develop-
ment and production contribute further to concentration and integration of the 
industry. 
Foreign Investments 
Foreign participation in the ASEAN textile industry has been very substantial 
due to the member countries' policy of encouraging foreign investments and the 
developed nations' shift of production to developing countries to reduce produc-
tion costs. 
In Thailand, there are only three major groups of textile companies: Thai, 
Japanese, and Thai-Taiwanese. Japanese participation has been particularly 
large, especially between 1960 to 1976. Foreign investments are likewise a 
significant source of capital in Indonesia. It accounted for 70 per cent of total 
investments in the textile industry from 1968 to 1975. In Malaysia, foreign capital 
accounts for a smaller portion of investments in the industry, but firms wholly 
owned by Malaysians are much smaller than those with foreign participation. 
In Singapore, wholly owned foreign firms comprise 8 per cent of all textile 
firms and only 3 per cent of garment firms. However, if all firms with foreign 
equity were considered, then the proportion with foreign participation increases 
to 32.3 per cent of the textile firms and 20 per cent of the garment firms. The 
foreign capital in the industry comes from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan, 
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Switzerland, and the United States. Finally, in the Philippine garment sector, 
foreign ownership is estimated at 45 per cent, with the investment mainly from 
Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. 
Foreign investments in the region's textile industry have led to the transfer of 
technology and established marketing channels which have enabled the host 
countries to penetrate the international market. Furthermore, the presence of 
foreign investments has also contributed to the duality of the industry structure. 
Firms with foreign capital are generally larger, vertically integrated, and 
export-oriented. They co-exist with smaller or medium-sized local enterprises 
producing mainly for the domestic market. 
III. Development Patterns of the Textile Industry 
1. Production 
When the textile capacities of individual countries are combined, the ASEAN 
region emerges as one of the major producers of textiles and garments. As of 
1981, the region had over 6 million spindles, 185 thousand looms, and 53 thousand 
knitting machines. However, the total number of textile equipment may not be 
an accurate gauge of production capacity as most of the equipment may be old 
and obsolete. 
Table 6.4 shows ASEAN production of yarn, fabrics, an.cl man-made fibres in 
1981. Indonesia leads the other count.ries in the production of fibres and fabrics 
and is second to Thailand in the production of yarn. The Philippines is third in 
the production of all three, while Singapore and Malaysia lag behind. 
TABLE 6.4 
Textiles and Man-Made Fibre Production, 1981 
Item Indonesia 
Textiles 
All yarns ('000 tons) 224 
All fabrics (million 
sq. m.) 2,094 
Man-Made Fibres 






Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
57 145 18 234 
250 668 40 1,879 
n.a. 16 
34 41 n.a. 102 
SOURCES: The Economist Intelligence Vnit (EIU), World Textile Trade and Production 
Trends, Special Report No. 152, 1983; Directorate-General of Assorted Industries, 
Indonesia; Thai Textile Manufacturing Association, Bangkok; and Textile Manufacturers 





























Trends in Fibre Use by Mills, 1974-81 










































































































SOURCE: EIU, World Textile Trade and Production Trends, Special Report No. 152, 1983. 
The rapid expansion of the textile industry in the ASEAN region can be seen 
from the doubling of fibre consum_\)tion by the textile mills (Table 6.5). Total 
fibre consumption in the region increased by 100 per cent between 1974 and 
1981. Fibre consumption is highest in Indonesia and Thailand. Malaysia's textile 
mills, on the other hand, have increased their fibre consumption the fastest. 
There has been a clear shift from cotton to man-made fibres in ASEAN. In 
1974, cott.on fibres made up 53 per cent of total fibre consumption. Cotton fibre 
consumption subsequently increased by only 49.3 per cent, while the consumption 
of rayon/acetate and synthetic grew by 340 and 130 per cent respectively. By 
1981, cotton fibre consumption was down to only 39.5 per cent of total fibre 
consumption. 
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TABLE 6.6 
Indonesia: Textile Production, Production Capacity, 
and Capacity Utilization, 1970-84 
Textile Products 1970 1975 1982 1984 
Actual Production 
Cotton fibre (tons) n.a. n.a. 14,294.0 71,292.0 
Synthetic fibre (tons) n.a. 47,720.0 132,397.0 174,640.0 
Yarn (thousand bales) 182.1 364.0 1,370.0 1,876.8 
Fabrics (million metres) 449.4 973.9 1, 708.9 1,190. 7 
Garments (million dozens) 6.8 12.6 21.1 24.1 
Production Capacity 
Synthetic fibre (tons) n.a. 47,720.0 132,397.0 174,640.0 
Polyester fibre - -staple 
and filament (tons) n.a. n.a. 105,550 173,750.0 
Rayon (tons) n.a. n.a. 36,000 36,000.0 
Yarn (thousand bales) n.a. 678.0 1,450.6 1,638.6 
Fabrics (million metres) n.a. n.a. 2,136.0 2,620.0 
Garments (million dozens) n.a. 14.1 20.3 24.7 
Capacity Utilization ( % ) 
Synthetic fibres n.a. n.a. n.a. 88.8 
Yarn n.a. 53.7 94.4 114.5 
Fabrics n.a·. n.a. 80.0 45.4 
Garments n.a. 89.4 104.4 97.6 
SOURCE: Directorate-General of Assorted Industries, Indonesia. 
Table 6.6 shows the rapid expansion of the textile and garment industry in 
Indonesia. Stimulated by a large domestic market and increasing penetration of 
the overseas market, production of textiles and garments grew at unprecedented 
rates from 1970 to 1982; Cotton fibre production stands out for the three-fold 
increase in output during the 1980s. The capacity utilization rate for fabrics fell 
below 50 per cent in 1985; for the rest of the products, capacity utilization rates 
are very high: 114.5 per cent for yarn and 97.6 per cent for garments. 
Thailand's level of production is slightly lower than that of Indonesia (Table 
6. 7). The two countries however exhibit very similar_ patterns -of growth. Rapid 
increases were experienced until 1980, after which the growth rate slowed down. 
Synthetic fibres began to be produced only in the early 1970s while the production 
of both cotton and man-made yarns consistently increased, with the- rate of 
man-made yarns rising faster than that for cotton. As of 1983, capacity utilization 
rates for all types of products were more than 80 per cent. Textile production 
continued to increase after 1983, by 5.6 per cent in 1984, and by 4.7 per cent in 
1985. 
In contrast, the Philippine textile industry performed very poorly during the 
1980s (Table 6.8). Textile production increased at reasonably high rates until 
152 Emmanuel T. nlasco 
TABLE 6.7 
Thailand: Textile Production, Production Capacity, 
and Capacity Utilization, 1970-84 
Textile Products 1970 1975 1980 1984 
Actual Production 
Cotton (.tons) 13,743 18,752 57,724 43,960 (1983) 
Man-made fibres (tons) n.a. 39,006 103,159 115,159 
Polyester staple. n.a. n.a. 49,514 57,323 
Polyester filament yarn n.a. n.a. 19,677 17,386 
Partially-oriented yarn n.a. n.a. 857 5,167 
Nylon filament yarn n.a. n.a. 16,716 16,413 
Viscose rayon yarn n.a. n.a. 16,395 18,870 
Yarn (tons) 56,846 135,122 227,485 247,166 (1983) 
Cotton 49,365 70,502 96,151 109,687 (1983) 
Man-made 7,481 64,620 131,334 137,479 (1983) 
Fabrics (thousand sq. m.) 416,336 942,832 1,523,506 1,841,910 (1983) 
Cotton 325,609 506,204 701,192 816,032 (1983) 
Man-made 90,727 436,628 822,314 1,025,878 (1983) 
Production Capacity 
Man-made fibres (tons) n.a. n.a. 113,520 128,040 
Polyester staple n.a. n.a. 49,200 62,400 
Polyester filament yarn n.a. n.a. 28,800 24,120 
Partially-oriented yarn n.a. n.a. 2,400 4,800 
Nylon filament yarn n.a, n.a. 15,120 18,720 
Viscose rayon yarn n.a. n.a. 18,000 18,000 
Yarn (tons) n.a. n.a. n.a. 287,687 (1983) 
Fabrics (thousand sq. m.) n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,219,846 (1983) 
Capacity Utilization 
Man-made fibres n.a. n.a. 90.9 89.9 
Polyester staple n.a. n.a. 100.6 91.9 
Polyester filament yarn n.a. n.a. 68.3 49.8 
Partially-oriented yarn n.a. n.a. 35.7 107.6 
Nylon filament yarn n.a. n.a. 110.6 87.7 
Viscose rayon yarn n.a. n.a. 91.1 104.8 
Yarn n.a. n.a. n.a. 85.9 (1983) 
Fabrics n.a. n.a. n.a. 83.0 (1983) 
SOURCE: Research Division, The Thai Textile Manufacturing Association. 
1970, but then, with the exception of knitted fabrics, started to fall during the 
first half of the seventies and only to recover during the second half. However, 
the production of cotton fibres continued to drop. The textile crisis became. more 
obvious in the 1980s with a decrease in production of 29.3 per cent from .1980 
to 1984. In a survey of the industry conducted by the Philippine Institute for 
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TABLE 6.8 
Philippines: Textile Production, 1965-84 
Textile Products 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 
Cotton yarn (tons) 16,478 41,916 35,675 38,433 n.a. 
Cotton fabrics 
(thousand metres) 162,708 212,905 209,143 166,183 n.a. 
Knitted fabrics (tons) 4,251 8,431 11,687 17, 765 n.a. 
Fabrics, .threads, and other 
yarns (metric tons) 105,000 74,269 
SOURCES: Philippine Statistical Yearbook and Inorganic Chemical Industries Department, 
Board oflnvestments (ICID-BOI). As quoted in Tariff Commission - PIDS Joint Research 









ASEAN Share of World Cotton Yarn and Synthetic 
Fibre Production, 1970, 1975, and 1980 
(In percentage) 
Cotton Yarn Synthetic Fibre 
Production Production 
1970 1975 1980 1970 1975 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
4.2 4.7 6.6 2.9 6.9 
1.4 1. 7 2.0 0.4 0.9 
0.4 0.7 0.8 n.a. 0.1 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.5 









SOURCE: Pacific Basin Economic· Council and the Japan National Committee, Pacific 
Economic Community Statistics, 1984. 
Development Studies and the Tariff Commission, it was reported that capacity 
utilization rates continued to slide from 65 per cent in1980, down to 58 per cent 
in 1984, and to so per cent .in 1985. 
Although textile production in. the ASEAN region is still only a small part of 
world production, the region'~ sh<tre has been increasing. Table 6.9 shows the 
share of ASEAN and its member countries. in· the world production of cotton 
yarn and syntheti~ fibre. The ASEAN production-·has grown more than eight 
times faster than the world production. Also, as compared with the Asian newly 
. industrializing economies (NIEs); ASEAN has experienced substantial growth in 
the production of synthetic fibres rather than in cotton. fibre .. 
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Indonesia and Thailand lead the region in the production of both cotton yarn 
and synthetic fibres. In the case of the Philippines, the production of cotton yarn 
has undeniably contracted. Subsequently, Thailand and Indonesia increased their 
production more rapidly such that in 1980, their shares were already more than 
double that of the Philippines. 
The shift of production from cotton to synthetics is a phenomenon observed 
not only in the ASEAN region but also world-wide. Changes in relative prices, 
end users, and product innovations are among the reasons. Since the introduction 
of synthetic fibres in the 1950s, prices have considerably dropped. In 1981, the 
world price of cotton was 6 per cent higher than that of polyester fibre. 
2. International Trade in Textiles and Garments 
All the five ASEAN countries have become net exporters of textiles and garments. 
The trade surplus is largest in Thailand with an export/import ratio of 1.94, 
Philippines (1.53), Indonesia (1.36), Malaysia (1.23), an_d Singapore having the 
least (1.04). The net trade surplus of the region in textiles amounted to US$559 
million in 1985 (Table 6.10). 
TABLE 6.10 
ASEAN: Textile and Garment Export-Import Ratios, 
1970, and 1980-8 5 
Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
1975 0.01 0.66 0.49 0.66 n.a. 
1980 0.28 0.89 1.52 0.93 1.46 
1981 0.23 0.78 1.62 0.91 1.47 
1982 0.32 0.84 1.55 0.90 1.82 
1983 0.67 0.98 1.37 0.88 1.37 
1984 1.13 1.06 1.43 0.97 1.58 
1985 1.36 1.23 1.53 1.04 1.94 
SOURCE: Institute of Developing Economies. 
ASEAN Exports 
The total.value of ASEAN textile and garment exports rose steadily until 1984 
(Table 6.11). In 1985, exports declined by 5 per cent, largely because of the 
significant drop in Singapore's textile exports. Overall, th_e growth rate during 
the first half of the 1980s was still impressive at 32.6 per cent. Indonesia had the 
highest rate of increase, averaging 35.3 per cent annually from 1980 to 1985. 
From a mere US$3.5 million in 1976, exports reached US$552.5 million in 1985 
and US$644.1 million during the first nine months of 1986. 
Thailand's textile exports grew at 12.5 per cent per year during the first half 
of the eighties while Malaysia's grew moderately at the rate of 7 .9 per cent per 
year in the same period. Singapore's export of textiles dropped by 3 per cent in 
19B5, but for the entire half of the 1980s, exports increased by 11.4 per· cent. 
Among the ASEAN countries, the Philippines had a dreary export performance 
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TABLE 6.11 
ASEAN: Distribution of Textile Exports by Country, 1970-85 
(Value in million US$) 
Country 1970 1975 1980 1984 
Indonesia n.a. 2.7 144.'0 496.2 
Malaysia 21.2 94.9 371.2 495.9 
Philippines 22.1 71.2 386.5 .. 328.1 
Singapore n.a. 247.4 796.7 915.1 
Thailand n.a. n.a. 500.1 829.3 








SOURCES: Indonesia: Central B~reau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia; 
Malaysia: Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics; Philippines: Natiorn:1l Census 
and ·Statistics Office, Philippine Foreign Trade Statistics; Singapore: Department of 
Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics; and Thailand: Department of Economic Research, 
The Bank of Thailand Qµarterly Bulletin. 
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in the first half of the 1980s. Its exports started falling in 1982 and continued to 
decline until 1984, then began to rise again in 1985. Textii'e exports 'during the 
period declined by 13.5 per cent. 
ASEAN textile.~xports consist mainly of garments. The proportion of garments 
to total textile exports range from 58.6 per cent for Indonesia to 79.0 per cent 
for the Phillppines. It is only in Indonesia that exports of fibres and fabrics have 
been rising faster than garment exports. 
The surplus in .the region's ,textile trade is due mainly to a surplus in the 
garment trade. All the ASEAN countries are now net exporters of garments. In 
contrast, except for Thailand "'.'hich now has an exportable surplus of fibres and 
fabrics, alHhe rest still have trade deficits in textile products. 
ASEAN exports of fabrics and gatments go mainly to the United States and 
Europear; markets, all of which are governed by quota restrictio.ns. Exports of 
synthetic fibres and cotton yarn and thread, .on the other hand,· find their way 
mo~tly to other Asian countries with a lower or the same level of development. 
Intra-regional trade has declined and is now minimal, 
ASEAN Imports 
In contrast with the rising level of exports, imports of textiles and g?-rments in 
ASEAN have been declining (Table 6.12). Overall, the level of imports decreased 
by 1.2· per cent from 1980 to 1985, although Thailand and Malaysia increased 
their textile imports during the period. Indonesia expe.rienced the largest decrease 
'of 20.8 per cent. Philippine imports went• down by 13.9 per cent. ' 
' Imports consist principally of raw materials and intermediate textile goods. 
Garment imports are very minimal. 'It is ~nly in Malaysia that garment imports 
· compose approximately 10 per cent of all imports. In other countries, 'garments 
account for about 1 per cent of total imports. Despite increases in domestic 
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of these items remain high. This indicates that there are differences in types and 
quality of these products imported and exported. Garment exporters and a 
selected consumer group still prefer to use imported fabrics. 
The bulk of fibre imports come from other Asian countries, mainly the Asian 
NIEs, with Japan and the United States following closely. The biggest suppliers 
for raw materials such as fibres, yarn, and thread used to be Japan and the other 
developed countries. Their shares, however, have declined with the emergence 
of other Asian suppliers. 
3. Production Technology 
The pattern of production and trade in textiles of the ASEAN region shows an 
obvious bias towards garments, indicating the region's comparative advantage in 
these items, due to the abundant supply of low-cost labour. The textile industry 
generally uses a labour-intensive technology; although it is now increasingly 
taking a more capital-intensive form in developed countries, the industry is still 
labour intensive in developing countries. It is estimated that the textile industry 
employs approximately 25 per cent more manpower in developing countries than 
in developed countries. 
Factor Productiv£ty 
A major factor working against the ASEAN countries is the relatively low labour 
productivity of their textile industries~ Table 6.13 shows the labour productivity 
of the industry and of .the whole manufacturing sector. Average labour produc-
tivity of the industry is lower than the average for the entire manufacturing sector. 
Between textiles and garments, the former has higher labour productivity. Among 
the ASEAN countries, Singapore is found to have the highest labour productivity, 
and the Philippines, the lowest. Generally, labour productivity in. the region 
increased during the first half of the 1980s. Once again, the Philippines was an 
exception. A survey of large textile firms disclosed that productivity i.n the 
Philippines dropped by 13 per cent from 1980 to 1984. On the other hand, the 
growth in productivity in Indonesia was the highest in the region. . 
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TABLE 6.13 
Factor Productivity in the Textile and Garment Industries 
and Manufacturing Sector, 1980-85 
Total Textiles Total 
Textiles Garments and Garments Manufacturing 
A. Labour Productivity (US$/w'orker) 
1. Value Added per Worker 
Indonesia 
1980 1,858 946 1,801 4,058 
1982 2,248 2,092 2,233 4,835 
1984 2,327 1,948 2,277 4,142 
Philippines 
1981 1,023 981 1,000 2,762 
Singapore 
1980 7,581 4,576 5,367 13,952 
1982 7,778 5,326 5,772 15,872 
1985 10,343 6,339 6,738 19,160 
Thailand 
1980 n.a. n.a. 3,411 3,869 
1983 n.a. n.a. 3,927 4,594 
2. Ouput per Worker 
(U S$/worker) 
Malaysia 
1981 15,144 6,438 11,200 28,006 
1983 16,801 8,559 13,048 36,229 
B. Capital Productivity 
1. Value Added per Capital Unit 
Philippines 
1981 4.74 5.81 5.12 4.99 
Singapore 
1980 2.88 7.86 4.78 4.58. 
1982 11. 21 10.10 10.37 4.21 
1985 12.75 14.59 14.27 5.41 
SOURCES: Same as for Table 6.li. 
,r 
. . :..,_,....-'-'. 
Labour cost. figures f9r selecte.d countries are ·shown in Table 6.14. The data 
reveal that wages in the Philippines are the lowest in ASEAN. Wages in Indonesia 
and Thailand are also .low, while in Malaysia they are higher. Singapore far 
. outstrips the wage rates in the other. ASE <\N countries, with wages. av.eraging . 
. more tha~ six times the wages. in the Philippines. When . ASEAN wages are• 
compared with U.S. wages, the differential observed is even wider. The low wages 
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TABLE 6.14 
Hourly Wages in Manufacturing and Textile Industries 
of Selected Countries, 1984 
(In US$) 
Manufacturinga Textiles b 
China 0.415 0.26 
Hong Kong 1.441 1.65 
India 0.231 n.a. 
Indonesia 0.302 0.22 
Japan 6.28 
Malaysia 1.035 n.a. 
Philippines 0.247 n.a. 
Singapore 1.538 n.a. 
South Korea 1.463 1.89 
Taiwan 1.794 1.64 
Thailand 0.411 0.56 



















SOURCES: For manufacturing: Research Institute of Overseas Investment, 
EXIM Review 7, no. 1 (1986); for textiles: EIU, Textile Outlook International, 
January 1986 .. 
in ASEAN countries give the region an advantage in labour-intensive industries. 
What can work against this advantage is the higher labour productivity in 
developed countries. A study by the· Economist Intelligence Unit (United 
Kingdom) disclosed that the productivity of the lowest-paying textile producers 
is less than a seventh of U.S. productivity and a sixth of the productivity of the 
most efficient European producers. The advantage of developing countries is 
therefore considerably reduced, especially in the more capital-intensive stages o! 
textile manufacture, as in fibre production. Developed countries, however, do not 
seem to have an <;:ffective counter to low wages in garment production, where 
the required skills are easily acquired and the machinery is not too sophisticated. 
One possible reason for the low labour productivity of the industi;y is the fact 
that the average compensation of a worker in the industry is much lower than 
the average for the whole manufact.uring sector. The average employment (:Ost 
in overall manufacturing is 30 to 54 per cent higher than the average in the textile 
industry. In view of the low compensation, more highly skilled workers cannot 
be induced to stay in the industry. 
Cost of Production 
The cost of raw materials accounts for the biggest proportion of production cost 
in all stages of' textile production.· Raw material prices are therefore very 
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important. Price distortions can arise because of protection accorded to the 
industry. A distortion in input prices can be carried forward to the final output 
through raw materials linkages. 
ASEAN countries are still not self-sufficient in textile raw materiaLs. With the 
exception of Thailand, all the others are net importers of fibres and fabrics. The 
prices of imported inputs are commonly determined by commodity markets in 
the United States and by other main suppliers. Input prices can, however, increase 
as a result of tariffs and import duties imposed by ASEAN governments. 
A ·clear case of how protection can distort prices is fabric production in the 
Philippines. Its main input, fibre, is heavily protected by Philippine tariffs and 
·import restrictions. Consequently, the prices of domestic raw material inputs are 
much higher than the equivalent import prices (by 119.3 per cent in 1984), 
effectively penalizing fabric production and making its products uncompetitive. 
Aside from raw material costs, energy costs are also important in the overall 
.cost of production. In an inter-country study of selected manufacturing 
enterprises published by Japan's Institute of Developing Economies in 1982, the 
following electricity costs in early 1980 were estimated for three ASEAN nations: 
the Philippines, US$0.07 /kWh; · Indonesia, US$0.03/kWh; and . Thailand, 
US$0.50/kWh. In contrast, electricity ·charges in Japan and Korea during the 
same period were calculated to be US$0.07/kWh and US$0.06/kWh respectively. 
IV. Problems and Prospects of the Industry 
The ASEAN textile industry has graduated from being an import-substituting 
industry to being a major export earner. Although well established, the industry 
still faces many problems, both external and domestic. 
1. External Problems 
Growing Protectionism 
Trade in textiles is increasingly being subjected to comprehensive regulations by 
governments. The success of Asian countries in developing their textile industries, 
starting with Japan in the 1950s, has resulted. in rapid increases in exports to the 
United Kingdom and the United States. The developed countries were unable 
to respond by rapidly restructuring their textile industries. Instead, claiming 
market disruptions, they sought the application of GATT provisions to regulate 
textile trade. 
Subsequently, the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA)l was introduced whereby 
the developed countries regulated the imports of textiles from . developing 
countries. Since 1973, four MFAs have been in operation, using quotas and tariffs 
to ration developing countries' exports. At present, import tariffs on textile and 
clothing in industrialized countries are two to three times higher than tariffs on 
manufactured goods as whole. 
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Since the main export markets of ASEAN countries, especially for fabrics and 
garments, are MFA members such as the United States and European countries, 
trade is subjected to quotas and sometimes non-tariff barriers such as intensive 
checks and countervailing duties. Bilateral agreements are negotiated between 
individual ASEAN countries and developed countries. Although some negotia-
tions have resulted in higher quotas, when exports reach a certain level too fast, 
they are bound to be restricted. 
The extension of the MFA in July 1986 for a fourth term, was expectedly met 
with objections by several developing countries. Developing nations view the new 
accord as symbolizing the way industrial states dictate terms to protect their home 
industries. The latest agreement specifically adds silk, linen, ramie, and jute to 
the existing fibres in an attempt to finally control trade in all textile products. In 
effect, the new agreement will restriCt additional trade - including (using 1985 
figures) US$813 million bf Hong Kong's exports, US$368 million of the Republic 
of Korea's exports, and BS$203 million of China's exports. 
At this point, we briefly review the background of the MFA, and consider 
what its effects have been so far on the world textile industry. The MFA was 
agreed upon in 1973 and became operative in 1974. It was renewed in 1978, in 
1982, and in 1986. The 1986 agreement extended the MFA for another five years 
up to July 1991. All four agreements were made under the auspices of CATT. 
The contracting parties were some fifty countries. They included almost all 
developed countries, together with those developing countries which were 
substantial exporters of textiles and clothing. It was agreed that the developed 
countries could place quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing 
from the developing countries through a quota system whereby each developing 
country would be given a quota allocation for its exports of textiles and clothing 
to the developed countries during a given period. 
The quotas were arrived at through a series of bilateral negotiations between 
each developed country. Base level quotas were agreed upon in volume terms, 
together with provisions for annual growth rates and for some flexibility between 
quotas and years. In the first agreement, annual growth rates were not normally 
to be less than 6 per cent, but lower growth rates were embodied in the later 
agreements. 
The MFA does not cover all the restrictions that exist on international trade 
in textiles. Most developed countries have restrictions on imports from exporters 
who are not members of the MFA, such as Taiwan, and some countries of Eastern 
Europe. In addition, there are a number of preferential arrangements. 
The main effect of the MFA has been to limit imports of textiles and clothing 
into the developed countries from the developing and newly industrializing 
countries. Other consequences include the following:' 
· (1) Developing countries differ in the ways in which they allocate quotas, but 
in general, quotas go to. well-established firms. This makes it difficult for 
newcomers to obtain export quotas. Since quotas are in quantum terms, those 
firms with quotas may try to improve quality in an attempt to increase value 
added and profitability. 
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(2) The MFA confirms the dominance of the leading supplying countries, 
namely, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, who between them have about 
70 per cent of all exports covered by quota. At the same time, the MFA has 
encouraged the growth of the textile and clothing industries in countries which 
originally were not subject to quota restrictions because they were small suppliers; 
once their exports grow to become a threat they too become subject to quota 
limitations. 
(3) Where quotas place limits on exports to developed countries, their effect 
is to raise prices above the level that would be reached in a competitive market. 
Quota holders therefore earn a windfall gain or rent. This is seen most clearly 
in the case of Hong Kong, where quotas can be bought and sold, and often change 
hands for substantial amounts. 
(4) Consumers in developed countries do not suffer from lack of choice on 
account of the MFA. They can in general obtain goods from their own 
manufacturers, or from other developed countries. They will, however, probably 
pay higher prices than if imports were freely available from all countries. The 
quotas thus act as supplementary tariffs in raising domestic prices in developed 
countries. The benefits accrue partly to the developing countries in the form of 
quota rents and partly to manufacture~s in developed countries in the form of 
higher profits than would otherwise be obtained. Some marginal textile and 
clothing firms in developed countries have therefore been able to stay in existence. 
Over the long term, it is very likely that the MFA will continue to operate 
and remain in a form that is basically consistent with a desire by developed 
countries to continue to place limitations on their imports of textiles and clothing 
from developing and newly industrialized countries. 
The 1986 MFA agreement continues the historic tradition of including all 
conceivable fibres in the MFA and of plugging all the "leaks" which allowed 
imports of clothing and textiles to grow under the previous arrangements. With 
the inclusion of additional natural fibres, the industrial countries have at least 
temporarily eliminated the possibility of having trade diverted into non-MFA 
fibres. Despite its elaborate new extension, the 1986 MFA agreement still cannot 
preclude the possibility of increased exports from non-MFA-controlled industrial 
countries. It will be through extending increasingly restrictive bilateral agree-
ments that the industrial countries will continue to exert protectionist pressures 
on developing country exporters. 
Technological Developments 
Rising labour costs in developed countries have led to intensified research and 
development into cost-reducing/labour-saving technologies. In textiles, ways are 
being developed to increase the speed of machines, combine a number of 
processes, and increase automation to lessen the need for more workers. Under 
this type of technology, textile manufacturing becomes highly capital-intensive. 
Even in apparel manufacturing, technological developments are being pursued 
such as the use of lasers in laying and cutting, and computer applications in 
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grading, marking, and cutting. These developments can lead to new types of 
products but can also hasten the obsolesc'ence of equipment long before they are 
worn out. Since developing countries, like the ASEAN countries, are dependent 
on imported technoiogy, the effort to catch up means a higher capital requirement. 
Experience has shown, however, that although it can be capital-intensive in 
developing countries, an industry still provides competitiveness to labour~inten­
sive countries. 
Slow-Down in Growth of Developed Countries 
ASEAN countries have also suffered from overdependence on_ developed 
countries for their exports. The modest economic growth and worsening balance 
of trade positions of developed countries like the United States have added further 
to protectionist pressures. 
2. Domestic Problems 
Some of the commonly observed problems of the industry in the ASEAN countries 
are as follows: 
1. Dependence on imported raw materials. This subjects p"roduction to delays in 
procurement, added costs of freight and insurance, and bureaucratic red 
tape. 
2. Antiquated equipment. Much of the existing. textile equipment are old and 
obsolete. Modernization, however, requires massive capital investment, 
which some countries are not prepared for. 
3. Low labour productivity. This can significantly affect comparative advantage 
in the industry. 
4. Need to acquire marketing capability. This~ will require government assistance 
to the producers in the industry. Alternatively, renewed efforts could be 
pursued to encourage joint-ventures with foreign companies which have 
global marketing outlets. 
Aside from these problems which are common to most ASEAN countries, 
- there are also problems specific to certain countries: 
1. Smuggling. This has been identified by Philippine textile producers as a big 
problem which destroys the competitiveness of the domestic industry. 
2. Government policies/export regulations. Official fees and stringent regulatory 
requirements can raise export prices above those in other countries. 
3. High interest rates and energy costs. 
4. Industrialization policy/protection rates. This has often led to the production of 
goods which cost more than they would if imported directly and which are 
uncompetitive in export markets. 
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3. Prospects 
Although there are many problems which each country's industry has to grapple 
with, the overall prospects are promising. The share of developed countries in 
world production and trade of textiles and clothing is declining. The NICs have 
been experiencing a rising cost of production and are unlikely to expand their 
production capacities further. Instead, they are investing in advanced machinery 
and equipment to improve efficiency. Textiles are therefore likely to remain 
comparatively advantageous for developing countries like the ASEAN. 
Industrialized countries have a US$15.8 billion deficit in clothing, but they 
have a US$5.1 billion surplus in textiles. Only a few countries handle the trade 
with these countries. Two-thirds of the clothing deficit is due to trade with Hong 
Kong and South Korea. ASEAN's share has been growing but the direction is 
towards the United States or the European countries. Still largely unexplored are 
the non-quota markets of Japan, Australia, the Middle East, and Africa. Although 
these countries are considered difficult by exporters because of inconsistent price 
quotations and lack of firm guidelines for garment exports, they can be penetrated 
with a comprehensive marketing programme. But for this, the assistance of the 
government will probably be required. 
V. The Emergence of China and Implications 
for ASEAN-China Relations 
One· major development that can affect the prospects of the ASEAN textile 
industry is the recent emergence of China as a major producer and exporter of 
textiles. There is a growing concern that China's entry into the international trade 
of textiles poses a threat to ASEAN producers. But whether China's industry is 
indeed in competition or rather complementary to the textile industry in the 
ASEAN region has not yet been conclusively shown. 
1~ China's Production of Textiles 
Before the twentieth_ century, the textile industry played a very important role 
in China. However, in the country's pursuit of a self-sufficient, closed economy, 
the industry declined. In a dramatic turnabout during the past decade, China 
reopened its economy and pushed for a modernization programme. This new 
development has pushed the industry toward recovery. The production of textiles 
has increased tremendously. 
China's textile industry is the world's largest, whether in terms of the number 
of looms or in terms of raw materials. The combined production capacities of 
the ASEAN countries pale in comparison to that of China. In 1981, China had 
18 million spindles, 540,000 cotton-type looms, and 700,000 wool spindles. Its 
total fibre consumption was 4.5 million tons of fibre, 75 per cent of which was 
cotton. Production of cotton yarn and fabrics has reached record levels of 3.2 and 
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1.8 million tons, respectively. Considering also cotton and polyester-blended 
fabrics, production has reached 14.3 billion metres. 
Despite such high production levels, the industry still has to improve, since 
much of the machinery are antiquated and productivity levels are still low. Efforts 
are being undertaken to upgrade the industry's facilities using technology 
imported mainly from Japan. The production of man-made fibres has already 
greatly improved with the establishment of new petrochemical plants. Thus, while 
the share of cotton fibres remains very large at 75 per cent, the production of 
synthetic fibres is expected to increase. Although its garment industry remains 
essentially oriented towards the large domestic market, sales to overseas clients 
have risen steadily during the past decade. · 
2. China's Trade in Textiles 
In a span of five years from 1977 to 1981, Chinese trade in textiles increased 
sharply by approximately 157 per cent, from US$2.1 billion to US$5.4 billion. 
In 1981, China's textile exports were 2.3 times the combined textile exports of 
the ASEAN region. Garment exports make up only 40 per cent of total textile 
exports but these have had the highest growth rate, despite the lower level of 
development of the garment industry. Fabrics, mainly of cotton, continue to be 
the major export product. Export items are directed to lower-priced markets 
where quality and fashion standards are not very high. 
Hong Kong is the major export market, followed by Japan and the United 
States. Hong Kong is farming out larger quantities of textiles and apparel to 
China for processing and finishing, to take advantage of the relatively low wages 
of workers in China. Labour cost in China approximates that of Thailand. These 
farm-outs which are either re-exported to Hong Kong or directly exported to 
other countries, are now competing with South Korean textiles in the Japanese 
market. China has become the sixth largest exporter of cotton fabric to the United 
States. In 1981, total exports to that country reached US$620 million, 60 per cent 
of which were clothing. 
Rapid increases in Chinese textile exports have caused friction in both the 
United States and European markets. The United States has unilaterally imposed 
quotas on Chinese textile products, after the failure of the two countries to reach 
a bilateral agreement. With the EC, a bilateral agreement was reached, but this 
contained a very stringent safeguard mechanism. Despite the fact that China, 
not being a beneficiary of MFA, had to absorb tariffs from 50 to 600 per cent 
higher than those imposed on other exporters, China's exports still achieved 
explosive growth. China's increasing trade is therefore viewed with strong 
apprehension because it can further intensify protectionist pressures by developed 
countries on the exports of all developing countries, including the ASEAN. 
3. China and ASEAN Relations 
ASEAN-China economic relations have been largely ambivalent. Lately, how-
ever, the slackening of demand by Western countries for_ various commodities 
The ASEAN Textile and Garment Industry 165 
produced by ASEAN countries has led to a search by the latter for alternative 
trade opportunities. The vast market of the ~ewly "reopened" China is being 
eyed. In recent years, there has been a spate of trading missions between the 
governments of ASEAN members and China. Trade agreements have been 
reached in certain areas. However, the concern remains that China c~mpetes 
with ASEAN in textiles, especially in the United States. 
The issue that therefore needs to be _c:larified is whether the textile industries 
of the ASEAN region and China are competitive or complementary. If they are 
competitive, what measures can be undertaken to lessen friction? 
Several areas have to be considered. Among these are the types of products 
sold, the markets for the products, and price and non-price considerations. 
A large proportion of China's production and exports, whether of fabrics or 
garments, are made of cotton. Seventy-five per cent of the fibres consumed by 
its mills are cotton fibres. On the other hand, the ASEAN region has long shifted 
to man-made materials. With the exception of Thailand, ASEAN countries are 
net importers of cotton yarns and fabrics. However, China will soon be increasing 
its production of synthetic fibres, yarns, and fabrics, with technological assistance 
from Japan. This will provide competition to the ASEAN textile industry. For 
now, the ASEAN countries remain importers of textile products coming mainly 
from the Asian NlCs. Price and quality considerations will have to be assessed 
in deciding to import from China. 
Competition is m~re evident in the U.S. market. In 1982, the combined 
ASEAN share in the U.S. textile imports was 13 per cent. This dropped slightly 
to 12.3 per cent in 1983. China's share is much larger: 18.4 per cent in 1982, 
dropping to 17.6 per cent in 1983. Since the ASEAN countries still do not 
negotiate trade agreements as a region, their share in the U.S. market is treated 
separately for each individual country. In terms of size, therefore, China is more 
likely to compete with the Asian NICs. Furthermore, China's trade is not yet 
governed by trade agreements and it can thus be subjected to restrictions more 
easily. 
On the basis of price considerations, China's cost of production structure 
appears similar to that of the ASEAN. Both have relatively low wages. Both also 
have low labour productivity. The fact remains; however, that China's textiles 
have successfully penetrated the export markets despite having to absorb from 
50 to 600 per cent higher tariffs, implying that China's textiles are priced cheaper. 
ASEAN countries should therefore investigate the causes of price distortions in 
their products to improve their competitiveness. 
Quality, assurance of supply, and marketing channels are the important 
non-price considerations. Quality cannot be assessed in this study in the absence 
of reliable data. In terms of assurance of supply, the sheer largeness of the textile 
industry of China can be an advantage for it. In the case of marketing channels, 
ASEAN producers are concerned that China is using Hong Kong to reach the 
export markets. 
The outlook points to increasing competition between China and the ASEAN 
region in textiles. The fear of some ASEAN producers that the increasing role 
of China in textile production and trade poses a threat to their industries does 
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not seem unfounded. This is a challenge to the ASEAN countries to finally 
reassess the status of their economic co-operation. 
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The textile industry is one of the world's traditional industries. Ij was once 
regarded by many industrialized countries as a stepping stone towarfis industrial 
development and economic prosperity. Today, it also plays ~n impbrtant role in 
building up China's socialist economy. For over thirty years sit the founding 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the country's textile Y1C!ustry has made 
a great contribution to the people's welfare, social employyient, promotion of 
foreign trade, as well as capital accumulation. Being the )argest manufacturing 
industry in the economy, its total output value laccounte'd for 20 to 25 per cent 
of the national industrial output during the 1950s. X>ue to the overwhelming 
development of heavy industry, its weight in th<:}1iational economy has been 
gradually reduced. Nevertheless, the industry stlll accounted for i8 per cent of 
the total national industrial output value in 1985 and ranked second only to the 
machine-building industry among the ten ker:'industries of the country. Of the 
18 per cent, 15.5 per cent was accounted for bY(textiles proper, and the remaining 
2.5 per cent by garments. Statistics of the Mi~istry of Textile Industry show that 
in 1986 the textile and garment industry employed 6.66 million workers (not 
including self-employed workers in the urban and rural areas) with 4.60 million 
working in the textile industry and 2 million working in the garment industry, 
together accounting for about 17.0 per cent of the nation's total employment, 
second only to the machine-building industry. 
Since 1987, under the policies of"economic reform" and "opening to the outside 
world", China's textile and garment industry has entered into a period of speedier 
development. Presently, China owns the largest number of cotton spindles and 
looms in the world and leads in the production of cotton yarns and fabrics. Its 
output of man-made fibres has surpassed 1 million tons to rank fourth in the 
world, after the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union. 
China's textile and garment industry serves not only as a cornerstone in 
domestic industrialization, but also plays an influential role in foreign trade. 
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China's textile exports (namely fibre, yarn, fabric, and garments) exceeded 
US$7.5 billion in 1985 and has since become China's leading export commodity. 
Many textile products have important positions in the international market with 
cotton yarns and fabrics making up 20 per cent of the world's exports. The 
development of China's textile industry has increasingly captured world-wide 
attention. 
This paper analyses three aspects of China's textile and garment industry: (a) 
the current production and future development of the industry; (b) the current 
status and outlook for trade in textiles and garments; ( c) the current status and 
outlook of the textile and garment trade between China and ASEAN. 
II. Current Production and Future Development of 
China's Textile and Garment Industry 
1. Growth in Production 
According to statistics of the Ministry of Textile Industry, total output value of 
China's textile and garment industry rose by 126.8 per cent from RMB59.12 
billion in 1978 to RMB120.00 billion in 1986 with an average increase of 9.5 per 
cent per annum. By volume, production in man-made fibre, wool, bast fibre, and 
silk spinning and weaving all enjoyed multi-fold increases, while the growth of 
the cotton spinning and weaving industry was comparatively moderate. 
In 1987, cotton yarn output increased to 4.36 million tons, and cotton fabric 
to 16.5 billion metres, a growth of 86. 7 and 49.6 per cent over 1978 respectively. 
Meanwhile, responding to the two price adjustments by the government in 1981 
and 1983 for cotton/polyester blend and pure cotton fabrics, the output of cotton 
yarn and fabric dropped back drastically in the consecutive years of 1983 and 
1984 following an unprecedented growth in 1982. It was not until 1985 that 
production improved and the output of hand knitting wool yarn, woollen fabric, 
bast fabric, and silk fabric increased by between 94 to 333 per cent over the 1978 
levels (Table 7.1). The reason behind the two price adjustments is that the 
purchasing price for cotton had long been kept too low. Therefore, China had to 
import yearly a large quantity of cotton that reached 900,000 tons in 1980 and 
cost the country a large amount of foreign exchange. The low price o(cottcin 
fabrics resulting from the low price of cotton led to a situation of excess demand, 
while the reverse was true for polyester/cotton fabrics. The purpose of the price 
adjustments was to correct the imbalance. 
The production of man-made fibres in 1976 was only 146 thousand tons. 
Beginning from the 1980s, with a number oflarge- and medium-scale petrochemi-
cal complexes such as the Shanghai Petro-Chemical Complex and Yizheng 
Petro-Chemical Complex coming on stream, man-made fibre output in 1986 
surpassed 1 million tons, which was about six times above that of 1976. 
Although China's garment industry had a late take-off and the production 




TABLE 7.1 ~ ;:; 
"' China's Textile Output by Type of Products, 1976-85 ;:!_ 
~ 




Total Value of Output ~ 
(RMB billion) 52.9 73.6 95.6 108.3 ~ 
" Man-made fibre 146.1 284.6 450.3 540.7 734.9 947.5 548.5 ;::! 232.9 .,_ 
('000 toris ); ~ .., 
Cotton yarn ('000 tons) 1,960.0 2,382.0 2,926.0 3,271.0 3,219.0 3,591.0 83.2 50.8 
;:; 
"' ;:!_ 
Cotton fabric 8.8 11. 0 13.5 14.9 13.7 14.3 61.8 29.6 ~ 
(billion metres) ~ 
Knitting goods ('000 tons) 427.1 545.5 688.6 676.8 q 
Hand knitting woollen yarn 27.8 37.8 57.3 102.1 110.0 125.9 353.9 333.1 
('000 tons) 
Woollen and worsted fabric 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.14 0.18 0.22 208.5 145.5 
(billion metres) 
Raw silk ('000 tons) 22.8 29.7 35.4 36.9 37.6 39.0 71.0 31.3 
Silk fabric (billion metres) 0.46 0.61 0.76 1.00 1.18 1.40 204.3 93.8 . . 
Piece goods of bast fibre 23.08 25.51 40.62 47.39 62.60 171.2 145.5 
(ip.illion metres) . 
1984 .. 
SOURCES: China Textile Industry Yearbook, 1984 and 1985. 
.... 
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TABLE 7.2 
China's Textile Production Capacity, 1978-85 
(In '000 tons) 
Finished 
Cotton Cotton Wool Woollen Man-Made Goods 
Spindles ·Looms Spindles Looms Fibres in Cotton 
Sector* 
1978 - 15,619.20 469.50 478.10 7 .12 381.00 686.60 
· 1980 17 '796.80 539.lO 600.50 8.33 521.00 773.50 
1981 18,935.40 570.60 744.40 10.02 633.90 818.00 
.1982 20,189.90 595.00 888.80 12.45 682.40 881. 70 
1983 . 21,405.60 624.70 1,005.30 14.65 769.90 912.00 
1984 22,196.50 633.50 1,205.20 17 .12 820.40 939.30 
1985 1,395.00 1,038.80 
Growth Rate 
84/78 (%) 42.l. 34.9 152.1 140.5 115.3 36.8 . 
In billion metres. 
SOURCES: China Textile Industry Yearbook, 1981, 1984, and 1985. 
garment industry turned out 720 million units of garments rising to 1,270 million 
units in 1985, with an average annual increase of 12 per cent. 
Technical innovation in textile equipment and facilities has beeh less impres~ 
sive. The output increase relies mainly. on extension of existing production 
capacity. Between 1978 to 1984 the riewly installed facilities in the cotton textile 
industry added 6,577,300 cotton spindles . and 164,000 cotton looms. The 
production capacity .. of both wool textile and man-made fibre indusfries also 
registered multicfold increases (Table 7 .2). In an e.ffort to improve product value 
added, China's textile industry has undertaken readjustment,' but the progress is 
slow. 
2. Rationalization of Industrial Structure 
The structure of the textile and garment industry may be examilied from four 
aspects;· that is the structures of sectors, products, raw fibres, as well as 
. technologies. The present structure of China's textile and garment industry is 
described below. 
Rapid Develnpmen.t of Highly-Processed Sectors 
In terms of product classification and depth of proq:ssing, China's textile and 
garment industry can be divided into several sectors, namely (1) man-made fibre; 
(2) cotton spinning and weaving; (3) wool spinning and weaving; (4) silk and 
bast fibre spinning and weaving; (5) cotton printing and dyeing; (6) knitting; and 
(7) garments. Among these sectors, man-made fibre falls into the textile material 
category; cotton spinning and weaving, and silk and bast fibre spinning and 
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weaving fall into the primary-processed product category; and wool spinning and 
weaving, ·including printing and dyeing processing, falls into the vertically-
integrated product category. 
Cotton textiles including downstream operation of printing and dyeing is the 
mainstay of China's textile and garment industry. As early as the 1950s, this 
sector made up about. 90 per cent.of the industry's total output value. This share 
has been shrinking with rapid expansion of other sectors, to 60 per cent in 1980, 
and further to 55.2 per cent in 1984. 
However, sustained increases in the production of highly processed .sectors 
was noted. The share of garments in the output value of the .textile and garment 
industry rose from -less than 4 per cent in 1978 to nearly 12 per ·cent in 1984. 
The share of wool textiles (including printing iilld dyeing) rose from 5. 7 to 6.5 
per cent, and that of man-made fibres, which is a capital/technology-intensive 
sector, rose from 6 to above 9 per cent. However, in spite of such progress achieved 
in these sectors, their contribution to the industry is still less than expected due 
to their inability to meet the growing market demand (Table 7 .3) ... 
TABLE 7.3 
China's Textile and Garment Industry: Output, 1978-84 
1978 1980 1981 1983 1984 . 
Output Value (RMB billion) 
Total 45.60 73.67 86.55 88.97 98.79 
Man-made fibres 2.83 4.98 6.19 6.02 9.06 
Finished goods in 
cotton sectors .. 31.~8 43.89 50.08 51.16 54.57 
· Knitting goods .. 4:09 6.39 8.16 7.72 8.22 
Woollen and 
worsted goods 2.68 3.47 4.35 5.65 6.42 
Bast fibre goods 0.75 1.00 1.07 1.61 1.68 
Silk goods 3.57 4.58 5.40 6.31 7.41 
Clothing 9.36 11.30 10.50 11.43 
Percentage Distribution 
Total 100.0 100.0 100:0 100.0 100.0 
Man-inade fibres 6.0 .. 6.7 7 .1 6.8 9.2 
Finished goods in 
cotton sectors 66.9 59.6 57.9 57.5 55.2 
Knitting goods 8'.6 . 8.7 9'.4 8.7 8.3 
Woollen and 
worsted goods .. 5.7 4.7 5.2 6.4 6.5 
Bast fibre goods 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.7 
Silk goods 7.5 6.2 6.2 n 7.5 
Clothing 3:5 .. 12.7 13.1 11. 7 11.6 . 
The tot<1l output value does not include the value of non-state enterprises. 
SOURCES: China Textile Industry Yearbook, 1981, 1984, and 1985; China Economic Yearbook, 
1981, 1984, and 1985. 
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Changes in Product Composition 
Final consumption of tex'tiles 1s mainly in three areas, namely garments, 
furnishings, and industrial use. 
As China's social economy progresses, profound changes are taking place in 
the people's living standards and consumption patterns. These changes are 
reflected in the shifts in textile consumption patterns from mono-consumption of 
clothing to more diversified consumption, which in turn diversifies China's textile 
production structure. Prior to the mid-1970s, over 90 per cent of the textiles were 
consumed by the garments sector and the rest were used for industrial purposes, 
as the consumption by the furnishings sector was viFtually non-existent. In 1984, 
this consumption pattern showed a ratio of 80:13:7. Although it still indicates a 
wide gap with the United States where the ratio is 40:30:30 and with Europe 
with a ratio of 50:20:30, it represents a general trend towards the changing 
structure of China's textile and garment industry. 
More Diversified Textile Materials 
The changes in composition of textile products reflect improvements m raw 
materials and technologies. For many years, cotton accounted for over 90 per 
cent of textile fibres in China's textile and garment industry, leading to the 
continuing lack of variety in China's textiles. Over-population coupled with 
limited arable land has deepened the problem of balancing land allocation. 
between grain and cotton planting. To alleviate the situation, the policy of 
"developing man-made fibres parallel to natural fibres" has been implemented to 
focus on the expansion of man-made fibres, and the purchasing prices of natural 
fibres other than cotton were raised significantly to stimulate production. As a 
result, textile raw materials are becoming more diversified. The 1984 mill 
consumption of fibres consisted of 3,4 70 thousand tons of cotton (62_.49 per cent), 
1,090 thousand tons of man-made fibres (19.6 per cent, with nearly three quarters 
being synthetic fibres), 755 thousand tons of bast (13.3 per cent), 133 thousand 
tons of silk (2.4 per cent), and 113 thousand tons of wool, angora, and animal 
hairs (2.0 per cent). The ratio of natural to man-made fibres shifted from 95:5 
in 1976 to 80:20 in 1984. 
China is basically self-sufficient in fibre resources. To meet the varied demands 
of the domestic and foreign markets, China has been importing some textile 
fibres, particularly of wool and man-made fibres in recent years. The import 
volume of synthetic fibres alone exceeded 700 thousand tons in 1985 or a quarter 
of the world synthetic fibre export; China is the world's leading importer. 
Multi-Level Technologies 
The technological improvement made in China's textile and garment industry 
combined with the advanced technologies and equipment imported in recent 
years has modernized the industry. But on the whole, traditional technologies 
and methods of production still prevail in most of the industry. Technologies and 
equipment such as open-end spinning, shuttleless weaving, and special finishing 
adopted world-wide during the 1970s make up only a small part of the production. 
The application of computer-controlled equipment is still under development. So 
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traditional technologies, combined with advanced and handicraft technologies 
co-exist in China's textile and garment industry. However due to the prevalence 
of traditional technologies, the ~quipment and facilities are generally considered 
backward, with low levels of automation and productivity. According to the 
Ministry of Textile Industry in 1985, China had 23,230 thousand cotton spindles; 
1,140 thousand or about 0.5 per cent were open-end rotors. The output of yarn 
averaged 23 kilograms per thousand cotton spindles per hour, and the average 
productivity per worker was about 1.5 pounds per hour at 22s cotton count, and 
0.36 pounds per hour at 36s cotton count with an average of 22s cotton count. 
China had 620 thousand cotton looms including 140 thousand broadlooms and 
5,000 shuttleless looms. The average capacity of cotton loom was roughly 4 metres 
per hour. The production of a hundred-metre fabric required 14-kilogram yarn 
at an average width of 1.02 metres. 
The productivity of China's man-made fibre industry is lagging far behind the 
international norm. The average annual output per person, between 1980-84, 
was 7.3 tons, as against 50 tons per person in the United States and Japan. 
The technical level of China's garment industry is even lower than that of the 
textile industry. Of the existing equipment in the garment industry, 58.4 per cent 
are medium- or low-speed electrical plain seam sewing machines and electrical 
scissors of the 1950s and 1960s; 25.3 per cent are sewing equipment of the 1970s; 
only 0. 7 per cent are computer-controlled equipment of the 1980s; and the rest 
are of the 1930s and 1940s vintage. 
3. Problems and Prospects 
From the above analyses, it is obvious ihat China's textile and garment industry 
has generally developed fast, yet some structural drawbacks do exist. In terms of 
traditional product processing, it is already a self-contained industry with a 
complete range of products and large-scale production. But its inner structure is 
comparatively irrational. Presently, the industry has an excessive concentration 
in primary and semi-processed product sectors with cotton spinning and weaving 
in a dominant position. Its product structure generally follows the pattern of large 
lots, regular items, and long cycles, which can neither adapt to the trend of 
multi-level consumptions on the domestic market nor meet the requirement of 
the international market for finished, quality, and diversified products with small 
lots and short cycles (including shipment). 
In the long run, China's textile and garment industry still has a bright future 
for the following reasons: 
(1) A number of new industries will emerge along with the development of the 
national economy. However, it is highly unlikely that these emergent industries 
will play a leading role at least until the year 2000. Therefore traditional industries 
like textiles and garments will continue to serve as a major force in China's 
modernization drive. 
(2) Textiles and garments are basic necess1t1es. Population growth and sus-
tained development of the national economy will raise the textile consumption 
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level of the Chinese people. China's fibre consumption per capita is 3.5 kilograms, 
only half the world average, and far behind the 20 to 25-kilogram level of some 
industrialized countries. This implies a great potential for China's textile and 
garment industry. 
(3) China's government will continue to back up the textile and garment industry. 
To revitalize the industry, the strategy designed to expand end-use textiles and 
achieve economic results was put forward by the government in 1985. According 
to the plan, priorities will be given to the man-made fibre and highly-processed 
product sectors such as garments. Presently China's textile and garment industry 
is at a historical turning point. It is gradually shifting emphasis from extension 
of production capacity to technological innovation. It is expected that China's 
textile and garment industry will take on a new look in the forthcoming decade. 
a. Production expansion of the cotton textiles will not be remarkable as the 
expansion efforts are being concentrated on the manufacture of highly-
processed products. 
b. The proportion of man-made fibre in total textile raw materials will rise 
from the current 20 per cent to 35-40 per cent, and the fibre consumption 
per capita will also rise from 3.5 to 7 kilograms. 
c. The consumption ratio between garments, furnishings, and industrial-use 
textiles is anticipated to rise to 60:20:20 from the present level. In this 
process, the growth rate of the garment industry will certainly be higher 
than that of the textile industry and the proportion of garments will exceed 
70 per cent. 
d. The total output value of the textile and garment industry grows at an 
. average annual rate of over 10 per cent and trade will expand in the same 
way, with the export growth of garments and other highly-processed textiles 
exceeding that of primary-processed ones. .. 
III. Current Status and Outlook of China's Trade 
in Textiles and Garments 
1. Current Status 
There has been a rapid growth in China's textile and garment exports following 
the strong, performance of the industry during the 1970s, particularly with the 
implementation in 1978 of the policy of opening to the outside world. According 
to China's customs statistics, in 1986, textile and garment exports (including 
goods pr:ocessed with supplied materials), totalled US$8.29 billion, equal to 30.3 
per cent of China's total export revenue, a gro~th of 83.8 per cent from 1980, 
and 4.1 times the value in 1975. With an average annual increase of about 10.7 
per cent from 1980 to 1986, its growth has surpassed that· of the world's trade in· 
textiles and garments as well as that of China's total exports (Table 7.4). 
As one of the primary textile exporting countries in the world, China accounted 
for 6.4 and 5.5 per cent of the world's total value of textile and garment exports 






































SOURCES: China's General Administration of Customs, China's Customs 
Statistics Y.earbook, 1980-86. 
TABLE 7.5 












SOURCES: China's General Administration of Customs, China's 
·Customs Statistics Yearbook, 1975 and 1985; GATT, International 
Trade, 1975 and 1985. 
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respectively in 1985. In volume, it is the leading world exporter of cotton yarn, 
greycloth, and silk (Table 7 .5 ). , . 
In recent years, the sustained growth of exports increased the trade intensity 
of textiles. In 1984, th~ country exported around 18 per c~nt out of its overall 
production of fabrics and greycloth, of which pure cotton cloth accounted for 22 
per cent, polyester-blend cloth 17 per cent, cotton-knit goods 16 per cent, silk 
fabric 3.5 per cent, woollen fabrics 6 per cent, and fabric of bast fibre 20 per cent. 
The textile exports in 1985 were as follows: 15 per cent of fibres; 21.9 per cent 
of primary processed products (yarn, thread, greycloth, and silk greycloth, etc.); 
22.9 per cent of semi-processed and processed products (converted cloth, silk, and 
woollen fabrics); 27.2 per cent of clothing and other wearing products including 
goods processed with supplied inateriaJs; and 12.8 per cent of other made-up 
textiles. Although significant improvements have been made over the past decade 
in China's textile export composition in which the share of primary and 
semi-processed textiles was reduced and the garment share was increased sharply, 
it still remains highly unbalanced with garments accounting for only a 27.2 per 
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TABLE 7.6 
Product Structure of China's Textile Exports, 
1975 and 1985 
(In percentage) 
Fibre 
Yarns and grey piece goods 
Finished piece goods 
and semi-manufactured goods 
Clothing and relative 
wearing goods 
Made-up textile goods 

















SOURCES: China's General Administration of Customs, China's 
Customs Statistics Yearbook, 1975 and 1985. 
TABLE 7.7 
Destination of China's Textile Exports, 1980-84 
(In percentage) 
Share of Developed Share of Hong Kong 
Countries and Macao 
1980 54.8 26.9 
1981 45.8 32.6 
1982 50.1 31.1 
1983 46.1 34.7 
1984 53.3 34.2 
SOURCES: China's General Administration of Customs, China's 
Customs Statistics Yearbook, 1980-84. 
cent share in sharp contrast to Hong Kong's 65 per cent, Taiwan's 63 per cent, 
and South Korea's 60 per cent (Table 7 .6). Similarly, the type of the textiles 
exported shows a disproportionately large 70-per cent share for natural fibres 
and a small 30-per cent share for man-made fibres and blended materials. 
China has a broad export market for its textiles. Its exports in 1985 went to 
140 countries and regions, mainly industrialized countries (50 per cent); Hong 
Kong and Macao (30 per cent); other developing countries (10 per cent); and 
the Soviet Union and East European countries (7 per cent) (Table 7.7). 
China's imports of textiles also grew steadily averaging an annual increase of 
20.1 per cent from 1975 to 1985; although the rate of increase was higher than 
that for exports, in value terms it was only over one-third of exports. Imports 
consisted mainly of fibres, fabrics, and a small amount of garments. For example, 
in 1985's imports totalling US$2,740 million, fibres were US$1,118 million; 
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SOURCES: China's General Administration of Customs, China's 
Customs Statistics Yearbook, 1980-85. 
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fabrics US$1,607 million, and garments only US$14.92 million. As a result of 
the increasing need for garment materials, mainly from Japan and Hong Kong, 
to be processed for re-export, imports grew by 1.4 times between 1980 and 1985. 
However, imports of fibres fell sharply by 46 per cent between 1980 and 1985 
due to th~ sharp decline in cotton imports, while man-made fibres and wool grew 
considerably (Table 7 .8). 
2. Impact of Industrial Restructuring in Developed Countries on China 
With industrial restructuring in developed countries, traditional industries 
declined. Production capacity in the textile industries in the United States, Japan, 
United Kingdom, France, and West Germany fell by 20 million cotton spindles 
between the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, there was an upsurge in developing 
countries with production and exports expanding vigorously in some East Asian 
economies, particularly in South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 
The sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen since late 1985 has hastened 
Japan's industrial restructuring process, with shifts away from labour-intensive 
industries towards technology-intensive ones. Affected by the currency apprecia-
tion, Japan's textile industry is continuing to cut its production and move its 
operation overseas. 
At the same time, South Korea and Taiwan, the prominent textile exporters, 
are also faced with currency appreciation and. large increases in_ production costs 
(mainly labour). As a result their textiles have declined in competitiveness in the 
export market. On the other hand, ASEAN countries and China have gained 
export competitiveness because of low labour cost. 
Demand for China's textiles and garments from developed countries, par-
ticularly the United States and Japan, has increased substantially in the past two 
years in the form of direct import, in-country processing, and co-production. 
Apparently the industrial restructuring of developed countries combined with 
changes in international comparative advantage have a positive effect on China's 
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textile and garment industry. Yet it should be noted that although the textile 
industry in Western countries will continue to decline, the high rate of unemploy-
ment means that governments will continue with the policy of protectionism, 
restricting imports to maintain domestic production of textiles and to protect 
employment. Therefore, import quotas and other restrictive measures will likely 
continue to prevail for some time to come. Protectionis~ has a negative impact 
on China's textile exports, particularly low- and medium-grade textiles . 
.3. Prospects and Challenges 
The likely trends in world textile trade are as follows: 
(1) World economic growth and trade expansion have levelled off since the early 
1980s. However, personal consi,unption and expenditure in Western countries 
continue to rise. The share of family expenditure on clothing and furnishing 
textiles is normally 6 to 9 per cent, and this is likely to stay unchanged. Therefore, 
demand for clothing and furnishing textiles will continue to increase. On the 
other hand, the demand for clothing in developing countries has grown markedly, 
due to both the increase of population and per capita income. During the first 
half of the 1980s, world textiie exports stagnated whereas garment exports enjoyed 
an increase of 4.2 per cent per annum. With the international market increasingly 
turning towards "ready-to-wear" garments, world export of textiles and garments 
will continue to grow at a moderate pace until the end of the century (Tables 7 .9 
and 7.10). 
(2) As stated earlier, industrial restructuring m developed countries and 
changes in factor endowments of countries have led to a new pattern of 
specialization. The textile industry will increasingly shift to low-wage developing 
countries, providing an opportunity for these countries to promote their textile 
and garment exports, a trend "likely to accelerate by the turn of the century. 
(3) The ~orld textile trade will not experience any major change. Exports by 
developing countries to developed countries and among themselves will increase 
TABLE 7.9 
World Textile Exports, 1980-85 
Textiles Annual Clothing Annual 
(US$ billion) % Change (US$ billion) % Change 
1980 55.35 40.20 
1981 55.30 0.00 41.40 2.99 
1982 50.70 -8.32 40.60 -1.94 
1983 50.70 0.00 41.00 0.99 
1984 53.50 5.52 46.00 12.00 
1985 55.40 3.55 49.20 6.96 
1980-85 0.00 4.20 
SOURCES: GATT, International Trade, 1982/83, 1984/85, and 1985/86. 
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TABLE 7.10 
Share of Textiles in Total World Exports, 1981-85 
(In percentage) 
Textiles Clothing 
1981 2.8 2.1 
1982 2.7 2.2 
1983 2.8 2.3 
1984 2.8 2.4 
1985 2.9 2.6 
SOURCES: GATT, International Traqe, 1982/83, 1984/85, and 
1985/86. 
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and the developed countries will remain dominant markets, absorbing about 70 
to 80 per cent of the world's total exports .. East Asian countries and ASEAN will 
be the leading textile suppHers in the world, For example, the recent substantial 
increase in the imports of the United States and Japan were from East Asian 
countries. In the case of the EC, the sluggish market demand and the intra-EC 
trade will limit the growth of imports from outside the EC. 
( 4) The product composition of international trade in textiles is increasingly of 
made-up, diversified, and high-quality products with the proportion of primary 
and semi-processed textiles (yarn, greycloth, etc.) falling and that of finished 
textiles and garments rising. 
(5) The pattern of world textile consumption is changing, with the growth rate 
of demand for clothing levelling off while the consumption of industrial-use, 
furnishing, and bedding textiles rising as a result of the growing demand from 
the automotive, housing, and tourist industries. For instance, among total fibre 
consumption in Japan, 35 per cent went into garment manufacture, 34 per cent 
to industrial-use textiles, J7 per cent to furnishing textiles, and the remaining 14 
per cent to bedding. In the United States, clothing consumption accounted for 
38 per cent, industrial-use for 30 per cent, furnishing for 18 per cent, and bedding 
for 14 per cent. Such a change in consumption patterns will have a sharp impact 
on the structure of the world textile trade. 
(6) Protectionism will gain momentum. The quota restrictions for textiles will 
become more severe and spread to more textile items. This will severely hamper 
the textile exports of developing countries to the Western markets, putting the 
exports from these countries into difficulties and further intensifying market 
competition. 
The global textile trading environment will provide an excellent opportunity 
as well as a challenge for China's textile exports. China has vast labour resources, 
giving it a strong comparative cost advantage for labour-intensive industries like 
textiles and garments. It is also rich in raw materials such as cotton, for which 
it has a surplus for export, and other natural fibres (silk, ramie, cashmere, angora, 
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etc.). In addition, its textile industry is already well developed, with considerable 
production capacity and technical strength. Therefore, it is to China's advantage 
to avail itself of the current opportunity for further expansion of textile exports. 
The problems that restrict exports are largely attributable to the export concentra-
tion in low- and medium-grade· products, which are subject to import quotas by 
the developed countries as opposed to high-value-added products. At present, 60 
to 85 per cent of China's textile export items are covered by such quotas, and 
growing protectionism will intensify China's problem of penetrating the Western 
market. The drawbacks currently suffered by China's textile indu.stry arise from 
outdated technologies and facilities such as incomplete processing procedures and 
technological backwardness in printing, dyeing, and after-treatment. Inconsistent 
quality in textiles, especially in garment materials, result in a high rejection rate 
for garment processing. All these challenges can undermine the competitiveness 
of China's textiles in the international market. 
IV. Current Status and Outlook for China-ASEAN Trade 
in Textiles and Garments 
1. Current Status 
The textile trade between China and ASEAN can be traced back to ancient times 
when the trade was once likened to "The Silk Road on the Sea'. Although some · 
progress in Sino-ASEAN textile trade has been achieved, yet, affected by post-war 
regional political and econo.mic turbulence, the trade remained small-scale. Also 
the trade development with different countries was very unbalanced (Table 7.11). 
TABLE 7.11 
China's Textilea Exports to ASEAN, 1975 and 1985 
1975 1985 
(US$ thousand) (US$ thousand) 
Brunei 114.8 32.0 
Indonesia ( 40,339.0)b 15,670.0 
Malaysia 6,170.0 19,825.0 
Philippines 3.6 4,080.0 
Singapore 58,550.0 100,468.0 
Thailand 46.1 23,116.0 
Total 64,880 163,193.0 











SOURCES: China's General Administration of Customs, China's Customs 
Statistics Yearbook, 1965, 197 5-85. 
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The development of the textile trade between China and ASEAN countries 
in recent years is summarized below. · 
Strong Growth 
China-ASEAN trade in textiles grew fast, particularly since 1979, under the 
impetus of China's economic refor~s and the efforts of the government in trade 
promotions. As shown in Table 7 .11, the 1975-85 decade witnessed an outstand-
ing increase of over 1.5 times in China's textile export to ASEAN countries (except 
for Indonesia and Brunei). Exports to the Philippines surged by over 10 times, 
followed by Thailand (4 times), and Malaysia (2.2 times). Singapore had the 
lowest growth of 72 per cent._ Due to various reasons, the direct trade relations 
between China and Indonesia were suspended for two decades starting from 1965. 
lnjuly 1985 a memorandum of understanding on direct trade was signed between 
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce of Indonesia, and bilateral trade soon resumed . 
. Although China's textile exports to Iridonesia in 1985 were only 40 per cent of 
the 1965 level, they amounted to US$16 million. 
Limited Volume 
While the recent growth in Sino-ASEAN textile trade has been satisfactory, the 
trade volume remained limited with China's exports totalling US$163 million, 
or only about 4. 7 per cent of the ASEAN countries' imports in 1985. Singapore 
alone took a lion's share (60 per cent or US$100 million) of China's exports to 
ASEAN. In 1985, China's total textile exports amounted to US$7,532 million, 
and only a trickle of 2.2 per cent found their way into the ASEAN markets. 
Limited Range of Products 
Fibres and various kinds of fabrics have dominated China's textile exports to 
ASEAN, although there are variations among ASEAN countries. China's textile 
exports to Thailand and Indonesia are mainly of fibres, contributing 89.6 and 
91. 7 per cent of its total textile exports to both countries respectively in 1985. 
China's exports to the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore are primarily of 
fabrics, accounting for 71.8, 82.1, and 75.4 per cent of its total textile exports to 
these countries respectively (Table 7.12). 
The small volume of end-use textiles (including garments) that China exports 
to ASEAN countries conforms with. the composition of textile imports of these 
,countries. ASEAN countries have well-developed garment industries and have 
reduced their garment imports to. less than 10 per cent of total textile imports 
with the exception of Singapore (Table 7.13). Although Singapore's garment 
imports formed a quarter of its textile imports, imports from China were a mere 
US$2,270,000, or 2 per cent of the country's overall garments imports in 1985. 
In spite of the long trading relationship, Sino-ASEAN textile trade has yet to 
reach a desirable level. The main reasons are given below: 
1. The lack of contact between China and ASEAN for years, comprehensive 
and deep understanding of each other's markets, and enthusiasm for close 
co-operation has hampered the textile trade's steady growth. 
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TABLE 7.12 
Product Structure of China's Textile Exports to ASEAN, 1985 
Total Exports Fibres Piece Goods 
Indonesia 
US$ thousand 15,670.00 14,370.00 68.80 
% 100.0 91.7 0.5 
Malaysia 
US$ thousa~d 19,825.00 1,190.60 16,270.20 
% 100.0 6.0 82.l 
Philippines 
US$ thousand 4,080.00 1,150.00 2,930.00 
% 100.0 28.2 71.8 
Singapore 
US$ thousand 100,468.00 19,100.60 75,782.80 
% 100.0 19.0 75.4 
Thailand 
US$ thousand 23,118.00 20, 718.00 1,740.00 
% 100.0 89.6 7.5 
SOURCE: China's General Administration of Customs, China's Cust~ms 
Statistics Yearbook, 1985. 
TABLE 7.13 
Share of Garments in Total Textile Imports of ASEAN, 
1983 
Total Import of Share of 
Textiles and Garments Garments 
(US$ million) (%) 
Indonesia 160.00 6.0 
Malaysia (1982) 408.00 8.9 
Philippines 200.00 5.0 
Singapore (1984) 1,260.00 25.0 
Thailand 270.00 3.7 
SOURCE: U.N., Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1984. 
2. Both China and ASEAN have similar export strategies, being overly 
dependent on the Western markets. Consequently bilateral trade and 
economic relations wer_e overlooked. 
3. The textile industries of both China and ASEAN are at the same stage of 
development and their product and technical structures have much in 
common. Again, lack of complementarity has a negative effect on bilateral 
trade. 
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2. Competition and Complementarity between China and ASEAN 
Textile and Garment Industries 
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The world textile market is huge, with total exports of about US$125 billion in 
1985. China's share of this market was only US$7 .5 billion (6 per cent) and that 
of ASEAN, US$39 million (3.1 per cent). In a positive sense, this presents an 
opportunity for both sides to further expand their exports. However, due to the 
sensitivity of textile commodities, the intense competition can always be felt in 
the international market. The mounting import restrictions applied by most of 
the industrialized countries have been extended such that quotas have become 
highly product specific. The result is increased market competition on certain 
products. Although the overall market on textiles is large, for specific products 
the market can be very limited. Under such circumstances, competition between 
China and ASEAN becomes unavoidable. 
Based on the current state of China's industrial structure and technology, 
products from heavy, chemical, machine-building, and electronics industries are 
unlikely to be competitive in the short run. However, textiles and light industries 
can still expand exports to generate needed foreign exchange. Faced with a 
continuing sluggish market for agricultural products, ASEAN countries are 
readjusting their exports to emphasize textile exports. The textile and garment 
industries of ASEAN countries (except Singapore) will become a mainstay of 
their export trade. In 1986 textile and garment exports by Thailand already 
surpassed that of rice, to become the leading export item. As planned by the Thai 
Government, the 1990's exports of textiles a~d garments will double that of 1987. 
A majority of China's textile exports are low- and medium-grade products. 
Due to the similarity in product composition of China and ASEAN a head-on 
competition may be unavoidable. However, China's textile exports are largely 
composed of fibres and primary processed and semi-processed products while 
ASEAN's exports are dominated by garments, so that thus far there· has not been 
any obvious trade friction. According to Chinese Government plans, garments 
and other highly-processed -products will be given priority in textile export 
promotion. However, because of constraints in the domestic· economy, China's 
penetration of thi:; world high fashion market will not be possible, at least in the 
upcoming years. It is generally considered that China's garment exports in the 
coming de.cade will still be largely confined to low- and medium-grade products. 
This will create head-on competition with ASEAN's exports. 
China and ASEAN not only share similarities in export structures, but also 
in geographical export orientation. In other words, both concentrate their exports 
on the Western markets, particularly the United States. About 70 per cent of the 
United States' textile imports every year have. been from the developing 
economies, whereas only 20 per cent in the EC market are from developing 
economies (Table 7.14). Each year, the United States a~d EC member countries 
together import over US$60 billion of textiles and garments. Though the overall 
market is tremendously large, the medium- to low-grade market is comparatively . \ 
small. On the other hand, China and ASEAN c;:ountries, especially the latter, also 
invariably take the United States market as a main outlet for their exports. In 
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TABLE 7.14 
U.S. and EC Imports of Textiles* and Garments, 1982-85 
1982 1983 
U.S. Total Import (US$ billion) 11.64 13.69 
From developing areas (US$ billion) 8.29 9.75 
Share of developing areas (%) 71.2 71.2 
EC Total Import (US$ billion) 35.31 34.44 
From developing areas (US$ billion) 7.29 6.92 
Share of developing areas (%) 20.6 20.1 
*Excluding fibres. 
SOURCES: GA.TT, International Trade, 1982-85. 
TABLE ·7.15 
U.S. Imports of Textiles' and Garments 
from China and ASEAN, 1983-85 
(In million US$) 
1983 1984 
China 923 1,110 
ASEAN 811 1,537 
Indonesia 87 266 
Malaysia 87 157 
Philippines .284 375 
Singapore 201 301 
Thailand 152 264 
*Excluding fibres. 























1985, exports to the United States by ASEAN reached US$1,154 million, and 
by China US$880 million, or about 29.6 and 11.2 per cent of their respective 
exports (Table 7.15 ). 
The differences in labour and other production costs could possibly heighten 
the China-ASEAN competition. The current wage level of China's textile and 
garment workers averages 20 US cents per hour (including social welfare). 
Though high~r than Sri Lanka's 15 US cents, this is much lower than the ASEAN 
countries', though only 4 cents below Ind_onesia's. Together with other low-cost 
factors, China's textile and garment industry certainly has a greater comparative 
advantage. 
While the textile and garment industries of China and ASEAN countries are 
generally in the same development stage, there are differences among the 
countries which makes possible the development of complementarity. 
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Raw Material Resources 
Raw fibres form an important base for the textile industry. Since 1978; the 
material foundation of China's textile industry has been further consolidated. 
Currently, China is leading the world in fibre production. As early as 1982, 
China's cotton output surpassed the United States, and China also led the world 
in output of silk, cashmere, and angora, accounting for about half of the world's 
total. In addition, China is abundant in resources of ramie, etc .. In 1984, China's 
cotton output reached 6.25 million tons, equal to the combined output of the 
United States and the Soviet Union; although it declined in 1985 and 1986, a 
high level of 4 million tons was still well maintained. It is expected that China's 
cotton output will be maintained at 4 to 5 million tons for a number of years to 
come. 
With the remarkable increase in cotton output, China need no longer import 
cotton and apply a system of domestic rationing. China has a huge 'domestic 
·market and small quantities of cotton used to be exported to meet the demand 
abroad. Stimulated by the growing world market, cotton exports are expanding 
vigorously at 300,000 to 500,000 tons per year. Besides cotton of average length, 
China also produces long staple cotton. This definitely provides an assurance for 
"mutual exchange" on the world market. 
The annual cotton consumption of ASEAN countries totalled about 450,000 
to 500,000 tons, which is certainly not a negligible market. This market has been 
growing at a pace of 6 per cent per annum for. the last decade due to the fast 
development of the textile industries in ASEAN. Indonesia and Thailand enjoyed 
the highest growth rate of around 8 per cent per annum, while growth in 
Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines was neglig~ble (Table 7.16). 
ASEAN countries are not rich in cotton resources; with imports covering 60 
to 70 per cent of the cotton consumed. Presently, the annual cotton import is 
about 300,000 tons, of which 50 to 80 per cent are exclusively from the United 
States. It was not until recently that China began to export cotton to ASEAN 
countries, with 33,000 tons in 1985 or 11 per cent of the total imports of the latter 
TABLE 7.16 
ASEAN Cotton Consumption 
1977178 1986/87 Annual .Average 
Crop Year Crop Year Growth Rate 
('000 tons) ('000 tons) (%) 
Indonesia 80 163 8.2 
Malaysia and Singapore 56 54 
Philippines 27 30 
Thailand 104 200 7.6 
Total 267 447 5.9 
SOURCE: International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton: World Statistics 
Quly 1987.) 
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TABLE 7.17 









SOURCE: China's General Admfoistration of 
Customs, China's Customs Statistics Yearbook, 1985. 
(Table 7.17). With the rapid development of textile inqustries, ASEAN countries 
will surely need to increase their imports of textile raw materials, and China has 
a sufficient supply of cotton, silk, angora, cashmere, ramie, etc., to meet such a 
demand. 
In spite of the fact that China's production of man-made fibres surpassed 1 
million tons in 1986, it is the newest sector and has only limited product varieties. 
Therefore, each year China has to import a large quantity of man-made fibres . 
. For example, in 1985, the import reached US$700 million. China's man-made 
fibre imports was once dominated by products from Japan, West Europe,. and 
the United States. Lately, because of the growing demand in the domestic market 
and the on-going restructuring by the industrialized countries which led to an 
export_ decline in_ man-made fibres, China has begun to switch to ASEAN 
countries for its supply. In 1985, China imported from ASEAN countries US$40 
million worth of man-made fibres, or 5.6 per cent of its total imports. Over half 
of the imports from ASEAN (US$23 million), mainly polyester textured yarn, 
nylon stretch yarn, and other synthetic fibre yarns, were from Thailand. 
A populous country such as China has to be largely dependent on man-made 
fibres for the growing needs of its domestic market. Man-made fibre consumption 
is expected to grow much faster than that of natural fibres. China will continue 
to import a fairly large quantity of man-made fibres, particularly stretch yarn, 
specialty fibre, texturized yarn, etc., to compensate for the gap in its domestic 
production. In short, there exist adequate opportunities to expand trade between 
China and ASEAN in the area of textile raw materials. 
Processed Products 
From a macro point of view, the development patterns of both China and ASEAN 
countries are characterized by a lack of high value added and highly-processed 
products. Nevertheless, each country has its own strengths. For example, China's 
primary-processed and semi-processed textiles (grey yarn, silk, and cotton 
greycloth) are well received world-wide, includihg ASEAN countries, and these 
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products account for 60 per ce.nt of China's textile and garment exports. In 
garm.ents, in spite ofrapid growth, China's exports are still confined to low-grade 
or low-value-added items. . 
In c~ntrast, the highly-processed-product sectors, such as garments in, ASEAN ' 
countries, (especially Thailand), have already successfully penetrated the U.S. 
and Japanese. markets and are growing. rapidly. Such success is as yet unmatched 
by China. The spectacular· development of AS~AN's garment industries .has 
brought about· fundamental· changes in the textile export composition, with 
garment exports accounting for over half of the total. Though the ratio varies 
among ASEAN countries, it is generally'6:4 (that is 60 per cent garments and 
40 per cent other textiles) as opposed to China's 3:7 pattern. Obviously ASEAN's 
export composition is superior to China's but its scale of exports is much smaller 
(Table 7.18). . 
Potential complementarity also exists between the textile and garment in-
dustries of China and ASEAN: Apart from a limited ·variety in garment materials, 
China's garment indus'try is also adversely .affected by its large-scale production, 
redundant management layers, and loose horizontal integratioil' between sectors, 
thereby making it difficult for industry to adapt to changing international market 
trends, and making the industry particularly vulnerable to the intense competition 
. in t.he world fashion market. China's imports of garment materials rose from 
US$681 million in 1980 to US$1,607 million in 1985. There exists a gteat 
possibility to further expand the textile and garmeht t~ade between China and 
ASEAN. 
ASEAN used to import processed fabrics.(garment materials) from West~rn · 
Europe, the United States, Japah, Asian NIEs, and other regions for garment · 
processirtg and re-exporting. ASEAN also imports from China fabrics of various 
kinds, mainly converted fabrics. With China's textile industry, particularly dyeing , 
arn;I printing, gearing up for production, opportunities for ASEAN to increase 
its imports of Chinese converted' fabrics will present themselves (Table 7.19). 
TABLE 7.18 . . 
Share of' Garmen:ts in ASEAN's Total Textile Exports 














SOURCES: U.N., UNCTAD, Handbook of lntern~tional Trade and. 
Development Statistics; 1984; U.N., Statistical Yearbook for Asia and 
t.he Pacific, 1984. 
TABLE 7.19 
















Malaysia 18,146.00 99.2 3,162.40 94.9 
Philippines 1,589.00 100.0 994.80 72.5 
Singapore 59,005.00 94.9 33,555.00 91.1 
Thailand 118.50 0.0 544.30 0.0. 
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TABLE 7.20 
Share of OECD in ASEAN Exports of Textiles and Garments 
ASEAN Exports to Share of 
Total Exports OECD OECD 
(US$ million) (US$ million) (%) 
Indonesia 480 413 86.0 
Malaysia 896 459 51.2 
Philippines 750 694 92.5 
Singapore 890 462 51.9 
Thailand 878 738 84.3 
Total 3,891 2,765 71.1 
SOURCE: OECD, Trade Statistics, 1985. 
Export Market 
As stated earlier, both China and ASEAN have similarly biased their exports 
towards Western markets, with ASEAN countries showing a higher concentra-
tion. According to the 1985 OECD statistics, ASEAN and. China exported to 
more than twenty OECD member countries US$2,766 and US$3,722 million 
worth of textiles respectively, accounting for 71. 7 and 49.4 per cent of their 
respective exports. The textile exports by ASEAN to the industrialized countries 
in 1985 is shown in Table 7.20, 
It is known that 70 to 80 per cent of the world textile consumption is 
.concentrated in the Western countries. However, markets in developing countries 
will grow with the economic development of these countries, thus offering a great 
potential both China and ASEAN countries can tap. 
In 1985, world textile export value (including fibre) was about US$125 billion. 
However the shares of China and ASEAN are both very small and far behind 
those obtained by Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. Should China and 
ASEAN actively participate in their global export strategy and diversify export 
markets, it would be to their mutual benefit, as it would reduce market 
competition. 
Technical Co-operation 
China's textile machinery production has made much progress lately. So far, most 
of the textile machineries and complexes can be self-manufactured and exported .. 
Some of the technologies used in the cotton textiles are close to maturity with 
the best being up to internation.al standards. However, in the garment sector 
ASEAN countries have a technical edge over China. This indicates a possibility 
for technical co-operation and co-production. The recent import by Thailand of 
cotton spinning and weaving equipment from China marks a good beginning. 
A current issue is the mounting protectionism by the industrialized countries, 
particularly the United States and the EC. This has seriously impeded the healthy 
de.:elopment of the textile industries of China, ASEAN, and other developing 
countries and could even endanger their textile exports. To counter this problem, 
190 Lin Bz; Xu Xianquan, and Z~ang jianfen 
China will have to upgrade its products, develop _quota-free items, and also 
strengthen its multilateral ties with the developing countries to take joint measures 
against such discrimin,ative restrictions. Only by this can Western countries . 
possibly make certain concessions .. On the issue of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, 
China and ASEAN should take concerted actions to improv~ mutual under-
standing and consultation to contribute to the stabili~ation and liberalization of 
the global textile trade. 
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. Trade in Services between 
ASEAN and China. 
Chew Soon Ben5' 
I. Introduction 
·There is a growing body of literature on the services sector in ASEAN. Koh 
(1985) studied the role of the services sector in ASEAN. Lee (1986) assessed trade 
in services between ASEAN and the United States. Tucker, Seow, and Sundberg 
(1983) looked at services in ASEAN-Australia trade. Pang (1985) provided an 
overview of ASEAN-EC trade in services. The present paper thus compl~ments 
the existing studies on the ser\rices sector in ASEAN as it examines trade in services 
between ASEAN and China. 
·It is always difficult to define services as they cor:istitute intangible output. 
There have been various at.tempts to define services and yet there is still no 
agreement among economists as to what .constitutes a service (Riddle 1986; 
Bhagwati 1984; Kravis 1983; Hill 1977; and Smith 1973, among others). 
Since the purpose of the present paper is to provide an understanding of the 
nature and imp~rtance of trade in services between ASEAN and China, a broad 
definition of services is adopted. Following the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
the services sector comprises wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, 
transport, . storage and communications, finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services; public administration and defence, and community and 
personal services. Trade in services refers to traps-border transactions in services 
between residents and non-residents. It also includes both trade and investment 
in services or invisibles in the balance of payments, including factor services such 
as investment income and workers' remittances. 
Specifically, we want to distinguish the following categories of trade in services. 
( 1) Factor services and nonjactor services. Factor services are normally defined as the 
investment income component of services plus requited transfers. The latter · 
consists largely of workers' remittances. Thus, factor services are investment 
income and workers' remittances. Non-factor services comprise all other invisibles 
in the balance of payments. 
(2) Services which involve no movement of people. This group involves the export of a 
service which is produced in the exporting country and consumed in the importing 
country, for example international transportation and telecommunications. 
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(3) Services which involve movement of producer to consumer. This group involves services 
which are produced and consumed in the importing country, for example 
providing consultancy, legal, accounting, and other services in the importing 
country. 
( 4) Services which involve movement of consumer to producer. This group refers to services 
whose production and consumption take place in the exporting country. Tourism 
is a good example. Another is educational and training services provided to 
foreigners in the exporting country. 
Standard international trade theory states that a country · which has a 
comparative advantage in product X will export product X. Hindley and Smith 
(1984) argued that the analysis of trade in services does not require a new 
theoretical framework separate and different from the established theories. Sapir 
and Lutz (1981) presented a test of conventional trade theory explanation of the 
pattern of world trade in services using cross-sectional data on the capital-labour 
ratio, the number of skilled and educated persons, etc. They found that the more 
developed countries, being relatively better endowed with physical and human 
capital, have a competitive edge in services trade. Their results, however, cannot 
be generalized to include, for instance, tourism. Developing countries have a 
competitive edge in tourism because of their natural resources and abundance 
of cheap labour to support the tourist industry. Another counter example is the 
export of physical labour services by developing countries to other countries. 
Since the services sector consists of various types of heterogeneous services, 
the pattern of trade in services is unlikely to be accounted for by one single theory. 
But the basic trade principle is still valid, that is a country which has a comparative 
advantage in producing service "At will sell service "Pt. 
The volume of trade in services between ASEAN and China is quite similar 
to that between developed and developing countries. ASEAN countries, especially 
Singapore and Malaysia, have a comparative advantage in exporting managerial 
and technical know-how to China. Nevertheless, trade in services between 
ASEAN and China is hindered by the fact that China does not follow the Western 
concept of services. Orthodox Marxism does not consider services as productive. 
Indeed, it was a common practice for the Soviet bloc countries to exclude services 
in the computation of national income (the so-called net material product 
approach). Recently, the Soviet bloc countries have taken into account freight 
charges in the computation of national income, but, to a large extent, services 
are left out. 
The Chinese traditionally despise service activities, regarding them as akin to 
slavery. Services have not been recognized as legitimate economic activities in 
/..China until recently. For instance, during the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, 
keeping a housemaid was condemned as bourgeois and decadent. Today, the 
practice of hiring housemaids is catching on in Chinese cities. 
China now accepts the services of housemaids as ec.onomically productive. 
According to a party official (Straits Times, 10 June 1987), "Housemaids are 
essential to the growth of a healthy socialist economy. They release from 
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household chores the better-educated young mothers of China, who ar,e more 
useful if employed outside their homes?' China also now recognizes advertising 
as having a legitimate economic role. Advertising was allowed in China only after 
1979. The Third World Advertising Congress was held in China on 13-20 June 
1987 at the Great Hall of the People, indicating that the Chinese Government is 
seriously promoting its advertising industry. 
The change in the Chinese attitude towards the services of housemaids and 
advertising may reflect their changed attitudes towards the concept of services in 
general. Such a change in attitude is vital for the development of .China's trade 
in services with foreign countries. 
Apart from the concept of services, there are two other problems that hinder 
trade in services between ASEAN and China. The first relates to patent rights 
and royalty. Patent rights and royalty are rental income which are not allowed 
in China. However, the Chinese must accept the Western concept of patent rights 
and royalty if trade in services is to be promoted. 
China does not allow foreigners to own any means of production either. This 
poses problems for joint-venture investments. Consequently, all joint-ventures in 
China are limited to a certain period of time, ranging from ten to thirty years. 
The second problem concerns the frequent and increased contact with 
foreigners. An important difference between trade in goods and trade in services 
is that the former does not require personal contact between the provider and 
the receiver while the latter requires such personal contact, except in separated 
services such as international transportation, telecommunication, and insurance 
policies. 
In non-separated services, such as those which involve no movement of people, 
personal contact between the receiver and the provider of services ·is inevitable. 
Such personal contacts on a large scale may pose security problems if trading 
countries have different political systems. This is one reason why Malaysia and 
Indonesia have reservations on promoting services trade with China. Malaysia 
and Indonesia are very unhappy over the Chinese policy of giving moral support 
to their communist parties. They therefore do not fully encourage frequent 
contacts of their nationals with the Chinese. Thus, politics precedes economics 
in trade in services between ASEAN and China. 
The focus of this paper is as follows: Section II compares services sectors in 
ASEAN and China; Section III examines the services trade of ASEAN and China; 
and Section IV examines trade in services between ASEAN and China. The 
concluding section discusses the prospects and problems in bilateral trade in 
services. 
II. Services Sectors in ASEAN and China 
Table 8.1 shows the sectoral composition of GDP and labour force in the ASEAN 
countries, and China. In 1985, the services sector accounted for 62 per cent of 
Singapore's GDP. Thus, Singapore can be classified as a services economy. The 
TABLE 8.1 
Sectoral Composition of GDP and Labour Force in China and ASEAN, 1965, 1980, and 1985 
% Share of GDP from % of Labour. Force in 
Services Industry Agriculture Services Industry Agriculture 
1965 1985 1965 1985 1965 1985 1965 1980 1965 1980 1965 1980 
China 23 20 38 47 39 33 11 12 8 14 81 74 
Indonesia 31 41 13 36 56 24 21 30 9 13 71 57 
Malaysia 
. . 
29 39 19 59 45 44 24 35 30 21 13 42 
Philippines 46 41 28 32 26 27 26 33 16 16 58 52 
Singapore 73 62 24 37 3 68 61 27 38 6 2 
Thailand 42 53 23 30 32 21 13 19 5 10 82 71 . 
1983 figure. 
Agriculture - Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing. 
Industry - Mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. 
Services - All other branches of economic activity. 
SOURCE: World Development Report 1987, Tables 1 and 3. 
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Thai services sector is also important as it contributes 53 per cent towards the 
Thai GDP. The contribution of the services sector towards the GDP in Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Indonesia are around 41 to 44 per cent. 
In terms of contribution towards employment, the sector in Singapore is the 
largest· employer with 61 per. cent in 1980. The ·.corresponding figures for the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are 33, 39, and 30 per cent, respectively. 
Surprisingly, the services sector in Thailand only accounts for 19 per cent of Thai 
employment. 
The services sector is generally labour intensive, regarded as contributing more 
to total employment than to total GDP. But this is clearly not the case in ASEAN. 
For Singapore, the services sector has about the same per cent share of GDP and 
employment. But in the other four ASEAN countries, the services share of GDP 
is far greater than the employment share. This implies that the services sectors 
· in these four countries; especially Thailand, is relatively high value added when 
compared to the agricultural sector. 
China, being a socialist country, has a different accounting framework for the 
computation of its GDP. ·Nevertheless, the services sector in China in 1985 
accounts for 20 per cent of its GDP and 12 per cent of total employment (Table 
8.1). 
Table 8.2 shows sectoral performances in ASEAN and China. The services 
sectors in these countries grew at different rates. For Singapore, the annual growth 
rate of the services sector was 9. 7 per cent during 1965-80 and 6.9 per cent 
during 1980-85. The Indonesian services sector' grew at 7 per cent in 1965-80 
and 6.3 per cent in 1980-85. The corresponding figures for Thailand are 8.0 and 
6.0 per cent respectively. The Malaysian services sector grew at 5.9 per cent in 
1980-85, while the Philippine services sector grew 5.2 per cent in 1965-80 and 
0.1 per cent in 1980-85. China, which started her open-door policy in 1979, had 
a growth rate in services of 7 .5 per cent for 1980-85. 
Table 8.3 shows the composition of the services sector in ASEAN. For 
Singapore in 1985, the services sector relied on three pillars, namely wholesale 
and retail trade (22.2 per cent of GDP); transport, storage, and communication 
(20.8 per cent); and finance, insurance, and real estate (24 per cent). For the other 
ASEAN countries the trade sector is the largest component of services, rangi.ng 
from 12 per cent of GDP for Malaysia to 15. 7 per cent for Thailand. For China, 
only two services sectors are measured, namely transport and commerce, which 
contributed 3.5 and 4.6 per cent respectively towards GNP in 1983. 
By and large, the services sector in Singapore is the most advanced and 
sophisticated in ASEAN. China, being a socialist country and also a latecomer 
in the services trade, has a relatively under-develop·ed services sector. With respect 
to trade in services between ASEAN and China, it is obvious that ASEAN could 
help China develop her services sector and, among ASEAN countries, Singapore 
is in the best position to do so as she is economically more advanced. 
·It is reasonable to say that services trade will increase rapidly in the future. 
As developed countries have a comparative advantage in services trade, they have 
















Sectoral Performance in China and ASEAN, 1965-80 and 1980-85 
(In percentage) 
Average Annual Growth Rate 
GDP Services Industry 
1980-85 1965-80 1980-85 1965-80 1980-85 
9.8 7.0 7.5 10.0 11.1 
3.5 7.3 6.3 11.9 1.0 
5.5 n.a. 5.9 n.a. 6.7 
-0.5 5.2 0.1 8.0 -2.8 
6.5 9.7 6.9 12.2 5.9 
5.1 8.0 6.0 9.5 5.1 















and real estate 
Government services 
Other services 
Total services as % of GDP 
•1983 constant prices. 
b1978 constant prices. 
'1972 constant prices. 
d1968 constant prices. 
'1985 constant prices. 
'Includes own~r-occupied dwelling. 
TABLE 8.3 
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77.8 47.4 
SOURCES: Singapore, Department of Statistics Yearbook of Statistics, 1985186; Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1986187; 
Bank of Thailand, Quarterly Bulletin 26, no. 3 (September i986); for Indonesia and the Philippines, from Asian Development Bank, Key 
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negotiations. Some developing countries such as India, Brazil, and Mexico are 
·against having services included in GATT, but ASEAN is agreeable to its 
inclusion. China is not yet a member of GATT. Nevertheless, as China does not 
have a comparative advantage in services trade, her position on services trade in 
GATT is expected to be non-supportive. 
III. Services Trade of ASEAN and China 
The commodity trade relations between ASEAN and China have been fairly good. 
The share of ASEAN in China's total trade in 1983 was 3.4 per cent for exports 
and 4.0 per cent for imports. H the re-exports via Hong Kong are considered, 
the proportions should be higher. On the other hand, ·the share of China in 
ASEAN's total direct trade in ·1933 was 1 per cent for exports and 1.9 per cent 
for imports. 
Under normal circumstances, commodity trade and services trade reinforce 
each other. This, however, is not true in the case of China-ASEAN ·trade. 
Although commodity trade between ASEAN and China has been growing in the 
past twenty years or so, services trade between ASEAN and China started only 
with the Chinese open-door policy in 1979. 
In other words, the Chinese open-door policy provides immense opportunities 
for many countries, including ASEAN, to have services trade with China. 
Unfortunately, there are no official data on services trade between each of the 
ASEAN countries and China. Consequently, the analysis on bilateral services 
trade is limited to (a) an examination of balance of trade and services in each 
ASEAN country and China; (b) some discussion on the extent of services trade 
between ASEAN and China; and (c) an examination of services trade between 
ASEAN and China on a case by case basis. 
The balance of payments data for e?.ch of the ASEAN countries and China 
is given in Table 8.4. Total services ,·efer to the sum of shipment, other 
transportation, travel, direct and other. investment, other official, and other 
private flows (labour income is included in other private flows). 
In 1985, Indonesia had a deficit of 7 ,563 million SD Rs in services compared 
to a surplus of 5,787 million SDRs in merchandise trade. Shipment, direct 
investment income, other invd;tment income, and other private flows top the list 
of the services imported by Indonesia. 
The Malaysian pattern of trade in merchandise and services is quite similar 
to the Indonesian case. Malaysia is also a net importer of services and a net 
exporter of merchandise. Direct investment income is the most important service 
imported, accounting for 33 per cent of the net import of services. Other 
investment income, other private flows, and travel also constitute important 
categories of services imported. 
The Philippine balance of payments situation is very different from those of 
Indonesia and Malaysia. The Philippines had a surplus of 114 million SDRs in 
1985. Direct investment income, other investment inco~e, · and shipment com-
TABLE 8.4 ~ 
Balance of Merchandise and Services Trade in China and ASEAN, 1985 ~ 
(In million SDRs) ;;;· 
~ 




24,729 18,180 14,909 4,564 21,17 5 6,957 ~ 
Merchandise Export ~ 
;:,,.. 
Shipment 854 0 388 164 696 334 ~ 
Other transportation 621 41 445 36 1,925 122 
;:,;: 
'.<: 
Travel 964 540 594 502 1,727 1,153 "' ;o 
Direct investment income 6 0 24 13 0 5 "'-g 
Other investment income 1,360 756 553 342 1,754 234 ;;;· 
Other official 128 0 98 364 98 138 "' 
Other private 531 191 513 1,825 1,910 1,102 
Labour income 90 686 
Total Services 4,464 1,528 2,615 3,246 8,110 3,088 
Total Receipts 29,193 19,708 17,524 7,810 29,285 10,045 
Payments 
Merchandise Imports 37,653 12,393 / 11,388 5,042 24,164 8,295 
Shipment 1,273 1,365 1,075 336 1,357 1,066 
Other transportation 295 308 457 38 0 128 
·Travel 309 550 1,146 36 606 275 
Direct investment income 14 2,545 1,503 131 0 51 





TABLE 8.4 (Continued') 
0 
China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Other official 259 111 88 22 35 41 
Other private 349 2,074 1,229 383 1,691 299 
Labour income 0 
Total services 1,750 9,091 6,820 3,132 5,199 3,456 
Total payments 39,403 21,484 18,208 8,174 29,363 11, 7 51 
Net Receipts (Payments) 
Merchandise Trade -12,924 5,787 3,521 -478 -2,989 -1,338 
Shipment -419 1,365 -687 -172 -661 -732 
Other transportation 326 -267 -12 -2 1,925 -6 
Travel 655 -10 !552 466 1,121 878 
Direct investment income -8 2,545 -1,479 -118 0 46 
Other investment income 836 1,382 -769 -1,844 244 -1,362 
Other official -131 -111 10 342 63 197 
Other private 182 1,883 -716 1,442 219 803 
Labour income 90 685 
Total services 2,714 7,563 -4,205 114 2,911 -368 
Services/Merchandise Ratio (%) 
~ 
" Receipts 18.05 8.4 17.5 71.1 38.3 44.4 E;
Payments 4.65 73.4 59.9 62.l 21.5 41.7 ~ 
"' ;o 
SOURCE: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1985. °' " ~ 
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prise the three main services imported by the Philippines. But, in contrast to 
( 
Indonesia and Malaysia, other official, other private flows (which includes labour 
income), and travel are the main services exported by the Philippines. 
Singapore, being a city state, is expectedly different from the other ASEAN 
countries and China in the structure of its balance of payments. Singapore is a 
net importer of merchandise and a net exporter of services. The main services 
exports are transportation, travel, and other private flows. Singapore is a net 
importer of shipment services. 
Thailand is a net exporter of merchandise and a net importer of services. The 
deficit in services trade was 368 million. SDRs in 1985. Other investment income 
and shipment are two important c?-tegories of services imported by Thailand, 
while services exported comprised mainly other private flows and travel. 
China experienced a deficit of 12,924 million SDRs in merchandise. On the 
other hand, it is a net exporter of services. The main export earning-categories 
are other investment income, travel, and other transportation. China is a net 
importer of shipment services. 
As data on services trade between each ASEAN country and China are not 
available, only a qualitative discussion on services trade between ASEAN and 
China is attempted here. 
All ASEAN countries, including Singapore, are importers of shipment services. 
It is therefore unlikely that trade in shipment services between ASEAN and China 
is significant. 
China, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand are net exporters of travel 
services. Malaysia and, to a much lesser extent, Indonesia are net importers of 
travel services. Table 8.5 shows that, in 1983, 36,000 Filipinos and 23,000 Thai 
went to China and the number of Chinese who visited Thailand, the Philippines, 
and Malaysia in 1983 were 116,211, 3,026, and 439 persons respectively. There 
are Singaporeans going to China for tours and for business but the data are not 
available. 
China and Singapore are net exporters of "other transport services" while 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are net importers. "Other 
transport services" actually reflect the intensity of economic ties between the host 
and foreign countries. As the economic ties between each ASEAN country and 
China are not strong, one would not expect the volume of trade in "other transport 
services" between ASEAN and China to b.e significant. 
China, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand are net exporters of "other 
private flows". The main item here is labour income. But we know that the 
number of Chinese workers is not significant in ASEAN. Likewise the number 
of ASEAN workers in China is negligible. Thus, trade in "other private flows" 
between ASEAN and China is also limited. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand have net payments of 
direct investment and other investment income. Singapore has net imports of 
'Other investment income, while China has net exports of other investment income. 
But, since bilateral investments between ASEAN and China are not large, the 




























































(1) Visitor Any person visiting a country other than that in which he has his usual place of residence, for not more than one year and 
whose main purpose of visit is other than following an occupation renumerated from within tile country visited. 
(2) Tourist That is, visitors as defined above staying at least twenty-four hours, but not more than one year, in the country visited and 
the purpose of whose trip can be classified under one of the following headings: a) pleasure, recreation, holding, and 
sport; b) business, visiting friends and relatives, mission, meeting, conference, health, studies, and religion._ 
(3) Excursionist - That is, visitors, as defined above, staying !es~ than twenty-four hours in the country visited (including cruise pa_ssangers). 
1International tourist arrivals at frontier by country-nationality. 
2International visitor arrivals at frontier by country-residence. 
3(i) International tourist arrivals at frontiers by country-residence; (ii) Departures. 
1Including countries and day-visitors from Singapore crossing the frontiers by road through the Johore Causeway. 
5(i) International visitor arrivals at frontier by country-residence; (ii) Including arrivals of nationals residing abroad: 1983: 65 013. 
6International tourist arrivals at frontiers. 
7Excluding arrivals of Malaysian citizens by land. 
8International visitor arrivals at frontiers. 
9Includes both China and Taiwan. In Pacific Area Travel Association, Annual Statistical Report 1984; Taiwan's visitors arriving by residence to 
Thailand is 6, 744 visitors. 
SOURCE: World Tourism Organization, World Travel and Tourism Statistics Yearbook 1983-84, vol. 38. 
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IV. Trade in Services between and ASEAN and China 
1. Indonesia 
Economic relations between China and Indonesia were frozen for two decades 
since 1967. Direct trade relations between Jakarta and Beijing resumed in July 
1985 when a memorandum of understanding was signed. China has signed a. 
US$13-million contract with Indonesia for the counter-purchase of 100,000 tons 
of Indonesian cement for 400,000 tons of coal (China Trade News, 1 October 1986). 
China has permitted ships flying the Indonesian flag to carry cement to China 
and coal to Indonesia. Such an arrangement would certainly facilitate more 
counter-trade between the two countries. 
China and Indonesia understandably want more counter-trade with each other 
for the following reasons; 
1. Exchange rate fluctuations. China devalued the renminbi by 13.6 per cent in 
July 1986 while Indonesia also devalued the rupiah by 45 per cent. 
·Counter-trade would avoid problems caused by the devaluation of curren-
cies. 
2. Both countries suffered a sharp decline in oil revenue. Both China and Indonesia 
want to export more of other commodities to compensate for the losses in 
oil revenue. 
In August 1985, Indonesia opened to Chinese yessels two ports in Java, one 
in Sumatra and one in Celebes. Moreover, certain banks have been approved to 
finance the bilateral trade between the two countries. These two measures would 
facilitate and reduce the cost of business for both parties. But in terms of actual 
business, not much has taken place (China. Trade News, vol. 23 [October 1985]). 
Basically, Indonesia is not 'ready to establish full economic ties with China. 
Equally important is the fact that business opportunities in services trade are also 
quite limited between the two countries. This is so because both China and 
Indonesia do not have a comparative advantage vis-a-vis each other in the export 
of services. 
2. Malaysia 
Malaysia undoubtedly has the expertise m medium-level technology in the 
cultivation and processing of primary products to play a role in the Chinese 
modernization programme. However, despite the China visit by the Malaysian 
Prime Minister in November 1985, Malaysia's trade with China is still very much 
on a government-to-government basis, and the people-to-people business 
relationship is still lacking. 
The main reason for the sl~w growth of bilateral economic relations between 
the two countries is politics. Malaysia is still not fully satisfied with China's stance 
on her moral support for the Communist Party in Malaysia. Consequently, 
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Malaysians cannot visit China freely. And in order for businessmen in Malaysia 
to import from China, they have to apply for import permits. For Malaysian 
businessmen to go to China to do business, the following procedures are involved: 
1. The businessman must get a letter of invitation from China. 
2. With the letter of invitation, he will submit his application for a visa to visit 
China to the Ministry of Trade. 
3. The Ministry of Trade will assess his application, with feedback from the 
Malaysian Trade Commission in Beijing. The criterion for approval is that 
the businessman must convince the Ministry of Trade that he needs to visit 
China for business. 
4. The Ministry of Trade will then submit a report to both the Ministry of 
Home Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs will usually accept the report from the Ministry of Trade at face 
value. The Ministry of Home Affairs will process the application from the 
point of view of security. If the Ministry of Trade submits a favourable 
report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will approve and, in most cases, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs will also approve. 
5. Once clearance is obtained from the Ministry of Home Affairs, a visa for 
the businessman to go to China for a period of two weeks will be issued. 
The whole process of visa application takes about one to two months. 
6. On returning from China, the businessman must submit a report tp the 
Ministry of Trade. This report is very important especially if the 
businessman needs to make subsequent visits to China to follow up on the 
business deals. The Ministry of Trade must be convinced that the business 
potential is good, and that the businessman needs to go to China for 
follow-up visits. 
7. If the businessman needs to go to China again for a follow-up visit (not a 
fresh application), he has to apply to the Ministry of Trade again, repeating 
the whole process. Since it is a follow-up visit, a multiple-entry visa to China 
will be issued for a period of up to six months. The time it takes to apply 
for multiple-entry visa for the purpose of follow up visits is three weeks to 
one month. 
8. For holiday tours, any person aged 60 or more can visit China. 
Malaysia is also not ready to establish full economic ties with China. On June 
1985, Dr Mahathir warned against holding too many illusions regarding the 
China market. He added that China would not be a huge market for the world's 
exports because the Chinese leaders· would not allow unlimited imports of 
consumer or even capital goods (Straits Times, 5 June 1985). 
The following are some examples of trade in services between China and 
Malaysia: 
1. Taisei Corporation of Japan and RKB Ltd of Malaysia will co-operate to 
build a hotel in Beijing with the Minmetals and Sejiqing Agricultural 
Co-operative of China. The hotel is worth US$33.8 million (China Business 
Review, 24 June 1985). 
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2. Malaysia's Perusahaan Tinggi has signed an agreement with the Zengchou 
Liquefied Natural Gas Control Department of Henan province to jointly 
manufacture gas stoves in China (China Trade Report, vol. 25, [May 1987]). 
Malaysia undoubtedly has a comparative advantage in exporting medium-
level technology in cultivation and processing of primary products and also in 
consultancy services such as management, accountancy, etc. However, Malaysia 
is very cautious in promoting services trade with China which involves movement 
of either provider or user. 
3. Philippines 
Services trade between the Philippines and China is mainly m banking, 
construction, and air-services. 
Banking 
The Philippine National Bank has an office in Beijing. The business activities 
include liaison, consultation, and other services for banking business (Almanac of 
China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1985). 
Construction 
The following comprise the Philippine-China trade in construction services: 
1. A Philippine-Chinese joint-venture to construct a 350-room luxury hotel 
in Guangzhou has been set up. The total investment is US$60 million with 
49 per cent Philippine equity (China Business Review 1, no. 1 Uanuary-
February 1983]). 
2. Metro Manila has signed a letter of intent for the construction of a: hotel 
cum commercial building complex in Shanghai (China Business Review 10, 
no. 5 [September-October 1983]). 
3. A Philippine-Chinese joint-venture to build a hydroelectric power station 
for the Magat River project has been set up. The total investment of the 
project is US$2.2 million (China Business Review 10, no. 6 [November-
December 1983]). 
4. A Philippine-Chinese joint-venture to supply equipment for a heat and 
power station and the design of a power plant in China has been set up. 
(China Business Review 9, no. 5 [September-October 1982]). 
5. The Philippine State Irrigation Bureau has won the tender for construction 
of a 6,000-kilowatt hydropower station in China. The contract is worth 
US$3 million (China Business Review 11, no. 1 [March-April, 1984]). 
Air Services 
The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) has begun a regular 
two-hour flight between Manila and Xiamen in Fujian Province (China's Foreign 
Trade, Issue No. 11 [1986]). 
206 Chew Soon Beng 
The Philippines has a comparative advantage in exporting hotel management 
services to China. 
4. Singapore 
The Singapore Commercial Representative Office (CRO) in China is well 
established to promote economic relations between China and Singapore. The 
activities of the CRO include seeking business opportunities for Singaporeans, 
organizing seminars in China, providing market information, keeping the Trade 
Development Board in Singapore informed, arranging contacts between s·in-
gaporean~ and Chinese officials, etc. 
The CRO has been promoting the following business areas in the past a few 
years: entrepot trade, petroleum/petrochemicals, industrial equipment, com-
puters, building engineering, infrastructure engineering, civil aviation services, 
financial services, exhibition management, tourism, hotel management, trading 
in China technologies, and counter-trade services. 
Economic relations between China and Singapore are strong. Singapore and 
China have joint-ventures in ninety-one projects worth a total of S$414 million 
as at the end of 1985. This figure indicates that among ASEAN countries 
Singapore has the most economic links with China (Business Times, 17 April 1986). 
Singapore Strategies on Doing Business with China 
The Singapore Government provides the infrastructure and support to Sin-
gaporeans to trade with China. The following are some of the efforts in 
strengthening economic ties with China: 
(1) A delegation from the Singapore Federation of Chambers of Commerce has· 
signed preliminary agreements for a series of co-operative ventures with Chinese 
enterprises. Letters of intent and memoranda signed covered many areas, such 
as joint-managed supermarkets, building materials, textile computer equipment, 
fishery, cigarette factories, and hotel building (Business Times, 9 April 1984 ). 
(2) The Third China Business Conference was organized by AGS Management 
Consultants and Ecotech. China signed twenty-three memoranda of agree-
ment or letters of intent covering 106 investment projects with Singapore 
businessmen at the above conference. Some of the largest projects are a hotel 
with 600-700 rooms in Sichuan province (S$66 million), the modernization of a 
chemical plant in Liaoning province (S$60 million), and a container terminal in 
Tianjin (S$44 million) (Straits Times, 6 August 1985). 
(3) The investment protection and promotion agreement between Singapore and 
China was signed in Beijing in November 1985 for a fifteen-year period. It will 
be automatically renewed at the end of the term unles~ ~me of the parties decides 
to end it. Business interests will be enhanced by such an agreement which will 
promote and protect investments in the two countries. Because of the agreement, 
foreign companies whose governments do not have such an arrangement will 
now find it worthwhile to use Singapore as the gateway to China. Among its 
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main provisions are that the tw:o countries are required to give each other 
most-favoured-nation treatment as folfows: 
a. Investment should be protected against expropriation or nationalization 
which cari only be made by law and with proper compensation. 
b. This compensation must be given without unreasonable delay and must be 
convertible and transferable. 
c. Investors can also repatriate their capital and profits from investments 
subject to the laws of the countries: 
d. Should there be investment disputes, the agreement provides for settlement 
through the setting up of an international arbitration tribunal. As much as 
possible, the arbitration shall take place in Singapore (Straits Times, 23 
November 1985). 
( 4 ) The Trade Development Board has awarded a cash grant to five professional 
bodies which have teamed up to sell their expertise to China. The five bodies -
Association of Consulting Engineers, Institution of Engineers; Singapore Institute 
of Architects, Singapore Institute of Planners, and the Singapore Institute of 
Surveyors and Valuers - represent 529 firms. The group is prepared to undertake 
a two-year programme which costs S$273,000-S$136,500 from the cash grant 
and the remainder from the five bodies. The expertise the group is offering in 
China covers urban development planning and development of ports and airpo~ts. 
The groups would also be able to take on projects to_ develop and manage hotels 
and to design housing and industrial estates. 
Problems in doing business with China include: 
a. length of time needed for contracts to be approved; 
b. problem of interpreting Chinese laws; 
c. restriction on foreign exchange; 
d. repatriation of profits; 
e. shortages of material supplies; 
f. the availability of quality of labour; and 
g. political risk (Business Times, 25- May 1985). 
Two _of the many things obstructing co-operation between Western companies 
and China are the language barrier and the Chinese way of life and thinking. 
Since many Singaporeans speak both English and Chinese and also understand 
the Western way of life and thinking as well as that of the Chinese, Singapore _ 
businessmen can play ·an important role in helping Western companies set up 
joint-ventures in China (Straits Times, 4 May 1984 ). 
On the other hand, Singaporean businessmen were told that they must know 
how to wrap up a total deal. In structuring a deal with the Chinese, the important 
thing is to put the financial aspect, management, and administration together. 
This is more important than having the h1rdware or the technology. Most people, 
"including Singaporeans, put too much emphasis on scientific know-how (Straits 
Times, ,17 December 1984). 
The main difficulty in selling services in China is that the Chinese company 
does not have the ability to pay for services in foreign exchange. Two ways have 
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been suggested for the Singapore partner to overcome the problem. One 
arrangement is for the goods made by the joint-venture project in China to be 
exported to Singapore. The other arrangement is if the goods are sold in China, 
the renminbi earned could be used to buy other goods for which there are markets 
outside China. 
The Extent of Singapore Involvement in Selected Services 
Entrepot Trade. Singapore is in a position to play the role of entrepot between 
China and other countries. For instance, Singapore is playing a role in indirect 
trade between Taiwan and China since Taipei bans any direct contact. But it is 
estimated that purchase orders by Singapore traders with Taiwan factories in 
May 1985 rose by 98 per cent over the month of April 1985 to S$279 million. 
Most of the goods went to China (Straits Times, 22 June 1985). 
Hunan province in China is turning to Singapore to process, pack, and 
re-export its products. Hunan's exports to Singapore totalled S$11 million m 
1984. The volume amounted to 2 per cent of Hunan's total exports. 
Acmes-Kings Corporation has a joint-venture with the Yunnan branch of 
China Machinery and Equipment Corporation ·(CMEC), with the Chinese 
partner holding 49 per cent of the equity. The joint-venture functions mainly as 
a purchasing and sourcing agent. Since trading started, about S$10 million worth 
of cast iron products have been imported into Singapore from Yunnan. The new 
joint-venture has an expected annual turnover of S$20 million initially. Acmes-
Kings is also planning to expand her activities from sanitary products to arts and 
crafts products, including brush paintings, calligraphic works, seal stones, and 
carpets. Acmes-Kings is also very keen in developing the fast-food business in 
China (Business Times, 8 January 1985). 
Building Construction and Town Planning. Services rendered by Singapore companies 
include major building construction projects in China. According to the Trade 
Development Board, Singapore contractors are involved in over S$500 million 
contracts in China. An indication of Singapore's involvement is that International 
Development and Consultancy Corporation (INDECO) will station up to seventy 
Singapore engineers in China over the period 1987-89. 
In December 1986, a contract was signed between the Chinese authorities and 
INDECO for two cities: Xiamen and Fuzhou. The work involves providing 
consultancy services in city planning and urban design of the city centre in both 
cities. 
Prior to this, a core team led by Mr Liu Tai Ker of the Housing and 
Development Board visited both cities in August 1986. The eight-member core 
team comprised the manager, company secretary, senior professionals, planners, 
architects, and traffic engineer. They maintained a close liaison with the Chinese 
authorities and achieved good results through frank discussion and periodic 
review of the work. 
The Singapore team is expected to offer their expertise in the following areas: 
conceptualization of ideas and formulation of plans to meet the Chinese vision 
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and growth needs; review of the concept and proposals with the authorities; and 
addition of new ideas to strengthen and improve the plan to accommodate the 
future needs of the city. The consulta~cy periods are about one and one and a 
half years for Xiamen and Fuzhou. respectively. Unfortunately, the dollar amount 
of the contract was not disclosed. 
Earlier in 1985, Singapore was asked to propose a package deal to design and 
build an industrial or housing estate (Straits Times, 24 ·September 1985). Local 
architects, planners,Jmd contractors were delighted at the prospect of building a 
new town in China but wanted the government to take the lead. Most of them 
were anxious about,financing and the repayment terms that had to be negotiated 
with the Chinese authorities. A government-to-government deal would provide 
the most suitable framework for the project. Private sector architects argued that 
the Housing Board and Urban Redevelopment Authority could play an important 
tole at the macro and official levels, and the private sector at the micro level. 
Many contractors also welcomed the opportunity of doing projects in China as 
the slow-down in building ·activity in Singapore had forced many to look for 
projects abroad. However, many of them worry about China's ability to pay in 
foreign exchange. 
Veneer Products (VP) has signed a joint project with Yue Hwa Enterprises of 
Shenzhen for a S$400-million warehousing and cold complex in China's Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone (Business Times, 19 January 1984 ). Under the joint-venture 
agreement, the Chinese authorities will provide about two square kilometres of 
land for the complex, while VP will be responsible for the project's development, 
construction, management, operation, and finance. VP has managed to obtain 
full financing for the first phase of the project from the Hong Kong office of the 
First National Bank of Chicago. The exact amount secured is not known but 80 
per cent of it is guaranteed by the Guangdong Trust and Investment Corporation, 
with the remaining 20 per cent backed by the Hong Kong arm of the Bank of 
China. 
Hotel Management. Singapore's Intraluck group has signed a contract to build a 
229-room three-to-four-star hotel at Waizhou, Shenzhen. The group, which will 
manage the hotel itself, has formed a Hong Kong subsidiary to develop the 
S$12.85-million project with the Hong Kong Wing On Travel Group and the 
China Travel Service Bureau. 
The financing, half in cash and half in loans from Hong Kong banks, is 
provided by the Singapore and Hong Kong parties, while the Chinese party 
provides the 10,000-square metre site. 
Another local consortium will help build a S$64-million hotel in Chengdu, 
Sichuan province. The Singapore partner in the joint-venture with the province 
is Wusang Engineering Pte. Ltd, an air-conditioning contracting firm. The firms, 
however, will form a consortium with companies which have hotel management 
and property development experience. 
Active Building and Civil Construction (ABCC) managed to confirm a 
joint-venture with the Tiaajin Travel and Tourism Corporation on a 300-room, 
US$25-inillion hotel project recently and is negotiating for another hotel of similar 
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size and value in Beijing (Business Times, 2 April 1984). ABCC has also signed a 
preliminary agreement (something like an approval in principle) with the Tianjin 
International Trust and Investment Corporation to build the 28-storey Tianjin 
International Trade Centre at an estimated cost of US$30 million. The project 
will be handled on a joint-venture basis with one of America's leading contractors 
for.high-rise buildings, Blount International. The partnership was formed because 
the Americans were keen to join a company which has close cultural affinities 
with the Chinese. For ABCC, working with a partner would spread risks and it 
would have additional new resources to call on. 
Services in Oil Exploration. A general manager and two deputy managers from 
Singapore were responsible for the operation of the Chiwan oil exploration 
support base in China for the. first two years. After this period, an official from 
the China Nanshan Development Company Ltd., a major shareholder in the 
joint-venture (70 per cent), took over as general manager. The deputy managers 
will continue ·~O come from the Off-shore Joint Services Company of Singapore, 
which is anine-µiember consortium made up oflntraco Ltd., Far East-Levingston 
Shipbuilding, Wah Chang International Corporation, Singapore Offshore 
Petroleum Services, Baker Marine, Jurong Town Corporations, Sembawang 
Holdings, Promet, and the Neptune Orient Lines (Straits Times, 10 August 1984). 
Exhibition Management Services. In 1986, one out of every three international 
exhibitions in China had some Singapore service content. There were about 250 
international exhibitions in China in 1986. Each average show had a budget of 
over S$5 million, making international shows in China a billion-dollar business. 
It is estimated that there would be 200 international exhibitions in China in 1987. 
For instance, two Singaporean companies were appointed by the Tianjin 
sub-council of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
(CCPIT) to help China attract foreign investment and expand trade (Business 
Times, 9 February 1984). The AGS Management Consultants and Exhibition 
Management Services (CEMS) will organize a series. of international investment 
meetings for both Chinese authorities and foreigners to negotiate joint-ventures, 
licensing agreements, and technology transfer. 
Shipbuilding. Singapore's Intraco has signed a letter of intent w.ith the China State 
Shipbuilding Corporation to enter into a trade agreement. Although the agree-
me~t covers trading of marine products, there are also non-marine products. 
Marine products include shipbuilding, shiprepairing, construction of oil-rigs and 
offshore platforms, drilling rigs, and manufacture of marine equipment. Non-
marine products cover steelworks, welding, electronics, hotel construction; trade 
centres, machine, textiles, food, and medical equipment and the manufacture of 
electrical home appliances such as refrigerators, washing machines, and kitchen 
utensils (Straits Times, 1 May 1985). 
Metalock (Singapore) Pte Ltd signed a joint-venture with Shanghai Ocean 
Shipping Repair Dockyard Corporation in 1983. Under the agreement, Metalock 
provides training, technology, and equipment in return for a fee, based on a 
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percentage of revenue. In 1984, Metalock trained several Chinese technicians in 
Singapore and sent S$1 million worth of equipment to Shanghai. The transfer 
. of know-how enabled Metalock to undertake specialized jobs to recondition and 
repair marine engine parts such as pistons, cylinder covers, and ship propellers 
in Shangpai-. In 1985, Metalock also had two more joint-ventures with shipyards: 
9ne,with Dalian and the other with Qingdao urider agreements similar to the 
first one (Business Times, 25 May 1985). 
Translation Services. Providing translation and interpreting services for 
businessmen wanting to do business· with China has been an important- source 
of business for Interlingua, a company in Singapore specializing in bridging the 
language gap. Over the_ past months, Interlingua has done several contracts, each 
worth S$50,000 in translation from and into the Chinese language. The bulk of 
the work has been fQr the oil industry (about 4,000 pages), with the computer 
industry gaining in importance (about 1,000 pages). Although turnover was 
e~pected to grow by 3 to 4 per cent per yea~, Interlingua is hampered by lack of 
qualified translators and interpreters (Business Times, 25 May 1985). 
Computer Services. The Singapore Nation~! Computer Board (NCB) and the 
Singapore Federation of Computer Industry (SFCI) have signed an agreement 
with China's Ministry of Electronics Industry providing a framework for 
long-term collaboration in information technology that covers training and 
development of software and international markets. The details of the agreement 
were not disclosed. 
China seeks transfers of software technology from Singapore in computer 
because Singaporeans speak Mandarin, Singapore has good application systems 
and expertise which are useful models for China, and Singapore is also regarded 
by the Chinese as a springboard into the world market for software and services 
at a later stage (Business Times, 4 January 1986). 
Far East Computers (FEC) has signed agreements with Fudan University in 
Shanghai and Academy Sinica in Beijing to sell computers to two educational 
institutions in China. FEC has been able to sell in China because of the following 
·reasons: (a) the two Chinese partners have agreed to provide engineering support 
to the Chinese customers while FEC does the marketing; (b) FEC will train 
Chinese engineers to do support work; and (c) FEC is able to provide training 
in Mandarin. 
A government-owned Singapore Computer Systems (SCS) has opened a 
subsidiary office in Hong Kong to spearhead its drive into the computer market 
in China. The SCS felt that the only effective way to compete for business in 
China was to use Hong Kong as a base because of its close proximity to China. 
and the SCS wants a permanent presence in Hong Kong to maintain the computer 
hardware. 
The SCS will not only develop software, but also sell turnkey computer systems 
as well as hardware and software products for mainframe and mini computers. 
The company hopes to team up with hardware vendors so that they can provide 
the software. The other alternative is to provide turnkey solutions in a joint-ven-
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ture with a Chinese firm. Prospects for the SCS are good as China has many 
c.omputers but lacks software support. Moreover, China prefers to deal with a 
government~owned company (Straits Times, 8 July 1985). 
Design and Engineering Services. Two Singapore building companies (Wah Chang 
International Group and Lim Kah Ngam Ltd.) have firmed up a joint-venture 
with the Tianjin Building Authorities to provide design and engineering services 
for a building in Tianjin (Straits Times, 15 June 1985). 
According to sources, there will be no problems in repatriating the Singapore 
companies' profits as the Chinese partners have already arranged the foreign 
exchange certificates in U.S. dollars. Foreign investors in China must apply for 
special permits to repatriate their profits if the earnings are in renminbi. The 
two companies have considerable business links i11 China. Wah Chang already 
has several joint-venture projects in the China offshore oil industry. In April 
1984, it was engaged to set up the biggest fabrication yard in China for offshore 
production platforms in the South China Sea and a nuclear plant in Guangdong 
Province. 
In 1985, Singapore lost to a Dutch firm the contract to provide the master 
plan for Hong Qiuo Airport in Shanghai. But Singapore was picked to provide 
consultancy service for design review, project management, and the running of 
the airport when it is completed. 
In 1987, Singapore's INDECO won a consultancy contract to plan and design 
the extension of Nanjing Airport inJiangsu province. Phase I of the development 
involves construction works estimated to cost S$60 million (Straits Times, 20 June 
1986). 
Factory Upgrading. A Singapore-based company (Representations International) 
has won a contract to improve the production capacity of Chinese cigarette 
factories with modern machinery. The contract is worth S$16 million (Business 
Times, 6 June 1985). 
A letter of intent has been signed with a Singapore company to manufacture 
melamine products in the province of Yunnan in China. The deal, when 
completed, would require the Singapore company to supply the machinery 'and 
equipment as well as production know-how (Business Times, 16 June 1985). 
It is estimated that 400,000 factories in China need to be upgraded. The main 
problem lies in their ability to pay in foreign exchange to foreign companies. If 
Singaporean businesses can find ways to overcome the foreign exchange problem, 
the potentials for them to upgrade Chinese factories are unlimited. 
Tourism. There are no available figures on tourism services being sold to China 
directly or indirectly. But China's tourism plan calls for a substantial increase in 
tourist arrivals and revenue. Large numbers of mid-level Singaporean managers 
are now employed in various international hotels in China. 
InJune 1987, the Chinese tour agency in China was allowed to open a branch 
in Singapore. The branch, Singapore China Tour Agency, will further promote 
tourism between the two countries. 
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Banking Services. There are two Chinese banks in Singapore, the Bank of China 
(BOC) and Kwangtung Provincial Bank (KPB). The BOC Singapore branch 
was established in June 1936. It is a fully licensed bank with three sub-branches. 
The KPB Singapore branch was set up in 1939 and has one sub-branch. The 
total assets of the Singapore operations of these two Chinese banks amounted to 
about S$4 billion as at the end of February 1987. However, only the BOC has 
Asian Currency Unit (ACU) capabilities. The main activities of these two banks 
are in deposits, non-bank loans, and inter-bank transactions. 
Three of Singapore's four local banks have established operations in China: 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) has a branch each in Shanghai 
and Xiamen; Overseas Union Bank (OUB) has representative offices in Beijing 
and Shenzhen; while United Overseas Bank (UOB) has a branch in Xiamen and 
a representative office in Beijing. 
With the financial reforms in China, the use of foreign funds to finance China's 
economic and infrastructural development has become more prevalent. Various 
Chinese financial institutions and commercial enterprises have raised funds in 
major overseas financial centres, through syndicated loans and bond issues. A 
number of Chinese institutions have raised or are in the process of raising bond 
issues in Singapore. Some of these institutions are: Fujian Investment and 
Enterprise Corporation, US$50 million fixed rate bond issues; Bank of China, 
US$200 million floating rate note issue; and Peoples' Construction Bank, US$150 
million floating rate note issue. 
The Chinese financial institutions, including the Peoples' Bank of China, have 
indicated their interest in sending their staff to Singapore for training. Singapore 
banks and the.Institute of Banking and Finance have made certain proposals on 
training. The Chinese find Singapore a suitable place to send their staff for 
training as the latter poses a minimum of language and cultural barriers. 
Gateway to China. Singapore is considered as a possible base for trade with China 
by some West German companies. These companies can combine their high level 
of technological know-how with the Singapore electronics industry and China's 
manufacturing ability in a partnership. The West German Government is 
encouraging its medium-sized industries to enter into joint-ventures with Sin-
gapore firms because Sing;ipore has the right infrastructure for these industries 
to move into the China and ASEAN markets (Straits Times, 5 May 1984). 
A senior Australian trade official was reported as saying that Australia has a 
definite advantage in the construction of power stations, specialized rails for 
industrial use, materi_al handling equipment, ports, and telecommunication 
facilities. But, Australian companies must team up with Singapore companies if 
they want to penetrate the Chinese market (Business Times, 26 February 1985). 
Denmark also hopes to use Singapore as a base for conducting business with 
other countries, especially China. China could benefit from Danish technology, 
especially in the agricultural field including farming and food processing, as well 
as technology engineering ana support services such as finance and medicine 
(Business Times, 23 March 1985). 
South Korean businessmen, hampered by the absence of direct trade ties with 
China, have been urged to use Singapore as a base for the rapidly growing China 
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trade. Joint-venture companies between Korea and Singapore should be set up 
to manufacture industrial products such as electronics and telecommunication 
equipment, and provide construction and engineering services. These products 
and services could be marketed in China and other countries (Straits Times, 17 
July 1985). 
Singapore and Finland could co-operate in computer software development, 
industrial design, and education programmes in the services industry. There are 
also opportunities to work together in other areas, such as fibre concrete 
technology for construction and telecommuniaation technology. Finnish engineer-
ing skills could be complemented with local financial and trading expertise to 
benefit from the ongoing process of modernization in China (Business Times, 21 
January 1986). 
The EDB has urged Swedish and Italian firms to use Singapore as a 
subcontracting base to penetrate into the Chinese market (Business Times, 10 
September 1986). 
Merchant Trading Pte. Ltd. in Singapore has signed a S$21.2-million contract 
for the supply of power generation plants to China. Although the bulk of the 
contract will go to the five West German suppliers, the Singapore company will 
earn a 3 per cent commission. 
Chee. Kent Investments Pte. Ltd. (CKI) has joined the Guangdong Develop-
ment Ltd. (GDC) to promote and co-ordinate investment in Guangdong 
pi:.o~ince. CKI will act as GDC's agent and representative to promote investment 
. in the province. CKI is also expected to help enterprises in Guangdong sell their 
products to overseas markets and handle imported raw materials for processing 
(Business Times, 17 December 1985). 
5. Thailand 
Thailand has good economic ties with China. There are no restrictions limiting 
Thai nationals from visiting China. Below are some examples of economic 
co-operation between the two countries. 
1. A Thailand-China joint-venture to construct a hotel in Lushan County. 
The total investment of the project is US$250,000 with 25 per cent Thai 
equity (Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1985). 
2. A Thailand-China joint-venture to renovate the Guest House in Shantou. 
The total foreign investment is US$1,013,000. (Duration: fifteen years; 
approved date: 1983/11) (Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade, 1984 ). 
3. A Thailand-China joint-venture to construct a resort hotel in Shenzhen. 
The total investment is US$30 million (China Business Review 9, no. 6 
[November-December 1982]). 
4. A Thailand-China joint-venture to construct 300-kilometre highway linking 
the Shenzhen and Shantou special economic zones (SEZs) (China Business 
Review 14, no. 2 [March-April 1987]). 
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5. A Thai company has signed an agreement with the Chinese authorities to 
form a company to handle passenger and freight shipping between Shantou 
and Hong Kong (China Business 10, no. 6 [November-December 1983]). 
6. An agreement on scientific and technical co-operation between China and 
Thailand has been signed (China Business Review 9, no. 3 [May-June 1982]). 
7. A new airport in the Shantou SEZ was opened to foreign passengers on 17 
January 1987. The Chinese airline, CAAC, will run chartered flights from 
Shantou to Hong Kong and Bangkok. 
8. Thailand has also signed agreements with China on investment protection 
and on establishing a joint committee on economic co-operation (China 
Business Review 12, no. 4 Uuly-August 1985]). 
V. Prospects and Problems in ASEAN-China Services Trade 
The pattern of services trade between the five ASEAN countries and China 
reflects the comparative advantage of the six countries. Singapore's involvements 
in China have been mainly in services and are largely knowledge-based. 
1. Prospects 
China is a latecomer in the services trade as s.he implemented her open-door 
policy only in 1979. It is therefore expected that ASEAN could export various 
services to China rather than the other way round. 
Being a communist country and a centrally planned economy for over three 
decades, much needs to be done by the Chinese authorities to facilitate services 
trade with foreign countries. China has recently undertaken the following 
measures with the objective of attracting foreign technology via joint-ventures. 
1. The Chinese Government has set up a special agency to co-ordinate and 
administer its counter-trade operations. As China does not have sufficient 
foreign exchange, counter-trade is an effective way to promote the country's 
foreign trade. A form of counter-trade is counter-purchase where exporters 
have to simultaneously purchase some Chinese goods. According to a 
deputy director of China's Import-Export Bureau, the counter-trade prac-
tice has played an important role in upgrading a great number of small 
and medium enterprises in China (Straits Times, 11 September 1986). 
2. China has signed double taxation avoidance pacts with fifteen countries, 
including Singapore and Malaysia. 
3. The Managing Director of China International Economic and Technical 
Co-operation Consultants Incorporated (Ecotech), Mr Li Zhaoli, stated that 
China is now improving its legal system, and has set up and promulgated 
more than forty economic laws and regulations to protect the interests of 
foreign investors. China"has signed investment protection agreements with 
more than ten countries, apart from double taxation avoidance pacts (Straits 
Times, 30 July 1985). 
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The prospects for ASEAN exports of services to Chi,na are very promising in 
certain areas. These are discussed below. 
Factory Upgrading 
There about 400,000 enterprises in China that need to be upgraded. For most 
· of them, it is not necessary to have more capital investment to raise efficiency, 
as higher productivity can be achieved through better management and technical 
know-how. According to the Chinese officials, it is unrealistic for foreign 
companies to simply sell management and technical know-how for a fee 
denominated in foreign exchange. In China, only firms which earn foreign 
exchange can seek approvals for foreign exchange allocations from the authorities. 
For most Chinese enterprises, the ability to pay in foreign exchange is nil as 
many are not export-oriented; 
Besides the shortage of foreign exchange, many Chinese officials are suspicious 
of foreign consultants who may be seeking short-term gains with no long-term 
commitments. 
Thus, foreign companies which aim to sell management and technical 
know-how to China must set up joint-ventures with the following conditions: 
1. Joint-ventures are for periods of fifteen to thirty years only. 
2. Joint-ventures would be in a better position to seek ways of exporting the 
Chinese products. 
3. Joint-ventures would be in a better position to seek ways for counter-trade. 
4. If joint-ventures were feasible for even only 10 per cent of the 400,000 
enterprises, it would still be a big market for foreign companies which intend 
to. upgrade Chinese enterprises (Business Times, 15 November' 1985). So far 
Singapore seems to be the only ASEAN country seriously taking advantage 
of the Chinese market for factory upgrading. 
Banking 
China is short of the financial resources it needs to implement its development 
plans. The country's foreign exchange earnings have been adversely affected by 
the declining price of oil, its leading export. Yet China needs to buy capital ~oods, 
ranging from power stations to aircrafts, to implement her aim of quadrupling 
industrial and agricultural output between 1980 and the year 2000. 
There are only three ways in which funds can be obtained to finance various 
economic programmes. One solution is to encourage foreign investment. How-
ever, progress in attracting foreign investment as an important source of funds 
has been slow. The second alternative is to approach the World Bank and other 
multilateral agencies for soft loans, but again the amount of financing available 
falls short of China's needs. The third alternative is to raise funds through loans 
from foreign ·banks. Indeed, some bankers anticipated that China's outstanding 
/ foreign debt is likely to jump to US$35-45 billion by 1990, compared with 
US$14. 7 billion in 1986 (Asian Wall Street Journal, 14 November 1986). Some 
banking executives in Hong Kong have indicated that the Chinese have become 
more receptive towards the use of foreign loans. 
f.· .. 
I · ... 
I
'.· · .. · 
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However, China's standing as a borrower is impaired by the following: 
1. The problems a~sociated with lending to China are serious and not likely 
to disappear in the future. Bankers face endless haggling, low margins, 
unclear legal procedures, and difficulties with obtaining repayment guaran-
tees. 
2. China's borrowing ability is constrained by the falling foreign exchange 
reserves and widening trade deficit.. Currently, 6.6 per cent of China's 
foreign exchange earnings goes to repay debt. Although this ratio is very 
low by world standards, China has said that it will.not borrow to the point 
where repayments exceed 15 to 20 per cent of foreign exchange earnings. 
Given this self-imposed limit, outstanding debt in 1990 could be reduced 
to only US$35 billion. 
Singapore with its financial centre is the only country in ASEAN that is capable 
of participating in China's loan financing. 
Airport Development 
China is determined to upgrade more than 100 airports throughout the country 
and has planned to spend about S$500 million to accelerate construction and 
expansion. Sixteen new airports have been planned. These are located in open 
coastal cities, important economic centres, tourist cities, as well as remote areas. 
China's air service has been subject to much criticism for its ageing aircrafts, 
tardiness on the ground, and its inability to maintain proper schedules. Apart 
from the construction of airports, China therefore also needs and wants modern 
-management ·know-how to run its airports. Singapore again is the only ASEAN 
country able to ·meet ·China's .needs for airpori: construction and management. 
Port Development 
China's· ports have been too few and too small to deal with the surge in foreign 
trade in recent years. Consequently, ports are so clogged that Chinese export 
. commodities are often delivered late. Port congestion not only reduces the 
competitiveness of China's exports, but also delays necessary imports, which in 
turn' upset production schedules and the country's modernization programme. 
For instance, in '1985, China's ports handled 340 million tons of cargo, but ships 
had to wait over· a morith to be unloaded at major ports siich as· Shanghai and 
·Dalian. The Ministry of Communications in China has· announced that ih the 
rn~xt few years more than RMBlO billion would be allocated to port development 
. ( CTW Supplement, 29 De"cember 1986). A total of· 200 berths, including 120 
deep-water ones, will be constructed in the next few years. Thus, by 1990; China . 
. '·should .have 1;200 ·berths, among which 320. will be deep-water ones. 
,.. As expected, . China i~ keen .to. seek foreig~ funds for .its massive p9rt · 
development programme beqmse· expenditure for this programme far exceeds 
the country's financial capability. About 33 per cent of the required foreign funds 
will come from the World Bank and the remaining portion will have to come 
from foreign investors. 
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In order to encourage joint-ventures in port development, China announced 
that the joint-venture co-operation period for port projects can exceed thirty years 
and may be extended (CTW Supplement, 29 December 1986). Despite such 
preferential terms, foreign investment in port development is still very small 
compared with that in hotel construction and industrial production. The 
fundamental reason is that joint-ventures in port investment do not earn foreign 
exchange but only renminbi. At present, only ships carrying foreign flags have 
to pay for berth fees in foreign exchange; other service charges such as cargo 
handling and storage, which form a major portion of the charges, must be paid 
in renminbi. 
Singapore again is the main country in ASEAN that is involved in port 
development in China. 
Export of Chinese Technology 
China has set up a company called China Patent Agent (HK) Ltd. in Hong Kong 
to export Chinese technology. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) has called 
for co-operation with Hong Kong industrialists to use Chinese technology for 
developing high-technology products to penetrate the world market jointly. The 
CAS has 40,000 scientists and technicians and 122 research institutes. 
Currently, China relies on Hong Kong for its excellent telecommunication 
facilities, managing and marketing expertise, and diversified trade channels to 
market its technologies. Hong Kong is apparently ahead of Singapore in this 
area, but Singapore may be expected to compete with Hong Kong in the near 
future (South China Morning Post, 9 April 1987). 
Exhibitions 
The number of international exhibitions in China is expected to increase sharply. 
Exhibitions which promote economic co-operation in trade and investment are 
an ideal forum for establishing closer contacts between Chinese and foreign 
business. 
Currently, Hong Kong and Singapore are very much involved in the 
organization of exhibitions in China. They are likely to remain important 
organizers of exhibitions in China in the near future. 
Tourism 
Tourism is a big foreign exchange earner for China. The number of foreign 
tourists and businessmen visiting China went up by 26. 7 per cent over the 1985-86 
period to reach 22. 7 million. 
Two aspects of international tourism in China are of significance to ASEAN. 
Firstly, there are more people from ASEAN, in particular from Singapore and 
Thailand, vi.siting China than before. Secondly, ASEAN and China can jointly 
promote tourism in East and Southeast Asia. It has been suggested, for instance, 
that Singapore and China could jointly promote each other as tourist destinations. 
Trade in Services between ASEAN and China 219 
Power Industry 
China faces a serious shortage of electric power. It is estimated that 20 to 30 per 
cent of China's industrial capacity goes unutilized because of insufficient power 
supplies (China Business Review, July-August 1985). 
In 1985, China announced that it would import 10,000 megawatts of thermal 
power plant capacity for coastal cities over the next two years. It is a potential 
market worth US$2 billion to foreign suppliers (China Business Review, July-August 
1985). 
ASEAN countries can work with Western or Japanese partners to jointly 
penetrate the Chinese power market. 
2. Problems 
Services trade between China and ASEAN can be expanded significantly if the 
following two problems can be resolved. 
Political Differences 
Mainly due to political differences, trade in services between Malaysia and China, 
and Indonesia and China have been very limited, On all accounts, Malaysia 
should have been in a very good position to offer its expertise in many fields to 
China, but this has not been the case. Malaysia and Indonesia _are basically 
unhappy with China over the Chinese policy of giving moral support to the 
communist parties in these two ASEAN countries. The political differences which 
are complicated by the ethnic issue are not likely to disappear in the near future. 
Economic Differences 
Many foreign investors complain about the following aspects of joint-ventures in 
China. 
( 1) Lack of understanding on the complexity of foreign investm,ent. Chinese officials are 
generally not aware that attracting foreign investment requires a whole range of 
infrastructure. There is a tendency to hasten foreign investment in China without 
taking into account the whole range of requirements, benefits, and consequences. 
(2) Inadequate supply of good quality local materials or components. There is a tendency 
for joint-ventures not to import materials and intermediate products so as to save 
foreign exchange. However, foreign investors are frustrated with the inadequate 
supply of local materials and their unreliable quality. 
(3) Managing local employees. The economic system in China does not encourage 
high work performance. Labour productivity tends to be low. 
( 4) Low regard for know.-how and technology. China has an inherent bias in the socialist 
system not to regard services highly. As such there is no high regard for services 
such as management know-how. 
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(5) Inaccessible or closed domestic market. Due to the shortage of foreign exchange, 
China does not allow foreign investors to convert renminbi to foreign exchange 
unless the joint-ventures are export-oriented. Joint-ventures which do not export 
would have to resort to counter-trade practices in order to repatriate profits in 
foreign exchange. Counter-trade involves many parties and usually only one in 
about ten attempts is successful. 
(6) Limited joint-venture period. This may be the most serious problem facing foreign 
investors in China. For joint-ventures in industrial production, the duration of 
the contracts is limited to a maximum of thirty years. For joint-ventures in port 
development, China allows the contract to go beyond this period. But basically, 
there is a limited period of time for joint-venture·s in China. The limited period 
would undoubtedly affect foreign investors' calculati.ons of rates of return in 
China. Towards the end of the contract, foreign investors may not be willing to 
re-invest in the plants and that eventually works against both the foreign investors 
and the Chinese partners. The limited joint-venture period also ,poses problems 
in securlt1g bank loans as land equipment cannot be used as collateral. 
(7) lncompatibiUty of laws and accounting practices. As has been discussed earlier, 
China is trying .to remedy this incompatibility. 
Despite the above-mentioned problems, trade in services between China and 
ASEAN will continue to grow. China is too big a market for ASEAN countries, 
especially Singapore, to ignore. On the other hand, China needs foreign 
technology and must constantly upgrade her infrastructure to attract joint-ven-
tures. 
By and large, China needs management personnel at all levels and in all fields, 
ranging from banking, computer, hotel, and air-travel to legal services to meet 
the targets of the country's ambitious modernization programme. Among the 
ASEAN countries, Singapore has been able to play the biggest role in the current 
economic development of China for the following reasons: first, the political 
climate for trade in services between China and Singapore has been very good; 
second, Singapore's economic experience is very relevant to China's needs; third, 
Singaporeans speak English and Mandarin, thereby enabling them to play an 
important role in bridging the gap between the Chinese and the Westerners. 
NOTES 
As data on Brunei. are not available, this paper only examines the services trade . 
between the other five ASEAN cou~tries and China. . . 
1. State Statistical. Bureau, Peopie's Repub.lic of China (PRC), Statistical Yearbook of 
China, 1985. · 
2. John Wo.ng, '~n Overview of ASEAN~China E~onomic Rdati~ns'', in ASEAN-
China Economic Relations: Trends and Patterns, edited by Chia Siow.:Yue and Cheng 
Bifan (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEASJ, 1987), p. 12. 
3. Statemem by an executive of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. in Hong K~ng. 
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The last two decades have seen the relationship between the People's Republic 
of China (hereafter China) and ASEAN countries undergoing a dramatic 
evolution. The end of the Vietnam War, the U.S.-China detente, and the Vietnam 
invasion of Kampuchea are major events which moved many countries of ASEAN 
to normalize their relationship with Beijing.1 The changes which took place within 
China itself have also led to closer co-operation between ASEAN and China. 
Many argue that the death of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and the purge of the 
Gang of Four escalated the new emerging trend in China and led to the rise of 
Deng Xiaoping to. the supreme position in China. Under Deng, China which 
had been under the strict socialist path, began to reform her economic system 
based on the Four Modernization Principles. The modernization of China, which 
began in 1970, comprises new thinking on the economic system, institutions, and 
economic relationship with the rest of the world - the so-called "open-door 
policy".2 These developments have caused some concern both within China and 
in the rest of the !Vorld. The introduction of the profit motive and the price system 
into China means that there can be incentives for Chinese to operate according 
to the market principle. At the same time, China has not solved the problems 
arising from the parallel operation of the price mechanism system and the planned 
economy. At present, the price mechanism is limited to certain commodities and 
localities and it is very difficult to envisage its extension to the whole vast economy. 
The introduction of the market system, while generally lauded by outsiders, 
has also led to a price spiral resulting in a higher cost of living for the Chinese. 
The economic reforms which China undertook means also that she is more willing 
to integrate with the international economy. Since China has reached self-
sufficiency in many commodities, her exports of surplus items have played a 
significant role in her economic relations with the rest of the world in general. 
Her exports of textiles and clothing, rice, and petroleum are also in competition 
with the exports of ASEAN. 3 
The integration of China into the world economy opens up many prospects 
and problems for ASEAN. Aside from the political and security issues, China is 
an economic power to be reckoned with. Consequently a strong economic 
relationship between ASEAN and China can help the two parties in the pursuit 
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of economic prosperity. This paper explores the possibility of a stronger trade 
relationship between ASEAN and China through the counter-trade channel. It 
draws on the counter-trade experience of ASEAN countries, mainly the practices 
by Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. 
II. Trade Flows between China and ASEAN 
China and ASEAN countries have a similar set of major trading partners, namely, 
Japan, the United States, and the EC. Of China's export trade with the rest of 
the world, a large proportion was conducted with the Pacific Rim countries, 
notably with Japan and the United States (Tables 9.1 and 9.2). The proportion 
of China's trade with the Pacific countries rose from 50 per cent in 1978 to 68 
per cent in 1985. 
Japan is the most important trading partner of China in terms of percentage 
share of China's trade. For example in 1985, China's exports to Japan represented 
20 per cent of her total exports, while imports from Japan represented 32 per 
cent of her total imports. The United States has become China's second most 
important partner in trade accounting i:p. 1985 for nearly 10 per cent of her im-
ports. However, China's trade with the United States andJapan varies in_bilateral 
trade balance. China has a trade deficit with Japan, a phenomenon shared by 
almost all of Japan's trading partners all over the world. China's bilateral trade 
balance with the United States however, showed a surplus in some years but trade 
is comparatively balanced, with the size of deficits and surpluses not more than 
10 per cent of the total trade. 
What are the patterns of trade between China and ASEAN countries? China's 
exports to ASEAN was a sizeable 10 per cent share in 1985 while her imports 
from ASEAN was a mere 2 per cent share of her imports. Tables 9.3 and 9.4 
show China's exports to and imports from ASEAN countries in 1978-85-. In 1978, 
China's exports to ASEAN were valued at US$845 million and her imports were 
US$292 million. By 1985, the export value had risen to US$3,121 million, and 
imports rose to US$887 million. Between 1978 and 1985, while China's exports 
grew on an average of 20.8 per cent per annum, ASEAN exports to China grew 
at 17.2 per cent. The ASEAN-China trade shows a persistent surplus for China. 
In fact, China's bilateral trade surplus has increased from US$500 million in 1978 
to US$1.6 billion in 1985. 
China trades with all the ASEAN countries. However, trading transactions 
take place mainly with Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Both Indonesia 
and Malaysia, for political and security reasons, have approached their trade with 
China cautiously. Between 1978 and 1980, China exported to but did not import 
any goods from Indonesia. In 1981 China began to import from Indonesia, 
amounting to US$8 million worth of goods, and this import trade has grown 
robustly with a growth rate o~ 50 per cent annum in 1981-85. In 1978, China's 
exports to Malaysia were valued at US$211 million but have grown very sluggishly 
up to 1985. The growth of imports from Malaysia was more promising. In 1978, 
Malaysian exports to China were recorded at US$110 million and reached 
TABLE 9.1 
China's Exports to Asia and the Pacific Countries, 1978-85 
(In million US$) 
Annual 




ASEAN 845 1,080 1,635 1,745 1,758 1,567 2,289 3,121 20.5 
_Australia 140 166 244 340 319 230 313 292 11.1 
Canada 83 143 132 183 165 200 258 296 19.9 
Hong Kong 2,249 3,021 4,401 5,264 5,430 5,847 7 ,131 7,568 18.9 
Japan 1,948 2,793 4,139 5,032 5,083 4,846 5,660 6,222 18.0 'i 
New Zealand 19 34 40 36 40 32 38 49 14.5 
United States 324 594 1,056 1,875 2,275 2,252 3,074 3,840 42.4 
Asia-Pacific Total · 5,608 7,831 11,647 14,475 15,070 14,974 18,763 21,388 21.1 
China Total 10,086 13,718 18,875 21,495 22,900 23, 712 27,644 31,325 17.6 
Asia-Pacific Share (%) 55.6 57.1 61. 7 67.3 65.8 63.1 67.9 68.3 
SOURCES:· U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, China International Trade, Fourth Quarter, 1985, July 1986; Joint Economic Committee, Congress of 







TABLE 9.2 ~ 
China's Imports from the Asia-Pacific Countries, 1978-85 ~· 




1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Growth Rate, g 
1978-85 "' ;::s 
~ 
(%) ~ i:l 
A SEAN 292 480 694 539 775 526 659 887 17.2 ~ 
Australia 484 776 796 639 838 393 736 865 8.6 
Canada 442 507 742 776 1,005 1,295 968 929 11.2 
Hong Kong 63 382 1,249 1,956 1,954 2,495 5,031 7,858 99.3 
Japan 3,074 3,674 5,109 5,076 3,500 4,918 7,199 12,590 22.3 
New Zealand 64 89 161 123 108 110 123 136 11.4 
United States 865 1,724 3,755 3,603 2,912 2,173 3,004 3,856 23.8 
Asia-Pacific Total 5,284 7,632 12,506 12, 712 11,092 11,910 17,720 27,121 26.3 
China Total 10,321 14,283 19,180 17,941 16,689 18,487 25,488 39,480 21.1 
Asia-Pacific Share (%) 51.2 53.4 65.2 70.9 66.5 64.4 69.5 68.7 
SOURCES: Same as for Table 9.1. 
"" "" O'l 
TABLE 9.3 
China's Trade with ASEAN Countries, 1978-85 
(In million US$) 
Annual Growth Rate 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1978-85 
(%) 
Imports from: 
ASEAN 292 480 694 539 775 526 659 887 17.2 
Indonesia 0 0 0 8 14 27 8 41 50.5 
Malaysia 110 182 217 88 110 157 165 161 5.6 
Philippines 47 51 45 78 105 22 60 80 8.1 
Singapore 58 170 308 179 240 213 243 333 28.4 
Thailand 77 77 124 186 306 107 183 2 71 19. 7 
Exports from: 
ASE AN 845 1,080 1,635 1,745 1,758 1,567 2,289 3,121 20.5 
Indonesia 116 125 189 242 220 194 214 233 10.5 
Malaysia 211 212 241 261 264 257 272 239 1.8 
Philippines 112 121 210 200 212 76 217 277 13.8 
Singapore 326 392 599 736 839 788 1,283 2,160 31.0 
Thailand 80 230 396 306 223 253 303 212 14.9 '?< 
~ 



















SOURCES: Same as for Table 9.1. 
TABLE 9.4 
China's Balance of Trade with ASEAN Countries, 1978-85 
(In million US$) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 
600 941 1,206 983 
125 189 234 206 
30 24 173 154 
70 165 122 107 
222 291 557 599 
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US$200 million in 1980 but slid to US$88 million in the following year. Since 
1983, China's imports from Malaysia have remained fairly constant at the 
US$160-million level. 
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines accounted for a major share of the 
China-ASEAN trade. Prior to the normalization of reiations between China and 
some ASEAN countries, Singapore was used as the entrepot for trading 
transactions with the rest of ASEAN. Hong Kong also acted as an entrepot (Table 
9.5). Since then, Singapore's trade with China contracted with the establishment of 
direct trading between China and these countries. China-Singapore trade has 
grown steadily, with Chinese exports to Singapore rising from a mere US$322 
!million in 1978 to over US$2 billion by 1985. For Singapore, on the other hand, 
, , . trading with China tends to be one-sided. Her exports to China remained in 
deficit for the entire period with a peak deficit of US$1,040 million in 1985. 
Singapore accounts for one-half to two-thirds of ASEAN-China trade. 
The Thailand-China trade has grown quite steadily over the years. China's 
exports to Thailand grew at an average of 14.9 per cent per annum betwe~n 1978-85 
while her impo'rts of Thai products grew at an average of19. 7 per cent per annum 
TABLE 9.5 
China's Import and Export Trade through Hong Kong, 1981-85 
(In million US$) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Imports from: 
China 58 91 136 269 
Indonesia 37 42 34 n.a. 
Japan 296 273 466 1,213 
Korea 163 56 45 160 
Singapore 29 27 35 n.a. 
Taiwan 438 208 169 426 
United States 114 170 203 375 
Exports to: 
Indonesia 228 251 224 195 
Japan 203 148 153 273 
Korea 74 94 115 185 
Taiwan n.a. 90 96 127 
Singapore 147 156 163 151 
United States 503 589 758 1,123 
Total 
Imports 1,438 1,316 1,675 3,590 

















NOTE: Converted into U.S. dollars by the annual average exchange rate of the HK 
dollar. 
SOURCES: Hong Kong External Trade, 1982, 1984, and 1985. 
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in the same period. While China's exports to Thailand hovered between the 
US$200-300 million, her imports of Thai products grew from US$77 million in 
1978 to US$306 million in 1982 and then declined to a lower level in the 
subsequent years. Thailand is the only ASEAN country which has ever recorded 
trade surplus with Chinii. In 1982 and 1985, Thailand's bilateral trade surpluses 
were US$83 and US$59 million respectively. 
The Philippine-China trade is quite active. In 1978 Chinese exports to the 
Philippines were valued at US$112 million and such exports grew during 1978-85 
at the rate of 13.8 per cent per annum. There was a sharp decline in exports in 
1983, reflecting political turbulence in the Philippines, but exports bounced back 
to the US$217 million in 1984 and US$277 million in 1985, surpassing Chinese 
exports to either Thailand or Malaysia. 
Chinese imports from the Philippines show a low level, with annual values of 
less than US$100 million in 1978-85, except for 1982 when imports reached 
US$105 million. 
In summary, ASEAN-China trade relations have been growing steadily with 
China exporting much more than she imports. Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines are the three main countries in this trade relationship. Singapore-
China trade is the largest portion of trade between ASEAN and China. 
III. Trade Practices in ASEAN and China 
Each nation has its own institutional and legal frameworks for conducting trade 
with other nations. Institutions can assist or hinder trade: The ASEAN countries 
conduct their international trade in accordance with the international rules of the 
game. Private enterprises, government agencies, and public enterprises can 
engage in trade with most nations around the world. In the private sector, trade 
practices are based on the price mechanism. Exports of goods are backed by 
Letters of Credit, D/Ps and D/As, and contracts agreed between parties. The 
regulatory agencies range from. the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Ministry 
of Agriculture, and other ministries. The laws governing exports and imports 
vary among ASEAN countries, with different lists of import and export bans, 
export and import licenses, and other trade controls. 
None the less, there exists a wide array of products and commodities which 
ASEAN traders can transact with their counterparts world-wide. While some 
ASEAN countries are more strict in their exports and imports for various political 
and economic reasons, trade is generally free from the intervention of the 
authorities except for selected commodities which are restricted by national 
policies. Thus, Bulog of Indonesia remains the sole importer of rice for the 
Indonesian Government. Pertamina in Indonesia and Petronas in Malaysia 
dominate their countries' petroleum exports. For Thailand, the Petroleum 
Authority of Thailand controls over 90 per cent of Thailand's petroleum imports. 
For China, foreign trade is much more controlled by the state. Before 1978, 
national foreign trade corporations (NFTCs) and their branches under the 
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jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) were the only institutions 
in China conducting import and export business. The economic reforms which 
took place in 1978 resulted in new institutional arrangements in trade. In 1982, 
several agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Trade, were merged into a 
new ministry - the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
(MOFERT). However, this ministry is just one of the many new institutions 
which deal with export and import. 




1. Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT); 
2. National foreign trade corporations and their local branches; 
3. Import and export corporations under industrial ministries and other 
institutions; 
4. Foreign trade bureaus under MOFERT in provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions; 
5. Local foreign trade corporations; 
6. Commercial organizations abroad; 
7. Agencies and trading offices in Hong Kong and Macao; and 
8. China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). 
Apart from these eight entities, Guangdong Province also has powers to 
conduct foreign trade, <! power not accorded other provinces in China. 
The complexities of a multiple institutional arrangement serve to show that 
China's trade practices can be cumbersome to foreigners. The operations and 
procedures of China trade are conducted both under and outside trade agree-
ments. 
The majority of China's trade agreements take the form of bilateral trade 
agreements, except for the Sino-EC agreement. China has signed bilateral trade 
agreements with over ninety countries, r.nder which trade is normally negotiated 
once every year and MOFERT is responsible for the signing of the agreement. 
Once the protocol is completed, actual business can take place and be carried 
out by various agencies depending on the scope of each entity. 
In addition to the above arrangement, China can sign non-governmental trade 
agreements with the private sector of those countries which have no formal ties 
with China. The Liao-Cheng Chih-Takasaki Memorandum signed between 
China and a group of Japanese business enterprises exemplifies this type of 
non-governmental trade agreements. 
The third type 'of arrangement is non-agreement trade, which accounts for the 
greater part of China's trade with other nations. The salient feature of this type 
of trade is that business is based on negotiations between trading parties with 
side contracts specifying terms and conditions of sale or purchase. Various 
Chinese trading companies can engage in this type of trade with private entities 
of other countries. 
The trading transactions which take place between China and ASEAN fall 
under the bilateral governmental trade agreements. Some agreements cover only 
product items and volumes, others cover volumes and/or values for individual 
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items. There can also be a non-binding agreement between China and ASEAN 
countries. Over the years, China-ASEAN trade agreements have developed from 
the non-binding type to a combination of itemized volume or values. One 
hypothesis which can be advanced is that the non-binding agreement serves as 
a diplomatic stepping stone. As each side becomes familiar with the other's trading 
practices and closer economic ties emerge, trade agreements progress into more 
specific terms. 
IV. Counter-Trade Practices m ASEAN 
Bearing in mind that ASEAN trade practices follow international rules, while 
the Chinese have trade agreements in accordance with their planned economy, 
the ASEAN-China trade agreements provide the frameworks whereby trade takes 
place between China and ASEAN countries. Although side agreements may be 
stipulated, the general impression is that there is flexibility in most item~ and 
rigid protocol is followed in only a few items. The trade agreements may differ 
in their terms and conditions but are akin to counter-trade practices prevailing 
in many countries around the world. 
The term "counter-trade" can convey different meanings and implications. To 
GATT, the proliferation of counter-trade is contrary to the general principle of 
multilateral trade. Both GATT and UNCTAD do not wish to see more 
transactions taking place outside the multilateral arrangement. This is under-
standable since counter-trade undermines the sacred shrine of both organiza-
tions. 5 While there are valid reasons to discredit counter-trade, since it is 
discriminatory and distortive, the practice of counter-trade between China and 
ASEAN can be an important vehicle for more balanced trade between both 
parties. It is this idea of balanced trade between importing and exporting countries 
which led many countries plagued by trade deficits and foreign exchange 
shortages to conduct trade under counter-trade terms. Notable examples can 
easily be drawn from countries in Eastern Europe (COMECON), Latin America, 
and Africa. 
To many people, counter-trade connotes an archaic barter trade described 
succinctly by David Ricardds wine and cloth exchange between England and 
Portugal in the eighteenth century. In practice, counter-trade has several forms. 6 
(1) Barter. This is the most simplified and perhaps the best known form of 
counter-trade. The transaction involves physical exchange of goods without price, 
though quantity and quality can be specified. Most barters are void of terms of 
payments but rule out the re-export possibility to the third country. They also 
stipulate the duration under which goods must be exchanged. An example of 
barter trade is when Brazil exchanged 50,000 tons of soybeans for 50,000 tons. 
of Mexican matpe in 1982. 
(2) Compensation. Under compensation trade, the private sector in one country 
can agree to sell goods to the government of another country, promising to 
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purchase the equivalent worth of products of that country. The purchasing 
country may settle the payment wholly in cash or with part cash and part 
commodities. The COMECON countries are currently practising this type of 
counter-trade because it offers them an opportunity to plan their local production 
and expedite the payments. 
(3) Counter-Purchase. Counter-purchase consists of two contracts simultaneously 
signed by two parties. The first contract covers the sale of goods and services 
while the second one covers the purchase of goods and services. The values of 
purchase and sale may not be equivalent but there is usually a specified period 
under which both sale and purchase must take place. The sale of DC-9 aircrafts 
by McDonnell Douglas Corporation to the government of Yugoslavia was made 
with an agreement to purchase canned ham and equipment along with job offers 
to Yugoslavs in an airline business. 
(4) Buy-Back. The buy-back system can be beneficial for activities which· require 
high tech and/or joint-ventures. Both parties must agree to the purchase of 
machinery and the sale can only be final when the foreign partner buys back 
either a part or total output of that collaborative effort. For example, International 
Harvester sold a tractor plant to Poland and in return it has to purchase all 
outputs of the tractor factory. 
(5) Swap. The swap arrangement is in general used for mm1m1zmg costs of 
transportation between countries. The routine is as follows: A swaps goods with 
B and A agrees to ship goods to C while B agrees to ship goods to D. In 1983, 
the Soviet Union agreed to a swap contract with Venezuela. Venezuela had to 
ship a specified volume of crude oil to Cuba while the Soviet Union would ship 
the same volume of crude oil to West Germany. This arrangement apparently 
minimizes the transportation cost. 
(6) Triangular Trade. This variety of counter-trade involves a third party in the 
transactions. Suppose Company A wishes to exchange goods with Company B. 
Company B can purchase goods from Company C and delivers them to Company 
A in return for required goods and services. This method of trade was quite 
popular during World War II. Today many companies have either set up a division 
to conduct business through this method or become specialists in the counter-
trade. The 3M Company has conducted business via this route and Philip 
Brothers is a world-wide firm specializing in triangular trade. In fact, many 
Japanese trading companies are prepared to expedite the exchange between two 
nations using this method. 
Among ASEAN countries, some forms of counter-trade practices are known 
to exist between each ASEAN country and the rest of the world. Indonesia 
officially introduced its counter-trade policy in 1982. In 1983 the value of 
Indonesian exports under counter-trade was about US$300 million. Japanese 
trading companies were against the Indonesian policy but finally Mitsubishi 
Company undertook a counter-purchase for Indonesian fertilizers. Since August 
1982, the Japanese have agreed to purchase US$700-800 million worth of goods 
in exchange for a US$1-billion oil refinery project. 
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The Malaysian Government also adopted the counter-trade policy in 1982 
when its trade deficit grew to US$400 million. Prime Minister Mahathir gave 
his approval on counter-trade and ever since September 1982, it has been on 
every Malaysian trade mission's agenda. However, Malaysia has conducted 
counter-trade with Pakistan, Burma, and Bangladesh. Under normal circumstan-
ces, counter-trade is used to enhance a country's exports but the Malaysian 
counter-trade with these three nations appears to encourage imports rather than 
exports. 
Singapore has extensive trading relations with numerous countries in ASEAN 
and the world. Some variation of counter-purchase has existed in the traditional 
entrepot trade. To take advantage of international trends in counter-trade, 
Singapore has be?un to actively promote the establishment of firms specializing 
in counter-trade. In 1986, pioneer tax holidays were granted to six trading 
companies, including Cargill Trading of the United States and Australia's 
Centrobank, to establish subsidiaries engaging in counter-trade in Singapore. 
Four additional firms may be granted the same status. 8 It is to be noted that 
Singapore wants to be a counter-trade centre rather than use counter-trade in 
exporting its own domestic manufactures. 
For Thailand, the pros and cons of counter-trade have been debated. The 
government under Prime Minister Prem has set up Committees and Sub-
Committees on Counter-Trade and a draft bill was prepared in 1986 to promote 
counter-trade. The Counter-Trade Bill was dropped in 1986 but the practice of 
counter-trade continues. In 1981, the value of Thai trade under counter-trade 
amounted to Bl,050 million. The following year saw a counter-purchase between 
Thailand and Indonesia involving aircrafts and refined sugar. Also in 1982, 
tapioca products were exchanged for fertilizers between Thailand and South 
Korea. In fact the counter-purchase of agricultural surplus commodities (that is·, 
tapioca, rice, maize, coffee, and so on) dominate the Thai counter-trade with 
v,arious countries, including the Philippines, Romania, Israel, and Brazil. Cur-
rently there are ten cases of counter-trade exchanges which are under review or 
ongoing. One of these is the exchange of Thai rice for an unspecified Chinese 
product. 
V. The Thai Experience in Counter-Purchase 
While Thailand might have been the newcomer to counter-trade practices, she 
has already, in this author's opinion, accumulated a vast experience in this trade. 
In many cases, counter-trade was adopted because the normal trading environ-
ment was not conducive to normal trade transactions. There were two constraints 
which led to the adoption of counter-trade by Thailand. The first was the surplus 
stock of commodities which necessitated that Thailand relieve domestic price and 
political pressure via counter.-trade, In fact, the first regulation on counter-trade 
was entitled "Regulation on the Counter-Trade of Agricult~ral Products" and its 
committee was administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives. 
The second committee was the national body with the Bank of Thailand acting 
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as secretariat which continued to tackle the problem of surplus agricultural 
outputs, using these surpluses as an offer to foreign buyers. Both committees 
have since been replaced by the Sub-Committee on Counter-Trade chaired by 
the Minister of Commerce. This sub-committee reports directly to the Council 
of Economic Ministers. 9 
Second, while Thailand allows for counter-purc.hase between private 
enterprises in Thailand and their overseas counterparts, some institutional and 
legal limitations require a counter-trade. The case in point is the exchange of 
tapioca products for Korean chemical fertilizers. As Thailand remains a net 
importer of chemical fertilizers, both private importers and the Marketing 
Organization for Farmers (MOFF), a public enterprise under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Co-operatives, can import chemical fertilizers. To maintain low 
retail prices for farmers the MOFF has to exchange tapioca for chemical 
fertilizers. The MOFF's liquidity problem may have necessitated that it conduct 
the exchange under this system. 
By 1986, the Thai Government instituted these guidelines: (a) counter-trade 
supplements other trading arrangements; and (b) counter-trade should be 
initiated by Thailand. 10 The first guideline recognizes the general belief that 
counter-trade is not efficient and may be costly. Thus it may be considered only 
as a supplementary channel for 'trade flows. The second guideline is to establish 
that Thai interest in counter-trade must take priority. In recent years, at the 
insistence of foreign buyers of Thai products, the Thai Cabinet has, at times, 
decided to proceed with the counter-trade even when it was not clearly in 
Thailand's interest. 
Most Thai counter-trade practices fall into three forms: barter, compensation, 
and counter-purchase. Other forms of counter-trade are not prevalent. (Appendix 
Tables A9.1 and A9.2). Two Thai cases illustrate counter-trade deals. Both cases 
involve an exchange of Thai agricultural products for manufactured goods. In 
1985, Thailand's Metro Machinery and Kitti Rice Company signed a contract 
with Interbras (a subsidiary of Petro bas). The contract required Brazil to purchase 
Thai rice to be shipped to Rio de Janeiro and Thailand to purchase Caterpillar 
tractors of the same value. By January 1986, the rice shipment worth B468 million 
was completed by Kitti Rice Company, but the Thai Government had not bought 
Brazilian tractors. By March 1986, the Thai mission agreed to buy tractors and 
generators from Brazil. In all, Thailand purchased tractors worth B88.4 million. 
The inclusion of generators into the deal had prompted the Association of Thai 
Industries to protest; it feared .that locallycmade generators were not given an 
equal opportunity. 
After some nineteen months, this rice-tractor counter-trade still has not been 
completed. There have been enormous costs involved. Both sides have travelled 
many times to the other country to negotiate contracts. Both parties have had to 
put up the case for their purchase and sale with their own governments and with 
the counterpart's government. Based on the time and expenses incurred in this 
trade, the counter-trade has entailed high transaction costs which cannot be 
recouped. 
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In contrast, the Yugoslav-Thai agreement which was initiated in 1986 
represents an ongoing trade involving Thai export of rice, garments, and tapioca 
products in return for cranes. The value of counter-purchase was set at B360 
million. The Thai Cabinet has finally approved the deal, the most troublesome 
part of which was the form of payment. In the end, it was agreed t'hat the Port 
of Bangkok would deposit three instalments of B120 million each· into the 
state-owned bank. Yugoslavia would purchase the items based on market prices 
and the value of products could be debited from the bank account. 11 
VI. Prospects for ASEAN-China Trade Expansion 
While most ASEAN countries have adopted and conducted counter-trade with 
many countries in and outside the COMECON bloc, there has been little effort 
by both ASEAN and China to pursue counter-trade. If we accept the proposition 
that trade in any form is superior to no trade, then ASEAN-China counter-trade 
should be encouraged. 
At present all ASEAN countries conduct their trade under the open interna-
tional system as well as under· bilateral trade agreements. On the other hand, 
China's trade is conducted mainly through bilateral trade agreements. It is 
unlikely that China's trade system will be transformed to meet the practices of 
the international trading system. Hence, ASEAN-China trade will be conducted 
mainly under the counter-trade format. 
The counter-trade practice, though not encouraged by various entities because 
of its lack of transparency and distortive nature, should be adopted to expand 
the trade flows between China and ASEAN. Since some ASEAN countries are 
very cautious in conducting trade with China for domestic political and security 
reasons, the counter-trade format would allow ample opportunities for both 
parties to accept or decline the offers. Items which are not in the interest of either 
China or ASEAN countries can be rejected without fear of negative consequence. 
It was shown earlier that ASEAN-China trade has been growing but the 
growth of trade has been in China's favour; that is China enjoys a trade surplus 
with all ASEAN countries with the possible exception of Thailand. ASEAN 
countries can only redress the imbalance by urging the Chinese counterpart to 
purchase more ASEAN products. Counter-trade can be a convenient tool to 
pursue this goal. 
In view of the present difficult world trading environment, the trading practices 
of ASEAN must be flexible and encompass a variety of formats. It has been 
recognized that counter-trade can be costly in terms of expenses and time 
involved. There are, of course, ways whereby inconveniences can be reduced, 
using either the compensation or the counter-purchase sch·eme. The compensation 
counter-trade is based on the equivalent values of purchase and sale. Items can 
be specified in terms of volumes and/or values. This can be written into the 
protocol and/or side agreements. Under the counter-purchase principle, the 
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overall sale and purchase do not match and this allows further room to select 
only goods on which both parties agree. Again the protocol may be specific as 
regards details of prices and quantities. Once the transaction costs are minimized, 
the counter-trade practices between ASEAN and China can lead to growth of 
















APPENDIX TABLE A9.1 
Summary of Thailand's Counter-Trade Practices, 1981-85 
Purchase Sale Values or Volume 
Chemical fertilizers Maize B500 million 
(16-20-0) 103. 736 tons 200,000 tons 
(B4,820 /ton) (B2,500/ton) 
Chemical fertilizers Maize B550 million 
(16-20-0, or 20-20-0) 200,000 tons 
123,834 tons (B4,820 /ton) (B2,748 /ton) 
Aircrafts (CASA) White sugar Equivalent values 
Chemical fertilizers Tapioca 
50,000 tons 88,000 tons 
Chemical fertilizers Tapioca 
60,000 tons 100,000 tons 
Chemical fertilizers Tapioca 









MOFF could only deliver 25% 
of the agreed amounts and 
Romania could only deliver 












16-20-0 for 100,000 tons; 











Marketing Organization for Farmers. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives. 
United Metro Company. 
C.P. Charoen Phokphan Company. 








35 % broken rice;' 
50,000 tons 
Maize, sugar, tapioca 
pellets, coffee beans 
A-1 Rice (30,000 tons) 
Gas cylinders 
Values or Volume 
US$750 million 

























Cargill (for Indonesia) 
Ore and Metal Trade 
Co. (India) 
APPENDIX TABLE A9.2 
Summary of Thailand's Counter-Trade Practices, 1986-87 
Purchase Sale Values or Volume Agency 
Vessels (3,500-14,000 tons) N.S. B60-170 million MOC 
Radar equipment Rice/maize N.S. MOC 
Coffee/Tapioca 
N.S. Rice, 50,000 tons N.S. MOC 
Bus chassis Variety of rice US$5 million MOT 
Locally-made vehicles Rice 60,000 tons N.S. MOD 
between 
Jan. 1987 - Dec. 1988 
Chemical fertilizers Tapioca, 100,000 tons N.S. MOC 
100,000 tons in 1987 plus other products 
Military equipment Maize, tapioca, rubber, N.S. MOC 
and sugar 
Crude oil N.S. N.S. MOC 
Buses and trucks Tin flour spar N.S. MOC 
Remarks 
MOC allows private parties 
to proceed . 
. MOT is considering the offer. 
Thailand declined the offer. 
MOT must deliberate its 
decision. 
Direct negotiation between 
ACMAT & MOD. 
MOAG is considering 
the offer. 
MOD is deliberating its decision. 
PTT is handling this negotiation. 
MOT and its state enterprises 





Hungary Medical equipment 








Ministry of Commerce. 
Ministry of Transport. 
Ministry of Defence. 
Ministry of Public Health. 
Marketing Organization for Farmers. 
SOURCE: As in Appendix Table A9.1. 
APPENDIX TABLE A9.2 (Continued) 
Sale 
Rice 
Rubber, rice, garments 
Rice, garments, tapioca 
Values or Volume Agency 
B80 million MOC 
N.S. MOP 
B360 million Port Authority, 
MOT, MOC 
Remarks 
Brazil bought B468 million 
worth of Thai rice. Thailand 
has so far purchased B88.4 
million of Brazilian products. 
This case continues. 
The Cabinet approves the deal 
in March 1987. 
The deal went through in 
May 1987. 
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APPENDIX A9.3 
PRO'IDCOL OF THE IMPORTATION AND EXPORTATION OF 
COMMODITIES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
KINGDOM OF THAILAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE YEAR 1987 
241 
The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, desirous of developing and expanding trade relations between the two 
countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, have, through friendly consultations, 
reached the following agreement on the import and export trade schedules of the two 
countries for the year 1987: 
1. The two sides agree to establish trade target value to US$400-500 million for 1987. 
2. The Chinese side is prepared to import from Thailand in 1987 the following 
commodities: 
Rice 100,000-120,000 tons 
Maize 150,000-200,000 tons 
Raw Sugar 100,000-200,000 tons 
Rubber 30,00-50,000 tons 
Synthetic Fibre 5,000-10,000 tons 
Cashew Nuts 2,000-4,000 tons 
Medicinal Herbs US$2,000,000-3,000,000 
Building Materials US$5,000,000 
Tobacco Leaves 2,000-2,500 tons 
Chemical Materials US$2,500,000 
Garment Accessories & Materials US$500,000 
Certain quantities of coconut oil, gem stones, fruits, fish meal, leather and secondhand 
tires. 
The importation of specific items will be decided according to the needs of China and 
Thailand's capability to supply. 
3. The Thai side is prepared to import from China in 1987 the following commodities: 
High-speed Diesel 300,000 tons 
Coal 100,000 tons 
Cotton 20,000 tons 
Raw Silk US$10,000,000 
Machinery & Equipment US$20,000,000-30,000,000 
Chemical Materials US$10,000,000-20,000,000 
Pharmaceutical US$10,000,000 
Paraffin 5,000 tons 
Certain quantities of farm tools and equipment, liquor and wine, and hardwares. 
The importation of specific items will be decided according to the needs of Thailand 
and China's capability to supply. 
4. The quantities above-mentioned will be contingent upon the results of further 
discussions that may be held between trade organizations or import and export traders 
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to the two countries on price and other transaction terms of the above-mentioned 
commodities. 
5. The two sides agree that the proposed transactions as referred to above shall not 
preclude other c,ommercial transactions between trade organisations or import and export 
traders of the two countries. 
6. The two sides further agree to promote commercial transactions in other products 
between trade organisations or import and export traders of the two countries so as to 
realise trade target value of US$400-500 million established for 1987. To this end, both 
value of US$400-500 milliort established for 1987. To this end, both sides agree to inform 
each other from time to time of additional commodities of respective export interests., 
Done in Beijing on 19 December 1986, in two original copies, each in the English and 
Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
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Counter-Trade in the Framework 
of China-ASEAN Trade 
Pang Rongqian, Fu Zhengluo, 
and Ma Yuanhe 
Over the past decade or more, trade between China and ASEAN countries has 
grown considerably. But there do exist some difficulties and problems. In the last 
few years, China's trade with some ASEAN countries has come to a standstill or 
even declined. This is indeed a very worrisome situation. How can the expansion 
of trade between China and ASEAN countries be promoted? Can counter-trade, 
a subject of much discussion, play a positive role in .expanding China's bilateral 
trade with ASEAN countries? These are the questions dealt with in the present 
paper. 
I. Developments and Problems in China-ASEAN Trade 
1. Developments over the Past Decade 
In the early years of the People's Republic of China (PRC), political considera-
tions prevented the country and most ASEAN countries from entering into any 
trade relationship with one another. In the sixties, of all ASEAN members, only 
Singapore and Indonesia had direct trade relations with China, while the rest 
were trading indirectly through either Hong Kong or Singapore. Since 1967, 
direct trade between Indonesia and China had been suspended. 
In the seventies, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand resumed trade 
exchanges with China even prior to the restoration of diplomatic relations. 
Singapore had no diplomatic ties with China, but none the less maintained good 
trade relations .. In 1978, ths two governments signed a trade agreement and 
subsequently set up commercial offices in each other's capital. Indonesia reached 
an understanding on non-governmental trade with China in November 1985. 
Over the past decade, China's trade with ASEAN countries has increased very 
rapidly. According to statistics from China's General Administration of Customs, 
the volume of trade between Ghina and the six ASEAN countries increased from 
US$524 million in 1975 to US$3.964 billion in 1985, a near seven-fold increase 
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in ten years. Of this, China's exports to ASEAN countries increased from US$402 
million to US$2.829 billion, and imports from ASEAN rose from US$162 million 
to US$1.135 billion. 
In 1986, however, China-ASEAN trade was reduced to US$3.358 billion, a 
fall of 15.3 per cent over 1985. China's exports in particular dropped sharply 
from US$2.829 to US$1.878 billion, caused mainly by plummeting international 
oil prices. On the other hand, China's imports from ASEAN countries continued 
to increase, reaching US$1.48 billion in 1986, an increase of 30.4 per cent over 
the previous year. 
Over the past ten years, the variety of commodities traded between China and 
ASEAN countries has also increased, particularly Chinese imports. Before 197 5, 
Chinese imports from ASEAN countries consisted mainly of rubber, timber, 
cereals, sugar, coconuts, traditional medicines, and other traditional items. Since 
1975, however, Chinese imports from ASEAN have also included industrial 
products such as steel products, offshore drilling platforms, kinescopes, 
refrigerators, automobile parts, chemical fibres, plastic materials, veneer boards, 
cement, and pesticides. 
During the same period, trade imbalances between China and ASEAN were 
remedied to some extent. China has enjoyed a trade surplus with ASEAN 
countries for many years. More recently, China responded positively to the 
ASEAN call to redress the imbalance by examining the possibility of increasing 
imports of items which China has a need for and which its ASEAN partners are 
able to supply. The Sino-Filipino and Sino-Thai Joint Trade Committees have 
played a positive role in promoting steady and balanced bilateral trade develop-
ment; In fact, the growth rate of China's imports from ASEAN countries was 
higher than that of exports in the period from 1975 to 1985, with an average 
annual growth of 25.1 per cent in the imports and 21.5 per cent in exports. At 
present, China maintains a relatively large trade surplus over Singapore and the 
Philippines, but has more or less balanced trade with Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia. In 1985, China even experienced trade deficits with these three 
countries. In 1986, China had deficits with Indonesia and Thailand while 
maintaining a marginal surplus with Malaysia. 
In the last decade, direct trade between China and ASEAN developed rather 
rapidly. However, certain commodities are exchanged via third parties like Hong 
Kong, an arrangement that play~d a positive role in the fifties and six.ties when 
direct trade channels were blocked. Thus, transit trade reflects the heritage of 
the past. We deem it reasonable and mutually beneficial that there should be less 
transit trade and more direct trade, as called for by ASEAN countries. China 
also favours direct trade and has embodied this preference in both its policies 
and measures. In fact, direct trade between China and ASEAN has already 
occupied a central place in recent years. In 1985, for instance, China's direct 
exports to Singapore and the Philippines were valued at US$2.08 billion and 
US$316 million respectively, while, according to Hong Kong official statistics, its 
transit trade with them was US$157 and US$57 million respectively, accounting 
only for 7.5 and 18 per cent of its direct trade with these two countries. Direct 
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trade is also the principal form of transaction with Thailand and Malaysia. There 
still exist some barriers to direct trade between China and Indonesia, so transit 
trade remains dominant. 
2. Trade Problems 
Trade between Chipa and ASEAN countries is rather insignificant in volume, 
usually accounting for only about 5 per cent of China's total trade, and for barely 
over 2 per cent of ASEAN's aggregate trade volume. What is noteworthy is that 
the rapid growth of China-ASEAN trade is largely a result of the impressive 
growth in China-Singapore trade. In 1986, China's total trade with Singapore 
was US$1. 768 billion, accounting for 52.6 per cent of its aggregate trade with 
ASEAN. China's trade with ASEAN countries, except Singapore and Indonesia, 
has stag~ated since 1980. Even China's trade growth with Singap~re is mainly 
attributable to its increased oil exports. Singapore is one of the major oil refinery 
centres in the world, with a daily capacity of 1 million barrels. In recent years, 
Singapore has accelerated its import of crude oil and oil products from China. 
Apart from oil, other Chinese exports to Singapore have stagnated. Thus, 
although China's trade with ASEAN has increased by 6.5 times over the past 
decade, trade with the majority of ASEAN countries has either stagnated or even 
decreased. 
One of the key problems in Sino-ASEAN trade relations is the lack of 
complemeritarity in trade structures. For many years, China's exports to ASEAN 
comprised oil and oil products, coal, foodstuffs, textiles, Chinese traditional 
medicine, raw materials for the chemical industry, and agricultural machinery, 
with oil and oil products being the largest items. Its imports from ASEAN were 
largely primary products like rubber, timber, cereals, sugar, coconut products, 
and copper. Although manufactured goods such as steel products, chemical fibre 
materials, and veneer boards have been added to the list, primary commodities 
remain predominant in Chinese imports from ASEAN. But the overall imports 
of both China and ASEAN are largely composed of machinery, raw materials,_ 
and semifinished products, that is manufactured goods in the main. Such trade 
structures cannot but constrain the expansion of bilateral trade. Both China and 
ASEAN countries wish to increase their exports of manufactured products to one 
another, for this is the only way to enlarge the scope of commodity exchanges. 
To this end, both China and ASEAN countries should continuously upgrade their 
economic and technological levels, optimize the structures of their exports, and 
improve th'e quality, designs, packaging, and services of their products so as to 
enhance their competitiveness and adaptability to the needs of each other's 
markets. It may take much time and painstaking efforts to achieve this, but it is 
an absolute necessity to do so. 
Of course, the issue of trade imbalances must be further addressed so as to 
ensure steady and sustained development of trade between China and ASEAN. 
It is also necessary for both sides to make greater efforts to minimize transit trade 
in favour of direct trade. 
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3. Possibilities for Expanded Bilateral Trade 
Further development of Sino-ASEAN trade relations is not only desired by both 
sides but it is also possible. In recent years, China and ASEAN countries have 
been accelerating their industrialization and modernization programmes and 
have experienced vigorous economic development. China's open-door policy has 
led to enormous trade opportunities for all countries in the world, including 
ASEAN countries, whose geographical proximity should undoubtedly give them 
a better chance to benefit' from this policy. China's industrial development will 
increase the country's demands for rubber, timber, copper, vegetable oil, and 
building materials. Improvement of Chinese living standards and changes in their 
life-styles will create a larger market for consumer goods and ASEAN countries 
can certainly take advantage of this. Although these countries suffered a few 
economic setbacks in the last one or two years, their economies are full of vitality 
and augur ~ell for fu~ther growth. China for its part will also benefit from 
expanded ASEAN economies and their greater import capabilities. 
Needless to say, it is no easy task to expand trade on a significant scale. It will 
take much painstaking efforts, as well as practical and effective measures. 
First, it will require that both sides, on the basis of greater production capacities 
and higher levels of technology, gradually optimize their trade structures and 
increase the share of manufactured goods in their exports, thus reducing their 
dependence on primary products. In the short term, this means focusing on the 
development of new commodities, particularly manufactured goods for export, 
while consolidating and upgrading existing commodities. The pace of products 
regeneration should be accelerated so as to improve their quality and competi-
tiveness. 
Second, trade has to be combined with various forms of economic co-operation. 
At present, in addition to trade, economic exchanges between China and ASEAN 
countries also take the forms of mutual investment, technical co-operation, and 
services contracting. In recent years, bilateral investment activities have been 
numerous, including not only investment projects in the services sector such as 
tourism projects, warehouses, shipping facilities, anq hotels, but also in the 
production sector such as electronics, apparel, furniture, foodstuffs, animal feed, 
motorcycles, and building materials. In the future, trade and economic co-opera-
tion in its various forms should go hand in hand. For instance, one party may 
set up a factory in another's territory and ship the products back for domestic 
consumption. Governments may negotiate agreements, allowing exemption of 
customs duty for imports of such commodities. 
Third, China and ASEAN need more exchanges to understand each other 
better. Owing to differences in their socio-economic systems and the fact that 
some ASEAN countries resumed their trade relations with China only ih recent 
years, better mutual understanding is needed, not only between government 
agencies but between trading communities and non-governmenta'i organizations 
as well. In addition, both sides should try to keep abreast of the latest 
developments in each other's societies. Understanding is the basis and pre-con-
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dition for co-operation. Governments should further facilitate personnel exchan-
ges, particularly those between business communities and schplars. 
II. Role of Counter-Trade in Trade Expansion 
Apart fr_om the aforementioned measures to expand Sino-ASEAN trade, maxi-
mum use should be made of other more flexible forms of trade, among which 
counter-trade stands out as one of the most prevalent practices in international 
trade. ,,/ 
Counter-trade is a general term which covers a wide range of trading 
arrangements that combine export with the obligation to import. Under these 
arrangements, an exporter must undertake either to buy products from the 
importer or to sell products or services on its behalf; or else the two sides undertake 
to substitute each other's payments with goods. These arrangements include single 
barter, trade by account, compensatio!l, counter-purchase, resale, and many other 
forms. Some of these forms were used right after the end of the Second World 
War, mainly between the Soviet Union and East European countries, 
including trade by account between the Eastern and Western countries. Since the 
advent of the eighties; counter-trade has developed rapidly into many other forms 
as required by the new international economic context. According to an 
investigation report by GATT in 1984, counter-trade now accounts for 8 per cent 
of the total volume of world trade. Some experts believe that the figure could be 
/ much higher, at-30 per cent. A survey by the American Council of Foreign Trade 
shows that the number of countries engaged in counter-trade has increased from 
15 in 1972 to 27 in 1979, and again from 88 in 1983 to over 100 at present. 
Among them, 14 states have promulgated comprehensive legal regulations 
governing counter-trade, and 77 have consolidated counter-trade regulations into 
their foreign trade law systems. 
1. Reasons for Rapid Growth of Counter-Trade 
The reasons for the rapid development of counter-trade are summarized below: 
( 1) Severe shortage of foreign exchange. Some countries are constantly short of foreign 
exchange to meet their import needs.· So they will, while purchasing needed goods, 
request that the sellers undertake to buy their products whose value will be 
counted to offset their payments. This arrangement also enables some companies 
to continue with their business without foreign exchange. 
(2) Heavy indebtedness. Some countries, which have accumulated enormous inter-
national debts over the years and have difficulties in obtaining new loans, cannot 
but adopt counter-trade to carry out business transactions in order to meet their 
pressing import needs. Besides, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
international banking community strongly request that the debtor· countries 
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reduce their imports and expand their exports. Counter-trade opens up a new 
channel through which debtor countries can continue with their imports: 
(3) J#ak market demands. For a long time now, the international commodity 
market,· particularly for primary products, has been very weak with ever-falling 
prices. In order to promote product sales, many countries have to rely on 
counter-trade as an appropriate outlet for their products. 
( 4) Rising protectionism. The Western industrialized countries, in an attempt to 
protect their own industries against external competition, have resorted to 
protectionist measures by imposing heavy tariff and non-tariff barriers on 
imports. The developing countries, in order to expand their exports, are using 
counter-trade as a means to get around such barriers. 
(5) Improvement of trade balances. Countries with huge trade deficits are adopting 
the policy of counter-trade to achieve trade balances by diversifying their trading 
.partners in order to reduce· their over-dependence on a few major markets. 
Counter-trade is helpful for a country or a business firm in exporting products 
which would be difficult to sell through regular trading forms. 
(6) Upgrading industries. In order to upgrade their industries when there is a 
shortage of foreign exchange, developing countries arrange with industrialized 
ones to either import advanced technologies and industrial equipment from them, 
or absorb their investment in building local plants by the latter's agreement to 
buy back the products to offset the payments, or as returns from their investment. 
At the ~ame time, developing countries. can also expand the export of their 
industrial goods through counter-trade arrangements, an undertaking that would 
otherwise be extremely difficult. 
(7) Enhancing competitiveness. Sometimes, firms in industrialized countries have to 
accept the not-so-favourable form of counter-trade, because they must find a way 
to export their manufactured goods and machinery products in a fiercely 
competitive market. Developing countries, for their part, prefer counter-trade 
because they can make use of the existing marketing channels of developed 
countries to promote their products and gain access to new markets. 
(8) Relaxed East-J#st relations. Over the past decade or two, international relations, 
including those between the East and West, have become relaxed to some extent, 
resulting in an increased amount of trading activities between the two sides. 
Counter-trade, originally a form of trade among Eastern countries, has thus found 
its way into East-West and North-South trade relations. 
2. Development of Counter-Trade 
Undeniably, counter-trade is not the best form of international trade in terms of 
economic efficiency. It has many problems arid defects. 
(1) Higher costs. Counter-trade involves a rather complex and extensive process 
of negotiation and implementation. It implies frequent co-ordination of relations 
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between the importer and the exporter, extending on occasion into the spheres 
of production and distribution beyond the scope of trade itself. So it can be very 
cumbersome. Negotiation on a single transaction may take se~eral years and 
involve repeated international travel between two or more countries, expending 
tremendous financial and human resources as well as unexpected hidden costs. 
And, there is always the possibility of failure in the end. Owing to the high costs 
involved, counter-trade often generates less-than-desirable economic results. 
(2) Higher risks. Counter-trade often involves transaction·of large amounts under 
long-term contracts, which entail greater risks. It is vulnerable to the fluctuation 
of commodity prices and exchange rates, thus likely to inflict economic losses 
upon one of the parties. Sometimes counter-trade transactions cannot be 
implemented due to various factors. To top it all, the importing ente~prise or 
agency often has no marketing expertise on commodities imported through 
counter-trade. It knows nothing about either their quality requirements, price 
ranges, or their market demands; hence it faces great risks. 
(3) Incompatibility with the principle of free trade. GATT and the IMF both advocate 
the principles of multilateral and free trade, whereas counter-trade is primarily 
confined to the bilateral sphere. Under counter-trade contracts, the seller 
undertakes to purchase a corresponding amount of goods from the buyer thus 
insulating a certain portion of commodities from free competition in the,market. 
Therefore, in a sense, counter-trade is incompatible with the principie of free 
trade. Though some new instruments have emerged, which would help multi-
lateralize, standardize, and documentarize counter-trade, it will still take time 
before such instruments can be used widely in international trade. 
( 4) Potential negative impact on social and technological progress. By the very nature of 
counter-trade, the exporter is required to make concurrep.t purchases of goods 
from the importer, thus relieving the importer of worries about market access, 
and reducing his initiative to improve the quality of his products. Counter-trade 
is also used frequently by the importer to peddle off his unsaleable goods. This 
situation prevents developing countries from perceiving the real needs of the 
international market and hampers their efforts to improve and diversify their 
products. In the long term, their social and technological progress can be held 
back, and the competitiveness of their products weakened. 
(5) Occasional upsetting of market stability. Many countries and firms enter into 
counter-trade because they are pressed by objective conditions. Goods thus 
exchanged do not necessarily meet their own needs, so they have to sell1them at 
reduced prices. In addition~ counter-trade can lead to a change of tradi'tional 
supply channels, thus upsetting the stability of the international market. 
As mentioned earlier, despite all its problems and defects, counter-trade is 
used or beginning to be used by over one hundred countries throughout the 
world. Many developing countries, and some developed ones, are requesting or 
extensively accepting counter-trade transactions. Some g'ove_rmn:ents do not 
recognize or even deny categorically that they are· engaged in counter-trade for 
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fear that such acknowledgement might give rise to the accusation that they are 
violating the principle of free trade advocated by GATT. But their non-
governmental commercial entities are eager for such trade. The United States 
andjapan are but two examples. It can be said, therefore, that the rise of counter-
trade has become a fact of life, a current trend in the world. Its development is 
determined by objective economic conditions independent of people's preferences. 
We believe that in spite of all its limitations, counter-trade enjoys advantages 
that one cannot expect from regular forms of trade. As a more flexible trading 
form, it can play a positive role in expanding exports, particularly the export of 
non-conventional items, and eiisuring their entry into new markets. Counter-
trade should not weaken nor substitute for regular trade but serve as a supplement 
to it. In the last few years, China has engaged in counter-trade with some ASEAN 
countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, and each side has some success stories of 
its own. It is hoped that this form of trade will develop even further as both sides 
accumulate more experience in overcoming the miny difficulties involved. We 
have reason to believe that counter-trade will play a gre~ter/role in expanding 
China's trade with ASEAN countries. The following is a review and analysis of 
the practices,· current status, and future prospects of counter-trade in Sino-
ASEAN trade. 
Ill. China's Counter-Trade Practices 
1. Policies and Practices in China's Foreign Trade 
Since the founding of the PRC, along with the continuous development of its 
national economy, the country's administration over foteign trade has undergone 
a process of gradual change and development. In the early fifties, in view of the 
needs of domestic economic restoration then, the Chinese Government had clearly 
declared that China would adopt and implement "the policy of controlling foreign 
trade and protecting trade" and an all-round administration over import and 
export was practised through such measures as formulating regulations on 
customs duties, import and export licences, and the centralized control over 
foreign exchange. On entering the sixties, a policy of state monopoly was 
implemented and thus all foreign trade transactions were taken over by the 
state-owned specialized companies engaged in import and export. 
China's foreign trade system has been over-centralized in operation and 
management. It had hampered the initiatives of the enterprises and became an 
obstacle to the further progress of foreign trade. Since the implementation of the 
open-door policy in 1979, China has started to reform its foreign trade system. 
First, the management power over foreign trade has been transferred to lower 
levels of control and the sole management by the specialized import and export 
companies no longer exists. With this change, the state has approved the setting 
up of over 1,000 foreign trade companies engaged in importation and exportation. 
Some of these are under the control of the local provincial, municipal, and 
autonomous region's governments; others are under the control of the various 
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industrial departments of the central government; and yet others are industry-
trade combined companies established by the productive enterprises. The 
channels for Sino-foreign trade has thus greatly increased. Second, the reform of 
the trade system requires the separation of the responsibilities on the part of the 
administrative body and that of the enterprises. The latter will manage themselves 
independently and the government departments concerned will perform merely 
some necessary administrative functions over these enterprises. 
The reform of the foreign trade system will aim at (a) full transfer of the 
management power to the lower levels in the future so that the enterprises will 
be able to choose freely the best economic and rational forms for foreign trade 
and enjoy full rights in decision-making; (b) the abolishment of mandatory 
planning and the establishment of direct planning and market regulation; ( c) the 
non-interference by the state in the operation of the enterprises; and ( d) the 
reliance mainly on legal and economic means for the management of foreign 
trade. 
Currently, the forms for Sino-foreign trade are mainly those that are accepted 
by international practices. On the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and 
helping supply each other"s needs, China has established trade relations with 
nearly 180 countries and regions of the world, most of which involve direct trade. 
Trade between China and the Soviet Union, the East European countries, as well 
as some of the developing countries assumes the form of clearing accounts trade 
on the basis of bilateral agreements. This part of bilateral trade is characterized 
by planning to some extent. 
For the sake of expanding trade, China adopts, according to international 
practices, various flexible trade forms, including counter-trade. 
2. Development of China's Counter-Trade 
China's counter-trade started in the early fifties. Upon the foundation of the PRC, 
China immediately entered into trade relations through counter-trade with the 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the chief form used then being that 
of barter trade by open account agreement. This system is still being used in 
trade between China and the Soviet Union and East European countries. 
Since the mid-1970s, counter-trade in its various forms has been vigorously 
on the rise throughout the world. China expanded the scope of its counter-trade 
in the early eighties to cover compensation trade and counter-purchase in addition 
to barter by open accounts agreement between governments. Apart from the 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries, China is now counter-trading with 
the United States and Japan as well as many developing countries. The country 
has gained some experience in this field which can serve as a basis for further 
expansion. 
3. Principal Forms of China's Counter-Trade 
At present, China's counter-trade is mainly composed of compensation, barter, 
and counter-purchase. 
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Compensation 
Compensation is often related to the importation of equipment and technology. 
There are mainly two forms of compensation used by China: direct compensation 
(buyback), where the buyback products are generated by directly using the 
imported equipment or technology; and indirect compensation, where products 
used as payment for the imported equipment or technology are not buybacks, 
but are other commodities agreed upon by the two sides. Derived from these two 
main forms are combinations of direct and indirect compensation, and compen-
sation entered into by three or more partners. 
From 1978 to 1985, China signed over 1,300 compensation contracts with 
other countries and regions,. saving over US$1.3 billion in foreign exchange. Of 
these, the majority fell into the category of direct compensation. The compensated 
proj~cts were mainly in the areas of light industry, textiles, agriculture, animal 
husbandry, fishery, m_etals and minerals, electronics, and the chemical industry. 
China's major partners in this field are firms in Horig Kong, Macao, and Japan. 
There are a few other countries and regions, too. 
Barter 
This is an ancient form of trade which has taken on new dimensions under the 
present circumstances. It is a direct exchange ".of:Commodities of equal values 
between two trading partners according to their needs. At present, China's major 
barter transactions are carried out between governments, and roughly fall into 
two categories. First, there is the package barter deal signed on an annual basis 
between governments, that is governmental barter trade. This is the most 
common form used between socialist countries. Having signed the agreement, 
the governments will delegate the power of negotiation, conclusion, and im-
plementation of specific contracts to state-owned trading corporations. In this 
kind of trade, e<:J,ch side establishes a general account in a bank, detailing each 
and every transaction entered into for overall settlement at the end of the year. 
Balances, if any, are transferable into the agreement for the following year. The 
other type is in the form of single barter agreements between governments, such 
as the agreement signed between the governments of China and Sri Lanka on 
bartering Chinese rice with Sri Lankan rubber at equal values, and the one 
between China and Equatorial Guinea on the latter's cocoa and Chinese . 
commodities of equal values. At present, barter, mainly in the form of trade by 
account, constitutes the single largest item in Chinese counter-trade. In 1985, the 
volume of transactions in this form between China and other socialist countries 
reached US$5 b,illion, amounting to 8.3 per cent of aggregate Chinese foreign 
trade. 
Counter-Purchase 
It is an arrangement in which one party, when it sells its commodities, must buy 
a certain amount of commodities from the other party according to agreement. 
It usually involves two separate contracts specifying convertible currency pay-
ments and mutual issuance of Letters of Credit. Commodities trade between the 
two sides may or may not be of equal value and are not necessarily related in a 
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direct manner .. For instance, the annual co-operative trade agreements between 
the China National Chemical Import and Export Corporation and such as-
sociated firms of Japan as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Ito all specify that the Japanese 
firms must purchase a certain <;tmount of Chinese commodities according to a 
certain ratio vis-a-vis the contracted value of Chinese imports from Japan. China 
Hua Neng International Electric Development Co~poration has also been very 
successful in arranging counter-purchase with General Electric of the United 
States, Mitsubishi of Japan, and ARS1DN of France, iri which these foreign 
companies undertake to buy Chinese commodities at a ratio of 50 per cent of the 
value of sets of power station equipment imported by China. At present, China 
. has no separate statistics on counter-purchase, but it is estimated to be quite 
modest. 
Apart from the three main forms of counter-purchase, China is moving 
gradually towards such other forms as tripartite trade and transit trade. For 
example, China National Chemical Import and Export Corporation is importing 
oil -from Iran for transit to Yugoslavia. In return China undertakes to provide 
services to Iran as compensation for oil imports. 
4. China's Policies and Regulations Governing Counter-Trade 
Although China has been engaging in counter-trade for some years now, its 
transactions have been largely in the form of governmental barter by open 
accounts agreement with the Soviet Union and East European countries. Other 
forms of counter-trade transactions are relatively few in number. Since China 
has not worked out any special policies and legal regulations relating to 
counter-trade, the following is only an attempt to summarize existing Chinese 
policy practices in this field, based on available information and data. 
(1) In order to promote economic ahd trade exchanges between China and other 
countries the government allows the various import and export corporations and 
localities to enter into counter-trade arrangements with other countries provided 
that such arrangements are not made at the expense of regular trade activities. 
(2) ·counter-trade arrangements' can be made with all other countries, but. a 
strong preference is given to those with whom China has trade deficits, through 
a form of combined import-export so that imports can be used as a leverage for 
generating more Chinese exports to those countries. 
(3) Although China has yet to work out a unified plan specifying which 
commodities can be counterrtraded and which cannot, yet in principle, it stresses 
that all those commodities which are in short domestic supply, are easy to market, 
and earn cash are not to be counter-traded, whereas those that are in abundant 
domestic supply and easily produced are considered appropriate for counter-
trade. China especially encourages counter-trade as leverage to generate more 
exports of machinery and power-generating products. 
(4) China, as a planned economy, plans all its imports and exports. All imports 
contained in the central or local plans are encouraged. to be made through 
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counter-trade. When any commodities other than those specified in the plans are 
to be imported, the importing entity must itself ensure export supplies and market 
access for the imported goods. 
(5) China provides preferential tariff treatment for compensatory trade. The 
government stipulates that when Chinese enterprises enter into processing, 
assembly, and small- and medium-sized compensatory ventures, their raw 
materials, auxiliaries, packaging materials, and spare parts to be imported 
according to contract, or their imported processing facilities through compensa-
tion, are all exempt from import duties. 
(6) Compensation projects are examined and approved either by the central or 
local governments according to the sums of money involved. Provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions are empowered to approve projects 
involving different levels of funding. Governmental barter in the form of open 
account agreements is carried out according to the plan of the state. Its 
authorization rests exclusively with the central government. Barter and counter-
purchase projects not covered by the state plan are subject to approval by the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). 
5. Chinese Institutions Engaged in Counter-Trade 
Although China has no specialized counter-trade companies, all firms and 
enterprises assigned the right to import are allowed to enter into this field. Quite 
a number of them have even set up their own counter-trade departments. In 
1986, the Chinese Government approved the establishment of three new 
corporations in charge of trade with specific regions of the world. These are the 
Corporation for African Trade, Corporation for Gulf Trade, and the Corporation 
for Latin American Trade, in an attempt to promote trade between China and 
these regions, mainly through counter-trade. Foreign firms interested in doing 
counter-trade with China can enter into direct contacts with Chinese foreign 
trade firms; those interested in compensation can contact Chinese production 
enterprises. All Chinese firms engaged in foreign trade, including counter-trade, 
are in principle assigned a specific scope of operation. If the imported and 
exported commodities under counter-trade are within the scope of.operation of 
one single corporation, it is allowed to handle the business independently. And 
if an overlapping of business operations occurs between two or more firms, these 
firms can co-ordinate and jointly enter into the process of negotiation, signing, 
and implementation of counter-trade contracts. 
6. Difficulties and Problems 
In the last few years, China's counter-trade has achieved some results. Experience 
has shown that this form of trade is a useful means of expanding foreign trade 
by increasing exports as well as the imports of certain production materials in 
short supply on the domestic market, without spending too much foreign 
exchange. Of all the forms of counter-trade, compensation, which combines 
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commodity trade, technology trade, and the provision of credits, has an important 
role to play in effecting technical renovation of the numerous small- and 
medium-sized Chinese enterprises which are technologically backward and whose 
equipment is outdated. It also helps to reduce state budgetary burdens. 
Of course, China has encountered some difficulties and problems in its 
counter-trade, particularly in the areas of extra-pl;;in barter and counter-purchase. 
(1) Difficulty in selecting the appropriate commodities. The dual role of counter-traders 
as both buyers a.r;id sellers makes it rather difficult for them to select commodities 
which they can supply and at the same time are needed by the other party. 
Besides, commodities offered by the exporter are often slow-selling products, 
which is not conducive to rapid agreement. On the other hand, neither party is 
willing to counter-trade products that can be readily sold for convertible currency. 
(2) Constraints of the existing Chinese foreign trade system. Under the present Chinese 
foreign trade system, there exists a distinct division between import and export 
operations, each having its own targets to fulfil, with little linkage between the 
two. The importer, whose sole responsibility is to import, is reluctant to involve 
his imports with the exports of other companies or agencies for fear of hampering 
his negotiation and conclusion of ~ontracts. 
(3) Incompatibilities between planned and non-planned requirements. China's import and 
export commodities are presently divided into planned and non-planned 
categories. When no import-export link is required, a foreign trade corporation 
is most hesitant to offer planned commodities within its scope of operation for 
counter-trade, for fear that it will be unable to fulfil its export targets. Local 
trading companies, on the other hand, deal mainly in extra-plan commodities if 
they choose to enter into barter trade. Since extra-plan barter is not allowed 
unless export tatgets set out in the state plan and unde.r governmental trade 
agreemehts are fulfilled, the remaining commodities are either slow-selling or 
new and extremely difficult to market. 
( 4) Lack of information. Chinese compensatiOn and extra-plan barter transactions 
are mainly carried out by local enterprises.' They know very little about foreign 
markets, and even less about counter-trade. 
(5) Inadequacies of related policies and legal regulations. Owing to a late start in 
counter-trade, except in the case of government barter by open accounts, China 
has yet to initiate and develop a complete framework of policies, legal regulations, 
and rules on it. 
IV. Counter-Trade Practices of ASEAN Countries 
Since the 1980s, the majority of ASEAN countries have been paying great 
attention to counter-trade because of slow growth. in the world economy, 
decreasing market demands, and falling prices for raw materials. 
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1. Indonesia 
Counter-trape was declared a government policy in January 1982. It is stipulated 
that in cases of government procurement or construction contracting, arrange-
ments must be made to export Indonesian products at values equal to those of 
the imported equipment or products, if Indonesian contracts with foreign firms 
(except those covering petroleum and natural gas) exceed a value of Rp500 
million per contract. But this regulation does not apply to foreign equity 
joint.:-ventures with private Indonesian citizens or state-owned firms, nor to 
projects utilizing preferential loans. In spite of strong objection from Indonesia's 
trading partners in its initial stage of implementation, this policy has come to be 
accepted with time. By early 1986, Indonesia had signed counter-trade contracts 
with twenty-nine countries committing more than US$1.5 billion. The single 
largest item was a contract with West Germany, which amounted to US$383 
million. Other major counter-trade partners include Japan, Canada, the United 
States, Singapore, Great Britain, South Korea, Romania, and Australia. 
Indonesia's largest import item through counter-trade is fertilizer. Also at the 
top of the list are equipment, train carriages, locomotives, chemicals, and airport 
equipment. Its major export items through counter-trade are veneer boards, 
rubber, coffee, tin, fresh prawns, aluminium, tea, and jellyfish. 
2. Malaysia 
In order to promote counter-trade, Malaysia set up a counter-trade group under 
the Ministry of Trade and Industries in July 1983 to co-ordinate relevant trade 
policies. Malaysia encourages counter-trade in the fields of government procure-
ment and projects using government loans or foreign assistance. For instance, 
when the government invites tenders for a particular project, the bidder who can 
arrange counter-trade has a greater chance of getting the contract. 
Malaysia encourages state agencies and private firms to engage extensively in 
counter-trade with countries which have contracted major governmental con-
struction projects, or with which Malaysia has trade deficits; socialist countries; 
and developing countries which have import potentials for Malaysian primary 
commodities and manufactured goods. The Malaysian Government has also 
declared a list of commodities that can be counter-traded so as to give 
counter-trade a well-defined scope. Several traditional products are not included. 
Other export-oriented regulations have also been promulgated by the govern-
ment, namely counter-traded products should not upset traditional markets of 
Malaysian products, and extra exports to a specific market are not allowed unless 
normal volumes are realized. 
3. Philippines 
The Philippines has engaged in counter-trade in recent years. In 1982, for 
instance, it signed a contract with Belgium trading coconut oil for military 
transport equipment. In the same year, it signed a contract with the· Soviet Union 
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agreeing to provide garments, furniture, sugar, and bananas in return for the 
construction of a local cement plant. Counter-trade transactions concluded in the 
Philippines are largely chance deals initiated by foreign parties when the two 
parties happen to have the needed goods. Up till now, the Philippines has had 
no established policies or practices relating to counter-trade. Economic difficulties 
in recent years seem to have created a better chance for counter-trade due to its 
potential for promoting exports. However, different departments still hold 
conflicting views on it. 
4. Singapore 
Singapore has devoted more attention to counter-trade in recent years. The 
Counter-Trade Service Group, established under the Trade Development Board, 
is responsible for providing data on trade, assisting in transactions, and helping 
local firms in establishing business contacts and exchanging market information. 
The government has taken measures to encourage counter-trade. For instance, 
starting from 30 May 1986, firms qualified to engage in counter-trade are given 
certificates of new trades, and are exempt from income tax on their returns from 
counter-trade for a period of five years. So far, six companies have acquired the 
status of new trades, of which five are affiliates of foreign corporations. Before a 
counter-trade company is granted the tax exemption, it must (a) have no less 
than S$500 thousand of committed capital; (b) do business of at least S$25 million 
annually; and (c) have two or three experienced counter-trade experts. Apart 
from the six certified companies, there are a few others whose applications are. 
being examined. Singapore has also sent government officials on promotion tour~ 
to Europe and the United States to attract interested firms to establish counter-
trade operations in Singapore. Its long-term objective is to make Singapore a 
counter-trade centre in the region. 
5. Thailand 
Faced with difficulties in exporting agricultural produce, private firms in Thailand 
have undertaken several counter-trade transactions with foreign companies. In 
1981, for example, Thailand traded rice for Soviet fertilizers, and in 1982 cassava 
for South Korean fertilizers. In 1986, the Thai Government reached an agreement 
with the government of Iran on counter-trading Thai rice with Iranian oil. At 
present, Thai counter-trade is still confined to farm produce and transactions are 
concluded mainly upon foreign initiatives. 
The government's attitudt! towards counter-trade has been one of non-support, 
non-intervention, and non-opposition. There are no special legal rules and 
regulations governing counter-trade nor any specialized agencies in the field. 
Thailand, as a member state of GATT, believes that counter-trade is at variance 
with the principle of free trade advocated by GATT. It also believes that 
counter-trade, for all its advantages for expanding export markets, is risky and 
may adversely affect the prices of traditional export commodities. Recently, 
however, the government seems to be paying more attention to counter-trade 
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and it is reported that a small group has been set up under the Foreign Trade 
Development of the Ministry of Commerce to study the issue. 
V. Counter-Trade between China and ASEAN Countries 
As China and ASEAN countries have become more active in counter-trade in 
recent years, their bilateral transactions have also increased and contributed to 
an overall development of bilateral economic co-operation and commercial 
exchanges. 
1. Present State of Counter-Trade 
Counter-trade between China and the ASEAN countries started in the mid-1970s. 
In August 1975, one month after diplomatic relations were established between 
China and Thailand, the Thai Government proposed to counter-trade equal 
values of Thai rice with Daqing crude and gasoil. A rice-oil agreement was signed, 
and Thailand used 200 thousand tons of rice to barter 310 thousand tons of 
Daqing crude and 250 thousand tons of gasoil. This was the earliest counter-trade 
agreement between China and ASEAN. There has been further development of 
this trade in the last few years. All the countries of ASEAN, except Brunei, now 
engage in a certain amount of counter-trade with China. 
Principal Forms of Counter-Trade 
For the last few years, counter-trade has involved mainly counter-purchase and 
compensation. 
Counter-Purchase. In 1986, China's Coal Import-Export Corporation and Metal 
Ores Import-Export Corporation reached an agreement with the Indonesian 
state-owned coal corporation, by which China supplied 100 thousand tons of coal 
in exchange for 100 thousand tons of cement from Indonesia. The value of this 
counter-purchase was about US$7.2 million dollars. China first exported the coal, 
then imported the cement. -Separate agreements were signed and Letters of Credit 
exchanged. In accordance with their scope of operation, the Chinese Coal 
Import-Export Corporation was responsible for the export part of the transaction, 
while the Metal Ores Import-Export Corporation looked after the import side. 
The bank set up counter-purchase bank accounts. 
The following agreements also took place in 1986: 
1. China reached agreement with a corresponding Indonesian company to 
exchange veneer boards for bicycle spare parts, jute, and cotton. 
2. An import-export company in Dalian, China concluded a counter-purchase 
agreement with a Malaysian company to exchange soya bean meal for palm 
oil. 
3. The Beijing Foreign Trade Corporation came to an agreement with a 
Philippine company to export Chinese vermicelli and paraffin wax in 
exchange for Philippine tin plate and palm oil, to the value of US$550 
thousand. 
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4. A Chinese export company in Wuhan reached an agreement with a 
Philippine company to export aluminium alloy in exchange for an equal 
value of semi-finished furniture. . 
5. The Foreign Trade Development Corporation of Guangdong signed an 
agreement with a Singaporean company to export rubber tyres to the value 
of US$100 thousand in exchange for rubber. Ths transaction was carried 
out with Letters of Credit, with the bank opening the accounts and assisting 
in the settlement. Two more similar transactions were completed in 1987. 
6. A foreign trade company in Beijing signed an agreement with a Sin-
gaporean company to export US$3.3 million worth of circuit plates for large 
computers in exchange for an equal value of steel. 
Compensation Trade. In 1987, the Shuiko Tin Selection Factory m Changning, 
Hunan Province concluded a compensation contract with the Long Da Mining 
Company Ltd. of Malaysia. Under this contract, China imported US$120 
thousand worth of complete ore selection equipment. Eighteen months after the 
installation and start of production, the Shuiko Factory was to use 38 tons of 
tin-in-concentrate as compensation. Both parties also agreed that the Malaysian 
side was to be responsible for all technical aspects of overall design, installation, 
trial production, etc. The Chinese side agreed to sell 2,400 tons of tin-in-con-
centrate to the Malaysian company at a preferential rate 4 per cent lower than 
world prices for a period of three to five. years after production began. This was 
valued at US$8.4 million. The 4 per cent preferential rate was to compensate the 
Malaysian side for its technical services. 
Other Forms of Counter-Trade 
Apart from these two forms of counter-trade, there also are tripartite and transit 
trade. Both can help to expand China's trade with ASEAN countries. In 1986, a 
Chinese foreign trade company in Shandong arranged to export to Singapore 
5,000 tons of sulphur, 4,000 tons of baryte, and 8,000 tons of calcined bauxite, 
all to the value of some US$300 thousand. At the same time, it imported through 
Singapore 5,000 tons of Botswana blue asbestos. Agai~ in 1986, the International 
Corporation of Economy and Trade in Wuhan, Hubei province exported through 
a Hong Kong company US$450 thousand worth of sesame seed, and received in 
exchange an equal value's worth of galvanized iron. According to the contract, 
the sesame seed was sold to countries of the ASEAN region. 
Role Played by Counter-Trade • < 
The above examples show that counter-trade between China and the ASEAN 
countries takes many forms, and the range of commodities exchanged is slowly 
increasing. Not only are traditional agricultural products involved, but also vital 
industrial materials and finished products. A complete counter-trade system for 
both sides will be difficult to" establish for a number of reasons. However, the 
upward trend of this kind of trade is certain. 
Of equal certainty is that counter-trade, because of its flexibility, is playing a 
positive role in stimulating trade exchanges and the economic development of 
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both countries. Take the case of the exchange of tyres .for rubber between 
Guangdong province and Singapore. On the Chinese side, this transaction 
increased sales of the product and opened up new channels for raw materials; on 
the Singapore side, sales of raw materials· were expanded and needed goods 
imported. Obviously both sides benefited. 
Of course, counter-trade between China and the ASEAN countries is still very 
limited, and it would be inappropriate to overestimate its role. However, the few 
instances cited above do seem to indicate that with the present stagnation of the 
world economy, rising protectionism, and falling demand of primary products, 
counter-trade between China and ASEAN countries can help to expand exports 
of indigenous products, while enabling imports of needed materials for national 
construction with a minimum expenditure of foreign currency. While some 
ASEAN countries have no shortage of foreign currency, others are in the same 
situation as China and lacking in foreign exchange. Counter-trade seems to be 
a most desirable means of expanding the flow of commodities, making up for 
each other's shortages, strengthening economic co-operation, and stimulating 
national economic development. 
2. Existing Problems and Difficulties 
Counter-trade between China and the ASEAN countries over the last few years 
does not lack success stories. However, there have been a number of problems 
and difficulties which can be summed up as follows: 
Insufficient Experience 
Counter-trade has certain similarities with ordinary trade payable in currency, 
but it is also more complicated, and the risk is greater. Problems may arise for 
both parties in the selection of commodities to be traded, target markets, 
quantities involved, loans, consignment exchange, etc., and these affect the 
transaction. Even after the contract is signed, unforeseen hitches may arise. There 
have been several cases of China-ASEAN counter-trade transactions that either 
fell through or remained unimplemented because of changes in commodity prices 
and foreign exchange rates. It has happened that one party has operated at a loss 
and in order to compensate .has quoted prices 20 to 30 per cent higher than 
normal, making it very difficult for the other party to accept. 
Limited Choice of Commod~ties 
It has been stated earlier that the trade structures of China and ASEAN countries 
are very similar. Imports consist mainly of mechanical equipment and industrial 
raw materials, while exports are agricultural and primary ore products. The 
number of commodities which are for export and also needed by the trading 
partner is thus limited in number. Most of these commodities are traded on cash 
terms, which further reduces the quantity available for counter-trade. For 
instance, a country may propose selling rattan furniture to China. Yet China 
produces this furniture itself, and of better quality too. So, obviously no deal is 
possible. From China's side, apart from coal, cotton, and a few other commodities, 
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most of the goods available for counter-trade are minor commodities which do 
not exchange easily with the major commodities of the other party. 
Incompatibilities in Trade Systems 
Neither China nor the governments of most ASEAN countries has as yet 
established a clear-cut policy on counter-trade, with the necessary laws and 
regulations to control it. There is no effective management organization in place. 
Certain countries take an ambivalent attitude towards counter-trade, and lack 
measures to stimulate it. In China, there is clear delineation of operations among 
the various foreign trade corporations. This means a single counter-trade 
transaction can involve several departments within a corporation, as. well as 
perhaps several other corporations. Co-ordination becomes a time-consuming 
and difficult business because no single corporation is in charge, On the ASEAN 
side, many of.the companies which wish to trade with China are family businesses 
with only one product to sell, and on a limited scale. They do not have the ability 
to engage in joint import-export operations like large corporations, and so 
counter-trade is difficult for them. 
Shortage of Information 
Counter-trade is more complicated and difficult than ordinary trade. Many 
factors are involved, thus a wide grasp of .international market information is 
needed. China and the ASEAN countries have already acquired a certain 
knowledge of each other's market needs and consumer habits, but further adaption 
to the needs of counter-trade is needed, so that more opportunities can be sought. 
This will improve the rate of successful transactions. 
VI. Prospects for Expanded Counter-Trade between China 
and ASEAN Countries 
1. Potentials for Counter-Trade Expansion 
There has been a good beginning for counter-trade between China and ASEAN 
countries. A long history of friendly relations, close geographical proximity, and 
similarity in life-styles are all favourable conditions for expanding trade. Over 
the last decade or so, there have been new developments in trade and they have 
become each other's important trading partners. It is necessary to review past 
experience and overcome difficulties to improve and expand this counter-trade. 
China and the ASEAN countries are all committed to developing their national 
economies .. As these grow, these countries will be able to supply more and more 
saleable goods to each other, which will find larger markets. China and its ASEAN 
neighbours are developing countries, but they have different natural resources 
and each has its technological advantages. Their commodities too can comple-
ment each other. For instance, one of the transactions mentioned above involved 
the import through compensation trade of Malaysian tin-ore selection equipment 
into China, because Malaysia is advanced in tin mining. China's agricultural 
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machinery and mini-hydroelectric equipment is also suitable to ASEAN 
countries. Both trade by cash and counter-trade have great potentials. 
The reform of China's foreign trade structure is a strong impulsion to 
counter-trade. As stated before, the present set-up limits the scope df operations 
of China's foreign trade corporations, and transaction formalities entail a great 
deal of red-tape, resulting in loss of trading opportunities and affecting morale. 
Ever since the implementation of policies of opening to the outside world and 
invigQrating the n9-tional economy, there has been a new impetus to economic 
development. The structural reforms now underway in the area of foreign trade 
will gradually expand foreign trade enterprises' ownership rights and allow them 
greater flexibility. This will create a better internal climate for counter-trade. 
2. Principal Forms to be Adopted 
In recent years, the main forms of counter-trade have been counter-purchase and 
compensation, with more transactions by the former. This was determined by 
the trading practices and structures of both parties. In the future, there should 
not be too much change in this, with counter-purchase still making up the major 
part of the trade, and compensation taking second place. 
( 1) Barter by governments by open account agreement is not a desirable form of trade. For 
China, this is the main form of counter-trade, but it is directed primarily at the 
centrally planned economies of the Soviet Union and. other socialist East 
European countries. The trading partners first sign an agreement to buy from 
each other a certain cash value of goods or labour over a given period of time 
(usually one year). Both sides open general accounts in their own bank and keep 
a record of each transaction. At the .end of the year, accounts are settled and any 
balance can be carried over into the next year. This kind of trade does not involve 
any foreign currency, there is no money £.r,w, and money is used only as a measure 
of price. However, this kind -of trade can only be carried out in a planned way 
by state-owned corporations entirely responsible for import and export. Any losses 
are also absorbed by the state. In view of the fact that ASEAN countries have 
market economies with foreign trade primarily in the hands of private businesses, 
this form of trade by open account agreement is not suitable. At most, single 
barter agreements between governments may be used. 
(2) Counter-purchase is a more' suitable method. This involves the signing of two 
separate contracts. For any one party, the first contract is for a ·certain value of 
exports which are paid for in money; the second contract is for imports either of 
equal or unequal value to the exports, also paid in money. Both contracts are 
signed at the same time, but can be implemented at different times. Counter-
purchase is flexible and involves money flows, making it very similar to ordinary 
trade. It is the most popular form of counter-trade used in the world today. In 
the future, China and the ASEAN countries should adopt this form as much as 
possible in their reciprocal trade. 
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(3) Compensation trade can be used as a supplementary form. Compensation is often 
used when the transaction involves one party supplying the other with equipment 
or technology. China and ASEAN are all developing countries with a generally 
low level of technology. The machinery and technology they need are mainly 
imported from the developed industrialized countries, and so compensation trade 
is carried out more with them. Therefore\ there is limited scope for compensation 
trade between China and the ASEAN countries. 
However, both China and ASEAN do have certain technologies that are in 
the forefront of world standards; or they possess certain technologies that may 
only be of medium standard but do meet the needs of the other country. It would 
be possible to have exchanges in these limited areas. Under compensation, the 
importing side can save foreign exchange, which increases the possibility of trade. 
ASEAN countries can also act as middlemen in the transfer of technology from 
the advanced industrialized countries to China. 
3. Commodities for Counter-Trade 
Chinese Possibilities 
Up to now, China has no regulations regarding which commodities can or cannot 
be counter-traded. Past export transactions have involved primarily rice, cotton, 
jute, gunny-sacks, coal, agricultural machinery, and other mechanical and 
electrical products. It has imported timber, steel, cement, veneer boards, pig iron, 
chemical fibres, and automobiles. 
ASEAN Possibilities 
These countries have no specific regulations either. Past transactions have 
involved mainly exports of rubber, timber, veneer boards, steel, cement, tin, 
aluminium, palm and coconut oil, rice, maize, cassava flour, bananas, sugar, and 
textiles; imports have been complete sets of equipment, transport and mechanical 
equipment, chemical fertilizers, petrochemical products, coal, steel, iron ore, rice, 
cotton, animal feed, and defence equipment. 
Possible Transactions 
The above lists show that many of China's exports are products the ASEAN 
countries need to import, and vice versa. China can export rice, cotton, jute, 
gunny-sacks, coal, petrochemical products, chemical fertilizers, agricultural 
machinery, and other mechanical and electrical products. China can import 
timber, veneer boards, steel, aluminium, cement, chemical, fibres, palm and 
coconut oil. 
There have been proposals to exchange Indonesian rubber or cement for 
Chinese coal; Malaysian rubber and palm oil for Chinese rice and coal; Thai rice 
and chemical fibres for Chinese cotton and farming machinery. There have been 
other proposals for Singapore to assist China with-its new power stations and 
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airports through compensation trade by way of crude oil and other ores. Other 
proposals have been made, but their success will depend on prices and many 
other factors. 
4. Some Recommendations 
On tlie basis of existing conditions and the experience of the past few years, we 
propose the following recommendations for promoting counter-trade between 
China and the ASEAN countries. 
First, there should be recognition of the role of counter-trade. The countries 
concerned should clearly recognize that counter-trade is a method of promoting 
exports, which serves as a useful supplement to normal trade. Specific policies, 
directives, and principles concerning counter-trade should be elaborated. If both 
parties ·so wish, they can follow the Latin American example by signing 
government agreements on counter-trade. · 
Second, single barter should be the preferred form. In the ASEAN countries, 
traders are mostly private businesses and there are relatively few state-owned 
enterprises. Therefore it is not possible to engage in multiple-commodity barter 
as China does with the Soviet Union and other East European countries in which 
settlement is done through the banks. Counter-purchase contracts payable in 
money seem a more appropriate method. By negotiating a single commodity at 
one time the transaction should be easier to conclude and implement. 
Third, counter-trade should be done on the private as well as on government-
to-government basis. Although in ASEAN trade is mainly in private hands, 
important commodities like rice and oil are often controlled by the state. 
Counter-trade in these commodities can be between governments, because the 
risk in\IOlved is great and the governments are better able to sustain it. As for 
counter-trade with private busine.sses, those with high credibility and strong 
management should be selected. Business should begin on a small scale and 
gradually grow. -· 
Fourth, _.information flows should be increased. Counter-trade is still in a 
preliminary stage so both sides must increase information flows. Seminars on 
counter-trade should be encouraged; the organizations concerned can periodically 
exchange data and information. More use should be made of information 
provided by ESCAP, UNCTAD, and other international and regional organiza-
tions. 
Lastly, there should be more training of personnel. The process of counter-
trade is complicated, which means greater demands on skills and management. 
Those in:volved must have a good knowledge of international finance and trade, 
be experienced, and have a sound grasp of the details inv:olved. They must know 
about commodity specifications and prices, markets and channels of distribution, 
transport and insurance. They should also be familiar--with the import-export 
regulations of each country and their trading habits. They must be clear-headed, 
resourceful, and able to deal with sudden crises. China and the ASEAN countries 
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lack such people and so they should provide training for such people as quickly 
as possible. 
It is out hope that trade between China and the ASEAN countries will continue 
to develop steadily and that counter-trade will play a positive role in promoting 
it. 
APPENDIX TABLE A10.1 
China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1975-86 
(In million US$) 
Year Total Trade Exports Imports 
1975 14,750 7,264 7,486 
1976 13,433 6,855 6,578 
1977 14,804 7,590 7,214 
1978 20,638 9,745 10,893 
1979 29,333 13,658 15,675 
1980 38,136 18,119 20,017 
1981 44,021 22,007 22,014 
1982 41,606 22,321 19,285 
1983 43,616 22,226 21,390 
1984 53,549 26,139 27 ,410 
1985 69,602 27,350 42,252 
1986 71,574 ·30,022 41,552 
SOURCES: China's General Administration of Customs, Customs Statistics 
1980-87; Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Publishing House, Almanac 
of China's Foreign Economic R.elations and Trade, 1980 (Beijing, 1980). 
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APPENDIX TABLE A10.2 
China-ASEAN Trade, 1975-86 
(In US$10,000) 
1975 1980 1985 
Exports to ASEAN 
Brunei 131 391 294 
Indonesia 6,148 12,502 
Malaysia 10,857 17,378 18,802 
Philippines 4,386 24,455 31,588 
Singapore 23,792 44,521 208,037 
Thailand 1,067 34,321 11, 706 
Total ASEAN 40,233 127,142 282,929 
As % of China's Total Exports 5.54 7.02 10.34 
Imports from A SEAN 
Brunei 2 1 
Indonesia 7,161 ~3,203 
Malaysia 5,104 25,478 20,032 
Philippines 2,144 9,471 9,832 
Singapore 3,477 23,990 24,250 
Thailand 1,395 13,139 26,179 
Total ASEAN 12,120 79,241 113,497 
As % of China's Total Imports 1.62 3.96 2.69 
Total Trade with ASEAN 
Brunei 131 321 295 
Indonesia 13,309 45,705 
Malaysia 15,961 42,856 38,834 
Philippines 6,530 33,926 41,420 
Singapore 27,269 68,511 232,287 
Thailand 2,462 47,460 37,885 
Total ASEAN 52,353 206,383 396,426 
As %· of China's Foreign Trade 3.55 5.41 5.70 
SOURCES: Sarne as for Appendix Table A10.1. 
APPENDIX TABLE A10.3 
China's Balance of Trade with ASEAN Countries, 1975-86 
(In US$10,000) 
1975 1980 1985 
Brunei 131 317 293 
Indonesia 977 -20,701 
Malaysia 5,753 -8,100 -1,230 
Philippines 2,242 14,984 21, 756 
Singapore 20,315 20,531 183,787 
Thailand 328 21,182 -14,473 
Total ASEAN 28,113 47,901 169,432 
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APPENDIX TABLE A10.4 





















































Total Export Import 
~ 
~ 
-1.7 -1.6 -12.9 
28.0 15.3 35.9 
-2.0 1.6 -4.7 
-6.7 5.3 0.7 
27.7 36.1 0.2 
-4.4 -19.4 14.8 
14.0 17.3 7.5 
APPENDIX TABLE A10.5 
Major Chinese Exports to ASEAN Countries, 1985 
(In US$10,000) 
Animal Tinned Raw Cotton Por- Crude Oil Paraffin 
Feed Soya Food Cotton Medicine Cloth Paper celain Coal Oil Products Tools 
Brunei 6 3 3 
Indonesia 122 4661 1,236 5 
Malaysia 2,036 1,842 384 83 166 869 472 236 178 39 91 287 
Philippines 101 46 56 217 35 5 3,232 12,176 368 139 19 
Singapore 2,348. 121 1,106 340 738 2,997 596 402 292 142,448 28,192 1,122 344 
Thailand 800 5 1,475 183 8 164 3 2,186 236 255 
Total ASEAN 5,407 6,624 2,047 3,190 1,087 4,096 1,270 646 3,705 154,624 30,785 1,588 905 
As % of China's 19.2 24.4 5.4 7.6 6.7 4.4 11.9 5.7 11. 9 28.4 21.1 38.4 8.5 
Total Exports 









APPENDIX TABLE A10.6 





Rice Sugar Rubber Timber Chinese Copper Steel ~ 
Medicine Polythene ~ 
Indonesia 206 2,205 25 516 
Malay&ia 4,252 8,292 10 
Philippines 814 56 1,147 178 
Singapore 2,479 460 1,427 2,123 
Thailand 2,669 2,920 3,202 141 3 264 
Total ASEAN 2,669 3,734 10,139 10,553 
627 
1,147 2,134 2,387 
As % of China's Total Imports 48.1 16.2 81.2 12.4 12.4 2.3 0.4 9.4 
SOURCE: Same as for Appendix Table A10.5. 
APPENDIX TABLE A10.7 
ASEAN Investments in China 
(In US$10,000) 
1979-83 1984 1985 1986 
Agreement Agreement Actual Agreement Actual Agreement Actual 
Value Value Investment Value Investment Value Investment 
Indonesia 76 173 8 150 49 
Malaysia 37 57 24 25 24 41 
Philippines 428 210 229 4,056 311 381 108 
Singapore 5,447 6,256 120 7,551 1,014 14,076 1,362 
Thailand 250 2,328 445 1,456 884 1,321 910 
Total ASEAN 6,125 8,907 851 13,260 2,242 15,952 2,470 
SOURCES: China Prospect Publishing House, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1984-87. 
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Export Processing Zones: 
The ASEAN Experience 
Mohamed Ariff 
I. Introduction 
Export processing zones (EPZs) began to make their appearance in Southeast 
Asia in the early 1970s, when several countries in the region shifted their 
industrialization and trade strategies in favour of manufactured exports. Several 
member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have 
established EPZs. Singapore may be considered as one big EPZ, in the sense that 
industries in this city-state enjoy certain privileges which are quite similar to 
those offered to EPZs elsewhere in the region. Brunei has no EPZs. The other 
four ASEAN countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, have a number of EPZs. It will indeed be an interesting exercise to 
systematically study their experience from which some valuable lessons may be 
learned. 
EPZs refer to designated industrial estates specializing in the production of 
manufactures meant mainly for exports, and constitute enclaves within the 
economy enjoying favoured treatment with respect to imports of intermediate 
goods, corporate taxation, provision of infrastructure, and waivers from certain 
regulations. 
While a wide definition of EPZ, as adopted by the World Export Processing 
Zones Association1 would include the Singapore and Hong Kong city-st~tes, a 
narrow definition would restrict the use of the term EPZ to a distinct physical 
area which is cordoned off. In Malaysia, these zones are referred to as free trade 
zones (FT.Zs), as the term emphasizes the enclave nature of the operation, that 
is free from the trade and customs regime of the country. None the less, we shall 
use the term "export processing zones", as the main activity of the zones is 
processing for exports rather than trading as such. 
The enclave nature of the operation makes the EPZs particularly attractive to 
transnational corporations (TNCs), although the investments in the zones are 
not entirely foreign. TNCs are closely associated with EPZs, as the latter make 
it possible for TNCs to spread out their production facilities on a world-wide 
basis. The special privileges given to firms operating within an EPZ are, of course, 
subject to the conditions that most, if not all of the output is exported and that 
all imported inputs are either fully utilized within the zones or re-exported. 
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The export processing act1v1t1es in the zones have been primarily labour-
intensive. Employment is the main reason for countries establishing EPZs, and 
low labour cost is the primary reason for the TNCs to move off shore. The major 
manufacturing activities in the EPZs involve light manufacturing processes, such 
as the production of garments and footwear and the asse_mbly of semiconductors, 
light consumer electronics, and electrical goods. 
The EPZ firms are sometimes described as "footloose", as they are capable of 
migrating with considerable ease, should the terms and conditions offered by 
another country be significantly more favourable than that of the present host 
country. In fact, EPZs may be seen essentially as devices for attracting such firms 
whose international mobile capital goods can be combined with internationally 
immobile domestic labour. 
EPZs may also be viewed as a means for "exporting" labour indirectly. EPZ 
firms sell their products abroad and earn foreign exchange, out of which local 
workers are paid. It is in this sense that employment in the EPZs is similar to 
sending workers abroad to labour-scarce countries like those in the Middle-East.2 
In this paper an attempt is made to study the ASEAN experience with EPZs. 
Singapore and Brunei are excluded, as they do not have EPZs in the conventional 
sense. Thus, the focus of the present study is ,on the experiences of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Of these, it is Malaysia which has had 
the longest and most rewarding experience. To be sure, the ASEAN experience 
is by no means uniform, it would be quite misleading to make any generalization. 
In what follows, an effort is made to examine the ASEAN experience in a 
systematic and analytical manner. However, the paper makes no claim to 
originality, as it is not based on any first-hand information or primary data 
collection. The paper draws' heavily on secondary data provided by a number of 
available studies. The main contribution of the paper lies in bringing into a 
sharper focus some of the salient features of EPZs in a comparative framework. 
Section II discusses the policy framework within which EPZ operations take 
place in the ASEAN region. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
III highlights the main characteristics of EPZs in the ASEAN region by providing 
a profile. In Section IV, the economic performance of EPZs is examined. In 
Section V, an evaluation of EPZs in the ASEAN region and their prospects are 
studied. Finally, in Section VI, some broad policy inferences with respect to EPZs 
are drawn in the light of the ASEAN experience. 
II. Policy Framework 
The last fifteen years have witnessed a rapid proliferation of EPZs in the ASEAN 
region. Today, there are more than twenty EPZs operating in ASEAN, excluding 
several licensed manufacturing warehouses (LMWs). 3 The rapid expansion of 
EPZs within ASEAN is by tlO means a historical accident. It is the result of 
deliberate policies designed to bring about important changes in the pattern of 
production and trade. 
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1. The Rationale 
The ASEAN countries began to adopt export-oriented industrial strategies, 
starting with Singapore in the mid-1960s, followed by Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand in the late 1960s, and by Indonesia in the early 1980s. The main 
reason for this policy switch was the disappointment with the generally poor 
record of import substitution. This, however, did not mean the end of import 
substitution in the region. Rather, it was a case of both import substitution and 
. export promotion co-existing side by side. Obviously, there have been policy 
conflicts in the sense th~t measures designed to support import substitution 
activities tended to discourage export-oriented ones and vice versa. One way of 
circumventing this dilemma was to create enclaves within which export processing 
could take place outside the trade and customs regime to which the rest of the 
economy is subjected. EPZs are thus viewed as devices which have enabled the 
ASEAN economies to pursue outward-looking export promotion and inward-
looking import substitution simultaneously. 
Malaysia took the lead by establishing a number of EPZs from 1971 onwards. 
The Philippines was the next to follow with the establishment of the Bataan EPZ 
in 1972 and a number of smaller ones in the early 1980s. Indonesia established 
its first EPZ in Jakarta iri,1973 and its second in Batam Island in 1978. Thailand 
is a latecomer in this regard, as it had no operating EPZs until 1982. 
This trend towards EPZs was reinforced by the growing labour shortage and 
rising wage levels in the industrial countries, resulting in offshore investments in 
countries with abundant labour, rather than in importing guest workers. This 
process would have been impossible, had it not been for the technological 
advances which allowed large-scale production based on standardized com-
ponents to be subdivided into production processes which could be distributed 
world-wide. Thus, in the case of electronics, the development of integrated circuits 
and miniaturized components has reduced the manufacturing activity to com-
ponent insertion on the printed circuit boards. Textiles is another typical EPZ 
activity that lends itself to international division of labour. 
Protectionist barriers against the exports of EPZs in developed countries tend 
to be less formidable than those erected against non-EPZ exports, given the highly 
international character of the EPZ activities. TNCs involved in EPZ activities 
themselves become a powerful lobby against protectionist forces in their home 
countries. TNCs have taken advantage of the low or zero tariffs on several 
products by producing them off shore and marketing them in their home markets. 
Thus, items 807.0 and 806.30 of the Tariff Schedule of the United States (TSUS) 
provide for duty-free re-entry into the United States of domestically produced 
components which have been assembled abroad. In the case of textiles, the main 
impetus. for offshore operation was to circumvent the import. quotas imposed 
under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. 
For the TN Cs, the main rationale for operating off shore lies in the enormous 
savings in labour cost. It has been estimated that the share of labour cost in total 
manufacturing cost can be reduced from 60 to 20 per cent by locating 
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semiconductor plants in offshore bases. 5 The substantial cost savings are largely 
due to the wide wage differentials between developed countries and the ASEAN 
countries. Thus, for example, labour costs in the semiconductor industry in 
ASEAN is roughly one-tenth of that in the United States. 
2. Objectives 
The policy framework for EPZs in the ASEAN region, of course, depends on the 
objectives ASEAN countries have set for themselves. Although specific objectives 
for establishing EPZs may vary between ASEAN countries, there are four main 
objectives common to all, namely employment creation, export promotion, inflow 
of foreign investment, and transfer of technology. 
Employment seems to be the single most important factor which has prompted 
ASEAN countries to establish EPZs. In most cases, the EPZs are located in areas 
where there were surplus labour. Thus, the choice of location depended largely 
on the availability of unemployed labour, although other factors such as the 
availability of infrastructure have also played crucial roles. With unemployment 
running at double digit rates in certain areas,
6 
it was felt that the establishment 
of EPZs would absorb excess labour and reduce social tensions. 
Export promotion, as an objective, was consistent with .the outward-looking 
posture of ASEAN economies which have traditionally remained fairly open. The 
precarious dependence on primary exports and the need for export diversification 
through increased exports of manufactures, especially non-traditional ones, have 
led the governments to lay considerable emphasis on labour-intensive light 
manufacturing in which ASEAN countries have comparative advantage. 
Manufactured exports would not only bring in foreign exchange but also provide 
an outlet for the growing industries which were constrained by the small domestic 
markets. The presence of TNCs in the EPZs facilitated penetration into the 
developed country marke.ts. 
EPZs were also seen as a conduit for the inflow of foreign investment into the 
ASEAN countries. As investment and trade have always been interconnected, 
more trade called for more foreign investment, which \\!_as also needed in some 
cases to ease the balance of payments strains. Foreign investment is viewed as 
superior to foreign loans, as the foreign creditors will have to be paid principal 
and interest in foreign currencies while the foreign investors will have to earn 
enough before they can repatriate profits. EPZs were therefore designed as 
enclaves so that foreign investors would find the regulatory environment more 
congenial. 
In addition, there were a number of other objectives, such as technology 
transfer, linkages, and regional development, in setting up EPZs. It was hoped 
that EPZs would facilitate the transfer of technology from developed countries 
to the host countries. It was filso envisaged that EPZs would establish linkages 
with the rest of the economy which would result in positive externalities. EPZs 
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were also looked upon as a mea.ns of dispersing industries to promote a balanced 
regional development. 
3. Incentives 
The ASEAN countries offer a number of fiscal and financial incentives to EPZ 
investors, although the incentives do vary between countries in terms of both 
variety and magnitude. Fiscal incentives consist of exemptions from corporate 
income tax, import duties~ import quotas, property taxes, and excise duties. 
Income tax exemptions take the form of tax holidays of up to eight years, or 
other modes such as accelerated depreciation and indefinite carry-forward of 
losses. Financial incentives include liberal foreign exchange facilities, unrestricted 
remittance of profits and approved royalties, and local investment finance on 
favourable terms. In addition, preferential rates for electricity and water supplies 
are also offered. 
As mentioned earlier, incentives given to EPZ enterprises vary from country 
to country. Malaysia seems to offer the most generous tax incentives in the region. 
It provides a variety of tax incentives including pioneer status, 
7 
labour utilization 
1. f 8 • d" 9 1 d d . . JO 11 !l d re ie , mvestment tax ere it, acce era:te epreciat10n, export a owance, an 
export refinancing facilit/ 2 A large proportion of the EPZ firms in Malaysia 
started off with pioneer status which proved to be quite effective in attracting 
foreign investors. In addition to the various forms of tax relief which are also 
available to non-EPZ firms, EPZ firms enjoy duty-free imports of intermediate 
goods and capital equipment. As the goods purchased by EPZ firms within 
Malaysia are treated as exports, they are exempted from excise duty. Sales from 
EPZ firms to the domestic economy (which cannot exceed 20 per cent of the 
annual output) are treated as imports into Malaysia, and are thus subject to 
tariffs, sales tax, and excise duty. 
In contrast, the Philippines provides the least generous fiscal incentives for 
EPZs in the ASEAN region. First, the Philippines does hot offer tax holidays to 
investing firms. Second, the fiscal incentive package given to EPZ firms is fairly 
similar to that extended to foreign investors outside the EPZs. None the less, the 
non-fiscal incentives offered to EPZ firms are quite favourable. There are 
generous deductions from taxable income in the form of accelerated depreciation 
and carry-over of net operating losses incurred in the first ten years of operation, 
for a maximum of six years immediately following the year of loss. Other fiscal 
incentives given by the Philippines include deductions from taxable income of 
half the cost of training labour. As in the case of all EPZs in the ASEAN region, 
the Philippines also allows duty-free imports ofraw materials, intermediate goods, 
and capital equipment. In fact, the Philippines exempts such procurements from 
virtually all regulations applying to imports. Moreover, EPZ firms are also exempt 
from most municipal and provincial levies. 
Indonesia provides a fairly generous incentives package which includes tax 
holidays of three to five years. Thailand's investment incentives seem more 
generous in the sense that tax holidays are given for a period of three to eight 
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years. Duty-free imports ofraw materials semi-processed inputs and capital goods 
are also permitted in Indonesia and Thailand. 
Among the non-fiscal incentives, physical infrastructural facilities are probably 
the most important. A wide range of infrastructural facilities are provided, 
including roads, railways, harbours, airports, and factory buildings or developed 
sites. These are supplemented by support services such as electricity, water, 
telecommunications, sewerage, and waste disposal. 
Th us, for example, the EPZ in Jakarta provides standard factory buildings of 
2,000 square metres each at subsidized rates, with harbour, airport, utilities, and 
transport and telecommunication facilities. The EPZs in Penang have leased their 
land for sixty years (which are renewable) from the State Economic Development 
Corporation (SEDC) and they enjoy excellent transport and telecommunication 
facilities, with a seaport eight miles away and an airport just one mile from the 
zone. In addition, they are provided with standard factory buildings. In the 
Bataan EPZ of the Philippines, a twenty-year lease of the land (which can be 
extended to another twenty years) with standard factory buildings is offered. 
Infrastructural facilities at Bataan are pretty lavish with housing facilities, medical 
and shopping centres, a golf course, a club house, etc. In the Lat Krabang EPZ 
(Thailand), land can be purchased or leased, while standard factory buildings 
are offered on a lease basis. Infrastructural facilities at Lat Krabang include roads, 
utilities, and flood protection. 
4. Administration 
The EPZs in the ASEAN countries, with the notable exception of Thailand, are 
administered by specially instituted authorities which are separate from the 
central government authorities that administer other industrial estates. In 
Thailand, the Industrial Estate Authority administers all industrial estates 
including the EPZs. No separate body has been set up to administer EPZs in 
Thailand, presumably because EPZs are not all that important for that country. 
The Philippines has set up an EPZ Authority (EPZA) which is governed by 
a seven-member Board of Commissioners headed by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry. As the EPZA comprises senior officials from various ministries which 
are concerned with trade and investment policies, there is a close co-ordination 
among various government agencies at the top level. This arrangement helps 
expedite the processing of applications and minimize bureaucratic red tapes. 
In Indonesia, the Jakarta EPZ comes under the jurisdiction of P. T. (Persero) 
Bonded Warehouses Indonesia, a state corporation. As this corporation has no 
authority to intercede between the Jakarta EPZ firms and the various government 
departments, the former have to deal directly with various ministries and 
government agencies, including customs and port authorities. Consequently, long 
delays, red tapes, and corruption are not unheard of. 13 · 
Malaysia has adopted a de~entralized system in organizing and administering 
its EPZs which are governed by the Free Trade Zones Act 1971. Under this Act, 
the Finance Ministry may designate any area as an EPZ after consultation with 
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the state government concerqed. State Economic Development Corporations 
(SEDCs) have been appointed to manage the EPZs in their respective states. 
Thus, the administration of EPZs in Malaysia differs from that in other ASEAN 
countries, in that the zones are controlled at the state level without any central 
government authority over all EPZs in the country. While this might have eased 
the EPZ administration in the country, the fact remains that there is very little 
cq-ordination between the various SEDCs and that EPZ firms have to deal with 
the various government departments individually. However, the LMWs are 
administered at the federal level through the Department of Customs and Excise. 
III. Profile14 
The profile of EPZs in the ASEAN region varies from country to country. 
Malaysia keeps a high profile, not only in terms of the large number of such 
zones and the large number of companies involved, but also in terms of the scale 
of operation and size of labour force. By contrast, Thailand keeps a rather low 
profile, as·its four EPZs (three in Bangkok and one at Lat Krabang) are a recent 
development. Although there are important differences which distinguish EPZs 
in one country from those in another, there are many common characteristics, 
which are alrriost universal, as was already seen earlier~ 
1. Location and Size 
Malaysia has the largest number of EPZs (11), not only within ASEAN but also 
in the entire Asia-Pacific region. The Philippines has 7 EPZs, Thailand has 4, 
and Indonesia has 2. Many of these EPZs are located close to international 
airports and seaports. Given the extensive international linkages, it is not hard 
to understand why proximity to harbours is so important for EPZ operations. 
Materials or components brought in from abroad are sent out again after they 
are processed or assembled. In the case of electronics, air transport is important, 
-given the high value-to-weight ratio which makes transport cost no more than a 
small proportion of the total value of output. 
The EPZs which are in operation in the four ASEAN countries are listed in 
T:able 11.1. It can be observed from the table that EPZs are more widely 
distributed within Malaysia, than is the case in the Philippines (Figures 11.1 and 
11.2). However, all of the EPZs in Malaysia are located in the west coast of the 
Malay Peninsula. Penang alone accounts for nearly 50 per cent of the EPZs. In 
terms of area, the Penang EPZs are far more important than those found in other 
states. In terms of number of firms, the Bayan Lepas (Penang) zone is the largest 
with 41 firms, while the smallest is the Prai Wharf (Penang) zone with only 1 
firin. 15 
As shown in Table 11.1, ASEAN EPZs range from 10.5 hectares Qakarta EPZ) 
to 425 hectares (Leyte EPZ). The Jakarta EPZ is small in size, mainly because 
it was meant to be a pilot project. The average si~ of the Malaysian EPZs is 
123 hectares, while that of the Philippine EPZs is significantly larger, that is 189 
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FIGURE 11.1 
Location of Free Trade Zones in Malaysia 
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FIGURE 11.2 
;u>cation of Export Processing Zones in the Philippines 
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TABLE 11.1 
EPZs in ASEAN: LocatiOn, Area, and Year in Operation 
Country/Area 
Indonesia 
Jakarta (Tanjong Priok) 
Batam Island 
Malaysia 
Pasir Gudang (Johore) 
Tanjong Kling (Malacca) 
Batu Berandam (Malacca) 
Bayan Lepas (Penang) 
Prai (Penang) 
Prai Wharf (Penang) 
Pulau Jerejak (Penang) 
Sungei Way (Selangor) 
Ulu Kelang (Selangor) 












n.a. - not available. 
- not yet operational 











































SOURCE: ESCAP/UNCTC, An Evaluation of Export Processing Zones in Selected Asian 
Countries, Publication Series B, No. 8 (Bangkok: United Nations, 1985). 
hectares. Most of the EPZs in the ASEAN region were established in the early 
1970s. After a short lull, a second wave of EPZs was established in the region in 
the early 1980s. 
2. Industries and Products 
The main activities of EPZs m the ASEAN region, as indeed elsewhere, fall 
within the realm of manufacturing. The ASEAN EPZs concentrate on assembly 
activities, such as electronic a_nd electrical products, and fabrication of products, 
such as garments and other wearing apparel. 
Assembly activities, as .represented by electronics and light machinery, lend 
themselves smoothly to EPZ operations. Parts and components are easily 
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TABLE 11.2 





Lat Krabang (Thailand) 
SOURCE: Same as for Table 11.1. 
Major Products 
Garments, electronics, food 
Electronics, textiles/garments, rubber goods, and 
metal-based products 
Electronics, garments, transport equipment 
Garments, electrical goods 
transported from parent companies abroad for simple assembly operations in the 
EPZs. It is mainly low wages and investment incentives which have caused the ·· 
labour-intensive phase of the manufacturing operation to be conducted in 
ASEAN EPZs. 
Clothing and textiles represent another important EPZ manufacturing activity 
that is highly labour-intensive. In some cases, however, garments "manufacturing'' 
also takes the form of assembly operation. Thus, for example, the production of 
garments in the Jakarta EPZ consisted in the late 1970s mainly of relabelling 
garments produced in Hong Kong and Singapore so that they can be re-ex.ported 
as Indonesian exports under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme 
operated by the European Economic Community (EEC). 16 More often than not, 
however, imported cloths are transformed into garments for exports. 
Most EPZs are engaged in the production of a variety of goods except for a 
few zones with restricted product lines. Products of EPZs include electronics 
components, electrical machinery, scientific and precision instruments, textiles, 
garments, footwear, toys, plastic products, and sport goods. Electronics production 
CO!J-Sists mainly of components, such as semiconductors, and consumer electronics, 
such as calculators, digital watches, and electronic games. Garment manufactur-
ing consists mostly of clothing and knitted and woven goods, while textiles include 
both cotton and synthetic fibres. Table 11.2 presents a summary of the product 
lines in selected EPZs in the ASEAN region. 
To be sure, the range of products manufactured varies not only from country 
to country but also from zone to zone. Thus, in Malaysia, Bayan Lepas EPZ 
produces mainly electronics components, while the Pulau J erejak EPZ is meant 
for shipbuilding industries. Likewise, in the Philippines, the Bataan EPZ 
concentrates on garments while the Leyte and Tabangao EPZs are meant for 
large-scale projects such as chemical and petroleum products. 
3. Enterprises and Employment 
As at the end of 1984, there were 186 firms operating in the ASEAN EPZs (Table 
11.3). In terms1 of the number of firms, the Bataan EPZ in the Philippines tops 
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TABLE 11.3 
Number of Firms Operating in Selected 


























SOURCE: Same as for Table 11.1. 
. . 
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the list. Conversely, the Jakarta EPZ has the smallest number of firms. However, 
it must be stressed that the number of firms is a poor indicator of the importance· 
of the EPZs, as the firm size varies considerably. Thus, the Penang EPZ 
(Malaysia) firms employ an average of 725 workers, compared with less than 100 
workers per firm in the Lat Krabang EPZ (Thailand). 
EPZ firms, are usually much larger than non-EPZ firms. Thus, for example, 
the average paid-up capital for EPZ firms in Malaysia in 1981 was US$2.3 million 
as compared with the average ofUS$1.1 million for the Malaysian manufacturing 
industry as a whole.17 It is also of relevance to note that LMW firms in Malaysia 
tend to be smaller and more labour-intensive than the EPZ firms. While 
electronics dominate both groups of firms, garments are proportionately more 
important among LMWs than among EPZ firms. 18 
As mentioned earlier, TNCs are the major participants in many EPZs in the 
region, especially those in Malaysia and the Philippines. For example, wholly-
owned TNC subsidiaries account for more than half of the firms in the Penang 
EPZs, while wholly-owned Malaysian firms number only 4, with joint-ventures 
making up the rest: fn the Philippines, TNCs account for about 80 per cent of 
all EPZ enterprises. 
As shown in Table 11.4, TNCs operating in the ASEAN EPZs include 
Motorola (United States), Siemens (Federal Republic of Germany), Northern 
Telecom (Canada), Shell (United Kingdom), and Matsushita Qapan). Undoub-
tedly, American and J apane.se firms dominate EPZs in Malaysia and the 














Major TNCs in Selected ASEAN EPZs 
TN Cs 
Matsushita, Minolta, NEC Qapan); Monsanto, Motorola, 
and Texas Instruments (United States). 
N.S. Electronics (United States); Siemens (Federal 
Republic of Germany); Kao Denko Qapan). 
Kanebo Qapan); Hewlett-Packard (United States); Bosch 
(Federal Republic of Germany); Northern Telecom 
(Canada); and Sony Qapan). 
Astec Electronics, Inc. (Hong Kong); Hitachi Qapan); 
and Wilson Electronics (United States). 
AM Cable TV Industries and Fairchild (United States). 
Adriste (Italy); and Texas Instruments (United States). 
Shell (United Kingdom). 
SOURCE: Same as for Table 11.1. 
The Jakarta EPZ is an exception to all these in that none of the developed 
country firms are directly involved, although there is evidence suggesting that 
many of the Jakarta EPZ firms are owned indirectly by North American and 
European firms. 19 None the less, it is investments from India, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore which are far more important than local investments in 
the Jakarta EPZ. Developing country participation in the Bataan EPZ is also 
noteworthy. In addition to TNCs from Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are eight 
TNCs from other developing countries, which include Malaysia, the Republic of 
Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia. In Thailand, the Lat Krabang EPZ has a very 
low level of foreign equity, as 85 per cent of the enterprises are owned by Thais.20 
IV. Economic Performance 
The fact that EPZs have been around for a long time and have grown in numbers 
in recent times signifies a fairly satisfactory economic performance of EPZ firms. 
While the economic performance of EPZs do vary from country to country, 
industry to industry, and firm to firm, the continued popularity of EPZs may be 
indicative of their importance to the economies of the host countries. 
As mentioned earlier, the EPZs in the ASEAN region have been set up with 
certain objectives. It would be meaningful to examine the economic performance 
of ASEAN EPZs in the light of the major common objectives. 
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1. Employment and Wages 
Employment generation was an important objective for establishing EPZs, 
particularly for countries with surplus labour. One important criterion for the 
choice of EPZ sites was the availability of cheap labour. Other things being equal, 
the latter consideration would be the most crucial one, given the unskillea-labour-
intensive nature of the entire operation. 
In Malaysia, where EPZs have made a considerable impact, total EPZ 
employment in 1982 was approximately 70,000 or 8.8 per cent of the total 
manufacturing employment in the country. While EPZs, by and large, are 
relatively more labour intensive than non-EPZ firms, rapid technological changes, 
especially in the electronics industry, have tended to reduce the labour content 
of the value added. Thus, for instance, the proportion of wage payments to total 
sales in EPZ electronics factories has declined from 9.1 per cent in 1973 to 7.4 
per cent in 1976. However, this proportion rose subsequently to 8.2 per cent in 
1982, apparently due to rising real wages. 21 
As alluded to earlier, the LMWs tend to be a little more labour-intensive than 
EPZs, but then, in terms of the proportion of wages in total value added, there 
is very little difference between EPZs and LMWs. In both cases, wages account 
for about one-third of total value added. 
Although EPZs are generally located in areas of labour glut so as to take 
advantage of low wages and to provide much needed employment opportunities, 
there are important exceptions. One of these. is the Bataan EPZ. A large 
proportion of the workers in this EPZ are migrants from neighbouring provinces 
such as Pangasinan and Ilocos, as Bataan itself has a labour shortage. The Bataan 
EPZ provides employment for about 23,000 workers, each firm employing 
roughly 400 workers on the average. The Jakarta EPZ provides jobs for only 
about 7,700 workers, which is not surprising given the small size of the zone 
where there are only eighteen firms. 
A striking feature of EPZ employment in the ASEAN region is the higli ratio 
of female labour. For example, about 74 per cent of the workers in the Bataan 
EPZ are females. Similarly, in the Malaysian EPZs, female workers account for 
about 75 per cent of the total employment. The ratio is much higher in certain 
zones: thus, for instance, at the Sungei Way EPZ (Malaysia) females constitute 
more than 80 per cent of the direct labour force. In the Jakarta EPZ, the high 
proportion of female workers is even more conspicuous, as the 90 per cent female 
Component of the work-force is typical of light manufacturing. One consequence 
of the enclave nature of the EPZs is the absence of trade unions. There is some 
evidence to suggest that labour regulations are violated in Malaysia22 and the 
Philippines.23 It also appears that work norms are set so high in the EPZs that 
workers tend to develop physical and mental disorders. The outbreak of mass 
hysteria in electronics firms in the Malaysian EPZs may be attributed to the 
excessive stress and strain experienced by the workers. 24 
While it is no secret that most TNCs have moved into EPZs to take advantage 
of low wages, there is no evidence that workers are being "exploited". Firms in 
EPZs are no worse paymasters than those outside the zones. In fact, wages in 
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the Jakarta EPZ are roughly 10 per cent higher than those offered outside the 
zone.25 Wages paid in the Malaysian EPZs are fairly comparable to those outside 
the zones. However, wages paid in the Bataan EPZ appear to be slightly below 
those paid in similar industries in Metropolitan Manila. 
26 
But, then, it must be 
pointed out that living costs are hi~her in Metropolitan Manila than in Mariveles 
where the Bataan EPZ is located. 7 · . 
2. Investment Flows 
There is little doubt that generous. fiscal incentives, coupled with liberal 
investment regulations that include 100 per cent foreign ownership, have 
generated great interests in EPZ among foreign investors, especially TNCs. This 
is attested by the conspicuous presence of TNCs in the ASEAN EPZs. 
However, capital investments made by foreign enterprises in the ASEAN EPZs 
are, generally, relatively small and rarely exceed US$1 million per unit. This is 
not surprising, as EPZ operations by their very nature are labour-intensive. This 
is especially so in electronics assemblies and garments manufacturing. Relatively, 
capital-intensive investments are exceptions, as in the case of the US$39-million 
car body stamping plant which employs some 300 workers in the Bataan EPZ.2 8 
The Malaysian EPZs have attracted the most foreign investments. The total 
paid-up capital of factories in the Penang EPZ, the largest "free trade zone" in 
Malaysia, is in the order ofUS$130 million, 86 per cent of which (US$112 million) 
is foreign-owned. In contrast, total investments in the Jakarta EPZ amount to 
US$22 million, of which only 25 per cent (US$5.5 million) is accounted for by 
foreigners. The investment figures are even less impressive for the Lat Krabang 
EPZ in Thailand where total investments amount to only US$7.4 million, with 
foreigners accounting for merely 15 per cent of it (US$1.1 million). 29 . 
The structure and composition of private capital invested in the Bataan EPZ 
are such that the role of foreign investment has been minimal. It appears that, 
in 1979, only 6.4 per cent of the capital consisted of equity, of which only 26 per 
cent (US$3.5 million) was foreign. It is of interest to note here that 83.6 per cent 
of the capital invested in the zone consisted of borrowings, .92 per cent of which 
was domestic. The high debt/equity ratio of foreign firms in the Bataan EPZ is 
h "k" . d d 30 t us very stn mg m ee . 
3. Exports and Foreign Exchange Earnings 
The importance of export activities in the EPZs can hardly be exaggerated, as 
these zones are deliberately designed to cater for the export market. However, 
nearly all the EPZ firms do sell a small proportion their output in the local market. 
To be sure, EPZs represent a policy tool for the export diversification drive which 
is meant not only to reduce the dependence on primary .e_xports but also to 
increase foreign exchange earnings. While it cannot be denied that the propor-
tions of manufactures in total exports have risen, due in part to the EPZs, the 
contribution of EPZs to f<;>reign exchange earnings does not appea~ to be 
substantial. The latter observation is consistent with the fact that the import 
content of EPZ manufactures tends to be extremely high. 
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In fairness, however, it inust be pointed out that the export performance of 
EPZs differs between countries, with some countries more successful than others 
in using the EPZ as an instrument in their export drive. Malaysia is an 
outstanding example of a country which has made fairly good use of the EPZs 
as export springboards, significantly contributing to the expansion of manufac-
tured exports. Malaysia could not have emerged as the world's leading exporter 
·of integrated circuits in so short a time, had it. not been for its EPZs. EPZs have 
also made Malaysia an important exporter of professional, scientific, and 
controlling instruments and the leading Third World exporter of precision 
instruments. 
In terms of net export earnings, however, the contribution of EPZs seem 
somewhat unimpressive, due mainly to the heavy import content. Thus, for 
example, in Malaysia, EPZ imports amount to as much as 95 per cent of EPZ 
exports. In the case of Indonesia, EPZ imports· in 1979 actually exceeded EPZ 
exports. The Philippine experience also shows that. EPZ contribution to net 
foreign exchange earnings have been negative. While the Bataan, Mactan, and 
Baguio City EPZs have made positive contributions in terms of net foreign 
exchange earnings, the Leyte and Tabangao EPZs incurred net foreign exchange 
losses, with the net losses in the latter zones outweighing the net gains in the 
former. 32 · 
4. Linkages and Technology· Transfer 
The enclave nature of the EPZs in ge~eral, and the assembly mode of EPZ 
operation in particular, seem tB have a built-in bias in favour of strong 
international linkages at the expense of domestic ones. It would therefore seem 
quite unreasonable to expect EPZs to develop strong linkages with the rest of the 
economy. 
However, domestic linkages are not totally absent. The Malaysian experience 
in this regard is not too discouraging. Thus, for example, local purchases by the 
Penang EPZ firms in 1982 accounted for about 5 per cent of their total purchases 
of raw materials and capital goods. Relatively small as these local purchases are, 
they represent an additional export outlet for local firms, since sales to the EPZ 
firms are regarded as exports. Moreover, the Penang EPZ has helped create new 
industries outside the zone to serve the EPZ firms. These include insurance, 
freight, stamping, machinery, mould and die-making, and packaging activities 
that have been established outside the Penang EPZ in response to demand from 
the firms in the zone. 
The ASEAN experience suggests that the extent of linkages between the EPZs 
and the domestic economies would depend mainly on the EPZ locations and the 
type of EPZ industries. The more developed the surrounding area, the more 
extensive the EPZ linkages. Thus, the linkages developed in Penang tend to be 
much stronger than those deve1oped in Bataan, as the latter represents a relatively 
underdeveloped part of the Philippines, while the former is far more developed 
in terms of infrastructure and other facilities. Another reason why the Bataan 
EPZ has low linkages with the local . economy is the heavy concentration on 
288 Mohamed Arif] 
electronics and optical industries which have a high import content. It has been 
reported that the local content in the Bataan EPZ fell from 16 per cent in 1972-7 4 
to 6 per cent in 1982, as garments and footwear industries in the zone declined 
in relative importance to electronics and optical industries. 33 The ASEAN 
experience shows that garments and wearing apparel manufacturing industries 
in the EPZs have about 10 to 15 per cent local raw material content. In contrast, 
electronics and. optical instruments in ASEAN· EPZs use only about 1 per cent 
local raw materials. 
The performance of EPZs in terms of technology transfer seems even more 
limited. The predominance of assembly processes entailing mainly unskilled 
labour inputs and the lack of local research and development (R & D) restrict 
the scope for the transfer of technology. Thus, for instance, in semiconductor 
manufacturing, high-tech mask-making and wafer fabrication processes are done 
in the home country while only the simple assembly processes are undertaken in 
the EPZs. The low-level technologies incorporated into the assembly operation 
tends to limit the technological spin-offs. It also appears that much of the 
technology applied in the zones have little relevance to the development needs 
of the country's domestic economy. 
Having said all these, one must hasten to add that technology transfer via 
EPZs is not insignificant. Training is given to local technical and production staff 
in the use of machinery and production technology. It is not unusual for TNCs 
to send some of their local staff for overseas training in the parent companies. 
For examfle, one electronics manufacturer has sent 160 Malaysians to Japan for 
training.
3 
There is also evidence that training provided in Malaysian EPZs to 
local technicians, supervisors, and managers is considerable and that the 
employees have found these skills useful even when they had left their jobs for 
employment outside the EPZs. 35 
V. Evaluation and Outlook 
In any evaluation, subjective or normative judgements cannot be avoided. It 
would, however, be misleading to make sweeping generalizations about ASEAN 
EPZs. As stated earlier, there are significant differences in the structure and 
performance ofEPZs within a country and between countries. Thus, what is true 
for one EPZ is not necessarily so for another. 
Tables 11.5 to 11. 7 provide time series information on three important zones 
in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines which substantiate the preceding 
analysis. An effort is made in this section to evaluate EPZs in the light of the 
ASEAN experience and to examine their future prospects in the region. 
1. A Critique 
One criticism that is often levelled against EPZs concerns their very enclave 
nature. EPZs are treated like foreign territories in the sense that they are not 
subject to all the rules and regulations of the land. There is evidence to suggest 
Number· of firms 
Employment (no. of persons) 
Exports 
Imports of raw materials 
Local raw materials 
Imports of capital goods 
Local capital goods 
Local/Total raw materials ( % ) 
Local/Total capital goods (%) 
Total official taxes 
Estimated unofficial taxes 
TABLE 11.5 
Indonesia: Aggregate Economic Performance of the Jakarta EPZ 
























































Malaysia: Aggregate Economic Performance of the Penang EPZ 
(In million US$) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Number of firms IO 21 31 32 33 34 35 38 41 49 50 
Employment (no. of 15,627 18,569 22,412 25,780 27,895 30,372 35,379 38,355 38,078 36,298 
persons) 
Exports 2.1 53.6 94.2 192.2 274.3 226.1 591.5 1,085.2 972.9 717.5 714.9 
Local sales 0.1 2.3 1.7 6.9 4.6 9.4 2.6 0.06 14.5 47.1 
Imported raw mterials 1.3 55.0 127.8 185.1 237.2 193.6 425.6 492.4 707.0 523.1 520.6 
Local raw materials 0.07 0.9 2.8 7 .1 6.7 10.5 13.3 14.5 14.5 16.9 22.8 
Raw materials from EPZs 5.8 )2.0 13 .1 40.3 64.5 76.6 48.9 82.3 
Imported capital 0.4 13.4 54.7 29.7 9.5 15.2 120.0 53.9 36.6 36.7 36.6 
equipment 
Local capital equipment 0 1.8 18.9 27.0 2.2 3.6 2.6 21.7 3.3 4.0 3.9 
Local/Total raw materials 5 2 2 4 3 5 3 3 2 3 4 
(%) 
Local/Total capital equip- 0 12 26 48 19 19 18 29 8 10 10 
ment (%) 
Total wages paid 0.9 6.3 5.2 14. 7 17 .4 25.0 43.2 56.6 72.3 80.5 83.4 
Total electricity used 0.4 0.7 1.7 5.7 6.9 7.0 8.6 12 .1 17 .8 23.5 23.2 
Total taxes paid 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.74 1.29 
SOURCE: Same as for Table 11.5. 
TABLE 11.7 
Philippines: Aggregate Economic Performance of the Bataan EPZ 
(In million US$) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Number of firms 5 14 16 39 38 47 51 51 52 52 
Employment (no. of persons) 1,298 3,321 5,502 8,962 12 ,821 17 ,495 18,877 19,204 19,858 19,410 
Exports 0.4 0.9 2 .1 7.3 22.4 39.7 73.1 98.2 122.7 134.0 159.6 
Local sales 3.9 6.8 4.3 11. 7 13.6 14.8 16.5 13.3 8.2 5.0 
Imports of raw materials 0.2 0.5 2.9 7.8 15.8 38.5 47.3 66.4 77.3 81.2 122.3 
Local raw materials 0.07 0.2 0.3 0.8 4.2 9.9 3.8 7.9 9.5 7.4 8.5 
Local/Total raw 30 30 8 10 21 20 7 11 14 9 6 
materials (%) 
Total wages paid n.a. 0.6 1.5 2.5 4.3 6.6 9.3 14.4 20.4 22.4 21.8 
Total electricity used n.a. 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 
Total taxes paid n.a. 0.07 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.5 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.4 
Total domestic borrowings 1.8 22.B 61.4 117 .8 85.9 89.4 3.3 2.8 2.3 1.9 1.5 
SOURCE: Same as for Table 11.5. 
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that some TNCs in some EPZs do make use of their special privileges to avoid 
payment of taxes through the transfer pricing mechanisms. Thus, for instance, 
most EPZ firms in the Philippines declare operating losses, even after several 
years of operation, and at the same time expand their activities. 
36 
Owing to 
transfer pricing, the true foreign exchange earnings of an EPZ firm presumably 
exceed its declared foreign exchange earnings. 37 There. is very little that the host 
country governments can do about such practices. 
Apparently, the most significant contribution EPZs have made is in the realm 
of employment creation. Even in this regard, EPZs are not free from criticisms. 
First, it may be pointed out that the overall contribution of EPZs to labour 
absorption is quite limited. 38 Even in Malaysia, where there is a large number 
of EPZs in operation, EPZ employment accounts for only 11 per cent of the 
manufacturing work-force or 1.6 per cent of the total employment in the country.3 9 
Second, employment effect is limited in the sense that it is often confined to a 
particular area or age group. Thus, nearly all the EPZ work-force consists of 
young female workers aged between 16 and 25. There is also the danger that the 
workers might be "exploited" in the sense they might be overworked and 
underpaid, as labour laws of the land are waived for EPZ firms. 
Yet another criticism that can be drawn from the preceding analysis is that 
EPZs cannot be an important source of net foreign exchange earnings, given the 
high import and the low local content of .EPZ manufactures. Worse still, as 
observed above, even the small net export earning can be lost through transfer 
pncmg. 
No less serious is the criticism that EPZs are not conducive to the development 
of backward and forward linkages and the transfer and diffusion of technology. 
The heavy intermediate-input bias in favour of imports works against the 
development of linkages so that EPZs may remain "enclaves" detached from the 
rest of the economy. Besides, there is very little scope for technology transfers 
given the highly unskilled-labour-intensive nature of the assembly lines. It 
appears that what transpires in the name of"training" is not technical "know-how" 
but simply mechanical "show-how", so much so that local personnel employed in 
EPZs gain little insight into the technology involved. 
Cost-benefit studies have indicated that the costs of establishing and main-
taining EPZs, by and large, exceed the benefits accruing to the economy of the 
host country. However, there are significant variations, and no generalization is 
possible. 
The cost-benefit study of the Bataan EPZ in the Philippines showed a negative 
net benefit. Warr has found that, while the benefits of the Bataan zone in terms 
of employment and foreign exchange earnings were negligible, costs were 
sizeable. It is no secret that the Bataan EPZ has generated less than half the 
employment projected, even after twelve years in operation that has resulted in 
20,000 direct jobs. Foreign exchange earnings of US$82 million (1973-82) pale 
in comparison with the US$192-million cost of building the zone. According to 
Warr, the estimated loss from the domestic borrowings of foreign firms in the 
Bataan EPZ alone would cancel all the total gain from the generation of 
employment and foreign exchange. 
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Another study by Castro41 showed that, in the Bataan EPZ, exports and 
employment have been too far below the projected level, while investment costs 
of the zone were geared to a high level of operation. With the occupancy rate in 
the zone remaining at the 50 per cent level, and foreign investment falling short 
of expectations, the Bataan zone would seem to be a liability rather than an asset, 
even though Castro herself was cautious about drawing any firm conclusions on 
the social costs and benefits of the zone. 
To be sure, the Bataan EPZ is not the only EPZ in the Philippines facing 
problems. The Mactan EPZ is also emerging as an expensive EPZ. It was 
envisaged that this zone would become the headquarters of thirty manufacturing 
firms and provide jobs for 30,000 people. All these expectations remain no more 
than dreams. The Mactan zone thus seems to be yet another bad egg in the 
Philippines' basket of EPZs. 
A study of the Jakarta EPZ by Warr also revealed that the costs outweighed 
the benefits, if the so-called "unofficial levies"42 are excluded. However, if 
unofficial levies are counted as a benefit, the net benefit would then become 
positive. While it cannot be denied that unofficial levies are an important source_ 
of benefits from the Jakarta EPZ, such benefits are confined to a limited, 
privileged group of individuals. 
The Malaysian EPZs, in general, appear to be far better off than their 
counterparts elsewhere in ASEAN. A recent study by Warr has shown that 
benefits emanating from the Malaysian EPZs, due to employment, use of 
domestic raw material and domestic capital equipment, purchase of electricity, 
and payment of taxes, clearly outweigh the costs incurred in establishing, 
maintaining, and administering the zones. An earlier World Bank study of the 
Malaysian EPZs also had indicated positive net benefits for Malaysia. 43 All this 
notwithstanding, it appears that the net gains from LMWs exceed those from 
EPZs. The main explanation for this is that t_he LMW programme did not entail 
the high infrastructure costs associated with EPZs, and LMW firms are, on the 
average, more closely integrated with the domestic economy than EPZ firms. 
2. The Other Side of the Coin 
While most -criticisms of EPZs are valid, some are exaggerated. In fairness, 
criticisms against EPZs do not necessarily constitute criticisms against EPZ firms. 
For, upon closer scrutiny, it appears that the failures of EPZs are mostly due to 
the ways in which the zones were planned and are run by the authorities. 
The Bataan EPZ in the Philippines provides an outstanding case in point. Its 
poor record can be attributed to several factors, the most important of which is 
its wrong location in an isolated, undeveloped, and mountainous area. The choice 
ofMariveles in the Bataan province for the EPZ necessitated costly infrastructural 
work and expensive movement of workers from outside the province. Evidently, 
it was political rather than economic considerations that led to the selection of 
the Mariveles 'area which was totally unsuitable for industrial development. 
Secondly, the natural disadvantage of the EPZ site attracted fewer firms than 
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hoped for, resulting in a low 50 per cent occupancy rate, which in turn rendered 
the operational cost of the zone extremely high. Finally, policies pursued by the 
authorities themselves were not always favourable to EPZs. The policy decision 
to expand the customs bonded warehouse scheme as part of the overall export 
development programme took the thunder away from the zone. The Bataan EPZ 
had to compete not only with other EPZs in the country but also with bonded 
warehouses. The latter have a clear edge over the EPZs in that they do not entail 
the heavy infrastructural costs associated with bounded zones. 
EPZs are often unfairly blamed for the low labour absorption. This disap-
pointment is largely due to the unrealistically high employment targets projected 
in the feasibility studies of certain zones. There is evidence to suggest that the 
export sector's employment coefficients are significantly above that of the 
domestic sector's for Malaysia and the Philippines. 44 EPZ firms are apparently 
much more labour-intensive than domestic-market-oriented firms. That EPZs 
account for a small proportion of the total work-force in any country lends no 
·support to the criticism, since much would depend on the number, size, and 
location of EPZs in any given country. In fact, one must not lose sight of the fact 
that employment accounts for not more than half the gross benefits from the 
EPZs in Malaysia and the Philippines.45 
The charge that EPZs are "sweatshops in the sun" where labour is exploited 
is also an exaggerated criticism. As was seen earlier, wages paid by EPZ firms 
are comparable to, if not higher than, what similar workers receive outside the· 
EPZs. That trade unions are kept out of the EPZs and that EPZ firms are not 
legally obliged to adhere to the labour regulation of the host country do not 
necessarily imply that working conditions in EPZs are exploitative. There is no 
evidence to suggest that labour regulations are violated in the EPZs any more 
than they are outside the zones. In fact, there is some evidence to the contrary: 
it is much easier for manufacturing firms located outside the zones to evade these 
regulations than it is for the EPZ firms in the Philippines. 46 
In any case, comparisons of wages ar,d working conditions in the EPZs and 
elsewhere must be interpreted with utmost caution, since not all the variables in 
the comparison are standardized. It would be incorrect to compare wages TNCs 
in EPZs pay to their workers with what they pay in their home countries. The 
fundamental question is whether wages would have been any higher in the 
absence of EPZs. Although such a hypothetical question is hard to answer, there 
is no basis to think that they would have been. In fact, there is little doubt that 
EPZs have helped raise wages in the surrounding areas by causing, for instance, 
a shortage of unskilled domestic help for local households. In addition to 
competitive wages, some EPZs offer superior non-wage benefits such as free 
transportation and subsidized meals. All these clearly show that EPZ firms are 
no monsters that prey on defenceless workers. 
That EPZs have very little linkages with the domestic economy seems quite 
obvious. As stated earlier, the enclave nature of EPZs itself is not conducive to 
the development of such linkages. Duty-free treatment for raw material and 
intermediate inputs, in particular, tends to discourage the sourcing of such inputs 
from local suppliers. However, in this context, it would be wrong to ignore the 
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externalities, which are manifestations of indirect linkages that EPZs have 
developed; with the surrounding localities. In this regard, the impact of the zones 
on the economy through the multiplier effect should not be ignored, for incomes 
generated within EPZs are translated into effective consumer demand outside 
the zones. 47 Thus, for example, it has been estimated that trade and commerce 
generated by the Bataan EPZ provide gainful employment to more than 10,000 
workers outside the zone. That EPZs generate little net foreign exchange earnings 
per unit of export is not surprising, given the import-dependent nature of many 
of their manufacturing activities. Even so, an EPZ firm that exports 100 per cent 
of its output will have to earn enough foreign exchange to pay the wages and 
other local costs. In other words, local workers are paid de facto in foreign exchange, 
as they would be if they had gone overseas for employment. This reinforces our 
earlier observation that the establishment of EPZs is tantamount to exporting 
labour. Be that as it may, it would be quite unreasonable to expect the EPZ firms 
to have a high proportion of local value added in order that their contribution 
in the form of net foreign exchange earnings is substantial. For one thing, EPZ 
firms, which face intense international competition, cannot afford to have a high 
local content as it would tend to raise their production cost. For another, local 
linkages take time to develop. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that linkages in the sense oflocal procurement 
are only a sm.all part of the broad issue of externalities in the form of technology, 
skill, and other spill-over effects. As was already noted, EPZs are subject to the 
criticism that the latter benefits are minimal, as their activities consist primarily 
of unskilled-labour-intensive assembly-type operations. But, then, there are other 
externalities which are likely to be more beneficial. Some of these result from 
increased knowledge of and closer contact with international markets and 
technologies. Some other benefits result from the international diffusion of 
imported technology through demonstration and competition effects, inter-firm 
movement of technical and managerial personnel, and the development of 
subcontracting networks. 
3. Future Prospects 
EPZs in the ASEAN region do not seem to have lost their lustre yet, even though 
cosFbenefit studies have thrown serious doubts abouf th~ir usefulness in .certain 
specific cases. While there is still room for a few more zones to be established ia 
the region, further proliferation of EPZs seems very unlikely. This does not mean 
the end of the EPZ era in ASEAN. It seems likely that the existing zones will 
exp~nd their operation in a vertical fashion and shift their mode of operation 
from assembly to actual manufacturing. 
The Malaysian EPZs, especially the electroniq production, seem ready for 
such a restructuring. The Malaysian Government is likely to assign a high priority 
to the development of an indigenous electronics industry over the next decade 
and beyond. Malaysia is expected to put considerable emphasis on the production 
of high value-added consumer electronics products such as video cassette 
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recorders and digital television sets. Malaysia aims to restructure the electronics 
sector so that the share of electronic components in the total electronics output 
will fall from 85 per cent presently to 61 per cent by 1995, and that of industrial 
electronics will rise from 6 per cent now to 15 per cent in 1995. Likewise, the 
share of consumer electronics is expected to grow from 9 per cent at present to 
24 per cent in 1985. 
Such an expansion programme will entail manufacturing of certain strategic 
raw materials for the electronics industry, such as high purity metals and metal 
alloys, industrial ceramics, and electronics grade chemicals, and the designing 
and development of software and integrated systems. 
EPZ electronics firms are expected to play a key role in this transformation. 
Already there are signs that they will respond positively to this call. For instance, 
National Semiconductor in Penang will be soon setting up Malaysia's first wafer 
fabrication plant. Similarly, Motorola, which came to Malaysia shortly after 
National Semiconductor, has a plant manufacturing communication equipment, 
in addition to two plants making semiconductor components. It may be noted 
that Motorola has recently expanded its plant in Sungei Way into the largest and 
most complex semiconductor manufacturing operation of Motorola world-wide. 
The future prospects of EPZs in other countries seem less promising. It seems 
likely that the existing zones will continue their operation without major changes 
in their scale of operation or structure of production. In any case, their share in 
aggregate manufacturing employment exports and output will probably remain 
small. Be that as it may, a few more EPZs may be established in the ASEAN 
region. Thus, Indonesia has plans to set up EPZs at Surabaya, Cilacap, 
Banjarmasin, Palembang, Medan, and Ujung Padang, while the Philippines has 
put on hold its plans for new EPZs in Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Albay, 
La Union, and Davao. 
The high costs entailed in the establishment and administration of EPZs have 
led ASEAN countries to seek alternative instruments of industrial development, 
such as licensed manufacturing warehouses or customs bonded factories and the 
duty rebate·or drawback system. 48 Thus, it appears that instruments such as these 
will become increasingly more popular in the region. Besides, the intense 
competition among developing countries for EPZs and the stiff inter-EPZ 
competition may lead to an incentives war to attract foreign investors or to 
prevent the footloose factories from migrating to other countries. 
Another. factor which may downplay the importance of EPZs in. ASEAN in 
the future is the rising level of real wages in ASEAN countries. Rising real wages 
tend to erode the comparative advantage in labour-intensive light manufacturing 
activities that EPZs usually specialize in. 
Perhaps the most serious threat to the future of EPZs in the ASEAN region 
comes from the new micro-electronic revolution that may obviate the need for 
EPZs altogether. Possibilities for increas·ed automation of assembly operation, 
complete integration of all stages of production, and industrial synergetic effects 
may cause TNCs to reduce or withdraw their offshore operations in EPZs. 
Already, in the semiconductor manufacturing, the mask-making and wafer 
fabrication processes require less and less labour due to automation. 
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A more immediate challenge to the EPZs stems from the nsmg tide of 
protectionism in the advanced countries. In the wake of global recession of the 
early eighties, many developed countries, including the United States _and the 
EEC members, have raised their tariff ~nd non-tariff barriers against many EPZ 
products, especially consumer electronics, garments, textiles, and machinery. No 
less serious is the threat posed by trade unions in industrial countries which 
agitate against "unfair competition" from EPZs in low-wage developing countries. 
VI. Conclusion 
All said and done, the fact remains th_e EPZs have become increasingly prominent 
in ASEAN, although their share in aggregate manufacturing employment, 
output, and exports remains somewhat small. Their importance also varies 
considerably between countries and no generalization is possible. Thus, the 
Malaysian experience shows that EPZs can be established and operated at a 
relatively low cost, while the example of the Philippines suggests that the 
achievement of limited benefits from EPZs can be quite costly. 
It is clear that EPZs are not "engines" of industrial development. For countries 
in the initial stage of industrialization, EPZs can provide an effective means of 
absorbing surplus labour. But, then, the problem of unemployment is too vast 
for EPZs to constitute a major outlet for the surplus labour in the region. 
Ironically, however, EPZs have played a less important role in the labour surplus 
economies of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand than in the relatively 
high-wage economy of Malaysia. Their heavy presence in Malaysia lends some 
support to the contention that good infrastructure and a stable economic policy 
environment are the most important factors attracting foreign investors, although 
the Malaysian incentives package is also generous. 
The main economic issue is whether public investment in the establishment 
and operation of the EPZs is socially productive. As was seen, the empirical 
evidence is limited and mixed. Interpretations of such evidence must be made 
with caution, especially since the cost-benefit analyses do not capture all of the 
variables. One of these is the presence .of externalities and demonstration effects 
which spill over to the rest of the economy. Another is that EPZs, being no more 
than a partial liberalization of the trade regime, may have the negative effect of 
deferring moves towards a more substantial policy liberalization. Yet another is 
that EPZs can lower the welfare of the country through what is referred to as 
"the locational diversion of resources". 49 In the final analysis, one cannot escape 
the conclusion that the EPZs will outlive their usefulness, if the countries opt for 
a general liberalization policy. 
What lessons can China draw from ASEAN's EPZ experience? It appears that 
the usefulness of EPZs will depend on the size of the host economy and its 
industrial orientation. The bigger the domestic economy and the more inward-
looking its industrial base, the greater the need for EPZs, as they can provide an 
outlet for liberal policies which cannot be extended, for various socio-economic 
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reasons, to the whole economy. In a small, outward-looking economy, EPZs tend 
to become redundant as was indeed the cas~ with Singapore. Of course, what is 
good for a small open economy like Malaysia is not necessarily good for a large 
and relatively closed economy like China. None the less, the experience of the 
former is not totally irrelevant to the latter. ASEAN's EPZ experience has shown 
what liberal policies can do to economic activities within restricted zones. It will 
be impossible for socialist China to liberalize its whole economy, for such policies 
may come into conflict with its cherished goals. Such policy_ conflicts can be 
avoided ifliberal policies are confined to restricted zones as is practised in Chinis 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs). However, it will be in the interest of China not 
to let its SEZs act as enclaves. The more integrated they are to the hinterland 
through backward and forward linkages, the greater the benefit to the country. 
In _this regard, China, by virtue of its size .and diversity of natural resources, 
stands to benefit much more from EPZs than its ASEAN neighbours, especially 
in terms of value added. 
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China's Experience with Special 
Economic Zones 
Wei Yanshen, Wang Yaoyuan, 
and Gu Yuanya .. g 
I. Introduction 
China's policy of opening to the outside world was made in late 1978. However, 
places are open to various degrees. Therefore there have been four echelons of 
opening - Special Economic Zones (SEZs), coastal open cities, coastal open 
economic zones, and inland. 
August 1980 saw "Regulations Governing the BEZs in Guangdong Province" 
authorized at the fifteenth meeting of the Fifth People's Copgress Standing 
Committee. Shortly afterwards came the promulgation establishing four SEZs in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. In April 1984, the Chinese Govern-
ment declared the opening of fourteen coastal harbour cities and Hainan Island, 
after it had gained experience from the four SEZs and the setting up of Economic 
Zones for Technical Development in open cities with good environment. Some 
preferential p'olicies concerning the SEZs were to be adopted to attract foreign· 
investment, which aimed to introduce advanced technology and start joint 
research and production of new technology, products, and industries. January 
1985 saw the Chinese Government's decision to open up the Yangtze and 
Zhujiang River Deltas, and the Southern Fujian Triangle as coastal economic 
zones. Thus, the SEZs, coastal open cities, economic zones, and inland open 
China to the outside world, in a sequence which moves from seashore to inland, 
with different levels and emphases. (Up to the end of 1986, 80 per cent of the 
operating foreign-invested enterprises were located in the coastal open cities.) Data 
on the SEZs are given in the Appendices. 
It should be pointed out that each of the various levels of opened areas has 
its own characteristics. SEZs profit much from their grographical position of easy 
access to the world market. The fourteen coastal cities have advantages mainly 
in their thriving economy and all kinds of talents. They are places abundant in 
resources, particularly foundations for industry. The population in these cities is 
less than 8 per cent of the national total, but the industrial output value accounts 
for 23 per cent of the national total. Compared to the SEZs and fourteen coastal 
cities, the open .coastal economic zones possess better agrici:iltural resources, with 
abundant agricultural products and higher commodity exchange rates. The two 
delta zones are located next to rivers and seas and are thus convenient for 
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transportation and communication with the outside world. In addition, industrial 
foundations and managerial proficiency are comparatively good. Therefore, the 
major tasks for the two delta zones are to combine city and country economies 
according to the priority order of trade-industry-agriculture in planning, with 
emphasis on fresh or living commodities, sideline products, textiles, food, etc., 
for export to earn more foreign exchange. 
The Economic Zones for Technical Development (EZTD) differ from the SEZs 
in the following areas: 
1. An SEZ is a comparatively independent administrative area, whereas an 
EZTD is a piece of land directly governed by the municipality ~here it is 
located with more preferential policies adopted. 
2. An SEZ is an extraordinary area with comprehensive functions, whereas 
an EZTD cares mainly about developing new technology and industrial 
production. 
3. In an SEZ, business income taxes are levied at 15 per cent for aU the 
productive and non-productive enterprises of foreign investments, whereas 
in an EZTD only productive enterprises may enjoy this preferential 
treatment. 
4. In an SEZ, most of the imported consumer goods may be fully or partially 
exempt from customs taxes, whereas in an EZTD, taxes are levied according 
to regulations on both imported consumer goods and other materials. 
The differences in preferential policies enjoyed in the open areas lie in the 
extent to which an area is opened. 
SEZs are the earliest opened windows in China. The Shenzhen SEZ was 
declared open in August 1980. It is contiguous to Hong Kong in the south. With 
a total area of 327 .5 square kifometres, it is the biggest SEZ in China. It ·is a 
young city .opened to the world after a seven-year-long large-scale construction. 
The Luoho and Shahe new urban districts, Shekou, Nantou, Shadoujiao, and 
Shahe together form a newly developed urban region as large as 47.6 square 
kilometres. Up to the end of 1986, the total utilized foreign capital amounted to 
more than US$1.3 billion, and the· domestic investment came to more than 
RMB500 million. Shenzhen has made an all-around progress in industry, 
agriculture, commerce, finance, transport, culture, and education. In 1986, the 
total social output amounted to RMB7.4 billion of which the industrial output 
value was RMB3.5 billion, more than fifty-eight times that of seven years ago. 
The export value in 1986 was US$725 million, more than thirty-two times that 
of 1979. 1 · 
The Zhuhai SEZ, established in August i980, borders Macao to-the south and 
is 137 kilometres away from Guangzhou to the north. The total area is 15.16 
square kilometres. In 1980-85, its capital construction was ten times as much as 
that in the previous twenty years. From 1979 to 1985, more than 1,700 agreements 
with foreign investors were signed. The agreed investment was US$1. 7 5 billion, 
and the utilized foreign investment was US$330 million. From 1980 to 1985, the 
annual growth rates of industrial and agricultural output values were 19 and 42.6 
per _cent for GNP, and 52. 7 per cent for financial revenue. 2 
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The Shantou SEZ was also set up in August 1980. It is situated on the 
Chaoshan Plain of Guangdong, near the South China Sea. With the approval of 
the State Council in 1984, the SEZ further enlarged itself to a total area of 52.6 
square kilometres, including the Longhu Export Processing District and Guangao 
District. Up to the end of i986, an area of 1.02 square kilometres had been 
developed for industry, port, and commerce. The total investment for capital 
construction came up to RMB310 million. Seventy-two investment agreements 
with the agreed investment of HK$785 million had been signed. The total real 
utilized funds amounted to HK$218 million. Among the 96 newly built and 
operated industrial ventures, 70 are mainly export-oriented. In the Canton-
Macao region, an area of 1.5 square kilometres has been developed for agriculture 
and aquaculture. 
The Xiamen SEZ, in South Fujian and facing the Taiwan Strait, is a harbour 
city south of the Shanghai Economic Zone. Established in October 1980 with 
formal approval, the zone was initially 2.5 square kilometres in size. Then in 
March 1984 it was decided that the zone be expanded to include the whole 
Xiamen Island, up to 131 square kilometres in total area. Work has been focused 
on capital construction. A newly-built Dongdu deep-water wharf and an 
international airport have been completed and put into operation. An imported 
program-controlled telephone switching system has been set up. An outward 
transportation system has begun to take shape covering sea, land, and air. At 
present, the Huli industrial estate has completed its first-term project. In 1986, 
the approved contracts of foreign-invested ventures numbered 245; the total 
investment was US$910 million, of which US$490 million were from foreign 
investors. About 150 foreign-invested ventures have started operations. The 
industrial and agricultural output values doubled from 1980 to 1985, and rose 
to RMB2. 7 billion by 1986. 
China's SEZs were established according to China's national environment, 
while taking note of experiences in foreign countries. SEZs are special areas 
demarcated within China's territory, relying on the interior's economic and 
technological support and implementing special favourable policies to introduce 
foreign capital and know-how. SEZs as a display window can play a pivotal role 
in the areas of technology, knowledge, management, and foreign policies. 
China's SEZs have characteristics different from the Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs) of ASEAN countries. China adopted an economic institution regulated 
by market mechanism under the state's guidance. Compared to ASEAN EPZs, 
China's SEZs have some advantages in the investment environment, but there 
is much room for improvement. Nevertheless, in the near future, China's SEZs 
and ASEAN's EPZs are bound to achieve mutual progress and prosperity through 
competition and learning from each other. In recent years, China's SEZs have 
made great progress in construction, but still have a long way to go in meeting 
the various demands of China's economic development. Now China's SEZs are 
in a critical period, turning from a stage of creating foundations to that of building 
an outward-looking economic structure. With their central tasks of increasing 
production, upgrading the economic level, and raising efficiency, China's SEZs 
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are trying their best to increase their attraction to foreign investors and strengthen 
their export competitiveness. 
II. Building Socialist SEZs with Chinese Characteristics 
Setting up SEZs is an important step in Chinis open-door policy and also 
desirable for broadening Chinis economic and technological co-operation and 
exchanges with other nations. These SEZs have their own characteristics, having 
been built under socialist circumstances. 
1. Building a Socialist State-Governed Mixed Ownership and 
Adopting the Market Mechanism under State Guidance. 
Chinis SEZs are conditioned by the country's overall socio-economic system, 
like the EPZs and free trade zones (FTZs) in other countries. First, joint-ventures, 
contractual joint-ventures, and wholly foreign-owned companies (henceforth all 
referred to as foreign-invested ventures) should become the major ownership 
structure in order to use foreign capital to introduce advanced technology and 
management experiences. These ventures have direct participation by the state, 
or their operation is regulated by the· state; thus state capitalism in the ownership 
structure of SEZs plays a leading role. 
The enterprises in SEZs, particularly the foreign-invested ones, have their raw 
materials and equipment mostly imported and their products mainly exported. 
Thus, the SEZs' market is closely linked with the international market, and the 
market mechanism becomes the basis of running the SEZs. For this reason,. the 
production and turn-over of the enterprises in SEZs are conditioned mainly by 
supply and demand in the international instead of the domestic market. Likewise, 
the price of products is mostly determined by the price in the international instead 
of the domestic market; the pressure imposed on the enterprises usually comes 
from competition in the _i_nternational rather than the domestic market; and the 
circulation and financing of capital are in a certain degree conditioned by the 
rules and conditions in the international financial market. In short, market 
mechanism influences the SEZs' economic development which, however, is at the 
same time guided by the socialist nature of the SEZs' economy. 
The SEZs' planning management system has changed since their estab-
lishment. Originally the planning system was a mixture of mandatory and 
guidance planning and market mechanism, stressing the management from both 
the departmental and local levels. Now it is in a transition towards a system with 
guidance planning and market mechanism combined, with emphasis on the local 
initiative. In Shenzhen there is no longer any mandatory planning except that 
of the quota in the scale of capital construction, finance, and foreign exchange. 
Mandatory planning has been· removed in production, exchange, and consump-
tion. Moreover, the focal point of planning work has gradually moved from the 
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practice of annual planning to analyzing the medium- and long-term programmes 
and setting the strategic target for SEZ development. As mandatory planning is 
reduced and removed, the government's way of planning management has also 
gradually been based on commercial value and supply and demand by using the 
economic levers of tax, price, wage, and cost to regulate production, distribution, 
exchange, and consumption. In a word, the regulation and intervention of the 
state in the SEZs is based on the market mechanism. The state tries to make its 
planning guidance or macro-control workable. 
2. CoJ;!.lbin~~g External Linkage and Internal Union 
What is the most suitable model for China's SEZs? This is the focal point in 
Chinese scholars' discussions about the SEZs' development strategy. Three 
viewpoints have been raised. One is to build an "inward-looking" ec;onomy. 
Almost no one has pursued this choice openly, but some do subscribe to it. 
Another viewpoint is to build an economy with "two directions". Those who hold 
this view think that as a trade pivot for internal and external industries and 
commerce, SEZs can both process the domestic materials for adding value to 
export, as well as assemble imported spare parts and components, and allow a 
small part of final products to be sold in the domestic market. The third viewpoint 
is that the SEZs should be "outward-looking". This is the most commonly held 
view at present. The reason is that China's SEZs are the product of an open-door 
policy, and only through this policy and an outward-looking economy can SEZs 
play the pivotal role of being a display window. 
The main features of an outward-looking SEZ are· as follows: 
1. The investment is mostly from abroad. In view of the fact that the 
investment in infrastructure, education, culture, and health depends mainly 
on domestic sources, the proportion of foreign capital in an SEZ should be 
based on the proportion of the investment in SEZ industries. 
2. Products are mostly for export, with the share of exports in total SEZ 
production increasing gradually. 
3. Import and export trade should 'result in foreign exchange balance or with 
some surplus. 
The main role and benefits of the external linkage of SEZs should be seen in 
expediting the SEZs' construction and production; helping transform SEZs into 
outward-looking economies; increasing.the exports of foreign-invested enterprises 
and raising their exchange-earning capacity; introducing advanced equipment;., 
and absorbing scientific management skills and spreading them to the hinterland · 
gradually after absorption, upgrading, and creation. 
China has a large territory and population with a vast market and rich human 
and natural resources. Therefore when SEZs intend to introduce foreign 
equipment, capital, technolo.gy, and managerial know-how, it is possible and 
necessary to carry out the policy of internal union, through actively co-operating 
with interior enterprises in talents, technology, capital, aqd natural resources. 
This internal union is of varying degrees. It includes the bilateral union of SEZs 
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with interior enter_prises; merging with the enterprises of other provinces and 
cities, university institutions, and research institutes, with some central depart-
ment concerned playing the leading role; and taking advantage of the SEZs' 
special geographical position to make them the base in the development of the 
hinterland's economic and technological exchanges with other countries and the 
Hong Kong-Macao region. . 
Experience has .shown that internal union is the basis for outward linkage. 
The SEZs' role of display window is played mainly through internal union and 
outward linkage. One of the important advantages of China's SEZs is the support 
from the immerise hinterland in terms of technology, human power, and natural 
resources. It is internal union that would bring this advantage into full play, and 
help extend the spread effects into the hinterland. So the sound development of 
the internal union enterprises creates strong material forces for the development 
of the SEZs' outward-looking economy. By and large, the SEZs' policy of 
combining inward and outward linkages to promote horizontal economic co-
operation greatly helps the SEZs' economic development, breaking the outdated 
economic system and spreading the SEZs' effects. In other words, the combination 
of internal union and outwctrd linkage has two desirable results: 
1. It promotes horizontal e.conomic union. This eliminates outdated ideas 
found in local and departmental exclusive ownership, breaks the. pure 
vertical management and separation of department and local government, 
and helps the rational structural readjustment of enterprises, products, and 
industries. Consequently it accelerates the development of the markets of 
commodity, capital, technology, and labour, and perfects the socialist 
market system. 
2. Through the comprehensive network of industrial blocs, interior enterprises 
can get information, open marketing channels, and export raw materials 
or products onto the international market. Besides, through this network the 
advanced technology and managerial know-how imported into SEZs can be 
transplanted into hinterland enterprises and may promote technological 
innovation and the upgrading of products, as well as increase economic 
efficiency. All these developments create a network system with inward and 
outward effects which form a favourable precondition for the full play of 
the SEZs' role as a display window. 
3. Building Diversified SEZs 
The strategic focus of the SEZs' economic development is to choose the right 
industrial structure. The common view is that SEZs should emphasize the 
development of industry. First, in order to fully play the. role of display window 
by introducing know-how and manageIIJ.ent experience, the SEZs should rapidly 
develop modern social productive forces which are based on advanced industry. 
Only a well-developed industry and the formation of many co-related industrial 
enterprises can lay a solid foundation for the SEZs' economy. Only when the 
SEZs' industrial products continuously flow into the international market, can 
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stable exchange and financial revenue be assured. Second, on that solid material 
foundation, the SEZs' trade and other tertiary services can be expanded and the 
SEZs' economy can resist any shocks from a fluctuating market. Third, a fully 
developed outward-looking industry is the basis of building an outward-looking 
economy. Trade alone cannot sustain long-term prosperity nor fulfil the goal of 
an outward-looking development strategy. Of course, emphasizing the importance 
of industry does not mean that the development of trade; information, science 
and technology, finance, and tourism are not important. In fact, production and 
exchange interact with each other. The development of the SEZs' outward-looking 
economy depends on the advance in foreign trade, information, transportation, 
education, science, and technology. 
Currently, Chinas SEZs are moving towards an outward-looking economy 
stressing industry and an industry-trade combination. Each SEZ has its own 
specific characteristics as well as common features with other SEZs. The SEZs 
should take account of their respective strengths and weaknesses and develop 
diversified SEZs with specific features. 
Shenzhen has the exceptional geographical advantage of being close to Hong 
Kong, having outward linkage with the international market and inward 
dependence on the Zhujiang River Delta and the mid-south hinterland where 
the commodity economy is well developed. Being Chinas first SEZ, Shenzhen 
has begun to take shape in infrastructure and other construction. It is a 
comprehensive SEZ with an outward-looking industry, and co~bines trade a~d 
agriculture at different technical levels. 
Xiamen has a good harbour and a long history of developing foreign economic 
and trade relations. Now it has formed a comprehensive transport network 
covering sea, land, and air. Because of its special geographical position in relation 
to China's effort to open trade and communication with Taiwan, Xiamen will 
open wider and implement some policies of a free port. 
Located on the southwest outlet of the Zhujiang River within thirty-six nautical 
miles of Hong Kong in the east, Zhuhai is connected to Macao by land. It has 
beautiful scenery and an attractive climate, thus earning the name "pearl of the 
sea'. While it has achieved success in infrastructure and an outward-looking 
industry and agriculture, Zhuhai has also turned its attention to developing 
tourism. 
Shantou started its construction later and on a smaller scale. In the process of 
building its SEZ, the local government.adopted the following guiding principle: 
co-ordinate land deyelopment with the operation of production and benefits-
making. By the end of 1986, half of the investment fund in capital construction 
had been recovered. Shantou also takes advantage of the surrounding rural are·as 
to establish a fruit-vegetable-based food-processing industry. 
III. Main Achievements of SEZs 
Around 1985, scholars, including those from Hong Kong and Macao, had a 
heated discussion about the development of SEZs. Experience has proven that 
China's Special Economic Zones 309 
the policy of building SEZs in China is correct. During the- past seven years the 
Chinese SEZs have made the the following achievements. 
1. Large-Scale Capital Construction 
The goal of establishing an SEZ is not to build a modern city, but to create a 
better investment climate to attract foreign capital for export and foreign --
exchange. So in the initial period more efforts should be put into the construction 
of infrastructure such as roads, water and electricity, and improving fuel supply, 
transportation, buildings, and other housing facilities. By the end of 1985, the 
four SEZs had undertaken more than RMB7 billion of capital con_struction, 
developed a sixty-square-kilometre area, and set up nine industrial estates, 
namely Shenzhen's Shekou, Shanbu, Shahe, Bagualing, and Shuibei; Zhuhai's 
Jida and Nansan; Shantou's Longhu; and Xiamen's Huh. About 900 new factories 
have been established and brought into operation, together with subsidiary 
facilities in commerce, administration, tourism, and services. Now these estates 
have become very attractive economic paradises. 3 
2. Large Foreign Capital Absorption 
The investment environment has improved and the four SEZs have absorbed 
large sums of foreign capital. By the end of 1986, 2,401 contracts had been signed 
with foreign investors. The agreed investment was US$6.46 billion, and the 
realized foreign direct investment amounted to US$2.24 billion. There were_ 1,490 
foreign-invested ventures registered, about one-fourth of the national total. In 
1987 the export earnings amounted to US$1.952 billion. In Shenzen about 5,000 -
contracts were signed by the end of 1986: The agreed investment ~_as US$3.8 
billion, of which US$1.3 billion had been put into actuaLus~,_!_}irect investment-
was US$0.96 billion. Among the 1,200 registered foreign-invested enterprises, 
more than half are in industry. Of these 250 have begun operations. By the first 
half of 1987, 322 foreign-invested enterprises had already been_operating in 
Shenzhen. 4 In 1986 the output value of foreign-invested ventures was more than 
RMB2.3 billion, 40 per cent more than that of 1985. The foreign-invested 
ventures' share of the industrial output has increased to _65 per cent, a:nd their 
share of the total export was 60 per cent. 5 These foreign-invested ventures not 
only strengthened the SEZs' economic power but also contributeci to improving 
management and upgrading technology. 
Perfecting the Investment Climate and Promoting the SEZs' Economic Development 
In the SEZs foreign capital is mainly invested in industry, transport, _and tourism, 
as well as in projects in airports, power stations, and communication. In 1979 to 
1985, among the ventures wi~h foreign direct investment in Shenzhen, 56 per 
cent were in the secondary industrial sector (with 47 per cent in industry); and 
43 per cent in the tertiary sector which plays an important role i~ upgrading 
industry, transport, communication, and tourism. 
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Introducing Advanced Technology and Equipment for Upgrading Industry and 
Technology of the SEZs 
Since 1979, the SEZs have imported advanced equipment, some of which are 
internationally advanced and some have filled domestic gaps. 
6 
By absorbing new 
technology, the SEZs began to develop some new products for the international 
and domestic markets. Of the more than 800 new products currently produced 
in Shenzhen, more than 400 are being exported. The industrial enterprises in 
Xiamen have also made obvious headway in developing new technology. In 1986 
the value of output added by new products amounted to more than half of the 
gross output value of the city's old enterprises. Among the 33 technology-
development projects with signed agreements, 3 have reached the international 
level, 6 belong to domestic new brands, and 19 are of domestic advanced level. 
Introducing Scientific Methods of Production and Management to 
Upgrade Enterprise Administration 
Through joint-ventures, the SEZs began to learn to deal with foreign investors. 
Through vocational training and consultants' guidance and by sending people to 
study in Hong Kong or abroad, the SEZs have accumulated a pool of skilled 
workers and key managers. 
Utilizing Inward and Outward Linkages to Spread Advanced Technology 
into the Hinterland 
Shenzhen Air Standard Piece Factory has transferred some imported technology 
and equipment for the innovation of interior old enterprises, and trained a 
number of_technicians for other standard piece factories in the Shantou, Tianjin, 
Jiangshu, and Zhejiang provinces. By absorbing advanced technology, Zhonghua 
Bicycle Factory can produce more than 100 kinds of bicycles which have been 
exported to the United States and Europe. Now the factory is co-operating with 
more than twenty domestic _factories to produce more competitive bicycles for 
the international market. 
3. Developing an Outwarq-Looking Economy to Expedite the SEZs 
Chinese SEZs have all made some achievements in industry, especially in 
Shenzhen, whose industrial production has been upgraded and begun to shift 
towards an outward-looking orientation, as it moves from the ground-laying to 
the development stage. 7 By the end of 1985, Shenzhen had 900 industrial 
enterprises, 600 more than in 1979, and the employees numbered 70,000, eight 
times that in 1979. Now Shenzhen has_ its own industries, such as electronics, 
light industries, textiles, clothing, food, building materials, machinery, chemicals, 
household electric appliances, and automobiles. The industrial output value came 
to RMB3.5 billion in 1986, more than forty times that of 1980; the share of 
industry in the national income rose to 32 per cent, and the foreign exchange 
earnings from industry accounted for 60 per cent of the total. So industry has 
become the leading sector in the promotion of the SEZs' economic development. 
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During the initial stage of building an· outward-looking industry, Shenzhen 
mainly engaged in labour-intensive processing with customers' materials and with 
imported assembly components. Since 1982, however, Shenzhen has begun to 
deepen its industrial development as seen in the following: 
1. Gradually shifting industry from mainly processing of materials to mainly developing 
its own products. In 1986, the export value of the SEZs' own industrial 
products came to 70 per cent of Shenzhen's total manufactured exports. 
2. Improving the technological structure of industry step by step. The proportion of 
technology-intensive enterprises rose from 3 per cent before 1983 to 5 per 
cent in 1984, and that of the labour-intensive enterprises fell from 56 to 50 
per cent. Among the 106 newly operated ventures in 1984, 11 per cent were 
technology-intensive, 59 per cent were with appropriate technology, and 30 
1 b 
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per cent were a our-mtensive. 
3. Shifting the marketing structure of industrial products gradually from the domestic to 
the external market. The share of exports increased from 37 to 51 per cent 
from 1985 to 1986.9 In 1986 the value of exports of cotton yarn, printing 
and dyeing cloth, linen and cotton cloth, knitting goods and textile 
instruments, radios, recorders, TVs, and electronic clocks produced by 
Guanmin Overseas Chinese Electronic Company reached more than 90 
per cent of total output. The development of an outward-looking industry 
has laid a solid foundation for the SEZs to widen and increase exports, 
which in 1986 increased by more than 20 per cent in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
and Shantou. In these SEZs a number of ventures have more than 60 per 
cent of their products sold abroad. Their export market has extended from 
the Hong Kong-Macao region to more than ten countries, including 
Europe, the Unit es States, and Japan. 
4. Reform of the Economic System 
In order to raise the economic efficiency of capital construction, It IS necessary 
to reform management. In project construction, the old method of planned 
assignment has been abandoned. Now the construction schemes are assessed 
beforehand, the building companies submit a tender, and the management of a 
venture is contracted. This experiment has been extended into the interior with 
some favourable results. 
The reform of the financial system has been in favour of financing the 
construction of SEZs. In order to meet the demands of the SEZ's economic 
development, since 1986 Shenzhen has started to create a new capital manage-
ment system which allows the local management a leading role and stresses 
horizontal union. The advantage of the new system is that it makes the fund flow 
and economi~ structure more rational, in favour of macro control. With the 
change of the senior-junior banks' relationship in fund management, the equality 
principle in arranging credits has been broken. Now the specialized banks can 
freely finance and make use of funds within the quota stipulated by the People's 
Bank of China, thus greatly promoting horizontal integration. 
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To allow enterprises initiative in financing as well as to fulfil their export task, 
Shenzhen's Industrial and Commercial Bank and the Shenzhen branch of the 
Bank of China recently introduced some new loan forms, and a turn-over quota 
or ration loan, under which the enterprises can, within certain limits, utilize funds 
whenever they need to without asking for approval at every step. At the same 
time when professional banks are intensifying reforms, some large ventures can 
begin to set up their own financial organizations. An example is the Shenzhen 
Development Financial Company, which has signed financing agreements with 
foreign banks from Canada, France, Japan, and Hong Kong, and raised RMB 
funds in the form of issuing bonds and stocks in Shenyang and Guangdong. 
The distribution system has been reformed to meet the needs of market 
regulation. The bottleneck in wholesaling ha.s been broken to establish a 
competitive system of commerce. For trade, the exclusive monopoly and separa-
tion between domestic and foreign business have been removed to enliven 
business. As regards price, there is a mixed system of planned, floating, and free 
prices. The price system is also allowed to serve as an economic lever to improve 
distribution and sustain market prosperity. The systems of hiring labour and 
wage have also been reformed. Shenzhen takes the lead in putting aside the 
traditional way of centralized employment and assignment, and transforming the 
fixed-labour system into a contractual-labour system, which encourages the 
workers to absorb knowledge and technology. The cadre and personnel system 
has been changed into an appointment system, with a country-wide public 
advertisement for people with various specialized skills and management talents 
urgently needed by the SEZs. The new system promotes better allocation of 
human resources. 
To reform organization, government administration has been simplified and 
some power has been decentralized to enterprises. From 1980, Shenzhen has 
., conducted two experiments in the administrative system, whereby some organiza-
tions were simplified and the approval ladders were lessened. All these have 
greatly favoured the SEZs' economic development. Based on the experience of 
these years, Shenzhen made a new reform plan in municipal administration in 
the beginning of 1987. In this plan a simplified approval process, audit, 
co-ordination of administration, supervision, consultation, a feedback system, 
management efficiency, and less red tape are all emphasized. By rescinding and 
merging some overlapping bodies, Shenzhen has reduced the number of its 
bureau-level organizations from seventy to thirty-nine. 
5. Consolidation of Ethics and Culture 
While building the material base, China's SEZs also put efforts into the 
construction of an ethical and cultural base. Shenzhen, for instance, has stipulated 
the "Outline of Building the Socialist Ethical and Cultural Civilization" in the 
Shenzhen SEZ and t.he "Guidance of SEZ Cadres". Shenzhen is trying to cultivate 
a new socialist type of people with ideals, morality, culture, and discipline, and 
build a favourable environment ~or the SEZ. On the one hand, according to the 
features and problems emerging in various stages of the SEZs' construction, 
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Shenzhen is trying to carry out its thought education programme with clear aims. 
It pays attention to popularizing knowledge of the law and improving the legal 
system to make the cadres abide by the law and live up to the socialist morality. 
On the other hand, in order to sustain the healthy development of ethics and 
culture, Shenzhen is also stressing the construction of its educational and cultural 
infrastructure, including the building of Shenzhen University, as well as a 
gymnasium, library, science centre, museum, theatre, and TV station. These 
create the basis for the SEZ's promotion of ethics and culture which will play an 
active role in Shenzhen's internal and external linkages in the fields of culture, 
education, art, and sports. 
IV. Problems Facing the SEZs 
China's SEZs have achieved some progress, but still face many problems and a 
rather big gap between expectations and achievements. 
1. Rationalizing and Readjusting the Scale and Structure 
of Capital Construction 
Experience so .far has indicated that a rational investment scale and structure is 
an important basis and guarantee for the economic development of SEZs. One 
reason is that a rational investment scale and structure will ensure maximum 
output with minimum input. Another reason is that the readjustment of 
investment structure and direction tends to be a critical measure in redirecting 
the SEZs' economic strategy. It is the first step in changing the industrial structure 
of the national economy and achieving the optimum allocation of productive 
forces. 
China's SEZs have made significant progress in capital construction since their 
establishment, but there are also some problems. The investment scale is an 
example. In Shenzhen, for instance, the scale of investment in capital construc-
tion, particularly that of internal union ventures and projects financed by the 
municipal government, exceeded the target by 90 per cent in 1984 and by more 
than 40 per cent in 1985. There emerged a so-called investment "starvation", 
where the banks vied with each other in giving loans, and the enterprises strove 
to start new projects. In order to attract foreign capital and create a favourable 
investment climate, it is necessary to make the SEZ's structure of capital 
construction emphasize the tertiary sector at its initial stage. But ·if hotels, 
restaurants, and commercial and office buildings are built in excess, then their 
utilization ratio will be very low. . . . . 
In view uf that, more attention is now paid to control the scale ofinyestment 
and readjust the structure of capital construction. For one thing, the.utilization 
ratio and project efficiency sh~uld be investigated. The projects being bu'ilt sh~uld 
be comprehensively evaluated as to their benefits and costs. Some of therri should 
be reduced in scale and others stopped. Projects of different kinds should be 
co-ordinated, whether they are in or out of plan, major or common, productive 
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or non-productive. The efficient and quick-yielding projects should be en-
couraged, but projects such as high-class hotels, restaurants, and commercial 
buildings should be scaled down to ensure the evolution and development of an 
outward-looking economy. 
Experience has shown that a strict control of the scale of capital investment 
and a rational readjustment of structure have led to the continuous, stable, and 
co-ordinated ·development of SEZs. While the investment in capital construction 
decreased by 40 per cent in Shenzhen in 1986, the industrial output, export, 
financial revenue, and tourism exchange income all increased sharply. Due to 
the contraction of non-productive projects, the proportion of investment in 
industry, transport, and energy has increased by more than 10 per cent. The 
number of newly-operating industrial ventures rose to 153, with a record 85 being 
foreign-invested. These developments indicate that contraction of capital con-
struction does not mean a scaling down of investment or foreign capital 
participation. On the contrary, with new orientation, the leaders at all levels will 
further improve the investment climate by improving the infrastructure in 
transport and municipal utilities, and promoting efficiency. 
2. Improving the Investment Environment 
An investment decision by investors is usually made only after weighing the 
overall advantages and disadvantages of the investment climate. So a favourable 
investment climate is essential for the SEZs to effectively attract foreign capital 
and absorb foreign technology for the strategic goal of an outward-looking 
economy. Ever since its establishment, every SEZ has put a significant amount 
of human and material resources into speeding up infrastructural construction 
with the aim of creating a more favourable environment, including living facilities 
and infrastructure in transport, electricity, communication, water supply, and 
work-places. These comprise the "hard environment". However, the investment 
environment also includes the "soft environment", namely economic law, ad-
ministrative management, production co-ordination, market system, and person-
nel quality. At present the "hard environment" is fairly satisfactory. The 
improvement of the "soft environment" appears more important. The following 
courses of action are urgently needed: 
(1) Preferential policies and charge systems should be further improved. Currently some 
foreign-invested ventures in SEZs are confronted with difficulties and problems 
such as financial loss, lack of circulation funds, and exchange imbalance due to 
shortcomings in policy, along with some management problems. The SEZs have 
begun to make some improvements and readjustments. Particularly after the 
promulgation in October 1986 of the "State Council's Stipulation For Encouraging 
Foreign Investment", the so called "22 Rules", the SEZs have introduced 
additional measures of preferential treatment for export-oriented and technically 
advanced ventures. The promulgation and implementation of these rules led to 
a favourable reaction both at home and abroad. 
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It should be noted that while the reduction or exemption of income tax is very 
important, investors from foreign countries which have not signed the agreement 
with China on avoidi!lg. double taxation usually do not show much concern for 
this incentive. What concerns them most is the reduction of charges on transport, 
water and electricity supply, wages, and real estate in order to make their products 
internationally competitive. Recently some departments have gone too far in 
imposing charges and fees, thus adding more burden to foreign investors and 
damaging the SEZs' image. The "22 Rules" reaffirm that the irrational charges 
should be stopped. On the basis of that rule, SEZs have made their respective 
regulations for implementation, which stipulate that en_terprises have reason to 
refuse payment of the charges not affirmed by the governments of the province 
and city. Departments and their heads who violate this rule ought to be penalized. 
At the same time SEZs have investigated causes of irrational charges, un-
reasonable rises in price, and arbitrary fines. For instance, Shekou has reduced 
more than fifty charges; the average reduction rate is more than 40 per cent. 
(2) Administrative efficiency should be promoted and the standarized management of foreign 
capital enhanced. The institutional system of SEZs is being reformed. But poor 
work-style, too many bottlenecks, red tape, and inefficiency still exist. In order 
to promote efficiency and co-ordinate the services provided to foreign investors 
by various departments, in 1986 the SEZs set up a leadership group for foreign 
investors or a service centre for foreign investment. Some SEZs are trying to 
implement a united office work system. Also, in 1986 the SEZs seLup a 
management group for foreign investment, which is responsible for making macro 
decisions regarding the introduction of the foreign capital with regards to strategy 
and policy measures, and for co-ordinating the approval of projects. The group 
also monitors foreign-invested ventures, providing them with guidance to 
improve their performance and increase their attraction to foreign investors: 
(3) The economic laws and regulations should be perfected. In recent years China's SEZs 
have drafted and published vegulations with approval from the People's Congress 
at the provincial and national levels, which assure the rational performance of 
the SEZs' economy. But these regulations are far from being perfect; and need 
to be further improved and supplemented as regards the preferential policy and 
investment guarantee. Therefore, after the promulgation of the "22 Rules" and 
some other .regulations, the SEZs at once implemented them and made some 
supplements to help ventures balance foreign exchange accounts and simplify 
procedures, and guarantee their independence. 
3. Expediting the Development of Outward-Looking Industries · 
To fully play the role of display window, SEZs ought to regard the adoption of 
advanced te\=hnology as an important task, building step by step an outward-
looking industrial structure supported mainly by advanced technology. But 
because the original industrial base and technology in Chinese SEZs are relatively 
backward, fuel supply is not sufficient. Moreover, with prevailing international · · 
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protectionism, it is very difficult for SEZs to import advanced technology and 
develop technology-intensive industries. Therefore, to develop an outward-look-
ing industry in the near future, China should combine economic rationality with 
technical advance and short-term goals with long-term strategies. China should 
not only consider the advanced level of technology,, but also the country's 
absorptive capacity, the SEZs' economic support capacity, economic efficiency, 
and export potential. In the near future, most of the country's attention should 
be focused on developing traditional industries equipped ;;vith relatively advanced 
technology, and exporting their products as far as possible. Some export-oriented 
labour-intensive industries should also be developed, but not too much. With 
their technical abilities enhanced, the SEZs will develop technology-intensive 
industries in order to finally create an outward-looking industrial structure which 
is focused on advanced technology. 
Several levels of industries should be developed in the SEZs in the near future. 
The first level is the kind of industry which utilizes the results of modern 
technological revolution to develop new products. It includes the application of 
micro electronic technology and computers, optical communication, and new food 
and pharmaceutical industries. Such industries will be only a small part of the 
whole industrial structure, but China must make some technical breakthroughs 
in its products in the short-term for the international market. The second level 
comprises the traditional industries equipped with advanced industrial instru-
ments, including electronics, petroleum chemistry, textiles, new building materials 
industry, and some precision machinery industries. The industries at this level 
form the largest part of the whole industrial output. Their needed technologies 
can easily be imported and absorbed, and their products can easily penetrate the 
international market. At the same time, through technology transfer, they can 
play the role of display window for the domestic enterprises and earn more foreign 
exchange. The third level comprises the labour-intensive traditional industries. 
_J'hese form a small part of the whole structure, but should be encouraged if their 
export potential is good. 
In short, to develop an outward-looking structure, the SEZs should, on the 
basis of international demand, produce light, small, precise, and brand-new 
products. They should stress the development of new products, quality improve-
ment, cost reduction, and delivery of goods on schedule. At present the SEZs' 
industrial products have three destinations, namely export, import-substitution, 
and domestic market. The first two should dominate. In order to make the SEZs' 
industry mor~ outward-looking, some specific measures can be taken, depending 
on circumstances. 
1. There should be continuous development and extension of the export-
oriented ventures whose raw materials supply, export channels, and 
exc.hange balance can be secured. 
2. Support should be given to those ventures which at present have a iow 
export rate and an exchange imbalance, because these can be improved 
through technical innovation, quality improvement, and cost reduction. 
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3. Those ventures with a great imbalance in foreign exchange accounts and 
whose export prospects are poor should be readjusted. 
4. Enhancing the Vitality of Enterprises 
The present economy of the SEZs is market-oriented. However, it needs to 
balance the management of enterprises under the state's macro guidance on the 
one hand, with the advantage of market mechanism on the other hand so as to 
achieve maximum output with minimum input. 
The invigoration of enterprises is the starting point in China's reform and 
readjustment. According to the regulations of the Party Central Committee on 
further reforming and invigorating enterprises, the SEZs will sum up their 
experiences, spread and perfect the manager target responsibility system, and 
integrate the duty, right, and benefit in micro reform. Enterprises can gradually 
implement the system of joint-stock, lease, and contract. SEZs should strengthen 
audit and supervision, separate the ownership and management of a factory, and 
give more independence to managers. 
Currently, with some enterprises facing serious debts and inefficiency, the SEZs 
will strengthen the management and rectification of the existing enterprises so 
as to enhance the managers' quality, set and perfect various rules and regulations, 
and build a large group of major projects and enterprises which are highly 
competitive and have a good capacity for earning foreign exchange. Thus, China 
should classify the existing enterprises and guide them. As regards those efficient 
and well-managed enterprises, their successful experiences will be summed up 
and spread. The enterprises which are heading in the right direction but have 
met with some difficulties should be supported and helped. The badly-managed 
ones should be rectified within a scheduled time, and those unsuccessful 
enterprises with serious problems and no promising future should be readjusted. 
With these measures, there will be improvements in profit, exchange earnings, 
and fund circulation for enterprises in the SEZs, and finally perhaps, reduction 
and even elimination of enterprise losses. 
V. Prospects for the SEZs 
In the past seven years, the SEZs' experience has shown that the contradiction 
between the material and technological bases for an outward-looking economy, 
including infrastructure and relevant major industries, and the role of display 
window that the SEZs are expected to play have been existing during the 
whole process of their economic development. This major contradiction not only 
determines the direction of the industrial structure but also influences.many other_ 
contradictions. With the· SEZs' eco.noniy becoming more outward-looking, some 
contradictions· will be partly or temporarily resolved or alleviated, but some will 
become more ser.ious. New problems will also emerge. 
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The development of SEZs can be divided into three periods. On the basis of 
a comprehensive study of the progress of the SEZs and the changes in the 
economic environment both at home and abroad, China's SEZs are seen to evolve 
through three phases. 
1. First Period 
This covers the first half of the 1980s and involves laying the groundwork for an 
outward-looking economy. 
The main problem in this period is the unsatisfactory investI!lent climate for 
foreign investment in the newly emerging SEZs. Therefore the major tasks in 
this period are for the SEZs to put into effect the special policies provided by the 
central government, to ta]se advantage of their own independence in economic 
affairs, to build the infrastructure and necessary facilities for life and production 
by raising funds from many channels, and to bring market mechanism into full 
play by simplifying administration, decentralizing power to enterprises, and 
further reform of the old economic system. Thus it will be possible to create an 
environment favourable to foreign capital introduction, advanced technology, and 
managerial know-how. It will also be possible to provide some benefits to the 
whole nation through openness and reform. 
2. Second Period 
This starts from the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, when the SEZs' 
outward-looking economy is in its formative and development stage. 
In the initial stage, China's SEZs were generally inward-looking. But they 
have moved forward, otherwise they could not play the role of display window. 
With the construction of material and technical bases for their economic 
development, the SEZs should readjust the old economic structure, in which the 
industrial proportion is small, industrial level is low, and products are not 
competitive in the international market. Only in this way can the SEZs' economy 
become outward-looking. During this second period, the major task is to absorb 
foreign investment with its enormous export potential and advanced technology, 
by further improving the investment climate and implementing the preferential 
policies. SEZs should now exploit and develop some major products which are 
competitive in the international market, enhance the self-supporting capacity of 
these products and raise their level of nationalization, strengthen export 
capabilities, and achieve at least a trade balance, if not some surplus. Simul-
taneously, the SEZs should develop relevant supporting industries and social 
services, heighten the ability of absorbing, innovating, and even proliferating the 
imported technology and management model. In addition, the SEZs should 
further their economic system reform and set up a flexible economic mechanism 
in the international market. By and large, in this period the SEZs should focus 
on increasing exports as their main task and develop an outward-looking 
economy by taking suitable measures and utilizing various initiatives. 
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3. Third Period 
This covers the beginning of the 1990s to the end of this century, when the 
outward-looking degree of the SEZs' economy will be heightened and their 
economy will prosper at all fronts. On the basis of solid industrial foundation, 
the SEZs in this period should focus on technically innovating the traditional 
industries and transforming the labour-intensive industries into technology-in-
tensive ones. They should also develop the high-tech industries into prominence 
in the national economy, and produce an increasing number of high-tech goods 
to meet the needs at home and abroad. In particular, Shenzhen and Xiamen 
ought to become economic centres for exchanging information and technology 
between China and foreign countries. They should make significant contributions 
to the realization of the strategic ideal of "one country, two systems" and the final 
reunification of the whole nation. 
VI. Comparison between China's SEZs and ASEAN EPZs 
As explained earlier, China's SEZs are still at their formative and developing 
stage. They have some advantages and disadvantages relative to the EPZs and 
free trade zones (FTZs) of foreign countries including ASEAN. China can learn 
from these foreign countries, particularly the ASEAN countries. Today China's 
SEZs are doing research to improve the investment environment and guarantee 
the sustained, stable, and healthy development of an outward-looking economy. 
In this section we would like to analyse and compare China's SEZs and ASEAN 
EPZs. 
1,. General Comparison 
According to Tax-Free Trade Zones of the World (Diamond 1985)10 , the ASEAN 
countries have built or are building a total of 19 free ports, FEZs, EPZs, and 
transit zones, and they are planning to build 23 more. 
Looking at the evolution of ASEAN EPZs and FEZs, all of them, except those 
in Singapore and Penang, were established and developed during the 1970s, in 
the wave of EPZs and FTZs emerging in the world. In contrast, China's SEZs 
came a decade later. Today while China's SEZs are still in their infancy, many 
ASEAN EPZs have entered a period of stable development or readjustment to 
a higher level. ' 
ASEAN EPZs are mostly located near ports or industrial and cofnmercial 
centres with highly developed transportation and infrastructure, including 
metropolitan cities like Jakarta, Bangkok, and Singapore. EPZs can fully utilize 
the original facilities and devote their limited funds to building some supporting 
projects, thtJS quickly creating a favourable climate for foreign investment. Except 
for Indonesia's Batam Island and the Philippines' Bataan, the scale of an ASEAN 
EPZ is also generally small; hence, its construction cost, especially in infrastruc-
ture, can be greatly reduced and the construction period shortened, allowing for 
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an earlier operationalization of the EPZ. But for China's SEZs, the original 
infrastructure and the base of existing industries are very backward and weak. 
So from the very beginning SEZs have had to face up to the hard task of creating 
the basic facilities in transport, water and electricity supply, and telecommunica-
tion. Furthermore, creating a favourable environment attractive to foreign 
investment for the larger-sized Chinese SEZs needs not only a large amount of 
funds, equipment, and materials, but also a longer period of construction. A large 
number of managerial personnel have had to be specially trained to qualify for 
SEZ jobs. After six years of hard work at the initial stage, China's SEZs have 
created a basic framework. The infrastructure construction has progressed. 
However, compared with their development objectives and the demands arising 
from the increasingly competitive international market, these SEZs still have a 
long way to go. 
Though ASEAN countries are diversified in their trade and foreign investment 
policies, in general their economic systei-ns are capitalistic and closely integrated 
with the international market. The modernization of economic management in 
some countries has reached a rather high level. Thus, when the EPZs were set 
up their economic and management systems were basically co-ordinated with the 
rest of the country and needed no great adjustments or reforms. But when China 
develops its outward-looking economy in the SEZs, it has to contend with 
complicated reforms and adjustments. In the face of pressure from the competitive 
international market, the SEZs' economic system has to be reformed as quickly 
as possible. But this process is unavoidably conditioned by the whole country's 
reform plan and "open-door policy". Therefore it would take a long time for 
China's SEZs to develop an outward-looking economy which is adapted to a 
changing world market as well as an economic system which suits the domestic 
circumstances. 
2. Investment Climate 
The investment climate is determined by many factors. Whether or not it is 
favourable depends not only on the zones' own conditions but also on the overall 
condition in the host country. This includes political stability, material base, 
legislations, and management efficiency. 
Political Climate 
Political stability is always the crucial factor for a potential investor to consider 
before making a decision. For .nearly twenty years the political situations in both 
China and ASEAN have been relatively stable. Thus the security and profit of 
foreign investment can be assured. With the economic basis becoming constantly 
stronger and with market potentials fully developed, China and ASEAN will 
become more and more. attractive to foreign investors. 
Recently China has become more attractive to foreign investment because 
economic power has been enhanced with further opening and reform. Moreover, 
China pursues a "one country, two system" policy towards Hong Kong and Macao 
and has established, apart from SEZs, open cities and development zones. All 
these further increase the confidence of foreign investors. 
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Material Bases 
A material base includes natural resources and infrastructure. It is also the 
precondition for foreign investment. Some ASEAN EPZs have quite a 
modernized environment with good infrastructure and supporting facilities, while 
some are improvihg and modernizing their environment. In contrast, the Chinese 
SEZ's large size and high expectations have brought some difficulties in perfecting 
the infrastructure. And due to the limited financial resources, the construction of 
the SEZs' infrastructure can only be undertaken step by step. It will thus take a 
long time for Chinese SEZs to improve and modernize their infrastructure, 
particularly in transport, fuel and electricity supply, communication, and other 
services to the extent that will meet the foreign investors' requirements. 
Polici(fs and Legislations 
In the process of establishing the EPZs, ASEAN countries have made explicit 
regulations and have taken relevant measures that cover the administration and 
function of port and zone, management and restrictions for both foreign and 
local ventures, preferential policy and incentives for investment, and the obliga-
tions and rights of a venture. 
Chinese SEZs have been established in succession since 1980 and much 
attention has been given since then to making and implementing laws and 
regulations concerning external economic affairs and especially policies stimulat-
ing foreign investments. At present, more than fifty laws and regulations 
concerning SEZs have been introduced in succession. However, more efforts 
should be made to supplement, revise, and specify some laws and regulations in 
the process of their implementation. The present legal system in China is far 
from perfect and the economic laws and regulations, especially some terms, are 
not definite enough to meet various kinds of requirements in establishing the 
market system in the SEZs'. 
Management Efficiency 
Management efficiency may involve many factors, including the efficiency of 
official organs and information channels, and quality of staff and services. China 
has much to learn from ASEAN countries in this respect, particularly in the 
simplification of procedures, stimulation of efficiency, flexible supervision, 
management approach, vocational training, and professional ethics. 
At present China's SEZs have yet to form a co-ordinated and efficient 
management system. The government is trying to solve this problem by fighting 
bureaucracy and enforcing some policies, upgrading the quality of government 
workers through professional training, and reforming administrative organs and 
personnel systems. 
3. Preferential Policies and Incentive Measures 
With due regard to national interests, China. and ASEAN countries have all 
implemented some preferential policies to encourage foreign investment. 
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Land Leases and Charges 
In China's SEZs, the tenure of land leases depends on the specific usage. The 
tenure in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou is 20 to 50 years, and in Xiamen it 
can be 60 years. For ASEAN countries, the tenure in Malaysia is 60 to 99 years, 
in the Philippines 15 years, in Singapore 30 to 99 years, and in Thailand 3 to 
33 years. 
China and ASEAN countries have very different charges for utilizing land, 
warehouses, plants, and buildings. Since 1984 China's SEZs have further reduced 
the charges for utilizing land. In addition, special favourable treatment is given 
to investment in industrial, agriculture, stock raising, transport, and fuel supply, 
and even more specially to the export-oriented and technology-intensive ventures. 
For ASEAN countries, the utility costs are relatively low in the Philippines and 
Thailand. So China is competitive in these charges as compared with ASEAN 
countries. 
Labour Cost 
Labour cost generally includes wages, social insurance, and welfare. In China's 
SEZs, some rules stipulate that 70 per cent of the labour cost is wage directly 
given to workers, 20 to 25 per cent is social insurance, and 5 to 10 per cent is 
~elfare subsidies. 
Among the ASEAN countries, labour cost is lowest in Thailand, whose level 
is near that of China. In Thailand the minimum daily wage is US$1.5 to US$1.75, 
and the social insurance is 8 to 25 per cent of the labour cost. All the other 
ASEAN countries have a higher labour cost than China and Thailand. The wage 
levels of Singapore are the highest, from US$4.8 to US$32 a day. 11 
So judging from the labour cost, China's SEZs have a competitive edge. 
Besides, foreign-invested, export-oriented ventures and technology-intensive ven-
tures in China do not have to give subsidies, thus further reducing the labour 
cost. Another factor with equal importance is that in order to fully take advantage 
of the SEZs' low labour cost, efforts should be made to improve the quality and 
technical level of workers and management efficiency, and to provide vocational 
training. 
Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives are important preferential measures in China and ASEAN. Low 
tax rates and a tax holiday period will encourage and direct capital to the favoured 
industries and infrastructure building. Generally the preferences cover duties on 
the import and export of goods and services, income tax of individuals and 
enterprises, profit remitting tax, consolidated industrial and commercial tax, local 
tax, surtax, accelerated depreciation, subsidies, and drawback. 
ASEAN and China have preferential duties on imports and exports into and 
from the EPZs and SEZs. Included are imported machinery, raw materials, spare 
parts, etc. for producing exported goods, investors' daily necessities, exports of 
processed and assembled products, and re-exports of the processed imports. But 
there are variations in preferences and quotas. 
China's Special Economic Zones 323 
The preferential treatment in enterprise income tax and the time limit of 
inducement also vary with countries. In accordance with the 1984 "Provisional 
Regulations Promulgated by the State Council of the People's Republic of China 
on Reduction and Exemption of Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated 
Industrial and Commercial Tax for Fourteen Coastal Port Cities, as well as the 
Four Special Economic Zones and Hainan Island", the income tax rate is 15 per 
cent in China's SEZs. 
For enterprises engaged in industry, communications and transport, agricul-
ture, forestry and livestock breeding, which have a contract life of ten years 
or longer, a two-year tax holiday commencing from the first profit-making 
year, is allowed, followed by a 50% reduction in the three following years 
(third to the fifth year), upon application and approval by the special zone 
tax authorities. 
The "22 Ruies" promulgated in October 1986 provide more favourable 
treatment to the export-oriented and technology-intensive 'ventures. 
Following the tax reduction and exemption period, the income tax rate is 
reduced to 10% to those ventures whose export value is more than 70% of 
their output. 
... the ventures with advanced technology can have another three more years 
of 50% reduction of income tax rate, but if the reduced tax rate is less than 
10%, then 10% is levied on. 
According to the Law of Foreign Investment and relevant corporate tax 
regulations in Indonesia, the corporate tax rate is progressively increased with 
income level. Although the tax rate is different from profession to profession, and 
from income level to income level, generally it is from 15 to 35 per cent and the 
tax exemption period is from 2 to 6 years. 
In Malaysia, both the local and foreign investors are entitled to preferential 
tax treatment. The corporate tax rate is 40 per cent, and t.he tax holiday is from 
2 to 5 years. Some ventures can enjoy up to 8 to 10 years of tax holiday. 
In the Philippines, a progressive corporate tax rate of 25 to 35 per cent is 
levied on ventures with different income levels. A tax exemption period of 5 years 
is given to some ventures, and from the sixth to the eighth year the tax rate is 
reduced by 75 per cent; from the ninth to the tenth year by 50 per cent; from 
the eleventh to the twelfth year by 20 per cent; and from the thirteenth to the 
fifteenth year by 10 per cent. 
In Singapore the tax exemption period can be extended from 5 to 10 years if 
the ventures have a large amount of investment or advanced technology. The 
basic corporate tax rate was reduced from 40 to 33 per cent in 1986. 
In Thailand the corporate tax rate of foreign-invested ventures is from 35 to 
45 per cent. According to the Foreign Investment Promotion Act of 1972, the tax 
exemption period is from 3 to 8 years; in the following 5. years the tax rate is 
reduced by 50 per cent. 
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In sum, the tax rate in China's SEZs is attractively lower than that in ASEAN's 
EPZs. But with tax exemption and reduction, ASEAN EPZs _provide a more 
favourable tax treatment to investors. 
Foreign Exchange Control and Financing 
All the ASEAN countries allow profits to be freely repatriated. Though they have 
a system of foreign exchange control, approval is readily given for capital to be 
transferred. Singapore gave up foreign exchange control in June 1978, and now 
allows free capital movements. 
In China, foreign-invested ventures are allowed to exchange foreign currencies 
among themselves under the supervision of foreign exchange control authorities. 
Banks provide the foreign-invested ventures with spot exchange, reserve, fixed 
asset, and liquidity loans. These loans, both in RMB and foreign currencies, are 
mainly given to well-managed export-oriented and technology-intensive ventures. 
The investors of these ventures are permitted to remit their profits without being 
taxed. But China is in no position to pursue a foreign exchange system of free 
utilization and free conversion as practised in Singapore, so some control and 
supervision are necessary. 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that both China and ASEAN have made 
great efforts and implemented effective measures to attract foreign capital and 
improve the investment climate. Generally speaking, China's SEZs are latecomers 
relative to ASEAN EPZs. But with farther opening and reform, the 
investment climate of China's SEZs will improve and become more competitive. 
It is well known that the establishment of SEZs is a strategic measure in China's 
economic opening and reform, aimed at speeding up the modernization process 
and facilitating economic prosperity. It is not directed against any country's EPZ 
or FTZ. The emergence of China's SEZs provides the foreign investors another 
favourable space, thus creating some competition with ASEAN EPZs in trade 
and investment promotion. This should not be seen in an adverse light as it is a 
very common phenomenon in the international economy. The real effect of 
China's economic opening is that the development of Chinese SEZs provides the 
world, and the Asia-Pacific region in particular, with more opportunities to extend 
economic ties with China. We believe that, given common interests and 
complementarity, China and ASEAN can develop their bilateral and multilateral 
relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The two sides have enormous 
potentials. It is extremely necessary and of mutual benefit to strengthen 
co-ordination and co-operation among the Asia-Pacific countries. Holding 
discussions about policies and measures regarding foreign investment is a good 
way. ASEAN countries and China should play a more important role and exert 
a larger influence in promoting economic development and co-operation in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
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linkage and internal union; market adjustment; 
preferential policies; display windows; pivotal function-
ing for inland development. 
More autonomy in foreign trade, business, and 
production; less limits on programmes of foreign in-
vestment; more efficiency in external economic af-
fairs; preferential policies introducing advanced 
technology, and developing new technology and 
products. 
Adjust industrial structure to the order of trade, in-
dustry, agriculture; speed up introducing and renovat-
ing; speed up coastal development to bring forth 
inland development. . '-"' 
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SEZs: Location, Year of Establishment, Size, and Development Mode 
Year of Area 







Industry as the lead, followed by trade; an outward-
looking comprehensive SEZ. 
Industry as the lead, with the development of 
commerce and tourism; an outward-looking 
comprehensive SEZ. 
A comprehensive overseas-Chinese hometown SEZ 
with industry and agriculture as the lead and with 
a co-ordinating development of the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary industries. 
An outward-looking comprehensive SEZ gradually 
implementing some free port policies, with the 
development of industry and then of tourism, 
commerce, and banking. 
An outward-looking comprehensive SEZ with 
industry as the lead in a co-ordinating development 
of the primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. 
SOURCES: The Hong Kong Press, Yearbook of China's SEZs, 1984 (1985); World Economy Herald (Shanghai), 14 September 1987; and 







APPENDIX TABLE A12.3 
SEZs: Basic Data on Progress 
Developed Estate 
three industrial estates and 
other commercial and tourist 
centres and towns 
three industrial estates 
one industrial estate, an 
aquiculture and agriculture 
area, port, _and commercial 
centre 
one industrial estate and an in-







16,000 (sq. m) 
60 
(1980-85) 
Total Investment in Infrastructure 





















APPENDIX TABLE A12.4 
SEZs: Investment by Sectors 
Industries 
Manufacturing: electronics, computer 
repairing, industrial instruments, tex-
tiles, clothing, medicine, printing, fur-
niture, and toys. 
Preferred technology-advanced items. 
Services: commerce, tourism, and 
finance 
Manufacturing: electronics, light in-
dustry, textiles, building materials, 
food, furniture, packing materials, 
and machinery. 
Preferred technology-intensive industries. 
Services: commerce, tourism. 
Agriculture: livestock raising and 
processing. 
Output Value 





Employment in Output Value of 
1986 Industry 
(10 thousands) in 1986 
(RMB 100 million) 
25.88 36.7 
10.61 7.2 
Shantou Manufacturing: textiles, toys, decorat- 2.9 87.69 48.9 g 
ing materials, and handicrafts. ;:;· 
"' Agriculture: export-oriented agriculture (including city <-," 
~ and aquiculture. proper) R 
Services: commerce, transport, tourism, ~ 
finance, and real estate. ~ 
" Manufacturing: electronics, semiconduc- c Xiamen 2.1 25.12 24.7 ;; c 
tors \ind computers, printing, paper ;:i ;:;· 
products, food, textiles, toys, building ~ 
materials, plastic products, chemical 
;; 
~ 
goods, furniture, and decorating 
materials. 
Services: tourism, finance. 
Total 18.9 149.3 117 .6 
SOURCES: China's Economic Yearbook, 1986, vii, pp. 89, 136-40; and China's Statistics Yearbook, 1986, pp. 75-76. 
Investment Agreements 
(number), 1986 
Total Agreed Investment 
(US$100 million), 1986 
Actual Investment 
(US$100 million) 
Foreign-Invested Ventures · 










APPENDIX TABLE A12.5 
































SOURCES:. China Prospect Publishing House, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1986 (Beijing: 1986); China's Statistics Yearbook, 
1987, pp. 75-76, 603-4; People's Daily, various issues; World Economic Herald (Shanghai), 8 June and 24 August 1987; Shenzhen SEZ Daily, various 




2 Rental (RMB/metre /year) 
Industry and stocking 
Commerce and tourism 
Building, lodging houses 
Outside stocking 
Agriculture and stock raising 
Provisional use 






APPENDIX TABLE A12.6 
SEZs: Cost Structure 
Shenzhen 
20-50 
Readjusted every three 
years; the scope of 
reduction or increase is 
































Readjusted every five years; the 
scope of reduction or increase is 






Standard labour cost 
. (RMB/person/month) 
Average ~onthly 























The lowest is 80-120; for 
manager personnel, 120-180. 
SOURCES: Yearbook of China's SEZ, 1984; "Rental Adjustment and Rules of Rental Preference and Reduction in Shenzhen SEZ", ibid., pp. 
97-98; "Provisi-0nal Regulations on Labour Wages for SEZs' Enterprises in Guangdong Province", in Laws and Regulations Regarding China's Foreign 
Economic Affairs, Book 1 (China: The Foreign Press, 1982); "Regulations on Labour Administration for Xiamen SEZ", and "Rental Regulations 
for Xiamen SEZ", fr. in Reference 6. 
Item 
Custom duty 
CommerciaJ and Industrial 
Consolidated Tax (CICT) 
APPENDIX TABLE A12.7 
SEZs: Preferential Policies and Incentives 
Legal Incentives 
Capital goods and raw materials are exempt from import tax. Consumer 
goods, except tobacco and wine, are exempt from import duty. 
Free export duty 
Free CICT for imported production means. 
Free CICT for exported products, except a few controlled ones. 
CICT rate 3% 




1. For the ventures engaged in industry, transport, agriculture, forestry, 
and· livestock raising, with an operation period of more than 10 years, 
no tax is levied during a two-year period after the first profit-making 
year, and tax is reduced from the third to the fifth years. 
2. For the ventures engaged in the services sector with investment of 
more than US$5 million and an operation period of more than 10 years, 
no tax is levied for the first year after making profit, and the tax is 
reduced from the second to the third years. 
3. For the ventures established in the less developed remote regions and 
with business concerning agriculture and forestry, another 10 years of 
tax reduction follow. 
Preferential Rate 
(Reduction or Exemption) 
(In percentage) 











treatment concerning tax 
and cost 
Special incentives and 
policies towards 
investment 
APPENDIX TABLE A12.7 (Continued) 
Legal Incentives 
1. No tax for remittance of profit. 
2. No charge for utilizing patented technology. 
3. No tax for loan interest. 
4. No local surtax and locai income tax (at the discretion of local 
authorities). No local income tax in Xiamen. 
5. If the profits are reinvested for another three to five years, the paid 
income tax of the reinvested profits could be returned. 
(The period in Xiamen is stipulated to be longer than three 
years, and in three other SEZs, longer than five years.) 
1. Special preferences towards foreign investment 
a. For the export-oriented ventures with foreign exchange surplus; 
b. For advanced-technology ventures, which provide advanced 
technology, develop new products, and upgrade the products to 
increase export or substitute the imported goods. According to the 
"22 Rules'', the above-mentioned ventures of two kinds can enjoy 
special preferential treatment in taxes and loans. 
Preferential Rate 






2. Special preferences are offered to Taiwan compatriots' investments 
according to the State Council's No. 57 Document issued on 5 April 
1983. 
a. Corporation income tax is exempt from the first to the fourth years, 
and is reduced from the fifth to the ninth years. 
b. Thirty per cent of products can be sold on the domestic market. 
c. There is no land charge from its establishment to the first five years 
after being operated. 
I. Foreign investors' legitimate rights are safeguarded by China, which 
puts a high value in fulfilling contracts and keeping credit. The 
divergences concerning contracts will be solved according to the 
principle of equality, mutual benefit, and friendly consultation. 
2. Ventures have management independence and can freely choose 
investment form. 
3. The income can be remitted freely after being taxed. 
4. A venture's capital can be withdrawn and remitted freely. 
5. For business efficiency, the procedure of coming or leaving China is 
being simplified, and approval ladders are being reduced. 
100 
50 
SOURCES: Yearbook of China's SEZs, 1984, Ref. 5; "The Rules of Encouraging Foreign Investment by the State Council", Ref. 10, p. JOO; "The 
Provisional Regulations Promulgated by the State Council of the PRC on Reduction and Exemption of Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated 
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NOTES 
1. The total industrial output value of the Shenzhen SEZ in 1987 amounts to RMB5. 76 
billion. Exports of industrial products amounted .to RMB3.57 billion, about over half 
of the total (People's Daily, 18 January 1988). 
2. The total industrial output value of Zhuhai SEZ in 1987 amounts to RMBl.2 billion, 
three times more than that in 1986. The total export value amounts to US$2.74 
hundred million, three times more than that in 1986. And for the first time, the zone 
saw a favourable foreign exchange balance, ibid. 
3. Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 28 February 1986, p. 1. 
4. Shenzen SEZ Daily, 16 July 1987. 
5. Shenzen SEZ Daily, 7 January 1987. 
6. Some imported instruments such as the mechanical paint gun by Huaqiang-Sanyan 
Electronics Limited Company (Shenzhen) and the Sony colour TV production line 
by Huali Electronics Limited Company are of the 1980s international level. 
7. The total industrial output value of the four SEZs in 1987 amounts to RMBl0.372 
billion. 
8. Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 19 May 1986, p. 4. 
9. Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 13 February 1987, p. 1. 
10. W. H. Diamond and Dorothy Diamond, Tax-Free Trade Zones of the World (1985). 
11. Ibid. 
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